UPDATED Iran Debate: How Weak (or Strong) is Ahmadinejad?

The Latest from Iran (30 August): Parliament Discusses the Cabinet

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UPDATED 31 August, 0725 GMT: Enduring America's Chris Emery, formerly known as "Mr Jones", has now made his contribution to what is becoming, I think, one of the most important discussions in the post-election crisis --- see below. Mr Smith has offered a reply.

UPDATED 1145 GMT: Mr Smith has made another intervention in the debate.
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Over the weekend, after Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's tough talking at Friday prayers in Tehran and as he was submitting his Cabinet choices to Parliament, we have been debating the President's position and future prospects. EA's Mr Smith and Mr Johnson are joined by Muhammad Sahimi of Tehran Bureau, whose column sparked the discussion, and Fintan Dunne.

SAHIMI: ....Such fabrications [like those in his Friday speech] are of course meant to present Ahmadinejad as a confident leader. But, in reality, he is weaker and more isolated than ever. True, the right wing is in control, but that control has been achieved first and foremost by the support of the high command of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). Otherwise, the base of support for Ahmadinejad among the population is extremely narrow, limited to at most 15% of the population.

At the same time,...glaring fissures which have emerged within the conservative and reactionary camp, which poses a growing threat to Iran’s political stability. Even Ayatollah Khamenei and the hardliners around him are well aware of the danger, which explains why they have been gradually retreating over the past few weeks.

First, they acknowledged some of the crimes that have taken place in the detention centers.

Second, they have retreated from linking the reformist leaders with foreign powers, notwithstanding Ahmadinejad’s tired accusations during Friday Prayers.

Third, Ayatollah Khamenei appointed Ayatollah Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi, the former judiciary chief, as a member to the powerful Guardian Council, in preparation for the departure of Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, the ultra-conservative secretary-general of the Council, and an ardent supporter of Ahmadinejad. At least compared to Jannati, Shahroudi is a relative moderate.

Fourth, Ahmadinejad’s appointment of Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai as the First Vice President was blocked. Mashai was even barred for two months from holding any governmental position, another tactic to put Ahmadinejad under control.

Fifth, many of the reformists and their supporters, if not their main leaders, have been released from detention.

Sixth, behind-the-scene efforts continue to reach some sort of reconciliation between the reformists and the conservative camp. So far these have failed because the main demand of the reformists, holding a new election, has been rejected.

Seventh, Saeed Mortazavi, the notorious Tehran Prosecutor General and the man implicated in many crimes was sacked.

At the same time, Iran’s uranium enrichment program has stagnated, either by design, or due to technical difficulties, or because of a lack of raw materials (yellow cake) needed for uranium enrichment. Iran has also become more flexible with the International Atomic Energy Agency, allowing more visits to its nuclear sites.....

All are signs of a very weak Ahmadinejad presidency ahead, not to mention his complete lack of legitimacy in the eyes of a large majority of Iranian people, even among those who may have supported him before the election.

Even more damaging for Ahmadnejad is that his chief clerical patron, Ayatollah Khamenei, has himself been greatly weakened. The Ayatollah has been openly challenged and strongly criticized by many important clerics. Grand Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri, the most important Shiite cleric in Iran, openly called him unqualified and his reign illegitimate. Ayatollah Khamenei has allowed himself to be reduced to the leader of one faction in the conservative camp by openly and unabashedly supporting Ahmadinejad. He can no longer pretend that he is above the political fray.

SMITH: [The Tehran Bureau article] lacks sources on just about all the allegations it makes and then essentially parrots the reformist line: Ahmadinejad is weak, is in trouble, is a lame duck already, etc.

While of course all of us wish that this was the case, the reality appears quite different, as we have seen no real thrust to wrestle him out of office. The Supreme Leader has only rebuked him frontally during the [former First Vice President] Mashai affair and he still has the rather remarkable opportunity of talking from official platforms such as Friday Prayers, saying things quite different from what the Supreme Leader says, and still walking out relatively unscathed.

Granted, he has the same amount, or more, difficulties than any executive leader in the world would have for forming a government, but I would be very cautious in calling Ahmadinejad a has-been and that days may be counted down to his demise. Sadly, I doubt this scenario will happen anytime soon.

We shouldn’t forget that the Supreme Leader, conservative critics of AN like the Larijanis, Ahmad Tavakoli (who happens to be the Larijanis’ cousin), and more have essentially agreed to accept the outcome of the Presidential election as announced by the Interior ministry. Hence, they are simply jostling for political kudoes and power within the Government, more than mounting a challenge that is really geared towards removing Ahmadinejad from power.

DUNNE: Muhammad Sahimi was too dismissive in describing of Ahmadinejad as "isolated and delusional", and he erred in reducing the regime to the person of the president.

But he was correct to describe Ahmadinejad as "weak". Professor Sahimi accurately catalogs the ongoing obstruction of the hardliners and the very public political fractures. Furthermore he shows the regime is now tellingly reliant on a narrow base of IRGC appointees to fill government posts.

Ahmadinejad/IRGC's core 'hard' support is as low as 12%, with a 'softer' support extending to up to 20% of the population. Because of this, the disputed president's public pronouncements are reductionist and defensive --aimed at his own supporters and the ill-informed. By contrast, most other voices in Iranian politics are addressing the remaining 80%+ of the population.

Despite their hard-line rhetoric, Ahmadinejad/IRGC are unable to crush the reformers. It is going to be far harder to violently suppress any mass public protests in the weeks ahead. And there is a dire political problem looming for this one-legged regime: it's the economy, stupid!

Even a government of national unity would be hard-pressed to dig the Iranian economy out of the mire against the backdrop of deteriorating global finances. A lame duck Ahmadinejad government comprising an ineffectual clique will certainly fail to turn things around. One shudders to contemplate the unspoken financial state of Iran. Currency problems and capital flight are doubtless significant.

As the weeks pass, the economy will join the stolen election as the twin key political issues for the populace. Imagine an opposition rally protesting the economic straits of the people as well as the stolen election. Imagine the regime trying to suppress such a rally.

That the reformers are not already in prison is a victory in itself. Now, a death by a thousand cuts threatens the Iranian regime. That reality explains the government's determined effort to halt such a slow slide by means of show trials --which have backfired.

The reformists could compromise by accepting the current status quo, on condition of substantive electoral reform overseen by a parliamentary process. But from their perspective it might be best to simply allow this regime to stew in their own economic juice until well roasted.

JOHNSON: I find Mr. Smith's assertion that Professor Sahimi's article "lacks sources on just about all the allegations it makes and then essentially parrots the reformist line" to be both inaccurate (many of Sahimi's statements have been have also been reported here in Enduring America as well as other news-sites), and rather unfair.

Mr. Smith states that there is no thrust to wrestle Ahmadinejad out of office. This statement only makes sense if Mr. Smith considers the reformist movement to be irrelevant. I think that there has been a major effort to wrestle Ahmadinejad out of office; and that effort is still going on. The fact that Ahmadinejad has not been able to imprison and/or neutralize the ringleaders of this effort (Khatami, Mousavi and Karroubi), even though he has explicitly demanded it in public, demonstrates the limitations that exist to his power.

Ahmadinejad's pre-Friday prayers speach seems to have a lot of significance for Mr. Smith. I think that it is rather strange that a strong and powerful and confident president of the Islamic Republic of Iran must choose the mid- to low-profile pre-Friday prayers speech, since many of the faithful participating in Friday prayers either eschew or arrive near the end of the speech, to address the country instead of using IRIB [state television]. Did IRIB not give Ahmadinejad broadcasting time? If so, what kind of a strong President is denied this?

Mr. Smith considers the fact that Ahmadnejad is "saying things quite different from what the Supreme Leader says, and still walking out relatively unscathed" as evidence for Ahmadinejad's power. I think this is more a statement of Khamenei's weakness than Ahmadinejad's strength. I think the replacement of [Tehran chief prosecutor] Mortazavi is the real litmus test. If Mortazavi's successor puts an end to the trials and somehow addresses the issues of torture and the secret burials, a tangible limitation of the President's power has been put in place. This would be the first step taken to abort Ahmadinejad's "velvet coup".

Mr. Smith also takes Ahmadinejad's parliamentary troubles lightly. I agree that conservative parliamentarians are "simply jostling for political kudoes and power within the Government". However I think that the rumblings and confrontations demonstrated by a sizable fraction of conservative MPs with regards to the President demonstrate that these MPs are convinced that: firstly, Ahmadinejad has no intention of giving them any kudoes and power; secondly, Ahmadinejad's plan may have also intended to weaken their power as well as that of the reformists; and thirdly, they may think that all the recent scandals (torture, unmarked graves, etc.) has turned Ahmadinejad into a political hot potato that must be dropped as soon as possibly.

The outcome of the presidential election was accepted by the conservatives in June. Not all of them are necessarily bound to continue to accept that now, especially if rejecting Ahmadinejad is equivalent to their political survival. The upcoming vow of confidence will be a demonstration of how the conservatives feel towards Ahmadinejad's policies.

SMITH: My assertions regarding Ahmadinejad were not so much related to his political "power", rather to his chances of political survival.

I don't deny that he is weak, has severe issues in forming his government, and is prey to all sorts of critics, both conservative and reformist. My considerations are focused, however, on whether Ahmadinejad will survive the storm in the short term and be able to stay in his place. I still believe he will, because the conservatives have too much to lose in terms of legitimacy after substantially endorsing the election results in June. No one, including the Larijanis, has contested the latter yet, and this is quite important in my view.

This is not to deny that friction between Ahmadinejad and Khamenei exists, but again not at boiling point level. Lastly, Ahmadinejad's appearing at Friday prayers was completely to be expected, as it is Government Week in Iran right now, and nearly all Presidents have appeared on the podium on this occasion.

EMERY: I wouldn't necessarily connect all the concessions detailed by Sahimi and Mr Johnson to Ahmadinejad's apparent isolation or weakness. Certainly the "stagnating" nuclear issue is not really evidence of a "very weak Ahmadinejad presidency ahea". I'm also not convinced that Ahmadinejad's inability to have Mousavi, Karroubi, Khatami, and Rafsanjani locked up is, as Mr. Johnson suggests, a useful demonstration of the limitations that exist to his power. The absence of such dictatorial powers are inherent in the office of the presidency.

My position is somewhere in between those expressed by Mr Smith and Mr Johnson. I agree with Mr Smith that Ahmadinejad will probably survive attempts to remove him. However, my prediction is for a totally chaotic second term in which Ahmadinejad is unable to achieve anything substantial as the Parliament and judiciary acts increasingly independently from the government (perhaps already seen in the "moving" of Mortazavi and appointment of Ejeie to posts in the judiciary). Increasingly, the question of the Supreme Leader's succession will come to dominate back stage political manoeuvrings.

As such, the real question is not so much whether Ahmadinejad has lost his public legitimacy or whether the Larijanis have or have not questioned the election result. The immediate apparent legacy of the crisis is that the coordination required for an effective legislative program will be almost impossible to achieve. The still-unknown legacy is the extent of the compromises, principally in terms of Iran's justice system, that Khamenei offers to avoid further mass protests. I don't see Ahmadinejad as particularly significant in how that pans out, although the result of the current trials does seem a reasonable litmus test.

The wider point is that Ahmadinejad doesn't actually appear to have much in the way of policies at the moment. Nor does he appear to grasp the enormity of the task in front of him. Ahmadinejad's second term may hang on this failure as much as anything else. Of course, he will now find it much harder to pass the legislation and reforms he thinks will do something about it and his failures will undoubtedly be capitalised on by his opponents. But a lot does depend on the merit of his policies.

Frustration will be hard for Ahmadinejad to take because the economy is where he has exercised more control than any other President. He also believes he has a strong mandate for his economic "vision", for which the SL has publicly stated his broad agreement (again, more than for any previous President). The real test will thus be when Ahmadinejad tries to pass something fiscal.

If Ahmadinejad does appear increasingly irrelevant or lame, then another important question is how he will react. When he appeared almost invisible in the first few weeks of the crisis, he tried to claw back his bureaucratic authority by some high profile sackings and appointments. I think everyone (including the Supreme Leader) was surprised at how brazen he was in trying to re-assert his visibility. It seems he is now emboldened enough to publicly differ with the Supreme Leader on the trials as well.

I don't see the Supreme Leader as likely to publicly remove his patronage from Ahmadinejad, but it could be possible that he will move closer towards an informal triumvirate with the Larijanis. But Ahmadinejad still has some leverage. Any US-Iranian engagement will require his cooperation, in that he will have the ability to de-rail it or at least cause severe problems. The SL will also recognise that there may be a political price to pay, in terms of the overall authority of the regime, for damaging the office of the Presidency. Ahmadinejad's ouster could even bring the IRGC [Revolutionary Guard] onto the streets.

SMITH: I largely concur with Chris Emery on the unstable nature of AN's second term, although I would, once again, exercise caution as to the real extent of Parliamentary opposition to Ahmadinejad. This will become much clearer in the next few days, as the various ministers receive their votes of confidence.

I too can see many avenues of deadlock for Ahmadinejad in his second term, particularly if the reformists attempt to embark on a long-term route that will target the 2012 Parliamentary elections, as they will have to attack the current composition of the Guardian Council and hence try to chip away at the current conservative quasi-monopoly over state power.

I would also be wary to think that Ahmadinejad does not " grasp the enormity of the task in front of him". I haven't seen statements to this effect by him. His second speech in Parliament yesterday, which I followed via live TV, was actually quite well-constructed. He defended, inter alia, his cabinet changes by saying that reshuffles are necessary, or else cabinets could last 50 years and elections would be made worthless. And his points on women and the experience of other members of his cabinet are also quite interesting. My own experience in dealing with him over the years (I have also had the dubious privilege of shaking his hand and asking him a couple of questions during press conferences) leads me to believe that he is more wily and clever than his external appearance makes him out to be.

As to the judiciary, I think we really have to wait till the end of Sadegh Larijani's appointments to see what the state of play is. Mortazavi was shooed out and in the door again in the last few days and the rest of the appointees such as Ejeie are hardliners in their own right, opposed to Ahmadinejad but not really wishing to make concessions to the reformists.

I still remain convinced that the Supreme Leader will pull a stunt by the end of Ramadan and pardon the reformist bigwigs, after the latter have received long prison sentences. Should he be clever, he would arrange for all of them to be carted off to his palace and be offered the pardon there in front of TV cameras. It would discredit them and allow Khamenei to show off his magnanimity, for free.

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1700 GMT: More, Much More on that Assembly of Experts Meeting. The Executive Committee's agenda appears to have been a delay in the next meeting of the Assembly, which was due to take place within the next 10-12 days, for a month because of Ramadan.
This rules out any quick intervention by the Assembly in the political crisis.

But the big question: who asked for the delay? Was it the head of the Committee, Hashemi Rafsanjani, to give himself time for his next moves? Or was it the other members --- former head of judiciary Hashemi Shahroudi, Mohammad Yazdi, Prosecutor General Ghorban Ali Dorri Najafabadi, and Ahmad Khatami --- all of whom are more supportive of President Ahmadinejad?

1605 GMT: The Executive Committee of the Assembly of Experts has met, but there are no details of the agenda or content of the discussion.

1550 GMT: There is still no news on whether the President has formally submitted his Ministerial nomination to Parliament.

1415 GMT: Report that Mohammad Reza Jalaiepour, an activist close to Mohammad Khatami, will be released from detention today. Journalist Zhila Bani Yaghoub has been released on $200,000 bail.

1405 GMT: Mehdi Karroubi has written to Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani to confirm that he is ready to present his evidence of the abuse of detainees.

1230 GMT: Mowj-e-Sabz claims that a group of senior clerics have met the Supreme Leader and criticised the behaviour of his son, Mojtaba, but "to no avail".

1225 GMT: Did the President Miss the Deadline? The official Parliamentary News Agency has an item at 1530 local time (1100 GMT), 30 minutes before the deadline for the President to submit his Cabinet nominations. Aboutourabi Fard, the anti-Ahmadinejad Deputy Speaker, says no letter had been received.

It is now almost an hour after the deadline.

1220 GMT: The new head of Iran's judiciary, Sadegh Larijani, is moving briskly with appointments: Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejeie has become Prosecutor General, replacing Ghorban Ali Dorri-Najafabadi.

Hmmm....Would this be the same Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejeie fired as Minister of Intelligence by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad a few weeks ago? Perhaps someone should give the President the latest news.

1130 GMT: EA source says that President Ahmadinejad's nationally-televised address, announcing his Ministerial nominations, has been postponed until tomorrow night after 9 p.m. local time.

1055 GMT: The Rah-e-Sabz website, quoting "reliable sources from Tehran", reports that Karroubi is resurrecting his plan from 2005 for the "Saba" satellite channel.

The plan was shelved four years ago after direct intervention by Ali Larijani, then chair of the National Security Council, who deemed the plan "an act against national security". Karroubi then founded the Etemade Melli newspaper to reach the masses.

Now Karroubi is threatening to get serious with the satellite channel should the regime's ban on the newspaper remain in place. Initial launch preparations are underway and "a group of film makers based inside the country" is willing to take part. The headquarters would be set up in another Mideast country (an EA correspondent suggests the United Arab Emirates), and the goal would be to air the "real news" that the state media neglects.

1045 GMT: To the Wire. Mehr News says President Ahmadinejad has still not decided on the appointments of three Ministers. Tabnak, however, says only one post (Justice) is still to be determined for the final submission to Parliament. The names of those Ministers who have been proposed, in both articles, are those posted earlier in Press TV/Fars accounts (see 0900 GMT).

0940 GMT: Saham News claims that a commission is investigating the Mosharekat and  Mojahedin political parties with a view to amending the law to prohibt contacts and exchange of views and information with foreign embassies and acceptance of foreign financial aid. An EA source confirms that this process started about six weeks ago.

0900 GMT: The President's Cabinet? Press TV, citing Fars News Agency, reveals Ministerial nominees. Among the appointments: Manouchehr Mottaki remains as Foreign Minister, Kamran Daneshjou at Science, Research and Technology, Mostafa Mohammad-Najjar as Minister of Interior, Mohammad Hosseini leading Ministry of Culture and the Islamic Guidance, and Ahmad Vahidi as Minister of Defense.

0855 GMT: And Yet More Support. The Association of Iran Alumni and Union of Islamic Associations of University Students have declared that they will not abandon Karroubi and other reformist leaders.

0850 GMT: The Green Wave of Support. We reported yesterday on the "reformist" front coming out in support of Mehdi Karroubi's position on abuse of detainees. Norooz have now published the text of the statement from the Islamic Iran Participation Front.

0820 GMT: Clarification on Reformist-Clerics Meeting (0740 GMT). Another EA correspondent explains, "Javad Shahrestani is not an Ayatollah, and most probably not even a mujtahid. He runs sistani.org from Qom and is the person who brought the Internet to the holy city and transformed it into a technology hub. However, he is not high on religious credentials. The fact that people refer to him as 'Ayatollah' underlies the attempt to indicate the higher level of these figures close to the opposition."

0740 GMT: A reader lets us know that the full English summary, provided by a Twitter activist, of Ayatollah Sanei's attack on the regime (full video in separate entry) is now available on the Internet.

0730 GMT: More Opposition Moves. An EA correspondent has verified news we saw yesterday, "The reformists Abdollah Nouri, Gholamhosein Karbaschi [former Mayor of Tehran and top advisor to Karroubi], and other reformists have been having separate meetings with Ayatollah Montazeri and Ayatollah Shahrestani, the son-in-law of Ayatollah Sistani [the leading Shia cleric in Iraq]. These reformists have requested that the Shia high clergy become more involved in the current issues of the country."

0650 GMT: We asked moments ago "whether some in the Government have realised that the high-profile hard line may be counter-productive".

Hmmm, maybe not. Hojatoleslam Ali Saeedi, the Supreme Leader's liaison with the Revolutionary Guard, said yesterday, "[The] leaders of the recent unrest are still out of prison." Rounding up those leaders "could be the will of the nation and the media".

Saeedi also defended the regime's high-profile display of "confessions" by figures such as former Vice President Mohammad Ali Abtahi:

These confessions were of utmost importance, since they shed light on the core of "the ordeal" and the rings linked to it....It was not unexpected that the foreigners would take us for the likes of Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan. However, it was strange that some of our compatriots were deceived by the enemies and played by their rules."

0630 GMT: Deadline day for President Ahmadinejad, as he has to present his selections for Ministerial posts to Parliament. The furour over the President's relations with the legislature, which had peaked with controversies over the 1st Vice President and Ministry of Intelligence, has quieted in the last week, but several key MPs have warned that Ahmadinejad must put forward candidates with expertise and judgement.

On another front, our Enduring America debate over the challenge of Hashemi Rafsanjani continues. After yesterday's spirited discussion between two of our correspondents and our readers, we've posted a sequel with the views of a third EA analyst. There is a clear split in our community on not only Rafsanjani's position but that of the President: some see Rafsanjani playing a clever game as Ahmadinejad loudly struggles, others see the President in the ascendancy. And, thanks to our readers, important factors such as the Revolutionary Guard, the "principlist" political bloc, and the Army have also been brought into the arena.

For me, however, the emerging story yesterday was the clear signal that the Green opposition has not gone away. While the organisation of public protest is still fragmented, many key secular and clerical figures rallied around Mehdi Karroubi's demand that the Government investigate and punish those responsible for abuse of detainees. Karroubi reiterated the protest in his statement, "You Will Not Force Me Into Silence", and Mir Hossein Mousavi, Ayatollah Bayat-Zanjani, and the "reformist" front were among those who offered high-profile endorsements. These complemented the "hot" Internet story of the day, the video of Ayatollah Sane'i's scathing attack on the regime.

As I've said on several occasions, the regime may be keeping the opposition vibrant --- ironically --- by trying to break it with detentions, confessions, and trials. Today's planned 4th trial of post-election political prisoners has been postponed until next Tuesday, raising the question as to whether some in the Government have realised that the high-profile hard line may be counter-productive.

If this is just a pause, however (and one of the rumours yesterday was that politician Saeed Hajjarian would be amongst the defendants), we will not only be considering the President's Cabinet and Rafsanjani's future. The Green Path of Hope, which Karroubi and Mohammad Khatami joined yesterday, may be more than a symbol.

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2105 GMT: Jomhoori Eslami has published a statement from 120 physicians and faculty members. After condemning the harsh and savage treatment of protesters, they assert, "It is imperative that, when the credentials of individuals aspiring to high office is being reviewed, their mental health should also be reviewed by a knowledgeable committee that the people can trust".

2100 GMT: Amir Mohsen Mohammadi, student and human rights activist, has been released from detention on $150,000 bail. Mohammadi had been detained since 14 June.

1945 GMT: Our Top Tribute to Journalism. Earlier today (0930 GMT) we awarded the Gold Medal for Dumbest Western Image for #IranElection to Time magazine's "Will Iran's 'Kennedys' Challenge Ahmadinejad?"

Who, you may ask, was the previous winner? Reza Sayah of CNN for his profile of Zahra Rahnavard, Mir Hossein Mousavi's wife, "a woman some [i.e., Reza Sayah of CNN] are calling Iran's Michelle Obama".

1920 GMT: The sharp-eyed Josh Shahryar noted that, in its report on Sunday's third Tehran trial, Press TV's website referred to "Iran's disputed Presidential vote", the first time that the qualifier "disputed" had appeared in state media. So today's brief item on clashes outside the offices of Etemade Melli further raised an eyebrow: "All gatherings have been banned in a crackdown on mass protests that erupted after the disputed election of 12 June.

1840 GMT: 48 Hours to Go. Meanwhile, President Ahmadinejad is getting warning signals about those Cabinet choices. Alaeddin Boroujerdi, the Chairman of Parliament's National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, has said, “The Majlis [Parliament] expects the president to select ministers carefully.” Deputy Speaker Mohammad-Reza Bahonar gave Ahmadinejad a wrist-slap for Sunday's televised announcement of six proposed ministers, presented without any information to Parliament, “This time the president introduced some of the nominees directly through media which is unprecedented."

1830 GMT: As President Ahmadinejad prepares to propose his Cabinet, the Supreme Leader is moving his own pieces on the political chessboard. He has appointed Ayatollah Hashemi Shahroudi, who just stepped down as head of Iran's judiciary, to both the Expediency Council and the Guardian Council.

1715 GMT: The spokesman of Mehdi Karroubi's party Etemade Melli has told Saham News that judicial officials will meet tomorrow with the editor-in-chief of Etemade Melli newspaper to discuss outstanding issues. The spokesman stated that there is a high probability that, after the conclusion of this meeting, Etemade Melli will resume publication.

1650 GMT: Peykairan reports that 15 people were arrested, two women beaten, and a bus attacked in clashes in 7 Tir Square.

1605 GMT: Read This Signal. Press TV English highlights Hashemi Rafsanjani's speech at the inauguration of Mohammad Sadegh Larijani today:

"In case of delivering fair verdicts, the society will have a sense of security and no one will feel helpless in asserting his violated rights," said the head of the Assembly of Experts.

Hashemi-Rafsanjani warned that if the nation feels troubled by the judicial treatment of detainees "the society will descent into chaos."

That would have been hard enough for President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to hear (except, according to some reports, he walked out before the end of the speech). But how about this? Press TV, a state media outlet, headlines the account to pin the blame on the Government: "In Iran, Rafsanjani links 'Unjust' Verdicts to Chaos."

1500 GMT: Very reliable sources have confirmed to EA that the suspension of Etemade Melli "until further notice", reported by Iranian Students News Agency earlier today, is true. The communique from the Culture Ministry rescinds the publishing licence of Etemade Melli due to its "repeated publication" of "illegal" articles that have produced "many complaints".

1344 GMT: Associated Press, from Iranian state television, is reporting the following statement from Mohammad Sadegh Larijani at his inauguration ceremony as head of Iran's judiciary: "Nobody should dare ... to violate rights or security of citizens. I announce that I will not forgive anybody in this regard and violators will be put on trial."

1340 GMT: Reliable Twitter source says journalist Kaveh Mozaffari will be released from detention today. Mozaffari was arrested on 9 July, the day of the 18 Tir demonstrations.

1325 GMT: Mowj-e-Sabz claims that, despite the initial ban on its publication (later denied by Tehran's chief prosecutor, who said that it was just "printing problems"), Etemade Melli newspaper did appear today.

1320 GMT: Reuters reports, "Up to 60 opposition supporters chanted 'Death to the Dictator' Monday near the building of a reformist newspaper....Police at the scene in downtown Tehran prevented the demonstrators from gathering in front of the offices of the Etemad-e Melli newspaper of leading reformist Mehdi Karoubi, the witness said."

1310 GMT: Twitter filled with unconfirmed reports of clashes in front of offices of Etemade Melli, with Basiji militia allegedly attacking demonstrators. Other reports that protestors are moving towards 7 Tir Square.

1220 GMT: We have posted, in a separate entry, the video of the encounter between Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Hashemi Rafsanjani at today's inauguration of Mohammad Sadegh Larijani as head of Iran's judiciary. An EA correspondent comments, "Have to say that Rafsanjani and Ahmadinejad warmth is slightly unnerving."

1130 GMT: A Very Interesting Development. According to the Iranian Labour News Agency, Hashemi Rafsanjani is taking part in the inauguration ceremony for Sadegh Larijani. Other people attending are President Ahmadinejad, former Revolutionary Guard chief Rahim Safavi, Ali Akbar Nateq Nouri, Speaker of Palriament Ali Larijani, Prosecutor General Saeed Mortazavi, and Guardian Council spokesman Abbas Ali Khadkhodai.

One EA correspondent asks, "Is Rafsanjani breaking ranks? He surely looks like fish out of the water in this midst." Or is Rafsanjani trying to build up his political base by showing that, amidst the tensions and conflicts with the President, he can still work with other Establishment figures. Or, to put the issue narrowly, is Sadegh Larijani's appointment so important for Rafsanjani that his public support outweighs his association with those he might consider as political enemies?

1045 GMT: A very slow news morning, punctuated only by this Twitter chatter: "Sea of Green will gather 4pm TODAY (Mordad 26/August 17) Karimkhan St". Etemade Melli party website, connected with Mehdi Karroubi, continues to feature headline that gathering for today in front of Etemade Melli newspaper has been called off.

0930 GMT: Possibly the Dumbest Headline of This Crisis. Congratulations, Time magazine: "Will Iran's 'Kennedys' Challenge Ahmadinejad?" This attempt to give the Larijani brothers a "Western" makeover continues in the opening paragraph:

The brothers Larijani — often referred to as the Kennedys of Iran — are emerging as a powerful counterweight to President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad from within the conservative camp. And unlike other Ahmadinejad rivals, the Larijanis are fully endorsed by Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatullah Ali Khamenei.

Several problems with that political "analysis" spring to mind. Even a passing look at our analyses over the last week of the manoeuvres within the Iranian establishment --- Parliament, the judiciary, the Ministry of Intelligence, the Supreme Leader, the President, the Revolutionary Guard, the clerics of Qom --- should offer a complex situation that goes beyond Larijanis in the Blue Corner, with the Supreme Leader as their towelman, and Mahmoud in the Red Corner.

For now, however, we ask readers, especially in Iran: do you know of any reference inside the country to the Larijanis as "the Kennedys"?

0715 GMT: Might as well begin today's updates with a chuckle. The chief prosecutor of Tehran, Saeed Mortazavi, has denied that last night's closure of the Etemade Melli newspaper, associated with Mehdi Karroubi (pictured), was because of a Government order: "Etemade Melli has not been shut down....[The paper] was not distributed on Monday following problems in its printing-office."

According to Mehdi Karroubi's son, Hossein, the paper was ordered to halt its presses after publishing a letter from Mehdi Karroubi responding to "insults" against him over his allegations of abuse of detainees.

0710 GMT:  A quiet start to the morning so we've posted an analysis which we hope will be both informative and provocative, "Question for the 'Green Path of Hope' and for the Government".

The Latest from Iran (16 August): New Challenge to Khamenei?

The Latest from Iran (17 August): Waiting for the Next Manoeuvre

NEW Iran: “Beloved and Popular” Mr Ahmadinejad Wants to See You in New York!
Iran: The Battle over the Judiciary and the Republic’s Future
The Latest from Iran (15 August): Battles Within the Establishment

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2200 GMT: Two late-night breaking stories. The first is the temporary ban on Etemade Melli newspaper after its publication of a letter from Mehdi Karroubi.

The second story is potentially bigger. Press TV's website reports that former President Mohammad Khatami met former members of Parliament and said, "We are the real protectors of the Islamic Republic not those who showed in recent months that they are uprooting the republic and Islamic nature of the establishment." Khatami expressed concern about the "illegal" attitude adopted towards the Iranian nation after the election: "Certain ongoing moves run counter to legal principles."

What Press TV fails to note is that those former members of Parliament issued a statement a few days ago raising the issue of the authority of the Supreme Leader. So this meeting may be part of the move to invoke Law 111 over the prudence and justice of Khamenei.

2005 GMT: Agence France Presse reports, "Iran released 24-year-old French academic Clotilde Reiss on bail Sunday six weeks after she was arrested on suspicion of spying, the French presidency said, adding that she is in good health."

2000 GMT: Revolutionary Road has posted a summary in English, including the names of the defendants, in today's third trial of post-election political detainees.

1905 GMT: And it's not just Press TV that is giving airtime to the opposition and "enemies" of the regime. An EA correspondent reports that Iranian state television, including IRIB Channel 1, is also carrying the denial of charges by an attorney for one of the defendants in today's trial in Tehran (see 1625 GMT).

1855 GMT: Press TV's website is now summarising, in fact almost reprinting in full, the latest statement from Mir Hossein Mousavi: “Our election campaign was conducted under the Constitution and the principles which the Iranian nation holds dear. We still remain committed to the same slogans.”

The article prints, without any critical commentary, Mousavi's memories of Election Night:

[At first] we thought that mismanagement was the cause of chaos. I, myself, made contacts with authorities of the country. On the election day, I called the Judiciary Chief [Ayatollah Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi] twice, the Prosecutor General [Qorban-Ali Dorri-Najafabadi] two times, the Majlis Speaker [Ali Larijani] twice, and the Office of the Leader of the Islamic Revolution [Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei] four times to raise issues about the pre-planned scenarios.

Mousavi, the former prime minister who worked under the founder of the Islamic Revolution, added that he had dispatched a team to see Interior Minister Sadeq Mahsouli, “but, surprisingly, he refused to meet” with them.

Mousavi's challenge to the regime is also featured: “We are confident that an atmosphere of mistrust would not have been created in the country if a fair attitude had been adopted [after the election], to the demands of the Iranian people, and if the media had been prevented from attributing the nation's will to foreigners and diverting facts.”


1700 GMT: In Case You Missed It. Yesterday US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton issued a statement calling on "Iranʼs leadership to quickly resolve all outstanding American citizen cases". These include the detentions of Iranian-American academic Kian Tajbakhsh, whose situation we have profiled on Enduring America, and three American hikers, who were seized when they crossed the Iraq-Iran border.

1640 GMT: Mir Hamid Hassanzadeh, who ran Mir Hossein Mousavi's Ghalam News website during the Presidential campaign, has been released on bail after 11 days in detention. Dr Saeed Shirkavand of the Islamic Iran Participation Front has also been freed on bail.

1625 GMT: Tehran Trial Twist. For the first time, an Iranian state media outlet has carried details of a denial of the charges against post-election political detainees. Press TV's website leads with, "The defense attorney of one of the post-vote detainees has described as 'severe' an indictment that charged his defendant with throwing a hand-made grenade."

The article continues with a specific description of the allegation against Meisam Ghorbani and the attorney's rebuttal rather, than as has been typical of state media reporting, focusing on the prosecution's description of foreign intrigue for a "velvet revolution".

1610 GMT: A Moscow Tilt against Ahmadinejad? The Russian company Megafon now denies that it will start a new mobile phone operation in Iran.

1600 GMT: More Cabinet Rumours. Hossein Sobhaninia, the deputy head of the Parliament's National Security and Foreign Affairs Commission, has told Mehr News Agency that Saeed Jalili (currently head of the President's National Security Council) will be next Foreign Minister and that the current Defence and Interior Ministers, Mostafa Mohammad Najjar and Sadeq Mahsouli, will swap positions. He added that he was incensed by Ahmadinejad's failure to consult with the Commission before these cabinet changes.

1150 GMT: Yeah, Yeah, Whatever. Besides announcing some of his Cabinet choices on Iranian television, President Ahmadinejad trotted out the "foreign interference" line, on the same time that 28 more defendants went on trial. Ahmadinejad told the "West", "This time you clearly interfered in Iran's domestic affairs and you thought you would be able to harm the Islamic nation. You should be held accountable for your actions but we know very well the fuss you created in the world is not a sign of your authority but rather it is a sign of your weakness and downfall."

1110 GMT: An EA correspondent writes, "In the end the Intelligence Ministry did not end up in the hands of [Basiji commander] Hossein Taeb, but it appears that the IRGC [Revolutionary Guard] is as present as ever. According to Fars News, [Heydar] Moslehi was Imam Khomeini's representative in the Khatam al-Anbia and Karbala military bases during the Iraq war and, more importantly, the Supreme Leader's "representative with the land forces of the IRGC and deputy of the Islamic Propaganda Organisation". Hence he is a solid Khamenei acolyte with strong ties to the IRGC. He is also currently a deputy to Ahmadinejad for Islamic University Affairs and Khamenei's representative in the lucrative Waqf Foundations Qrganisation.

1100 GMT: Fars News has now published the indictment and photographs from today's Tehran trial.

1050 GMT: The two women announced today by President Ahmadinejad in his Cabinet choice, to lead the Welfare and Health Ministries, are Fatemeh Ajorloo, a conservative MP from Karaj, and Marzieh Dastjerdi, a gynaecologist.

According to Dastjerdi's biography, just published by Mehr News, she is a solid stalwart of Iran's health establishment, having served in the women's section of the Cultural Revolution Council and the top management of the Health Ministry. She is currently on the board of trustees of the Medical Sciences College of Tehran, of which she is also head of international relations.

1030 GMT: An Iranian website is reporting a statement from the "conservative" Society of Teachers and Researchers of Qom, whose members include Mohammad Yazdi and Ahmed Khatami, calling on the Government to ensure detainees' rights and to curb illegal actions committed during arrests and detentions.

1015 GMT: Confusion on the Internet over the demonstration of support for Etemade Melli, originally proposed by Mehdi Karroubi for Monday. As we reported earlier (0720 GMT), Karroubi's office cancelled the demonstration after threatened attacks by Government backers did not materialise on Saturday. A Facebook site run by supporters of Mir Hossein Mousavi, however, continues to maintain the call for protest.

Because the newspaper is closely connected with Karroubi's party, also called Etemade Melli, and because the information on the party's website is co-ordinated with Karroubi, we are treating his office's announcement --- still the lead item on the website --- as the latest information.

1000 GMT: Back to our first story of the day. President Ahmadinejad has just spoken live on Iranian TV. He says the full Cabinet will be named on Tuesday, but some names have been confirmed. Two women, for the Welfare and Health Ministries, will be proposed. Hojatoleslam Moslehi will be nominated as Minister of Intelligence. Ahmadinejad promised at least one more female minister in the full Cabinet.

0940 GMT: A New Challenge to Khamenei? On Friday, we reported and analysed the first wave of a constitutional move against the Supreme Leader's authority, with the statement of former MPs and Ayatollah Dastgheib's move for an emergency meeting of the Assembly of Experts.

This may now be building from "significant" to "important" story with the revelation, in Mowj-e-Sabz, of "a second wave". A number of high-ranking clerics from Qom, Mashad, and Isfahan have sent an open letter to the Assembly of Experts, asking them to re-evaluate the credentials of the Supreme Leader.

Using the words of Law Number 111 of the Constitution, the clerics assert that the necessary conditions of prudence and justice that are essential for any Supreme Leader have not been met. Therefore, according to the principles of Islamic jurisprudence set by Ayatollah Khomeini, Khameini is and must automatically deposed.

Some cautions with the report: Mowj-e-Sabz has a marked political stake in the story, as it is the website of the Green opposition. And the names of the clerics are not known, as they have been withheld out of consideration for their safety. Still, if true, the report indicates the growing pressure against the Supreme Leader.

0755 GMT: Fars News has an initial report on today's trial of 25 detainees for incitement of "velvet revolution". The indictment accuses them generally of "creating chaos and general disarray after the recent elections" and specifically of making bombs and distributing weapons.

0750 GMT: Propaganda of the Day. Keyhan writes, "Girls that have been recently arrested in the latest unrest and their families" want Mehdi Karroubi to be taken to court and be punished. Keyhan claims that these girls and their families believe, "From the time Karroubi published his letter our friends and relatives look down upon us and our reputation has been besmirched....Karroubi is a power-hungry liar and we can only regain our reputation by proving the falsity of his statements in court."

0730 GMT: Further to our first update on 72 hours for the President. Ali-Akbar Javanfekr, Ahmadinejad's press spokesman, says the President will introduce his cabinet to Parliament on Tuesday or Wednesday.

0720 GMT: Mehdi Karroubi has responded to the attacks upon him in Friday prayers in Tehran:

Unfortunately a number of Friday Imams have abused the sacred position of Friday prayers and have used the market of false accusations, lies and infamy to sell their religion and have insulted the holy institute of Friday prayers....I had written a letter because I was concerned [about issues] and felt that it was my duty to respond, some individuals welcomed this letter others criticized it; however, this issue should not become a pretext for destruction, false accusations and insults. I welcome both approbation and criticisms; however, I can not remain indifferent to those who insult and those who have sold their religion for filthy lucre and I will most certainly respond to them in the near future.

Meanwhile, Karroubi's office has called off the demonstration of his followers scheduled for Monday: "Because the demonstration of the critics that was scheduled Saturday did not occur and the operation of Etemade Melli (newspaper) is continuing with no impediments, we are requesting that all supporters to demonstrate their good intentions by refraining from gathering arround the office of Etemade Melli. We would like to take this oppurtunity to thank public support that has been shown towards the personnel, editors and reporters of this newspaper....We would also like to thank the security forces that have maintaned calm and order around the office of the newspaper.

0700 GMT: Amidst a relatively quiet morning, we've concentrated on a special analysis on the fight over Iran's judiciary, marked by the appointment of Mohammad Sadegh Larijani as its head yesterday, and the wider contest between clerics, politicians, and the Revolutionary Guard.

At the same time, we're now starting to watch the clock on the future of the President. Not sure many have noticed, but Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has 72 hours to get approval from Parliament of his choices for Cabinet ministers. Otherwise, under Iranian law, the way is out for dissolution of the Government and new elections.

Iran Special: Mohammad Sadegh Larijani and a "Militarised" Judiciary

Iran: The Battle over the Judiciary and the Republic’s Future
The Latest from Iran (15 August): Battles Within the Establishment

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In the midst of the ongoing uncertainty over the appointment of Mohammad Sadegh Larijani as head of Iran's judiciary Enduring America correspondents have been paying close attention to this extended analysis by Mehdi Khalaji, of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Khalaji offers both background and critique of Larijani within the context of what he calls the "militarization" of Iran's legal and judicial bodies.

We have read this in the light both of WINEP's political position of long-time hostility to the Iranian regime and of Khalaji's own history as a former cleric. An EA correspondent writes, "Khalaji usually goes down very strong on his former Qom classmates usually. His analysis may turn out to be true, but Sadegh is actually more scholarly than what Khalaji makes him out to be. For example, I have a very erudite rebuttal of Mohammad Khatami's civil society that was written by him 11 years ago in a right-wing weekly called Sobh. However, what Khalaji says about Khamenei's progressive replacement of the elite with a younger generation of his own liking is very similar to other analyses, including those from "reformists". Interesting to see how opinions are converging on this front."

Militarization of the Iranian Judiciary

Widespread reports suggest that Sadeq Larijani, a young and inexperienced cleric with close ties to Iran's military and intelligence agencies, will officially replace Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi as head of the Iranian
judiciary on August 16. [Editor's Note: The installation was originally scheduled for 15 August but has been delayed, reported to the 17th.] This appointment is particularly significant, since the judiciary in Iran wields considerable power --- albeit through the approval of Iran's top leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei --- and has a great deal of latitude to make decisions without reference to law or Islamic concepts, especially when "safeguarding the interests of the regime" is deemed necessary.

Who is Sadeq Larijani?

Born in 1960 in Najaf, Iraq, Sadeq Larijani is the son of Grand Ayatollah Hashem Amoli and the son-in-law of Grand Ayatollah Hossein Vahid Khorasani, currently one of the most widely followed marjas, "sources of
emulation" whose rulings are regarded as binding by devout Shiite believers. Larijani's two older and well-known brothers -- Ali Larijani, speaker of the Majlis (Iranian parliament) and former nuclear negotiator, and Mohammad Javad Larijani, the deputy head of the judiciary, former deputy foreign affairs minister, and mathematics graduate from the University of California, Berkeley -- are also married into respected clerical families: Ali is the son-in-law of the late Morteza Motahhari, an ideologue of the Islamic government, and Mohammad Javad is the son-in-law of Hassan Hassanzadeh, an ayatollah in Qom. Khamenei, at one point the supervisor of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), became
intimate with the Larijani family during Ali's several-year post as deputy commander of the IRGC.

Sadeq justifies his lack of political experience in a short autobiography on his website. Because he "felt that the West's cultural invasion was no less important than a military invasion," he decided to prepare himself
for "confronting the cultural invasion," in part by learning English. He used his new language skills to translate several philosophical works,such as an article by Karl Popper on the philosophy of science and G. J.
Warnock's Contemporary Moral Philosophy, the latter of which he annotated and critiqued from the Islamic point of view. Sadeq first made a name for himself by criticizing religious intellectuals such as Abdulkarim Soroush and eventually became one of the main voices of the Islamic Republic. Larijani taught courses on Islamic ideology, both at the seminary in Qom and at various IRGC bases around the country.

In 2001, Sadeq Larijani was the youngest jurist ever to be appointed to the Guardian Council, the twelve-person body responsible for approving all laws passed by the Majlis and for supervising elections. In the course of his Guardian Council activities, he has tried to remain under the radar by avoiding public appearances and media interviews. He has also made every effort to keep his relationships with Khamenei, the intelligence apparatus, and the IRGC under wraps.

Militarizing Iran's Institutions

In his twenty years in office, particularly in recent years, Khamenei has replaced military, political, economic, cultural, and clerical officials with a new generation of politicians and clerics who owe their political
or religious credentials to him. The IRGC and intelligence apparatuses became the main avenues through which young ambitious men loyal to Khamenei could enter the political scene.

Although most of these new politicians and clerics are close to Khamenei, they are not traditional clerics with independent political and religious credentials, such as those who participated in the 1979 Revolution.

Instead, most of the new generation began their careers in the military, the IRGC, and the intelligence services. Notable examples include Ahmad Khatami (no relation to former president Muhammad Khatami), an influential intelligence agent who is now a member of the Assembly of Experts and the Friday prayer Imam of Tehran; Ahmad Salek, Khamenei's representative in both the Qods Force and IRGC intelligence and a member of the Militant Clerics Society of Tehran; Hossein Taeb, the commander of Basij militia and former head of IRGC intelligence; and Sadeq Larijani.

Khamenei's Judiciary

Khamenei keeps close control of the Iranian judiciary: he not only appoints its head, but also gives unofficial recommendations to other high-ranking judiciary officials. Often a micromanager, Khamenei has been
known to go over the judiciary's head, exemplified by his recent order to close the Kahrizak detention center in Tehran (a move that usually requires a court order). Critics say the closure was meant to prevent a Majlis investigation into abuse of the facility's prisoners -- most of whom were arrested following the postelection demonstrations.

Although the Iranian constitution states that the judiciary supervise all juridical and legal processes, some bodies, such as the Special Court of Clerics, work under Khamenei's direct supervision outside the judiciary's
framework. Moreover, even though the IRGC, Basij, police, Intelligence Ministry, and Special Court of Clerics run many of Iran's detention centers, the judiciary has no jurisdiction over any of them. Further
complicating matters, Khamenei is constitutionally the final arbiter in any dispute between government officials, with the right to overrule Islamic law when necessary to safeguard the interests of the regime. As
such, the judiciary uses Islamic law as the basis for its decisions only when Khamenei sees such use as not in conflict with the regime's interests -- as he defines it.

Not only is the judiciary empowered to ignore Islamic law, it also bypasses the country's criminal law, particularly in politically related cases. This has led to harsh criticism by secular lawyers as well as
clerics in the last two decades. In an open letter to Hashemi Shahroodi, for instance, published in Ettelaat newspaper on August 2, Ayatollah Mustafa Mohaqeq Damad, a prominent scholar of Islamic law, criticized the concept of the "interests of the regime," complaining, "The bitter taste of what happened in the judiciary under you, especially in recent days, would not be forgettable for Iranian people ... Under you, the judiciary,
which is the pivot of society's security, is not only shaken but destroyed."

Conclusion

Iran's judiciary -- under the watchful eye of Iran's top leader -- has a great deal of power to shape the country's legal system and environment. Sadeq Larajani's ties to the IRGC and intelligence agencies provide ample reason to believe that he will use his new powers to crack down even further on human rights and civil liberties than did his predecessors. Moreover, Larijani's appointment signals that the judiciary, the IRGC, and the intelligence agencies will be more closely aligned then ever. Presumably, this state of affairs indicates that traditional ayatollahs deeply trained in Islamic law -- but who are not members of the
intelligence-military-political circles -- will have a lesser role in government in years to come. Given the unstable situation in post-election Iran, such a scenario could be a recipe for continued and ongoing chaos.