The Latest from Iran (29 August): The Stakes Are Raised

UPDATED Iran: How the Regime Constructed the “Velvet Revolution”
Iran Video Exclusive: Ministry of Intelligence Proves “Velvet Revolution”
The Latest from Iran (28 August): The President Prays

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1820 GMT: EA correspondent Mr Johnson gives us some guidance on the change of Tehran chief prosecutor:

Regardless of Dowlatabadi's political affiliations, the replacement of Mortazavi is a sign that the establishment considers him to be a liability and perhaps dispensable as a potential scapegoat.

The main issue is whether this change is merely cosmetic or whether the establishment take a proactive approach, namely, scuttle the trials (which can be easily done because all the indictments are so flimsy that none of them can bear any legal scrutiny), and somehow solve the very public and very embarrasing and inflammatory issue of prison tortures and unmarked graves, thereby regaining some semblence of legality and law. The next few days will be extremely inportant.

1755 GMT: A reader strikes back immediately at the security force denials of involvement in post-election raids: "You can't fake live video feed. We've got evidence on several videos that basij attacked dorms in Tehran University," and offers this:

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FzUhJXTspcw[/youtube]

1740 GMT: This is now looking like a concerted campaign between the President and security force commanders to deny any post-election misdeeds. After Tehran's police chief denied any detainee was killed in Kahrizak prison (0845 GMT), the Revolutionary Guard commander General Mohammad Ali Jafari has said the post-election death toll is 20 Basiji militia and only 9 "opponents and outlaws". Jafari denied that the Basiji were involved in the raids on university dormitories days after the election.

1715 GMT: EA's Iran analyst Mr Smith drops by to take issue with the portrayal by Tehran Bureau of an "isolated, weak, and delusional" Ahmadinejad (1310 GMT):

This lacks sources on just about all the allegations it makes and then essentially parrots the reformist line: Ahmadinejad is weak, is in trouble, is a lame duck already, etc.

While of course all of us wish that this was the case, the reality appears quite different, as we have seen no real thrust to wrestle him out of office. The Supreme Leader has only rebuked him frontally during the [former First Vice President] Mashai affair and he still has the rather remarkable opportunity of talking from official platforms such as Friday Prayers, saying things quite different from what the SL says, and still walking out relatively unscathed.

Granted, he has the same amount, or more, difficulties than any executive leader in the world would have for forming a government, but I would be very cautious in calling Ahmadinejad a has-been and that days may be counted down to his demise. Sadly, I doubt this scenario will happen anytime soon.

We shouldn't forget that the Supreme Leader, conservative critics of AN like the Larijanis, Ahmad Tavakoli (who happens to be the Larijanis' cousin), and more have essentially agreed to accept the outcome of the Presidential election as announced by the Interior ministry. Hence, they are simply jostling for political kudoes and power within the Government, more than mounting a challenge that is really geared towards removing Ahmadinejad from power.

1700 GMT: Back from an afternoon break for a wedding.

After a couple of weeks of indecision, Tehran's Chief Prosecutor Saeed Mortazavi has been replaced by Abbas Jafari Dowlatabadi, head of judiciary in the southern province of Khuzestan.

The Los Angeles Times is framing Dowlatabadi as "a relatively moderate newcomer" and portraying Mortazavi's "firing" as a signal against the trials of political detainees that he oversaw. We're not sure of that interpretation --- any comments would be welcome.

1340 GMT: Our question (0445 GMT): "Does Mehdi Karroubi make another intervention on detentions and abuses?" Karroubi's answer: an open letter to the head of judiciary, Sadegh Larijani, offering to provide documentation and detainees who have suffered abuse.

1323 GMT: The principlist member of Parliament Ali Motahari, who has been highly critical of the Government in recent weeks, has said Ahmadinejad's remarks contest and challenge the Supreme Leader and the President must be held responsible for his deeds and words, particularly on the issue of detentions.

1315 GMT: The reformist party Mojahedin of Islamic Revolution, some of whose members are among the political detainees, have strongly condemned the 4th “show trial” and called it a reminder of the medieval inquisition courts and Stalin-era tribunals. The party emphasised that the staged “trials” and false “confessions” are conspiracies to suspend the reformist parties.

1310 GMT: And, on the same theme, Muhammad Sahimi at Tehran Bureau pays great attention to the "glaring fissures [which] have emerged within the conservative and reactionary camp", albeit with the dramatic presentation of an "isolated, weak, and delusional" Ahmadinejad.

1300 GMT: It's not just Enduring America that is raising questions about the divide between the Supreme Leader and the President in light of their differing speeches on Wednesday and yesterday. The reformist website Rah-e-Sabz has noted the divergences over foreign-inspired revolution and, in particular, Ahmadinejad's denial of any security force responsibility for abuses less than 48 hours after Ayatollah Khamenei promised that anyone guilty of such abuses would be published.

1110 GMT: The Battle over the Cabinet. A prominent "conservative" member of Parliament, Ahmad Tavakoli, has said that 7 of President Ahmadinejad's 21 Ministerial nominees will fail to receive a vote of confidence. Echoing reports from yesterday, Tavakoli said all three women put forth will be rejected because of a lack of executive experience.

1040 GMT: In an interview with Etemad newspaper, Mohammad Hashemi, the brother of Hashemi Rafsanjani, said that Rafsanjani is not planning to quit leading Friday Prayers He also described how security forces beat Rafsanjani's daughter-in-law while arresting her during one of the post-election protests.

0905 GMT: Pretty slow day after yesterday's excitement. No answers to any of our questions at 0445 GMT. Internet chatter is on the call by Human Rights Watch on the new head of judiciary, Sadegh Larijani, to "tackle rights abuses".

0845 GMT: Nothing Happened Here. More signs of an Ahmadinejad Fightback. After the President's claims yesterday that incidents at detention centres were the fault of the protest movement, rather than the security forces, the Tehran police chief, Azizollah Rajabzadeh, has explained that "no defendants were transferred to the Kahrizak detention centre without a judicial warrant and no defendant was killed" in the prison.

Oh. Well, following on the week's theme --- the Supreme Leader and the President on different pages of the script --- someone might want to tell Ayatollah Khamenei, who has admitted mistakes at Kahrizak and ordered its closure.

0515 GMT: A Follow-Up on "Velvet Revolution". After our analysis yesterday, "How the Regime Constructed the Velvet Revolution", an EA correspondent points to an interview by Ayande News with Hamid Reza Moghadam-Far, the Managing Director of Fars News Agency, and a Mr. Gharebaghi, whom Ayande claim are two of the authors of the Tehran trial indictments. Their views of the "velvet revolution" are posted in an update of the analysis.

0445 GMT: At the risk of being overdramatic, Friday was a day of two statements, that of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to and beyond the audience at Tehran's prayers and that of Mohammad Khatami to and beyond reformist leaders.

The founding assertion of each statement was that the current President/former President was ready to take the post-election crisis to a political and legal showdown with the ultimate public punishment. In Ahmadinejad's case, he was ready to press until the opposition leaders were imprisoned for a long, long time; in Khatami's, he was ready to see the "traitors" ejected from power and positions of responsibility.

What we now await, in an always-shifting conflict but one which continues to be about legitimacy, is the response of others. With respect, the protest movement is mainly an observer, with the next mass demonstration proposed for 18 September, so attention turns to political and religious leaders. Does Hashemi Rafsanjani and his allies break cover, after their recent skirmish over the Tehran trial, and give any support to Khatami? Does Mehdi Karroubi make another intervention on detentions and abuses, and thus those responsibile for them, or wait for a Parliamentary response to his claims? Where is Mir Hossein Mousavi?

And, just to repeat our thought from yesterday, what does the Supreme Leader do now?

Iran: The Inside Line on Hashemi Rafsanjani (from His Brother)

The Latest from Iran (15 August): Battles Within the Establishment

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Hashemi Rafsanjani's siding with the reformists came out in the open with his sermon of July 17 at Tehran University. However, little information on his point of view was in the public view until Friday, when the Islamic Labor News Agency news agency published a long interview with Mohammad Hashemi, younger brother and close confidant of the former president. It offers revealing glimpses on the wily cleric's frame of mind and suggests that he is not sitting idly, despite being thwarted in attempts to perform routine tasks such as leading Friday prayers.

Of particular interest are Mohammad Hashemi's statements that Rafsanjani believes that Ahmadinejad, and implictly Khamenei, have veered off the course of the Islamic Revolution. All this makes Rafsanjani's position in the run-up to the next meeting of the Assembly of Experts, which should take place within the next 30 days, all the more interesting. Will the leader of the sole body that can dismiss the Supreme Leader finally act according to his constitutional powers and steer Khamenei back on a course of "allegiance" to the Imam's line?

Extracts from the interview:

MH: People were unhappy about the Ahmadinejad government since 1386 [2006], and these people were not restricted to any particular faction. At least 15 million people are still unhappy today. The Guardian Council cannot be the only side to be able to talk on the national media --- the unsatisfied people must be allowed to talk as well.

A lot of people think that their rights have been trampled upon. The way to restore the confidence of the latter in the system is not through violence and jailing. The solidity of the political system will not be reinforced through this sort of behaviour. People acting in this way must change attitude.

These days are really testing for [Hashemi Rafsanjani]. He cannot be upbeat or feel glad when he notices that a group of our compatriots are in jail or are beaten up or even have their relatives arrested and violently dealt with. This situation is not one that generates joy and sweetness for Mr. Hashemi."

During the ninth presidential elections of 1384 [2005] those events [attacks on Rafsanjani] occurred , there was a discussion on these events in the first session of the [Expediency] Council itself. Some of the members asked Hashemi why he did not respond to the allegations. During that meeting, Shaykh Hassan Sanei [brother of Grand Ayatollah Yusuf Sanei and head of the 15 Khordad Foundation] is afraid. After the rest expressed bewilderment, Sanei explained that Hashemi is afraid that the Revolution might be slighted. It is for this reason that he is ready to face these hardships.

Hashemi Rafsanjani is deeply unpleased and unsatisfied by the current situation and does not consider it to be in line with the programme and development of the path of the Revolution. Hashemi Rafsanjani is distressed when he observes doubts being cast over human dignity.

They want to move Hashemi Rafsanjani out of the way in order to establish an Islamic Government.

[Why have attacks against Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani increased?] An issue came up after the passing away of the Imam [Khomeini]: Do we want an Islamic Republic or an Islamic government/state. The Imam desired an Islamic Republic. Some, however, later said that the Imam would not have wanted a Republic had he been alive today. He had brought up the idea during his lifetime for the sake of appearing courteous and respectful of others. However, Mr. Hashemi wants the same Islamic Republic that the Imam preferred. Presently, there are some [political] figures that do not want this and, for this reason, they need to force Mr. Hashemi out of the way in order to achieve an Islamic government. In order to reach their preferred goal, they resort to insults and lies. This group assigns no rights whatsoever to the people within their government. This comes despite the fact that the Imam said that everything the state does has to be for the people's sake. During Mr. Mousavi's government, the Imam would say that the government should not get involved in what the people can perform autonomously, and stated that the people should be able to express their wishes and desires.

Unfortunately, we have now reached a point in which some people get to the level of announcing on radio, TV, and the press that the Imam would not want a Republic had he been alive now.

Hashemi, the right man in times of crisis

Hashemi had the ability to resolve certain crises during the Imam's time due to the Imam's support and cooperation. We are not witnessing a similar situation now, due to certain decisions being taken the way they were. Mr. Hashemi cannot be as effective alone as he could have been back then. We should also not forget that Mr. Hashemi does not have state-governmental power in his hands; due to the lack of the latter, Mr. Hashemi cannot take practical steps. He does not want to act in a way as to allow foreign megaphones to claim that there is a power struggle going on inside Iran.

[MH referred to his brother's suggestions, as made at the July 17 Friday Prayers, as a "Three-point Decree"] Unfortunately, these suggestions were not received as they should have been: Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi acted in a very insulting way. The faction opposing Mr. Hashemi are waiting for him to say anything in order to insult him.

As stated by Mr. Hashemi, the Leader of the Revolution is able to resolve this crisis. Otherwise, violence and the imprisonment of political personalities will not resolve the current crisis - our revolution would have not succeeded had we been supposed to proceed along these paths.

On the "confessions" of former Vice President Mohammad Ali Abtahi and journalist Mohammad Atrianfar in the Tehran trials:

Both Atrianfar and Abtahi reached the conclusion, in jail, that there has been no rigging in the elections. The question rises as to what sort of facilities were provided to these gentlemen in prison, given that extensive documentation is necessary to prove that rigging or otherwise happened during the course of the last elections. [These] speeches are costly for the regime and the country.

[Would MH, as head of Iran Radio and TV in the 1980s, have shown these confessions?]
The broadcast of these types of confessions is external to the decision-making of the Radio-TV management. I was personally against the airing of the confessions of Ayatollah Shariatmadari, which the Information Ministry insisted upon. I visited the Imam after the first sessions was televised and he concurred, saying, "You don't have to pay attention to Mr. Shariatmadari anymore." This was due to the fact that Mr. Shariatmadari was a marja [senior cleric] with plenty of followers, pursuing his case further would have had adverse results.

The airing of confessions today can be linked to a pre-ordained plan to rid the political system of several ["reformist"] political parties.