UPDATED Iran Debate: How Weak (or Strong) is Ahmadinejad?

The Latest from Iran (30 August): Parliament Discusses the Cabinet

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UPDATED 31 August, 0725 GMT: Enduring America's Chris Emery, formerly known as "Mr Jones", has now made his contribution to what is becoming, I think, one of the most important discussions in the post-election crisis --- see below. Mr Smith has offered a reply.

UPDATED 1145 GMT: Mr Smith has made another intervention in the debate.
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Over the weekend, after Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's tough talking at Friday prayers in Tehran and as he was submitting his Cabinet choices to Parliament, we have been debating the President's position and future prospects. EA's Mr Smith and Mr Johnson are joined by Muhammad Sahimi of Tehran Bureau, whose column sparked the discussion, and Fintan Dunne.

SAHIMI: ....Such fabrications [like those in his Friday speech] are of course meant to present Ahmadinejad as a confident leader. But, in reality, he is weaker and more isolated than ever. True, the right wing is in control, but that control has been achieved first and foremost by the support of the high command of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). Otherwise, the base of support for Ahmadinejad among the population is extremely narrow, limited to at most 15% of the population.

At the same time,...glaring fissures which have emerged within the conservative and reactionary camp, which poses a growing threat to Iran’s political stability. Even Ayatollah Khamenei and the hardliners around him are well aware of the danger, which explains why they have been gradually retreating over the past few weeks.

First, they acknowledged some of the crimes that have taken place in the detention centers.

Second, they have retreated from linking the reformist leaders with foreign powers, notwithstanding Ahmadinejad’s tired accusations during Friday Prayers.

Third, Ayatollah Khamenei appointed Ayatollah Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi, the former judiciary chief, as a member to the powerful Guardian Council, in preparation for the departure of Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, the ultra-conservative secretary-general of the Council, and an ardent supporter of Ahmadinejad. At least compared to Jannati, Shahroudi is a relative moderate.

Fourth, Ahmadinejad’s appointment of Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai as the First Vice President was blocked. Mashai was even barred for two months from holding any governmental position, another tactic to put Ahmadinejad under control.

Fifth, many of the reformists and their supporters, if not their main leaders, have been released from detention.

Sixth, behind-the-scene efforts continue to reach some sort of reconciliation between the reformists and the conservative camp. So far these have failed because the main demand of the reformists, holding a new election, has been rejected.

Seventh, Saeed Mortazavi, the notorious Tehran Prosecutor General and the man implicated in many crimes was sacked.

At the same time, Iran’s uranium enrichment program has stagnated, either by design, or due to technical difficulties, or because of a lack of raw materials (yellow cake) needed for uranium enrichment. Iran has also become more flexible with the International Atomic Energy Agency, allowing more visits to its nuclear sites.....

All are signs of a very weak Ahmadinejad presidency ahead, not to mention his complete lack of legitimacy in the eyes of a large majority of Iranian people, even among those who may have supported him before the election.

Even more damaging for Ahmadnejad is that his chief clerical patron, Ayatollah Khamenei, has himself been greatly weakened. The Ayatollah has been openly challenged and strongly criticized by many important clerics. Grand Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri, the most important Shiite cleric in Iran, openly called him unqualified and his reign illegitimate. Ayatollah Khamenei has allowed himself to be reduced to the leader of one faction in the conservative camp by openly and unabashedly supporting Ahmadinejad. He can no longer pretend that he is above the political fray.

SMITH: [The Tehran Bureau article] lacks sources on just about all the allegations it makes and then essentially parrots the reformist line: Ahmadinejad is weak, is in trouble, is a lame duck already, etc.

While of course all of us wish that this was the case, the reality appears quite different, as we have seen no real thrust to wrestle him out of office. The Supreme Leader has only rebuked him frontally during the [former First Vice President] Mashai affair and he still has the rather remarkable opportunity of talking from official platforms such as Friday Prayers, saying things quite different from what the Supreme Leader says, and still walking out relatively unscathed.

Granted, he has the same amount, or more, difficulties than any executive leader in the world would have for forming a government, but I would be very cautious in calling Ahmadinejad a has-been and that days may be counted down to his demise. Sadly, I doubt this scenario will happen anytime soon.

We shouldn’t forget that the Supreme Leader, conservative critics of AN like the Larijanis, Ahmad Tavakoli (who happens to be the Larijanis’ cousin), and more have essentially agreed to accept the outcome of the Presidential election as announced by the Interior ministry. Hence, they are simply jostling for political kudoes and power within the Government, more than mounting a challenge that is really geared towards removing Ahmadinejad from power.

DUNNE: Muhammad Sahimi was too dismissive in describing of Ahmadinejad as "isolated and delusional", and he erred in reducing the regime to the person of the president.

But he was correct to describe Ahmadinejad as "weak". Professor Sahimi accurately catalogs the ongoing obstruction of the hardliners and the very public political fractures. Furthermore he shows the regime is now tellingly reliant on a narrow base of IRGC appointees to fill government posts.

Ahmadinejad/IRGC's core 'hard' support is as low as 12%, with a 'softer' support extending to up to 20% of the population. Because of this, the disputed president's public pronouncements are reductionist and defensive --aimed at his own supporters and the ill-informed. By contrast, most other voices in Iranian politics are addressing the remaining 80%+ of the population.

Despite their hard-line rhetoric, Ahmadinejad/IRGC are unable to crush the reformers. It is going to be far harder to violently suppress any mass public protests in the weeks ahead. And there is a dire political problem looming for this one-legged regime: it's the economy, stupid!

Even a government of national unity would be hard-pressed to dig the Iranian economy out of the mire against the backdrop of deteriorating global finances. A lame duck Ahmadinejad government comprising an ineffectual clique will certainly fail to turn things around. One shudders to contemplate the unspoken financial state of Iran. Currency problems and capital flight are doubtless significant.

As the weeks pass, the economy will join the stolen election as the twin key political issues for the populace. Imagine an opposition rally protesting the economic straits of the people as well as the stolen election. Imagine the regime trying to suppress such a rally.

That the reformers are not already in prison is a victory in itself. Now, a death by a thousand cuts threatens the Iranian regime. That reality explains the government's determined effort to halt such a slow slide by means of show trials --which have backfired.

The reformists could compromise by accepting the current status quo, on condition of substantive electoral reform overseen by a parliamentary process. But from their perspective it might be best to simply allow this regime to stew in their own economic juice until well roasted.

JOHNSON: I find Mr. Smith's assertion that Professor Sahimi's article "lacks sources on just about all the allegations it makes and then essentially parrots the reformist line" to be both inaccurate (many of Sahimi's statements have been have also been reported here in Enduring America as well as other news-sites), and rather unfair.

Mr. Smith states that there is no thrust to wrestle Ahmadinejad out of office. This statement only makes sense if Mr. Smith considers the reformist movement to be irrelevant. I think that there has been a major effort to wrestle Ahmadinejad out of office; and that effort is still going on. The fact that Ahmadinejad has not been able to imprison and/or neutralize the ringleaders of this effort (Khatami, Mousavi and Karroubi), even though he has explicitly demanded it in public, demonstrates the limitations that exist to his power.

Ahmadinejad's pre-Friday prayers speach seems to have a lot of significance for Mr. Smith. I think that it is rather strange that a strong and powerful and confident president of the Islamic Republic of Iran must choose the mid- to low-profile pre-Friday prayers speech, since many of the faithful participating in Friday prayers either eschew or arrive near the end of the speech, to address the country instead of using IRIB [state television]. Did IRIB not give Ahmadinejad broadcasting time? If so, what kind of a strong President is denied this?

Mr. Smith considers the fact that Ahmadnejad is "saying things quite different from what the Supreme Leader says, and still walking out relatively unscathed" as evidence for Ahmadinejad's power. I think this is more a statement of Khamenei's weakness than Ahmadinejad's strength. I think the replacement of [Tehran chief prosecutor] Mortazavi is the real litmus test. If Mortazavi's successor puts an end to the trials and somehow addresses the issues of torture and the secret burials, a tangible limitation of the President's power has been put in place. This would be the first step taken to abort Ahmadinejad's "velvet coup".

Mr. Smith also takes Ahmadinejad's parliamentary troubles lightly. I agree that conservative parliamentarians are "simply jostling for political kudoes and power within the Government". However I think that the rumblings and confrontations demonstrated by a sizable fraction of conservative MPs with regards to the President demonstrate that these MPs are convinced that: firstly, Ahmadinejad has no intention of giving them any kudoes and power; secondly, Ahmadinejad's plan may have also intended to weaken their power as well as that of the reformists; and thirdly, they may think that all the recent scandals (torture, unmarked graves, etc.) has turned Ahmadinejad into a political hot potato that must be dropped as soon as possibly.

The outcome of the presidential election was accepted by the conservatives in June. Not all of them are necessarily bound to continue to accept that now, especially if rejecting Ahmadinejad is equivalent to their political survival. The upcoming vow of confidence will be a demonstration of how the conservatives feel towards Ahmadinejad's policies.

SMITH: My assertions regarding Ahmadinejad were not so much related to his political "power", rather to his chances of political survival.

I don't deny that he is weak, has severe issues in forming his government, and is prey to all sorts of critics, both conservative and reformist. My considerations are focused, however, on whether Ahmadinejad will survive the storm in the short term and be able to stay in his place. I still believe he will, because the conservatives have too much to lose in terms of legitimacy after substantially endorsing the election results in June. No one, including the Larijanis, has contested the latter yet, and this is quite important in my view.

This is not to deny that friction between Ahmadinejad and Khamenei exists, but again not at boiling point level. Lastly, Ahmadinejad's appearing at Friday prayers was completely to be expected, as it is Government Week in Iran right now, and nearly all Presidents have appeared on the podium on this occasion.

EMERY: I wouldn't necessarily connect all the concessions detailed by Sahimi and Mr Johnson to Ahmadinejad's apparent isolation or weakness. Certainly the "stagnating" nuclear issue is not really evidence of a "very weak Ahmadinejad presidency ahea". I'm also not convinced that Ahmadinejad's inability to have Mousavi, Karroubi, Khatami, and Rafsanjani locked up is, as Mr. Johnson suggests, a useful demonstration of the limitations that exist to his power. The absence of such dictatorial powers are inherent in the office of the presidency.

My position is somewhere in between those expressed by Mr Smith and Mr Johnson. I agree with Mr Smith that Ahmadinejad will probably survive attempts to remove him. However, my prediction is for a totally chaotic second term in which Ahmadinejad is unable to achieve anything substantial as the Parliament and judiciary acts increasingly independently from the government (perhaps already seen in the "moving" of Mortazavi and appointment of Ejeie to posts in the judiciary). Increasingly, the question of the Supreme Leader's succession will come to dominate back stage political manoeuvrings.

As such, the real question is not so much whether Ahmadinejad has lost his public legitimacy or whether the Larijanis have or have not questioned the election result. The immediate apparent legacy of the crisis is that the coordination required for an effective legislative program will be almost impossible to achieve. The still-unknown legacy is the extent of the compromises, principally in terms of Iran's justice system, that Khamenei offers to avoid further mass protests. I don't see Ahmadinejad as particularly significant in how that pans out, although the result of the current trials does seem a reasonable litmus test.

The wider point is that Ahmadinejad doesn't actually appear to have much in the way of policies at the moment. Nor does he appear to grasp the enormity of the task in front of him. Ahmadinejad's second term may hang on this failure as much as anything else. Of course, he will now find it much harder to pass the legislation and reforms he thinks will do something about it and his failures will undoubtedly be capitalised on by his opponents. But a lot does depend on the merit of his policies.

Frustration will be hard for Ahmadinejad to take because the economy is where he has exercised more control than any other President. He also believes he has a strong mandate for his economic "vision", for which the SL has publicly stated his broad agreement (again, more than for any previous President). The real test will thus be when Ahmadinejad tries to pass something fiscal.

If Ahmadinejad does appear increasingly irrelevant or lame, then another important question is how he will react. When he appeared almost invisible in the first few weeks of the crisis, he tried to claw back his bureaucratic authority by some high profile sackings and appointments. I think everyone (including the Supreme Leader) was surprised at how brazen he was in trying to re-assert his visibility. It seems he is now emboldened enough to publicly differ with the Supreme Leader on the trials as well.

I don't see the Supreme Leader as likely to publicly remove his patronage from Ahmadinejad, but it could be possible that he will move closer towards an informal triumvirate with the Larijanis. But Ahmadinejad still has some leverage. Any US-Iranian engagement will require his cooperation, in that he will have the ability to de-rail it or at least cause severe problems. The SL will also recognise that there may be a political price to pay, in terms of the overall authority of the regime, for damaging the office of the Presidency. Ahmadinejad's ouster could even bring the IRGC [Revolutionary Guard] onto the streets.

SMITH: I largely concur with Chris Emery on the unstable nature of AN's second term, although I would, once again, exercise caution as to the real extent of Parliamentary opposition to Ahmadinejad. This will become much clearer in the next few days, as the various ministers receive their votes of confidence.

I too can see many avenues of deadlock for Ahmadinejad in his second term, particularly if the reformists attempt to embark on a long-term route that will target the 2012 Parliamentary elections, as they will have to attack the current composition of the Guardian Council and hence try to chip away at the current conservative quasi-monopoly over state power.

I would also be wary to think that Ahmadinejad does not " grasp the enormity of the task in front of him". I haven't seen statements to this effect by him. His second speech in Parliament yesterday, which I followed via live TV, was actually quite well-constructed. He defended, inter alia, his cabinet changes by saying that reshuffles are necessary, or else cabinets could last 50 years and elections would be made worthless. And his points on women and the experience of other members of his cabinet are also quite interesting. My own experience in dealing with him over the years (I have also had the dubious privilege of shaking his hand and asking him a couple of questions during press conferences) leads me to believe that he is more wily and clever than his external appearance makes him out to be.

As to the judiciary, I think we really have to wait till the end of Sadegh Larijani's appointments to see what the state of play is. Mortazavi was shooed out and in the door again in the last few days and the rest of the appointees such as Ejeie are hardliners in their own right, opposed to Ahmadinejad but not really wishing to make concessions to the reformists.

I still remain convinced that the Supreme Leader will pull a stunt by the end of Ramadan and pardon the reformist bigwigs, after the latter have received long prison sentences. Should he be clever, he would arrange for all of them to be carted off to his palace and be offered the pardon there in front of TV cameras. It would discredit them and allow Khamenei to show off his magnanimity, for free.

Iran Document: The Mousavi Speech to University Professors (23-24 June)

The Latest from Iran (23 August): An Anti-Ahmadinejad Bloc?

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On 24 June, we reported: "A curious and, if true, troubling incident. It is alleged that 70 faculty members, having met with Mir Hossein Mousavi, were later arrested."

Almost all of the faculty, most of whom were sociologists, were released, but it was unclear why the authorities reacted so fiercely to the gathering. Now Iran Quest has gone back to the speech, printed in Mowj-e-Sabz on 5 July, and offered an English translation. (The clarifications and notes in parentheses also come from Iran Quest.) The speech stands not only as an important record of Mousavi's thoughts in the day after the election but as a possible guide to continued protest:

We are accused that we are American and European (agents), that we are controlled by outsiders. That’s why I think it is imperative to state what (really) is the foreigners’ plan; And to take a stance against this issue. That’s why we need to talk about these issues. Even today and in the context of our current situation, if we truly do believe that one of the most significant outcomes of our revolution has been our independence, then we are obligated to indeed take a stance despite the harm that it may cause us. What I am really saying is that it is not going to harm us, but even if it did, we would still have to take a stance; it is important to work on this issue more extensively and declare a clearer position on as soon as possible. (The issue: accusations that Mousavi is an imperialist agents attempting regime change)

We can not completely get rid of this (accusation) influence altogether because fundamentally there is something wrong with this from the roots. There are limited media outlets that could communicate with people, gain their confidence and ultimately turn people’s attentions to those forces inside the country loyal to the Islamic Republic, Islam, the Nation, and its independence. In this regard (lack of media outlets) we are facing some serious problems. In the recent week, I have constantly discussed that this (lack of media outlets) is harmful to the whole system not just one group; that this would hurt us all. Unfortunately, we can not make a compromise. As we speak, 25 to 45 personnel of ‘Kalameh-e-sabz’ (Green Wave – Mousavi’s campaign newspaper) have been detained on charges of conspiracy. This shows how misinformed those who are in charge and take a stance against us really are.

In regards to taking legal action, I used to believe and still do that taking action that is lawful is our ultimate principle and our departing point of every action even if those laws are not taken very seriously. We can’t withdraw from this principle. Even if we disagree with a rule of law, we must resolve our issue through legal channels. I have mentioned this on numerous occasions during and after the election campaigns. Rumors and propaganda that accuse me of acting illegally are all absolute lies. I completely follow the rules and guidelines, even with regard to the Guardian Council to whom we drafted our complaint. But when 7 (out of 12) members of the Council are favoring one political party (allusion to Ahmadinejad's campaign) against the law we start having objections; if they want me to fawn and flatter them and attend their meetings, (despite the illegalities) then I would not go. I have filed my report and drafted my complaints, if they want to act appropriately they have all the documents. A person like Mr. Mohtashami (one of Mousavi’s campaign chiefs and the head of the Ministry of Interior during Khatami’s reformist presidential period) is constantly following up on the fraud issue, going back and forth and he is prepared to attend any meeting and explain what has happened.

You have seen, when Mr. Kadkhodaie (spokesperson of Guardian Council and Ahmadinejad supporter) announced on the case of ‘the cities with more votes than total number of eligible voters that “the investigated cases fraud totaled 3 million votes but that doesn’t affect the election results”. When Mr. Karroubi (the cleric and the more reformist presidential candidate) responded, the response was censored even in Mr. Karroubi’s newspaper Etemade Melli (National Trust Daily.) If you look carefully some of Mr. Karroubi’s phrases from his response are missing, and wording does not resemble Mr. Karoubi’s usual wording. Such is the environment that they have created throughout the country. We definitely won’t act illegally, we would act based on laws. Issues that Dr. Hazeri (one of the attendees who spoke before Mousavi) touched on are very significant and beneficial; these problems should get out there and be discussed….

There are many ways to voice your objections while keeping within the frameworks of the law. Of course, some are creating an atmosphere (of enmity). Today, Kayhan’s (most prominent pro-Ahmadinejad newspaper) headline was about (people’s) angry waves of vengeance from Mousavi. These personal attack are character assassinations to stop this movement. I believe with our canny and clever people these (character assassinations) would fire backwards. What they say would radicalize the atmosphere and create some problems but would bring no benefits to the legitimacy of the current government.

My view, of course hoping to god’s will I hope I am wrong, is that the Guardian Council will ultimately declare no fraud. Then a government will be formed base on legal procedures that exist and will continue on. However, if the previous government had the problem of being incompetent, deceiving, and many other problems that it created for itself and for the country, this government would have an additional problem on their hands; it will suffer from lack legitimacy. There will be doubts whether this government is rightful or not, and such doubts will make the government very vulnerable internationally and nationally, this would even make it possible that government would give away privileges to foreigners. That’s how the governments act when they weaken. We also know from signs and previous events that in the past whenever the current government has had such problems they’ve backed down.

It’s the same story with internal affairs. We (with the incumbent government staying in power) would find many problems. The crucial issue is what other forces would do when the new government (of the incumbent) is supposed to become official through the inauguration and the sworn-in ceremony in the parliament. This is one of our most important questions without any answers. Yesterday in a meeting there were talks that considering the recent events, and new awareness, we must act. This should not mean we stand against the government meaning that god forbid whatever they do we sabotage. However, we should organize nationally and independent from the government to take actions that are possible.

There is an important point here. They are after a hegemony from the current situation. They want to put people’s contentment and satisfaction to support their illegal actions. This is a critical point here. This means that they want to convince people that in regards to all (the post election disputes) that happened they were right and everybody else was wrong; that there was no fraud in this very healthy elections and everything turned out just fine in the end. We can’t submit to this. It’s our right to stand up through legal channels and declare that this incident (election fraud) was not fortunate , and if there’s no awareness (on this incident) this could establish the fundamentals for a dictatorship and god forbid lead the nation on an ominous path.

I introduced, early on in the elections, the discourse on issue of evading the rules of law (and how they plant the seed for dictatorship). I never thought we would reach a point where the election itself would be the solemn support for my arguments of dangers that I warned about from the beginning; this is the most important issue in our nation. This (election) showed that audacities of some to evade the laws can be stretched to extents that it is now; existence of such behaviors would make anything (ominous) possible in our nation.

Despite all this, they would only be able to stabilize their hegemony if they convince people to reconcile with the election results. They have to force those devoted religious forces [to accept] that nothing has happened, and everything (all the fraud cases) have happened in accords to the Islamic laws in place and that these justify all the crackdown on newspapers and imprisonments. This is what we need to push to get out there, to campaign on so that we can keep our constitution alive; our religious beliefs, independence of our nation and the rest of the revolutionary values that formed our fundamentals of our society with the leadership of Imam (Khomeini). I believe everybody has a say in this and has a role to play. Everyone must rely on their own creative talents to do something. We should eventually come together in our thoughts and locate common routes that we can all agree on. Till then, I think we must do something (to accommodate) whoever, with whatever plans and creativity, does something; just like how I’ve said each citizen is a medium; so that we can push on this agenda to some extent.

Rapport with different classes including the religious leaders

Fortunately, in the national arena we have the support of various classes of society specially the clergy who are grown sensitive to recent events. We occasionally saw clerics in the election and protest rallies, and our friends here know that. There are movements in Qom (the seminary city of Qom holds one of the largest school of Shiite Islam in Iran and is home to many grand clerics who act as religious leaders to the whole Muslim population and have many followers) and we have lobbied and met with some of the grand ayatollahs (top senior religious figures) of the city. The mere fact that these religious leaders have not approved the elections, despite all sorts of pressure to do so, is further proof to my words (that there are things happening in Qom.) But we need more work on this. Me, contacting, and camping and few others going back and forth to Qom is not going to do it. We must all feel the need here, and expand our relations with the grand ayatollahs. I believe we have good channels and informing the ayatollahs about your analysis or problems would have a positive influence.

The same course of action applies to the rest of society. We must try hard that our future movement does not step outside the system boundaries. This is dangerous to us and to the nation, and we don’t even believe in it either. My vision, is that we can move inside the system, but the system that the Imam Khomeini (the Grand Ayatollah who overthrew the Shah and established the Islamic Republic) defined with pure Islamic basis, stripped from lies and deceit, and toward clarity, bravery and accompanied by the type of rationalism coherent with the modern world. We would be critical in this framework, and this will be the base for our new movements.

There was another discussion on multiple people leading the movement. I believe in this (that this is the right way to go.) I have had talks with Mr. Karroubi and prior to that with Mr. Rezaei and Khatami. The movement would continue this way. Our intention is to expand this even further. The bigger this becomes the less vulnerable we’d become and the more we’d able to benefit from a collective will and rationale. In our future agenda too we are considering a collective movement, not individually. Of course, it’s possible that the wave be directed to me, but rest assured that this is not about me and it is a much greater aspect to it. The awareness that rose in the country is irreversible, meaning that it’s not possible to go back where we were six months ago even under any amount of pressure and appearances security forces on high alert. We must believe in this (irreversibility). However it’s not certain that we always move forward. There are always backlashes, and mismanagement could lead to some undesired outcomes, that’s why we must be watchful. This means that sessions like this must continue and information should be distributed. We must keep raising awareness. The movement must be managed properly specially considering the shock that people have had to bear.

One of our most important issues, is media. We solved our problem prior to the election by relying on the people. If you’ve noticed, we neither used TV nor any costly media. Even our posters were printed on A4 paper to save and reduce costs...as much as possible and in return we’d managed to get great amount of benefits.

However, there is a new modern perspective on use of virtual space in expanding truth that our youth took advantage of. This is our secret weapon. I don’t think we can get access to a mass medium anytime soon but by relying on virtual spaces, a belief in our youth and their creativity in using these new tools, we can fill up this media gap to some extent.

There was another topic about installing a satellite channel from outside the country. I think these options should be on the table, but the significant point here is that despite all the censorship and clampdowns (on websites and web logs) we stress on expanding our youth base and ask them to provide us with solutions to extend our news networks.

We have big problems here ( in regard to the media), especially with a strict one-way manner of broadcasting from IRIB. However, from the my own experiences these omni-directional exaggerations broadcasted in support of diminishing our movement would fire backwards on them. Nonetheless they (their propaganda) could cause doubt, and disorder within us and I can see the effects myself sometimes. What I mean is that on the first day, there was no question whether there was fraud or not, everyone felt like there was. But people have been asking by now about the true stats, the real results and the reasons behind the fraud. That’s why we must work on ourselves. What I say is that the media are effective: when someone (comes on TV) and blasts everyone (in the movement), true that this would make people angry, but it’d also raise questions deeper within their thoughts, question that they cannot answer alone (based on the limited access they have to information). That’s why we should find ourselves responsible to resolve these questions.

As Mr. Hazeri knows well, even from early stage of this campaign we were a small group but a our campaign gained great amount of power from the contact that it established with the masses of people, and from people’s trust in us. That’s what is needed right now. There was delicate work done from this trust of the people that is that we said we are not going to constrain any creativity. Anyone is free to do what they want, and this worked for us. Right now that’s what we need. That’s why this group gathered around here, could think within themselves of ways to open up this blockade on flow of information so that we can have access to a medium. In regards to legal support (for establishing media) we had a great and knowledgeable person working with us Mr. Amir Arjmand who’s been detained and is now in prison. There are other strong people around who helped out. We have also recently noticed that we need great work in this area.

Necessity of capitalizing on people’s creativities and inclinations

There were talks about plainclothes officers. Presence of such officers as you know is very illegal. I have voiced my objection to this. We also wrote a legal document which caused reactions from Chief of Police and some other institutions (context: people within security institutions denied associations with such plainclothes officers, and tried to label them as rebels within the crowd) which should reveal to you how sensitive this case is. I believe we should continue a legal and lawful protest against this presence. Such an act could close up (at least some) opportunities for these forces to be used. Because those who use security forces against people can’t legally hold their forces on the streets without any uniform, not every organ of security forces commit to this continuously, which makes presence of plainclothes officers even worse (in that nobody is willing to take their responsibility.) People too have shown a strong and persistent reaction against these (plainclothes) forces, and we must capitalize on that. Some of our friends here mentioned that some of these plainclothes officers have been identified by people using their pictures on different website; Such methods are good and could be effective; this could restrain their presence. We should also continue working from the legal and political channels to protest against this so that we can wipe these issues off this nation. If we have police forces and security forces, they should react to such illegalities so that we can rid of these problems from our country.

Another question was asked that addressed why I entered the electoral battle without a campaign team. I had my own view of how the situation would developed, and I don’t think I made a mistake that I declared (my candidacy) late. In any case, if I had declared my candidacy a year earlier I would have not even made it to the elections; they wouldn’t have let me make it. I wanted to declare my candidacy on the 15th of Esfand or even later (last month of the Persian calendar, corresponding to late February) so that I would have time to organize and plan out so that we can gather our friend and move carefully. That’s why I declared it on the 15th. I even tried to get the message across without actually saying it that I can’t declare that I am running now, because there would have been an atmosphere (of enmity created against me through character assassinations, personal attacks, false accusations, and associations by proxy) to destroy my image, among many other things. I believe I acted realistically with regards to this. If I had declared it couple of couple of months earlier around Mehr (September) I would have not have probably even lasted till Nawrooz (new year in March). Anyhow, (admittedly) this (extent of fraud) was not something I had anticipated. I do agree that we’ve all been surprised. The recent news of the extent of fraud shows clearly that the extent was much more than I anticipated. I was also not anticipating the extent of interest the Supreme Leader took in the incumbent. If I had known about this, I may have changed some of my perceptions.

We had another problem too in this elections, the very important problem of campaign head-starts. Issues here are no more legal than other acts of fraud during the election. Issues (mentioned earlier) are problems that even with a sound election would necessitate nullifying the elections; just like someone who starts with the wrong epilogue (the epilogue to the prayers is Vozoo: act of washing the hands and face and anointing the head and feet) would be praying a null prayer. That’s why the introductory acts are illegal and against the law. Things like distributing money, falsifications of facts. And another one that was just discovered that there were laws on how to distribute subsidies from oil income; Parliament has objected to what has happened. It’s obvious that because of the elections the parliament has postponed the issue. Other things like the breakdown of SMS (Short Message Service text) networks occurred during and before the elections that...could have crippled us. We had based our whole communication system based on these networks. With all of constrains brought about to our election supervisors we had relied to these networks to communicate. (and we were assured too that this network is reliable, we had a whole group of computer and information processing specialists in a headquarters to process and organize all the information received, with the collapse of the networks all this was useless. When we protested to what has happened with two of our groups approaching two bodies of TCI (the only state-owned telecommunication company of Iran) we got nothing, they dodged responsibility claiming that "we didn’t do it". The shutdown orders did not come from us.’ This wasted our time and led to even more constraints.

One of our friends here had asked, where are we headed with all this? The "where" would definitely cover the current state of affairs (in regards to continuation of the protests) and could even be stretched as far as the next month or even year. It all goes back to analysis of what has happened in our country until right now (from the election), based on the analysis we are going to evaluate our opportunities and anticipate possible processes to unfold and plan accordingly. There could be discussion here that would take a whole session by itself. Those sociologists and political scientists amongst us could allocate some time to these issues. They could sit down and discuss issues, and think about short and long term solutions out of this mess.

There is a another thing that is of utmost important; that is the forces that take interest and have attended the elections themselves come from different brands of thought. Some say that street protests should stop and shift to a different format, some disagree. Some are radical, and some advocate a more conservative approach. Such discussions should keep happening so that we can collectively find solutions. Differences definitely exist between your friends and between our fellows too.

Hopefully we should reach some conclusion. Right now we are according certain necessities. There are some issues that we just have to follow after people. Many of the incidents that happened after Friday (the election day) were not organized by any one centralized group or organization; such is that massive rally on Monday that many of our friends here attended too. Our perception was that only a few would come out. My own presence, even if I were beaten a little, would at least reduce the violence against people and give them something to reduce their anguish. We attended the rally with this perception, but the immensity of the rallies and the presence of the people was much more than what we had anticipated. Or the rallies in Toopkhone Square (note: it’s ironic because the square is named after the leader of the revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini; the name that Mr. Mousavi uses to refer to the square is the name that common people use all the time which should reveal degree of informality during this speech) were not organized from a headquarters either.

Right now too (arbitrarily organized) movements such as these keep happening. I’ve said this even in the statements that the idea of green color too came to us from people, there wasn’t a group of scientists trying to think this through and advertise it with people. In one of our trips to the provinces a roughly 18-19 year old boy suggested the idea and they put a green scarf around me, and they told the reporters too mind you that I think it’s a good color, I am not bad with aesthetics due to my occupation as an artist (painter). We thought this would go out well, and Fateh (another senior member of Mousavi’s inner circle) and others thought it’s a good idea too, and this (green color) became the symbol, and managed to get many around itself and turned itself into a flag. This helped because of the great value our people have put into this color through out history that we have always associated this color with the great prophet, his family, and allies. That’s why the color has a religious tone to it and people have a good image and are comfortable feeling with this color. It’s also one of the colors in our national flag, and a color in nature too. God greatly helped us too. Our fortune with this color was great and it became very influential throughout the whole nation. Things (ideas) like these came out of people. I am not saying that we should not have any plans and just follow what people do, but that we should plan properly and follow people when we can, it’s a two way thing.

Dr. … insisted that between the significance of our Iranian nationality and Islamic roots, we must rely on Islamism in our system; that it’s the Islam of our system which is in peril. (I believe) this is right. But let me tell you about an episode which taught us a lesson during the campaign. In our campaign trips to Rasht (center of a province in among one of the greenest provinces in Iran) during our heated discussions about cultivating tea leafs and why they are uneconomical when Iranian farmers grow Iranian tea based on their sense of nationality and honor, I noticed that despite imports of tea that kills the profit for these farmers, being oblivious to our own products is being oblivious to our strong sense of nationality and honor which is very strong throughout the whole country.

It came to my mind that we can talk to people about many issues from similar perspectives. That’s why, when I talked about rice and rice imports hurting our own growth in that court in a gym in Rasht, and about how this is harmful to our economy and is a disregard to our sense of nationality, and about where our hundreds of years of love and yearning for Iran has gone, the crowds got very excited. And there was strong sense of nationality in that court. We expanded this to our national campaign, and we always got very excited response in Isfahan, and other places whenever we introduced issues in a the light of our sense of nationality. Without me saying anything, people started shouting “Iran Iran” and hitting the ground with their feet. I think this sense of nationality is something that in these past 20 years has been very lost. Because I believe the great departed Imam (Ayatollah Khomeini) put a great value to these feelings. It’s also true that discussions around this topic (whichever Islamism or nationality should be insisted) have been there in past 20 years. For our future, an future full of hardships until the country stabilizes, we need to return to these values to excite people and unite them around goals that would keep our country safe and would lead us toward solutions that are beneficial to the country. Such acts would help with our own integrity in pushing for groups that would become active economically and culturally.

When we talk about Iranian-hood, just like Dr. Shariati (one of the most prominent of Muslim sociologists and thinkers of the years prior to the revolutions) used to say, when we return to the composing elements of our society most of the fabric of our society is Islamic, and we can’t separate our nationality from Islamic traditions. We don’t have an Iranian-hood without the Islam, this is what the last regime used to do and it lost, In the (years of) Islamic revolution, and even before the revolutions Dr. Motahari (another very prominent but more Islamist sociopolitical thinker) talked about similar issues and that was one of his most important books. After the revolution too, this has always been with us, but we’ve never benefited form it as we should have.

This is situation where we can use this (sense of nationality). Many of the wrong and harmful policies that cause disadvantage and fallbacks is because of lack of this sense and the yearning for our country.

In another hall in Zanjan (another capital of Iran’s provinces), I was among a group of students, some of these kids that were bothering (others). They were waving a Palestinian flag. I said that it’s true we like Palestine and have defended it and this (support) has always been a slogan ever since the revolutions. But in a group meeting that we are talking about elections of Iran, what meaning does that flag has? Students started shouting chants, and the person was embarrassed and lowered his flag. There, when I was going to talk about these slogans and issues, I remembered Yaser Arafat coming to Iran as our first international guest when Imam (Ayatollah Khomeini) was told that he was going to make a trip to Khozestan (southern province of Iran with extensive oil resources) and Imam asked to stop him, concerned that he was going to take advantage of the Arab minorities living in Khozestan.

We have forgot about this (Iranian nationality) especially in this last four years, and we must return to these values. This can have a great influence over our messages and our future plans, I believe in this, and I would follow through with it. There are solutions suggested like boycotting the Seda-Sima (Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting) which I don’t’ want to get into. There was criticism that I did not anticipate such moves. It’s only true that I didn’t. I didn’t anticipate the extent of it. However, what I think we should view as an opportunity here is what has happened (recently.) What happened (the massive organized fraud, coup …Mousavi avoids using some of these words) was not a hasty act of self-defense. Instead what has toppled this election is a something that has been developing within our country and our establishment for years, and thanks to recent events it has revealed itself and its dangers. Such new findings should be seen as an opportunity.

Let’s pay attention to what people’s preferences are. Expensive methods would reduce people’s support for us. We shouldn’t be thinking that we can’t fight back through legal channels. When all the talk about lying was getting out there people came up with that very amazing poster where they sketched a “Lie” and covered it with a “Stop Sign”: “Lying is forbidden.” As someone with a bit of expertise on arts myself, I say this is one of the most amazing and most expressive posters designed ever (in hundred years). I never stepped into a city after that incident where I haven’t seen that sign again. Rest assured, some (ominous) deeds have been conducted in this nation and the election revealed these (deeds) and they became posters. This condemnation of a "Lie" (in posters) is not only condemning the deceit in the government but is also (a condemnation) of the desire to create lies and deceit; (the same) lie and deceit that unfortunately is created deep inside us all due to different (from our proper revolutionary values and thus wrong) policies that we had towards cultural issues.

Prior to the election, people tried to overcome this issue (of deceit and lies within us). The green waves that started and stretched from Tajrish (one side of the city in North with the well higher above average incomes) to Rah-Ahan (all the way to the other side with more middle and poorer classes) were (all) created on this very issue; to move beyond this deceit and hypocrisy which has shredded our nation to pieces, a nation of different groups and customs. This is why, when I see the (subject of) lie and the posters – I don’t know who drew this poster, since it’s a populist poster too with language of streets, but it seems like it is this very language the has contributed so much to the popularity of this poster. I guess that we can build on the opening that has revealed the (incumbent’s) government for what it really is and on appetites within the heart of our society (a phenomena that we must try to understand) and push forward with this movement.

People also showed us the solutions. People aspire to be together, be cheerful, and love Iran and be able to advance it ahead; (they aspire to) science, tolerance for one another, and that there’d be freedom.

Something funny happened to me that I told Mr. Khamenei (the current supreme Leader who at the time of Khomeni’s leadership had been president with Mousavi acting as his vice-president) too. I’ll tell you about it too to lighten up the mood here. One (campaign day) I was driving to Yaft-Abad from Navab St. (streets of mid to south Tehran)We happened to ride beside a Peykan (a decreasingly in some areas but still very common car on the streets of Iran manufactured internally) with Ahmadinejad (supporters) passengers. They recognized me, stretched their heads out of the windows holding posters of Mr. Ahmadinejad and yelling the slogan:” Freedom of expression, cannot be done with, something, and uhhm, and something.” (during the debates Mousavi was not as fluent as people would expect a presidential candidate to be. Ahmadinejad supporters are making fun of Mousavi here through the slogan.) I told our driver to slow down so that we can driver closer to them, and we (Mousavi and Ahmadinejad supporters) started chatting and joking. We were doing this for almost a good 10 to 15 minutes, I did not sense any enmity, like any tendency from them to want to throw something at me, or conduct agitated driving, or me feeling that I’ve been berated.

So, this was our spirit before the elections that variety of groups with different ideas would come together. If the establishment had capitalized on this, certainly, we would have had more centrist approaches on the speed of our progress (in the country.) I guess, one of our future projects should be reviving this very spirit through out our nation. We must take a stance against any action that would encourage disparity between classes of people. We must not gain a reputation of favoring those who are with us and not those who are against us. Our nation is one and there are different ethnicity and ideas that tolerate each other. If someone is a felon, well, they’d take him and put him behind bars. As for the rest of people, when they are innocent they can live their lives together and tolerate each other (in his words he’s advocating the policy of innocent until proven guilty against the policy of pre-emptive strike).

The election, and the environment prior to the election revealed that this is possible. People here ask me for a sample. An example is the nights prior to the elections when people poured into the streets without the slightest of confrontation. We must not let these achievements go to waste. We must add this to our vocabulary, and use as the achievement. In our communication with people we must regard it as an achievement.

We must not – they accuse me, not personally me but it’s unimportant now – act in such a way to expose us to accusations of illegality. This is a very important point. We shouldn’t think that we can’t confront and voice our concerns through legal channels. We have examples of people who fought and got results (using similar methods) around the world and in our country. We must note that the hardships in this method is not any less than the illegal methods. Some think that a revolutionary method is to ignore consequences and as they say "just get down with it". No, legal approaches have their own problems, hardships and headaches, but they would provide the country with something more stable instead. This approach would help us bond with other classes of society, bond with cleric classes, gather people together and reduce risks and costs for those classes who want to take part in mass activities.

If people are involved and exposed in a movement for a long time, it’s going to harm them. Naturally, with country’s current problems and the economic situation, their support would deteriorate. We must not let the official format (of the current government) become hegemonic, meaning that they have got the people to cope with whatever. We must raise and discuss these issues so that people are aware.

Action within the frameworks of the system

I have pointed this out before that hopefully (if God is willing) our actions too should remain in the frameworks of the system. Now our strategizing units should take care of questions like what organizational work we should take on, or things like necessity of a new party through brainstorms. Yesterday we had a discussion with a group of friends and managerial executives of the country. We talked about how the course of action that the (incumbent) government took, has ignored and alienated an immense force. If university professors and elites of the country stay with this (immense force ignored by incumbent) we can organize a national project through different NGOs active in economic, cultural and political issues while at the same time come together, centralized, all following the same goals. This is a challenging work, but it’s very doable, and we can take it on. This would consequently allow us to keep those forces that have recently risen alive and awake; and fight hopelessness as the most fearful condition we could be led to.

I remember many of you when we joined together to make this crowd 25 years ago. You were all young. I was here from the very beginning. You have all grown up now and have children. You probably have children that had turned away from politics, but have accompanied you this time around [people in the crowd: not only accompanied but also stepped further ahead of us], ok and stepped further ahead of you, [people in the crowd: and now they are hopeless], Alas, this is what I’m talking about, we must do something that they (the younger ones) would not yield to hopelessness, we must do something that they wouldn’t lose hope, we must open up a new way and tell then that future maybe full of hardships but it’s a doable future to make.

Our whole system of governance is not limited to the presidential government, and our whole history is not 4 years or 8 years. We are a country with a long history. History tells us we are 2500, 3000 years old, but we have artifacts dating back to 12000 years. We have a long ancient history. We’ve had countless ups and downs, and this is one of those ups and downs. It’d require sacrifice. Some may not survive. Some would rise up and others would fall down. However, in the grand scheme of our history all this would have minimal influence. We must get this across to our young ones. We must tell them that this is some hard work, nobody would just hand you a well developed future. I don’t think that there’s a well-developed country that has not gone through these phases. What I mean is that, all countries have gone through some challenging routes, and we are no exception.

Hopefully (if God is willing) we should inspire our youth with a hopeful spirit and maintain the unity of the nation and push forward with it. We must also think of solutions, practical solutions. Managing our current position in the incoming month, would one of the most arduous phases. There are many possibilities. Obviously, our establishment would have paid minimally if it would have investigated the truth, and everybody would have abided by the results. Now whether we find a solution or not; well, Mr. Khatami (a former and first reformist president of Iran) has taken action for a solution and some of the Ayatollahs of Qom (the seminary city), have devised a solution, some of the higher ranking people within the system too are looking for solutions, to see whether they can find a way out.

Now, like the annulment of any second stage in the election process, or the ostensible investigators’ committee (fact-seeking committee) with ideas just to wrap stuff up, our solutions are almost, not completely but at least almost, impossible to conclude to anything practical. I am not very optimistic on this, but this is a phase we must go through. Same (pessimism is expected) from the Guardian Council, hopefully (if god is willing) I am wrong that they would act partially, we can only pray that they would act impartial. They could at least assuage people a bit even if they find 5% fraud, and they come out and declare that 5% as illegal actions committed during the election.

Now, the extent to which they are willing to admit to this (fraud) is another thing, but the important things are what course of action we would take and what people’s expectations are. Some people shout very radical slogans. There were slogans saying: “Mousavi, Mousavi, get our votes back” as if I have collected the votes myself. (Mousavi chuckling) In the crowds I replied that “I don’t have the votes with me!” (audience in the room laughing) I told them that we would all try and will get our votes back together. (audience in the room now shouting slogans too: “get our votes back, get our votes back”) Yes, of course, get our votes back. Of course, people are getting more realistic and they know that our resources are very limited, they are adapting to this reality (of limited resources) and (instead) they are organizing themselves within themselves.

In the current situations (of people getting detained) this issue, and continuing on (with the movement), is naturally accompanied by many costs and possible harms, which should makes questionable whether this would continue on or not. What Dr. Hazeri said earlier on in this meeting is very important. It should be discussed and talked about so that we can find approaches on our next steps. For now, we have a shabby little campaign headquarters. They’ve attacked us, they took whoever could have been more helpful and influential and locked them away until they got to top senior members.

The same Alireza Beheshti (Son of Ayatollah Beheshti. The father was assassinated by People’s Mujahedin (fighters) of Iran (hereafter MKO) bombings during the war, who was the first head of judiciary courts in the Islamic republic and one of the three closest and most influencial men on Ayatollah Khomeini the leader of the revolution along with Rafsanjani – now head of Assembly of Experts and Chairman of the Expediency Discernment Council. and Khamenei – the Supreme Leader.) when he got arrested in our newspaper headquarters; he was one of the most influential of our people. We thought they would arrest both brothers (both sons are close friends and consultant to Mr. Mousavi) and they got really close to arresting them too, but they decided to let them go.

We are analyzing our current position, hopefully (if God is willing) we would take decisions that are in line with our national interests and religious beliefs. We should not leave our principles no matter how radicalized the environment turns out to be, even if we have to sacrifice ourselves for it. We are committed to avoid lies, act truthfully, accept something if it turns out right, and committed to open up if a proper solution would come about even if it would harm us. I know that if our intentions are good, God too would help us.

I here take stand and swear that all the incidents that have happened were significant events and I don’t associate them with any weaknesses in our management. We were a bunch, among us Mr. Manouchehri who laughs a lot because he knows this. (Mousavi chuckling himself) You (Mr. Manouchehri) do know. (audience laughs) We were a group of friends and people we decided to run and to act and strategize the way we did. Because of our honesty, God blessed us and this nation-wide environment was created as an asset for our nation. In future too we will believe in our own abilities and we would rely on our own ethics and of course we must have aptitude in our management to move within our frameworks. I am confident and hopeful that definitely (in the end) this movement will be beneficial to our nation.

The Latest from Iran (20 August): Grinding to a Halt

The Latest from Iran (19 August): Challenges in Parliament and from Prisons

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1810 GMT: Recognise Us Because We're Really Nice. There have been signs this week that the Ahmadinejad Government would be more flexible in its position on the nuclear programme, and today this came from the Associated Press, via unnamed diplomats:

Iran has lifted a ban and allowed UN inspectors to visit a nearly-completed nuclear reactor. Inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency visited the reactor in Arak after a year-long ban...Iran agreed last week to expand uranium enrichment monitoring of the site.

1735 GMT: Ahmadinejad and the IRGC Factor. As we wait for the fallout from the President's televised speech on his Cabinet selections, here's how American anlaysts get it right. And wrong.

The appointment of Ahmad Vahidi as Minister of Defense has been noticed because he was commander of the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps in the late 1980s/early 1990s. So, it is said, Vahidi's appointment indicates a consolidation of the relationship between the President and the IRGC in the face of opposition not only from "reformists" but from "conservative" and "principlist" elements.

Right.

And, the analysts continue, this indicates that Ahmadinejad plans to continue and maybe accelerate Iran's material support for pro-Iranian parties and militias in the Middle East.

Wrong.

This, of course, may be a consequence over time of Vahidi's appointment but to assert --- without any evidence --- that the external dimension is more important than the President's manoeuvres in an internal crisis smacks of a view that revolves around Washington, rather than Tehran.

1725 GMT: Worst. Claim. Ever: It's All Hillary's Fault. Iran's police chief of police Esmail Ahmadi-Moqaddam has said that the "confessions" of political detainees must be authentic because their mastermind, Hillary Clinton, has openly revealed their plans: "Some say that the police has extracted confessions by force, but I tell them: No-one has extracted confession out of Mrs. Clinton, yet she reveals all issues freely."

While Ahmadi-Moqaddam's statement should be called out as a crass cover-up of the state's treatment of prisoners, it does point to the lack of wisdom in Clinton's posturing --- motivated primarily to counter domestic charges that the Administration had stood back from post-election events --- when she told CNN earlier this month that the US Government did much "behind the scenes" for Iranian protesters.

1450 GMT: Reuters has now picked up on the problems for Ahmadinejad's Ministerial appointments in Parliament, adding this quote from Speaker Ali Larijani on Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting: "Those nominated by the president for government posts must have sufficient expertise and experience, otherwise a great deal of the country's energy would be wasted."

1410 GMT: Creating Some Political Space? Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani, speaking to the Islamic Society of Engineers, has declared that the primary duty of Government is "justice so human beings may perfect themselves" and that it was essential for people to have "economic, cultural, and political mobility".

1340 GMT: Tonight's the Night. After the stop-start process of naming his Cabinet, President Ahmadinejad takes to the national airwaves in a broadcast just after the 9 p.m. news. He may do so with a bit of nervousness: protestors are planning to drown out the President with "Allahu Akhbars", and Ahmadinejad's previous broadcast didn't go so well. Remember his defeat at the hands of the Giant Moth? (If you missed it, here's the video.)

1150 GMT: Another Shot at Ahmadinejad. Jomhoori Eslami reports that an Iranian court has temporarily suspended former First Vice President and current Presdential Chief of Staff Esfandiari Rahim-Mashai for two months because of charges of financial misconduct.

1140 GMT: The Fight Begins? The Deputy Speaker of the Parliament, Mohammad Reza Bahonar, has warned that at leave five of President Ahmadinejad's choices for Ministers may not receive votes of confidence. Reuters has English-language summary of report.

1100 GMT: No Newspaper is Safe. Even the hard-line "conservative" Kayhan could be banned from newsstands. According to the Iranian Labor News Agency, the same court that banned Etemade Melli has ordered Saeed Mortazavi, the Tehran Prosecutor General, to halt the publication of Kayhan, because of the failure of its editor, Hossein Shariatmadari, to answer two court summons. Shariatmadari was taken to court by Mir Hossein Mousavi's chief advisor Alireza Beheshti and others over the "publication of repeated lies" against the candidate.

0720 GMT: The English-language version of the Iran Parliament website has just released the names of the 18 ministers whom it says were submitted by President Ahmadinejad to the Parliament "on Wednesday". There are no surprises amongst the names, which we revealed in yesterday's updates.

0620 GMT: Reading Another Change. We reported yesterday that the new head of Iran's judiciary, Saeed Larijani, had given a clear thumb-in-the-eye to the President with the appointment of Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejeie, the Minister of Intelligence fired by Ahmadinejad, as Iran's Prosecutor General.

Larijani is also replacing Tehran's chief prosecutor, Saeed Mortazavi, with Morteza Bakhtiari, the former head of Iran's prison service and former Governor of Isfahan. The timing is a bit curious, since Mortazavi was seen as the legal force behind the prosecution of post-election political detainees, and we are in the middle of the Tehran trials.

So is Larijani asserting his authority against the President? Or is the simple explanatio n that Mortazavi is moving to a post in Ahmadinejad's executive? And will there be an impact, short-term or long-term, on detentions and prosecutions?

0540 GMT: Meanwhile, a foreign-policy breakthrough for the President and his Government received surprisingly little attention. Syrian President Bashir al-Assad was in Tehran for a chat.

The cover story was that Assad came to Iran to broker the release of French national Clotilde Reiss, arrested and still awaiting trial on bail. Iranian state media preferred the image of election legitimacy, quoting Assad's greeting to Ahmadinejad, “I’ve come here today to personally convey my warm congratulations to you and the Iranian nation. I believe what happened in Iran was an important development and a great lesson to foreigners."

The overriding significance, however, is in the Associated Press headline, "Iran’s supreme leader reinforces Syria alliance." Ahmadinejad, who has been ostracised internationally since his trip to Moscow just after the election, will get a symbolic boost; however, it is unclear whether Assad was reinforcing the alliance or holding it in suspension. Before 12 June, it appeared that the Tehran-Damascus relationship was an important influence on questions from the Israel-Palestine dynamic (and the in-fighting within the Palestinian leadership), the situation in Lebanon, and the wider state of play (political and economic) between Iran and Arab States. How much of it that continues while Ahmadinejad's real rather than symbolic legitimacy is still doubted?

0500 GMT: We took a break last night to recharge our batteries and return this morning not to news but to two non-events.

The first non-event was President Ahmadinejad's to formally submit his Ministerial nominations to Parliament by yesterday's deadline. In the morning, all appeared to be almost complete: Mehr News was reporting three names remained to be confirmed, and then Tabnak said only one, the Minister of Justice. At 1:22 p.m. local time, a few hours before the deadline, the English-language site of the Parliament recapped the news.

And then nothing. There was a clue that all was not well when the President's Wednesday night national broadcast was postponed for 24 hours but, otherwise, updates stopped as the deadline came and went. (Press TV's website is still stuck on its Wednesday morning headline, "More Ahmadinejad cabinet nominees revealed".) Then, just after 10 p.m., the Farsi-language version of the Parliament website reported simply, "The letter of the President still has not come."

No one is offering the reason for the delay, but the obvious speculation is that some of the names in the list leaked by the media were unacceptable to members of Parliament. And so we enter today, ready to analyse but with no way forward yet on the questions: will Ahmadinejad make concessions and change some of his selections? Will there be any punishment for his failure to meet the deadline? Will any high-ranking "conservative" or "principlist" MPs come out publicly against the President?

However, it is the other non-event, largely missed by media, which is occupying us this morning. Yesterday the Executive Committee of the Assembly of Experts postponed the next meeting of the Assembly, which was due in about 10-12 days. Our question from yesterday's update, "Who pushed for the delay?", is still unanswered. To get an idea of the stakes involved in this answer, consider the make-up of the Executive Committee: Hashemi Rafsanjani aligned against Ahmadinejead supporters Hashemi Shahroudi (former Head of Judiciary), Mohammad Yazdi (Rafsanjani's foe within the Assembly), Ghorban Ali Dorri Najafabadi (Prosecutor General), and Ahmad Khatami (the hard-line temporary leader of Friday prayers in Tehran).

An EA correspondent offers this assessment, leading to an important but so far overlooked point:

The excuse that the Assembly meeting was delayed because of Ramadan [which starts on Saturday] appears as exactly that, an excuse and nothing more. Parliament will debate and possibly block Ahmadinejad's ministerial nominees well into Ramadan, Government will carry on business, and I am sure the trials will not go into recess for a month.

So what seems to be the case here is someone simply unwilling to have the session happen so soon. The latest letters sent by the former MPs and the Qom ulama [clerics] might have precipitated the case. They either blew the lid off Rafsanjani's machinations or persuaded the Supreme Leader to force a postponement in order to work on the Assembly members and make sure they don't spell trouble for him. At any rate, it just adds to all the shocks that have hit the orderly functioning of state institutions after June 12.

Amidst all the demonstrations, the detentions and trials, and the political machinations, the Iranian Government is effectively suspended. And the longer that situation persists, the more the question emerges: when is there a breaking point, not of showdown in the streets or in the Parliament, but in day-to-day life?

Iran: Text of Latest Karroubi Statement "You Will Not Force Me Into Silence"

The Latest from Iran (19 August): Challenges in Parliament and from Prisons

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Mehdi Karroubi has continued his campaign against the Government, particularly with regard to the treatment of detainees, with a new statement published in Saham News and, in a shorter version, in Aftab Yazd. This English translation should be read in conjunction with Karroubi's letter of 29 July to Hashemi Rafsanjani and his interview last week with Saham News:


Some individuals think that these insults and defamations [in response to Karroubi's letter claiming abuse of detainees] will force me to retreat. I advise these gentlemen to study history and observe that after the Revolution and at the end of the 3rd Parliament [1992] many people said whatever they could about me, including accusing me of embezzling funds and sending them out of the country. Who was the person who toughed it out?

In the last week I have been at the receiving end of many harsh attacks from MPs , IRIB [Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting], the media, and some clergymen. If this trend continues, I will say things that [those individuals] would prefer to remain unsaid....

After the 10th Presidential election [of 12 June] horrific events involving violence, lawlessness, irresponsibility by individuals having no official position interfering in the name of protecting the establishment, by paramillitary groups, and by plainclothes security forces have occurred in our country. These events are such that responsible, concerned. and informed individuals must set aside caution and self-preservation in order to do whatever they can in order to prevent a repetition of these events and destroy all the roots of such styles of confrontation....

In any part of the world it is possible that during demonstrations people get arrested, but I doubt that those arrested will be carted off to special locations and left to the mercies of their jailers. Here they are first transported to an unknown location such that even the head of the judiciary and the head prosecutor claim that the prisoners were not subjected to such treatment in official prisons under our jurisdiction....

All these events have occurred because the public are protesting the results of an election. Is this the correct way to treat people who are only want to know what was the fate of their votes?....Usually a protocol and regulations exist for obtaining confessions....The fact that such lawlessness has been observed in the methodolgies used for extraction confessions leads me to say that these confessions were extracted violently by ill-informed and unprudent and foolish individuals....

I am sorry to say that the SAVAK [security forces of the Shah] behaved in a more humane fashion than the individuals in charge of the recent arrests....

The head of this newspaper [Kayhan] that writes such lies about the children of the revolution is a near friend and colleague of Said Emami [a Deputy Minister of Intelligence who allegedly ordered the chain killing of intellectuals and dissidents in Tehran]...The head of Friday prayers who calls me a terrorist and anti-revolutionary is the same person who, during the Shah's time when all of us clergymen were persecuted, ran away to Pakistan to ostensibly do mission work for the Ayatollah....

Some of my friends in Parliament who have made statements against me should not forget that they have only gained their seats because [the Guardian Council] disqualified their rivals from running against them.... The reaction of some individuals in the armed forces towards me is to be expected because these individuals have amassed a huge amount of political and econonomic power, but they must also know that ideas are not limited or dependent to a few individuals and they diffuse into families as well. As indeed members of your own families have disagreements with you....

48 years ago in Mashaad, when the mosque of Goharshad incident occurred, a number of ignorant security forces [of the Shah] wanted to impede Imam Khomeini's movement with a campaign of misinformation, and they were thwarted by the truth leaking out....How can the officals expect anything to happen in Modern Tehran in the age of communications without anyone finding out?

You have now induced conditions so that no one dares to speak out, I reiterate to you that these behaviors and the atmosphere of fear that you have caused will not force me into silence and if there is a requirement I will state the relevent issues.