The Latest from Iran (12 August): Two Months Later

NEW Translation: Mousavi on Detentions, "Foreign Interference", and Islamic Republic (12 August)
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NEW Translated Text: The Indictment in the Tehran Trials
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The Latest from Iran (11 August): A Change in Prayers and a Pause


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2050 GMT: We've posted the English translation of Mir Hossein Mousavi's statement today. The text goes beyond our initial analysis (1700 GMT): this is a concerted and, in my opinion, clever attempt to turn the "foreign interference" charge back on the regime. It is the Government's actions such as detentions, propaganda, and lies, Mousavi says, that makes the Islamic Republic vulnerable to the manipulations of powers such as the United States.

1910 GMT: Ayatollah Ali Mohammad Dastghaib has asked for an emergency meeting of the Assembly of Experts, saying it is the duty of the Experts to the Iranian people "to maintain the Constitution".

1855 GMT: Mehdi Karroubi has responded to Speaker of the Parliament Ali Larijani's statement that he "wanted evidence" of  allegations of detainee abuse, contained in a letter from Karroubi to Hashemi Rafsanjani. A Karroubi spokesman said that information would be provided on the charges, which included rapes of women and young boys.

(A side note: it is now being claimed that state media exaggerated Larijani's statement when it said he called Karroubi's allegations of rape "a lie" --- see 0720 GMT.)

1840 GMT: Mahmoud is God. So says Ayatollah Mesbah-Yazdi, who told a gathering of "Basij Artists", "Once the President has received the investment from the Supreme eader, the holiness of the Supreme Leader is transferred to him as well, therefore people should obey the President as if they obey God."

1815 GMT: Presidential candidate Mohsen Rezaei, following up his criticism of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad yesterday, has said that if allegations of abuse of detainees are proven, "all the related officials should be dismissed and tried" on criminal charges.

1750 GMT: Saeed Mortazavi, the prosecutor in charge of the trials of those arrested during the post-election conflict, says the hearings for French national Clotilde Reiss have been completed, but her conviction and/or sentence has yet to be determined: "Reiss is still in jail but her trial is over and any decision on her release on bail or remaining in prison will be taken by the judge."


1735 GMT: An Iranian website has published the list of about 100 individuals who are banned from appearing on Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting. (No one from Enduring America is on the list...yet.)

1730 GMT: Mowj-e-Sabz, the website for the Green movement, carries the dramatic allegation that a member of the Guardian Council, in the presence of the Supreme Leader, testified to widespread "cheating" in the Presidential election.

1700 GMT: Back from break with partial question, asked in our initial update, about the next move of opposition leaders. Mir Hossein Mousavi's website, Ghalam News, has declared, "What happens in Iran's prisons these days clearly shows the necessity of a deep change in the country." The new twist is an attempt by Mousavi to turn the charges of "foreign interference" against the regime: "Could America harm Iran ... as much as these events in prisons have damaged the (1979 Islamic) revolution and the country?" (Reuters has a summary in English.)

1300 GMT: The Iranian Labor News Agency has given a guarded acknowledgement that all was not normal in the bazaar in Tehran today, referring to "the presence of security forces in the market". The article emphasised, "The market should be calm....A market with any gathering "is the opposite".

1100 GMT: Twitter reports on today's demonstration at the Central Bazaar in Tehran are offering a pattern of events common from earlier gatherings: mobile phone service cut off to hinder communication, police trying to prevent any mass grouping, and demonstrators shifting to other places.

0930 GMT: Fars News Agency reports that Ayatollah Ahmad Khatami will lead Friday prayers in Tehran. In his prayer addresses since 12 June, Khatami has taken a hard line regarding protestors, on one occasion threatening the death penalty, but has also criticised President Ahmadinejad.

0855 GMT: Shajarian Update. Good news for fans of the Iranian classical singer, who has refused to allow the broadcast of his songs on Iranian state media as a protest against President Ahmadinejad's depiction of the opposition as "dust". It seems that some of Shajarian's music will soon be available via the Internet.

0845 GMT: No confirmed information on size of protest at Central Bazaar in Tehran today, but Twitter chatter claims a significant turnout and a large presence of security forces. One live Farsi-language blog is claiming that Mir Hossein Mousavi's wife, Zahra Rahnavard, joined the demonstrators and that 80 percent of the Bazaar's shops are closed.

0800 GMT: Discussion is heating up on the latest statement of Ayatollah Bayat-Zanjani, which is being seen by some as an open challenge to the ultimate authority of the Supreme Leader. Zahra Rahnavard's Facebook page offers this summary: "The Supreme Leader other than being fair should also obey the constitution and comply with the Assembly of Experts and as soon as he loses these conditions will automatically loses [sic] his position."

0735 GMT: It has been officially announced that, as expected, Mohammad Sadeq Larijani (the brother of Speaker of the Parliament, Ali Larijani) will replace Ayatollah Mahmoud Shahroudi as head of Iran's judiciary on 15 August. Mohammad Sadeq Larijani is a member of the Assembly of Experts and of the Guardian Council; another Larijani brother, Mohammad Javad, is head of the judiciary's human rights division.


0730 GMT: Fintan Dunne in Sea of Green Radio offers an interesting analysis of Iran's release, on bail, of the French-Iranian national and French Embassy employee Nazak Afshar: "Repression of the type which the Iranian regime is attempting requires both brute force and political...savvy. The brutality has been on vivid display, but the savvy tellingly absent."

0720 GMT: Larijani Walks the Tightrope. The Speaker of the Parliament, Ali Larijani, is quoted by the Islamic Republic News Agency, in response to the claims in Mehdi Karroubi's letter to Hashemi Rafsanjani, ""The issue of detainees being sexually abused is a lie. Following an investigation of detainees in Kahrizak and Evin prisons, no cases of rape and sexual abuse were found."

The denial comes only a day after Larijani called for a Parliamentary investigation of the treatment of detainees, and the Speaker has also been in the lead in requesting other enquiries into the behaviour of security forces.

Analysis? On the one hand, Larijani wants to maintain some authority for the Iranian Parliament, the Majlis, and thus some pressure on the Government. On the other, he does not want to lose control of those investigations, especially not to the Green opposition.

0705 GMT: We have just posted an English translation and a brief analysis of the indictment in the Tehran trials of almost 100 detainees.

0645 GMT: Another Warning for Ahmadinejad. Presidential candidate Mohsen Rezaei, following the firing of the Minister of Intelligence and more than 20 other officials in the Ministry, has criticised, “The personnel of the ministries of foreign affairs, intelligence and defense … are not suddenly fired or retired in any country as such a move would create many doubts.”

Significantly, given the Parliamentary pressure on the President,  the warning from Rezaei, who is Secretary of the Expediency Council, was sent in a letter to Speaker of the Parliament Ali Larijani.

0600 GMT: Two months ago, a Presidential election was held in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Three hours after the polls closed, the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, declared President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad the victor with almost two-thirds of the vote.

Today that President, who was finally inaugurated a week ago, still struggles to establish his authority. On Tuesday, the "principlist" bloc, the largest in Iran's Parliament with 202 of 490 representatives, wrote a letter to Ahmadinejad insisting that his choices for Ministerial posts must have "experience and expertise". The letter comes after a day after the President had to hold an emergency meeting over the principlists amidst criticism of several of his selections for high-profile offices.

And the opposition two months later? It is still very much present, though in what numbers and what forces is unclear. After the setback of Hashemi Rafsanjani's withdrawal from Friday prayers in Tehran, activists in the Green movement is trying to rally today with marches to central bazaars in major cities. The first protests are scheduled for 10 a.m. local time (0630 GMT). The leaders of that movement have been relatively low-key in recent days, apart from Mehdi Karroubi's attempts to press for movement on the detainees issue. I

And the Supreme Leader? Well, he apparently now has his own Facebook page.

Translation: Mousavi on Detentions, "Foreign Interference", and Islamic Republic (12 August)

The Latest from Iran (12 August): Two Months Later

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Speaking to the Central Committee for organising reforms, Mir Hossein Mousavi, in the context of criticism of the newspaper Keyhan for its savage attack upon Mehdi Karroubi, said:

I believe that even if the US had used all of its might, it could not have inflicted a greater damage to the country and the Islamic revolution than [the horrific events] happening in the detention centers....Isn't Keyhan by positioning the cultured and intellectual class against the establishment, acting in concert with foreign powers as it is displaying an enmity towards the establishment similar to that of the doubters [the People's Mujahedin] and maintaining the interests of the US and the UK?

...The greatest falsehood was misrepresenting the natural desire of the public for reform as foreign interference....If we study
carefully we shall see that no one has served foreign interests more assiduously than those claiming that the reform movement was inspired by foreign interference....Does the US prefer your broadcasting medium to be a fair and reputable source or for it to lose its reputation by repeating falsehoods?...Are those who ask the IRIB to be fair and transparent working in the interests of foreigners or [is it] those who have forced the people to seek news from foreign media?...Isn't attacking
Karroubi...the best service that can be made to foreign interests?

Mousavi concluded his speech by praying for the freedom of the imprisoned political activists.

The Latest from Iran (11 August): A Change in Prayers and a Pause

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Iran: The Karroubi Letter to Rafsanjani on Abuse of Detainees

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2015 GMT: Lots of Twitter chatter about a demonstration for the Central Bazaar in Tehran, and bazaars in other Iranian cities, at 10 a.m. local time tomorrow.

1650 GMT: Speaking of the Revolutionary Guard. Here is the article which caused so much fuss this weekend, and which we have been covering extensively, by Yudollah Javani in the Guards' house journal. It concludes with the call for the judiciary to pursue the arrests of "ringleaders" of demonstrations such as Mir Hossein Mousavi, Mohammad Khatami, and Mehdi Karroubi.

1620 GMT: Stepping Up Pressure, But On Whom. The commander of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps, General Mohammad Ali Jafari, has called for "confronting soft threats in all the cultural, economic, political and social arenas": "IRGC's strategy for confrontation with soft threats comprises preventative measures, full intelligence information on the type of a given threat and the time of its occurrence and plans for preventing its occurrence and formation."

Jafari added that the IRGC is preparing its infrastructure for confronting military, hard, and soft threats, with the battle against soft threats delegated to the Basiji militia.

Yet what is meant to appear as a tough statement against the foreign-inspired "velvet revolution" may also be a tactical retreat. Jafari did not repeat the threats, issued by other IRGC outlets, of arrests of opposition leaders.

And, in what appears to be a coordinated public relations assault, the commander of the Basiji, Hojjatoleslam Hossein Taeb has warned, in an address to his forces, "The enemy always strives to hinder unity among the (Iranian) people and seeks to attain its devilish goals through sowing discord as a means of soft threat."

Taeb was not as careful as Jafari to limit his comments at the foreign menace, "The enemy stepped into the scene of the presidential election...to achieve its goals by means of its agents and elements in Iran."

1555 GMT: Press TV Turns Up the Heat on Mahmoud. Not one but two stories on Press TV English's website sound a warning to President Ahmadinejad. First, it carried the story, which we revealed yesterday in a special analysis, that the President had to scurry to a meeting with more than 200 members of "principlist" majority bloc in Parliament because of challenges to his Cabinet choices.

Then, four minutes, another article reported that senior "reformist" MP Mostafa Kavakebyan had demanded in Parliament that Ahmadinejad report on "constitutional violations" during the post-election conflict: "It is the duty of the President to pursue such issues. However, the president has made no move in this regard.” The same article mentioned the submission to Parliament by the Mousavi campaign of the numbers of protestors killed and detained.

1550 GMT: From the Asosciated Press: "President Nicolas Sarkozy's office says a French Embassy employee on trial in Iran has been freed from prison. A statement says Sarkozy has spoken with Nazak Afshar since her release."

However, the statement also indicated that French national Clotilde Reiss is still being held and implied that Afshar has been bailed and still faces prosecution: "Sarkozy also wants the charges against Afshar, a French-Iranian citizen, to be dropped."

1450 GMT: There is still some confusion over Hashemi Rafsanjani and Friday prayers in Tehran. Khabar Online adds two comments to the official statement of Rafsanjani. The first is from Mohammad Hashemi-Rafsanjani, who pleaded ignorance of his brother's position. The second is from a close relative who insisted on remaining anonymous: "Mr. Rafsanjani has not completely made up his mind about his presence in the Friday prayers....The current conditions are special conditions that require Mr. Rafsanjani to re-evaluate his decision."

1430 GMT: We've split off this morning's first update as a special analysis, "Sifting Through Rafsanjani's Decision".

1420 GMT: A very slow day on news front, but reports that some detainees are being released, albeit with high bails. Amir Hossein Shemshadi, a member of the Green 88 campaign, was freed after $50,000 was posted; photographer Majid Saeedi put up $120,000.

1050 GMT: More on the Revolutionary Guards' Threats. Siavush Randjbar-Daemi, who is featured in today's roundtable discussion on "Truth and Reconciliation in/for Iran?", has published a useful overview of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps' warnings of possible arrests of opposition leaders. The article is in the Italian newspaper Il Messaggero, but for those who don't know Italian, the general sense can be picked up through Google Translate.

0920 GMT: Who's Trashing Larijani? The pro-Ahmadinejad Raja News claimed yesterday that Speaker of the Parliament Ali Larijani called Mir Hossein Mousavi on the phone "in the afternoon of the elections day" to congratulate him on his imminent win.

The article criticizes Larijani for acting irresponsibly, given that he had access to confidential information. In addition, it cases doubt on the legitimacy of Larijani's doctorate.

0900 GMT: Reuters reports, via Sarmayeh in Iran, the statement of Alireza Beheshti, chief advisor to Mir Hossein Mousavi, "The names of 69 people who were killed in post-election unrest ... were submitted to Parliament for investigation. The report also included the names of about 220 detainees."

Judiciary spokesman Alireza Jamshidi said at a separate press conference that more than 4000 protesters were arrested in demonstrations after 12 June, "but 3,700 of them were released in the first week after their arrest.

0815 GMT: We've just posted a challenging in-depth discussion amongst four specialist Iran-watchers on "truth and reconciliation", in light of an open letter from 31 academics to The Guardian of London.

0800 GMT: Media Silence. This is eerie. No one is noticing Rafsanjani's official announcement. CNN International's last Iran story is from more than 24 hours ago, on the Revolutionary Guard's threat to arrest opposition leaders. BBC English posted yesterday morning on the Karroubi letter to Rafsanjani, as did Al Jazeera English.

Iran: Sifting Through Rafsanjani's Decision

The Latest from Iran (11 August): Rafsanjani’s Decision

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UPDATE 1800 GMT: The Iranian Labor News Agency reports that Hashemi Rafsanjani, meeting with an attorneys' organisation today, emphasised the protection of the rights of defendants. Press TV is playing up the story, "Rafsanjani Demands Prisoner Rights amid Accusations [of Mistreatment", with the extract from his statement, “Judgment...as well as the rights of the accused can provide guarantees for the presence of justice in the final verdict.”

After a day of confusion and speculation, former Hashemi Rafsanjani confirmed publicly this morning, in a brief statement on his website, that he will not lead Friday prayers in Tehran “to avoid possible conflict”.

The immediate reading of the decision, as well as the politics around it, is that my Enduring America colleagues got it right in our last update yesterday. Rafsanjani had made his decision 24 hours ago but held back from confirmation while there was a battle over how it would be presented. Those behind the regime, both within the system (the head of the Friday Prayers Committee) and in the media, quickly put out the line that Rafsanjani had stepped down because of the threat of opposition manipulation of the event. The former President’s advisors countered by implying that he withdrew because of the threat of violence, as security forces tried to prevent a mass gathering around the prayer site.

That publicity contest will play out today, but I think it is already surpassed by the fallout from this decision. This is a blow for the opposition movement, even as President Ahmadinejad struggles and possibly sinks, and it may mark a re-arrangement of the forces in the post-election conflict.

First, the immediate winner. Step up, Supreme Leader.

The fear of Khamenei has always been that Rafsanjani would work closely with the leaders and protestors of the Green movement. That is why he paid special attention to the former President in his Friday Prayers address of 19 June, trying to split off Rafsanjani from those irresponsibility challenging the election result. Initially, Rafsanjani did remain quiet, waiting more than two weeks before making a guarded statement, as the conflict was defined between the Green Wave and the regime.

Then two events occurred. In mid-July, a group of “hard-line” clerics tried to take Rafsanjani out of the picture, attempting to remove him from leadership of the Assembly of Experts. That effort backfired badly, with other clerics rallying around Rafsanjani. The former President did lead Friday prayers on 17 July, bringing a massive opposition rally to the site and on the streets. And his address was no longer so guarded — this was a challenge to the position of President Ahmadinejad and a criticism of the system that Ayatollah Khamenei was leading.

The 17 July address boosted the Green movement, as it found the energy for new demonstrations, and it gave support to a growing number of secular and religious figures — not just from the movement but from “principlist” and “conservative” factions — focusing on the Government’s use of violence and detentions. The inauguration of Ahmadinejad became a peripheral event. More importantly, there was talk that the Supreme Leader’s ultimate authority might be challenged.

The fear for the regime must have been that Rafsanjani’s appearance this Friday, even if his words were again guarded, would give the platform for a confrontation which is no longer about the 12 June result but about the legitimacy of the current system. That has now been removed. The Supreme Leader again has a “breathing space” amidst the ongoing political manoeuvres.

Second, the opposition. The post-election challenge has always been two halves of a walnut. One half has been the public show of anger over the current situation and of hope that changes could be made. The other half has been the less dramatic, often behind-the-scenes political manoeuvres.

Rafsanjani’s importance has been not so much that he is part of that public movement but that, as a former President and current head of the Assembly of Experts and Expediency Council, he is a key member of the Establishment. He had a political base not available to Mehdi Karroubi, Mir Hossein Mousavi, or even former President Mohammad Khatami. And his own resumé, as an Ayatollah and a long-time political leader, brings together the clerical and secular dimensions within the Islamic Republic.

So before 17 July, the former President was a potential symbol bringing together the two halves of the challenge and, after 17 July, he was a very real force galvanising resistance. Opposition leaders and protestors have to confront the cold fact this morning that this may no longer be the case.

There was an incident this week which pointed to this difficulty. Two days ago, Mehdi Karroubi’s advisors published a letter from the Presidential candidate to Rafsanjani that had been written at the end of July. Karroubi had asked Rafsanjani to pursue an enquiry into the abuses of detainees, giving graphic examples. Apparently the former President never replied, so on Monday the letter was posted in the newspaper of Karroubi’s party. The underlying question to Rafsanjani was now on the surface: are you really with us?

In the short term, the reactions of Mousavi, Karroubi, Khatami, and other leading politicians and clerics will be worth watching. In the longer term, however, the response will have to go beyond these leaders, just as it has to move beyond Rafsanjani: can the movement find the strength and the occasion for another public display of opposition?

And finally (for now), Rafsanjani. Had this been any other politician stepping down, the headline would be “Defeat”. When Rafsanjani skipped his turn in the rota for Friday prayers on two occasions in June/July, he did so from a position of control, considering his next moves. This time, the withdrawal looks like it was forced upon him by the regime.

This, however, is not any other politician. This is Rafsanjani, one of the prominent figures in (and for almost all of) post-1979 Iranian politics. This is a man who, even after his defeat by Ahmadinejad in the 2005 election, has continued to inspire admiration from his supporters and fear from his opponents. This is “The Shark”.

So what is his move? Personally, I’m not sure that he can mend relations with the leaders of the Green movement. So is his manoeuvre, including this withdrawal, an indication that he is positioning for compromise with leaders within the system, including the Supreme Leader? Is there an expectation that, with a possibly terminally wounded President, there may be a space for Rafsanjani to move again for even higher offices than the ones he now occupies? Or, for once, did he simply get wrong-footed and pushed into a defensive reaction, one where he will have to reconsider his position?

Truth and Reconciliation in/for Iran? A Roundtable Discussion

The Latest from Iran (11 August): Rafsanjani’s Decision

On July 31st, a politically diverse group of 31 academics, students, and anti-war protestors published an open letter in The Guardian of London, criticising what they viewed as the western media’s one-sided coverage of the post-election developments in Iran.   Foremost amongst the fallacies they perceived was the portrayal of the election results as “the start of a ‘velvet’ revolution against the Islamic Republic". At the same time, the letter alleged that the US State Department has used the crisis to “justify its continuation of Bush-era policies of financing anti-Iranian government organisations". Not only was this an act of political opportunism on the part of advocates of regime change, this interference and propaganda campaign aided the Iranian Government’s crackdown on the opposition and slowed the pace of democratic progress.

The authors contend that is only without foreign threats and interference that “the Iranian people [can] reach their aspirations of freedom and establish their unity in a framework of independence and national sovereignty.” For the reformist and Green Movement to affect real change in Iran, there must be a reversal of the West’s opposition to Tehran’s nuclear program and an “end [to] all their illegitimate economic, political and military pressures aimed at the internal destabilization of Iran".

Beyond this critique of Western policy towards Iran, the authors issued suggestions for finding a “reasonable solution for the conflict”. They demanded of the Government an end to attacks upon activists and the immediate release of political detainees. The letter also calls for a spirit of national conciliation facilitated by the establishment of an “independent truth and national reconciliation commission with representation from all candidates, such that it can gain the trust of the people of Iran". Addressing the leaders of the reformists and the Green movement, the authors suggest that “in order to prevent exploitation of the current crisis by western propaganda and opportunist groups, they unambiguously oppose all sanctions and condemn regime change. operations and any foreign support for the anti-Islamic Republic opposition".

The publication of this letter provoked a spirited debate within academic circles, so Enduring America invited interested parties to participate in a roundtable discussion. The exchanges touched upon all the issues raised in the letter but also spread to a wider debate on how the academic and media approach critical analysis of Iran. Participants included: Siavush Randjbar-Daemi, a Doctoral Candidate in Contemporary Iranian History at Royal Holloway, University of London. Holding dual Iranian citizenship, he has reported extensively on Iranian affairs for national Italian newspapers; Dr Farideh Farhi, a leading US-based scholar of Iran and co-author of the letter; Chris Emery, a British-based Doctoral Candidate who has written on Iranian affairs for The Guardian and contributes regularly to Enduring America; and Nathan Coombs, a Doctoral Candidate in London who specialises in revolutionary politics and is co-editor of the Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies.

SIAVUSH RANDJBAR-DAEMI: The authors introduce themselves as “anti-war activists” and proudly highlight their recent efforts against the “the pervasive deception created by western and Israeli-influenced media”. The group further attempts to remember that it does not wish to see a particular faction in Iran advance its goals, rather they wish to see the country’s “national rights” to be respected and be borne to fruition.

Like many Iranians across the globe, this group has been taken aback from the aftermath of the heady June 12 elections. They state that they wish to “help develop realistic solutions for the benefit of all our compatriots of whatever political persuasion” and particularly propose the creation of a South African-styled “Truth and Reconciliation Commission” to solve the current divergence internal to the regime and express hope that the large number of political activists and civil society practitioners currently imprisoned and facing trial will be freed soon.

What makes the “Open Letter” unappealing for informed readers are the frequent generalisations contained in some of its salient points. Particularly of concern is the lampooning of the Western media. While it is certainly true that segments of the European or American press have been incorrect if not entirely libellous in their respective Iranian coverage in past years - as unconfirmed scoops on the supposed military capabilities of the Iranian nuclear programme or the fake Yellow star story published by Canadian National Post in 2006 suggest - the concept that Western media as a whole has acted in unison to portray a constant skewed, biased and negative image of Iran is questionable. Even more alarming are sweeping judgements such as “The western media, by their one-sided coverage of the post-election developments, portrayed the street demonstrations protesting the election results as the start of a "velvet" revolution against the Islamic Republic”.

At the heart of this particular issue lies a more tangible definition of the “Western media”. The tendency to identify the latter with a few well known villains of the piece, such as BBC, CNN, Fox or Al Jazeera runs into serious trouble if one were to be present in media events in Tehran in the week preceding and following June 12. Nothing less than hundreds of reporters were accredited by the Iranian Culture Ministry for the elections, and most of whom catered for audiences that went in to the hundreds of thousands, if not millions. Coordination across several time-zones, languages as well as experience in direct reporting from Iran that went from journalists on their first assignment in Tehran to experienced hands who pointed out to sign-posts left unchanged since 1979 to produce any sort of “one-sided coverage” was well-nigh impossible. Rather than preach the ills of an inherently diverse group of reporters, the authors could have spent more time detailing the specific parts of the western media that engaged in deception and wrong-doing.

The analysis of the internal situation offered by the open letter also raises some questions. The bulk of the current political-legal quandary faced by the reformists internal to the Islamic Republic is essentially blamed upon the “provocative and confrontational policies” of George Bush, which, according to the authors, “played a key role in the defeat of Iranian reformists in the parliamentary elections of 2003 [sic] and the presidential election of 2005”. Whereas there are no grounds to dispute the erroneous and inhumane traits of Bush’s Middle East policy, the attribution of the conservative victories in 2004 - when the Guardian Council, a distinctively hawkish body, disqualified thousands of would-be reformist candidates from the Majlis race - and 2005, when the reformists and pragmatists such as Hashemi Rafsanjani paid the price of an extremely lacklustre political performance in preceding years, to foreign political meddling is a conjecture that would most likely baffle even the more staunch reformists in Tehran. While it is certainly true that the perception of increased outside intervention made life difficult for Khatami’s camp, one is left wondering why the latter successfully convinced the Supreme Leader to accept to a series of major overtures to the West in that same time frame, such as the wide-ranging settlement proposal sent to Washington soon after the Iraq war in 2003 ,which included a radical overhaul of Iran’s entire regional foreign policy, or the Tehran Nuclear Agreement between the EU3 and Iran in late 2003.  One is therefore left to ponder whether the reformists have been the target of their own undoing on the national political scene, going as they did from total control of Parliament and the presidency in 2000 to the almost total exclusion from institutional participation of present.

The analysis provided within the open letter as to the cause of present disturbances raises some questions. Most peculiar is the attribution of the decision by millions of Iranians to flood the streets of Tehran within hours of the election results to “various irregularities [...] including the suspension of reformist newspapers and mobile telephone SMS service on election day”. It would have been perhaps ideal at this stage to recall the main slogan of the protesting masses: “Where is my vote?” Iranians did not take to the streets to reclaim the distribution of reformists’ dailies or request the resumption of the ability to send text messages. Rather, they felt that an undeniable right of any modern society, and most particularly their own, that has spent the best part of the past century inconclusively engaging in a long-drawn state-building exercise, the chance to choose an official candidate of its liking, had been abruptly taken away from them. Far from being an irregularity whose classification can be cloaked under the term “various”, this request stands at the heart of the unparalleled tension between the different wings of the political elite of the Islamic Republic. Its omission from the discourse of the “open letter” is therefore surprising and of concern.

The open letter ends on a number of valid points, including the invocation to allow Iranians to be masters of their own destiny and the invitation, to Western governments, to avoid a repeat of the 1953 coup or any other sort of interference. However, in their role of informed and esteemed academics, the signatories should perhaps adopt a less generalising approach and one more inclined to grasp the complexity of the dynamics of the Islamic Republic’s relationship with the West and its domestic politics, whose insularity to winds of change occasionally blown from abroad appears to be remarkably resistant three decades after the Revolution that sought to end Western interference in Iran once and for all.

CHRIS EMERY: Although I found myself agreeing with large segments of this letter, I found its overall message confusing. This letter seems to have three aims: to criticise Western policy in Iran, to condemn Western media coverage of the current crisis, and to make suggestions to resolve the impasse. The first two assertions require a more detailed interrogation than is possible here and thus fall flat. The third aim requires MUCH more detailed elaboration, especially regarding the composition, remit, time frame and powers of the "national reconciliation commission". Without this, the purpose of this letter is as unclear as its intended audience. It reads more like a collection of academics trying to get something off their chests than a serious roadmap for solving the impasse.

Though I agree with many of the letter’s critiques of Western policy, several analyses are less persuasive. Firstly, the authors contend that the only thing standing between President Khatami's successful reformist agenda (1997-2005) and rehabilitation of Iran's relations with the West was Bush. This is simply false; Khatami had already faced a hard-line backlash in 1999 following the student riots and there is little to suggest the Supreme Leader was as equally committed to normalised relations. Even Khatami’s overtures were carefully pitched as a dialogue between faiths and peoples rather substantive talks between two governments. I think it is also disingenuous to suggest that Iran’s cooperation with the US in toppling the Taliban was a personal gesture by Khatami aimed more at rapprochement with the US than as an action clearly in Iran's security interests.

Whilst recognising the counter-productive nature of Western policies, I disagree that the final success of democracy and reform in Iran is dependent on the actions of the West. This, in my view, absolves the Iranian authorities of their primary responsibility for their actions.

FARIDEH FARHI: Siavush's criticism is certainly well-taken and there is no doubt that not all Western reporting has been as the statement describes, although much has. But I don't see how Chris' point about the understanding of  Khatami's gestures can be construed from the statement. The point is simply that Bush's policies helped to undermine the reform movement (I believe the sentence says it played "a key role" and not "the" key role). Is this a wrong point? As to the West’s responsibility, show me a state that has not moved in the direction of securitization and away from democratic practices when under foreign threat.

Are there objections to our suggestions? Are they problematic or wrong suggestions? I will be delighted if this statement begins a conversation in this regard even if all the suggested ideas are rejected and replaced

NATHAN COOMBS: The authors’ focus on the Western media’s portrayal of the post-election insurrection follows two recognizable trends that we have witnessed since the elections in Iran.

First is the reformists' rhetorically convenient emphasis on the opinion of the unreconstructed (and-ill informed) anti-imperialist Left in the West, for whom Ahmedinijad is seen as the representative of the poor and a bulwark against American ambitions in the region. Need it be said, this is a distorted and caricatured portrayal; based as it is on a marginal strand of the Left’s take on the situation, never mind the Western media as a whole.

All the Western media, barring some exceptions that stand out precisely for their rarity, were firmly behind the uprising; not just in the sense of uncritical cheerleading for [Presidential candidate] Mir Hossein Mousavi, but in portraying the events as a broadly class-composed popular uprising. This impression was established through the reliance on English-speaking Tehranese ‘informants’ and Iranian scholars based in the West such as Professor Ali Ansari. It was not a critically examined proposition, whatever the truth of the matter.

As such the claim that the Western media portrayed the uprising as a “velvet revolution” by anti-Islamic Republic forces (implying that it was doing so for the benefit of foreign regime-change advocates) does not hold water at all. If anything, there was a clear recognition by the likes of the BBC that what was unfolding was an intra-establishment power play, to which Western commentators predominantly came down firmly on the side of Mousavi, to the exclusion of more radical currents.

Second, the overall framing of the letter is firmly nationalist. In its thorough conflation of anti-Islamic Republic forces with pernicious foreign influence, the letter amounts to essentially a whitewash of the realities of the Islamic Republic and an elaborate piece of apologism. The sub-text is status quoist. From the opening paragraphs to the last, the woes of the IRI [Islamic Republic of Iran] are firmly lumped at the feet of imperialist forces and the policies of the specific government of Ahmadinejad, rather than the Islamic system itself. In its call for a premature truth and reconciliation commission, the authors’ seek to co-opt the spirit of the uprising to refine and buttress the Islamic Republic.

This is justified in terms of seeking to bring in the interests of the bourgeoisie more firmly within the apparatus and juridical norms of the state. As the letter puts it, “These social and political pressures, along with government mismanagement caused by the removal of competent technocrats, have negatively impacted the public interest and put enormous pressure on the middle class, the educated class, journalists and artists. These people must be allowed a more open and free environment in order to fulfil their instrumental roles in service of the country.” And in the spirit of national unity, under the justification of representing the interests of the middle class, the authors applaud the fact that: “extremist elements who used the opportunity to create chaos and engaged in the destruction of public property were condemned by Mousavi". Finally, in a total denunciation of any authentic revolutionary anti-IRI ambitions: “We call on the political forces of both sides to move toward building such a constructive climate and toward creation of an economic, political, and cultural agenda that can respond to all social needs.”

One can only hope that the siren call of this letter is not heeded, and that the workers, students, and radicalized of Iran can build some sort of organization to surpass the inhibiting reformism of Mousavi and his nationalist supporters of the IRI. The Western media has little, if anything, to do with it.

EMERY: Farideh, I do not deny the damage Bush's policies have wrought. However, I think this letter overemphasized Khatami's ability to reconfigure Iran's relations with the West. Certainly, Bush's policies didn't help, but in many ways the instruments of the state were more arbitrary and 'rogue' in the 1990s.

As you say, the main point is that we talk about these issues. Given the enormously broad spectrum of political beliefs and perspectives amongst the authors of this letter, I do wonder how this can be coherently achieved.

FARHI: Chris, if you are reading the statement as though it is trying to discount the overall responsibility of Iran's leaders for political, economic and judicial failures, then that is a shortcoming that was not the intent of the statement. At least in one paragraph tries to deal clearly with those failings (and note that there is a reason the first recommendations address the domestic situation and forces).

At the same time, the intent was also not to shy away from discussing the context of the past two decades of containment and regime change policies on the part of the US and the impact of those policies on distorting Iran's body politic, making many already paranoid officials even more paranoid. Does this mean that the US is the cause for the mess Iran is in today? Of course not. Ultimately culpability lies with those who have other choices but choose to stunt their people's citizenship.

Did Iran have many rogue elements in the 90's? Yes, but Iran was also gradually moving in a direction that could be considered positive even during the Rafsanjani presidency (1989-1997). I have no difficulty acknowledging that the trend was deemed dangerous by hardliners and hence their resistance and reaction. But I don't see any useful purpose in not placing that resistance and reaction in the context of external pressures and threats that by the way were not limited to the Bush Administration.

FARHI: Are the hard-line forces wrong in using these props to justify their authoritarian policies? Of course they are, and they should be condemned as the statement does. But I do not see any useful purpose in toning down the discussion of the instruments they were given, which they have recklessly used and should be held responsible for, since they had the option of not using them.

Frankly, I do not see any reason for anyone interested in the expansion of civil liberties and equal treatment of citizens as well as a somewhat independent foreign policy (yes I am a shameless and hopeless liberal) to shy away from attempting a balanced view, even if that attempts ends up being flawed as you suggest.

EMERY: These are very compelling clarifications. However, I feel the fact that such detailed elaboration is required reinforces my point. The above debate is enormously complex and, I think, treated in much less measured terms in the letter. Likewise, the issue of how the West has covered the current crisis requires examples, comparisons, and historical and political context.

As Siavush pointed out, there has been some fantastic reporting of current events by some outstanding journalists, if of course there have also been some awful, politically motivated, and historically ignorant pieces. It strikes me as a) unfair to tar the former with the latter b) slightly naive to issue a call for the latter to end. It won't, anymore than the ridiculous reporting by the Iranian media.

So I am still unsure what the overall focus and intended audience of the letter was. It seems to be doing quite a lot, often with a slightly complacent reliance on an anti-imperialist framework. Your fundamental point is that the West should butt out and give the reformists space. I think this is essentially what the US Government has done. Obama was resolute in his insistence that this could not become a US-Iranian issue. He has not vocally supported the Green Movement and has not even alleged fraud in the elections.

You say that Obama has kept 'many of his predecessors' policies'. I think Bush would have claimed the Green Movement for himself, immediately condemned the elections as a sham, and would have used all of this as a platform to ramp up his confrontational policies.

If we are emphasising the need for external forces to moderate their policies to allow the political space for domestic change, why are there no suggestions for the Iranian Government to moderate its rhetoric and policies vis- a-vis the West, particularly in the Middle East?

I agree that there probably is a link between external threats and democratisation. I would disagree, however, with the implications of the statement, “Only under these conditions, without any foreign threats, can the Iranian people reach their aspirations of freedom.” Many non-democracies strengthen or uphold this state with or without facing external threats (Saudi Arabia, Burma, Guinea, China). In fact, the Central Asian region is littered with such states. The fact remains that the IRI's attitude to political and human rights has ebbed and flowed, but has never really shown a structural capability to tolerate dissent. Structural and bureaucratic obstacles are MUCH more significant than the external strategic environment.

FARHI: Chris, as to your point about the US government butting out, the statement did point out the difference between Obama's and Bush's approaches and noted the trend was positive, but it also pointed out that the general framework of US policy regarding Iran's nuclear program has remained the same, at least so far. Obama has continued to be interested in a sticks-and-carrots approach, so has his Secretary of State who has talked about "crippling sanctions" if Iran doesn't abandon its pursuit of a weapons program (The US Senate just passed legislation to that effect as well). To be sure, the linguistic shift to a "weapons program" and away from "enrichment suspension" is an important shift, but so far I have not seen any concrete manifestation of what that shift will mean in terms of policy. Suspension as a pre-condition has been removed, but that demand as an outcome has not necessarily been abandoned).

As to the equivalence you imply we should have endeavored to pursue regarding both the US and Iran's immoderate foreign policies, it just doesn't make sense in terms of the purpose of the statement written by people who identify themselves anti-war. Such people are worried about a US attack on Iranian territory, about which there has been not only a whole lot of loose talk but actual threats and policies

Finally, the IRI has been criminal and rigid more often than not but what has distinguished it from many other countries in the region and also other post-revolutionary societies is the level of conflicts and disagreements within it among various groups contesting for power. There is a reason the search for one revolutionary party was abandoned in Iran in the 1980s, and there is a reason you have such heated and violent confrontation about the direction of the country at this point. These conflicts are structural in so far as they represent different interests and ideas. The writers of the statements, despite their ideological diversity, believe that the contending forces --- and there are more than two --- need to find democratic and non-violent rules to live with each other, rather than attempt to purge the other from Iran's body politic.

From my point of view, there is nothing utopian or ideal about the Islamic Republic, but representing the conflict in Iran as many in the West --- or inside Iran --- have done as being between the "people" and the Islamic State, as though the people of Iran are one unit collectively engaged in an endeavor to transform a hated state, is both incorrect and I believe dangerous. It is part and parcel of the hope that a simple wishing away of the Islamic Republic or the street mobilization we have seen will do the trick.

The statement, by the way, is also written in Persian, and its intent for multiple addressees, I think, is clear in the five suggestions.

COOMBS: Farideh, let me take just two of your responses:

"There is a reason the search for one revolutionary party was abandoned in Iran in the 1980s and there is a reason you have such heated and violent confrontation about the direction of the country at this point.”

Could this also not have something to do with the fact that Mousavi, then Prime Minister, presided in 1988 over one of the most brutal mass executions of political opposition in the 20th century? The search for a revolutionary party to overthrow the IRI was not abandoned as much as extinguished.

Ultimately, what you write here, that people basically need to learn to live together, is a confirmation of my reading of the letter: the denunciation (in the contemporary lingo of democracy and pluralism) of the need for the overthrow of the IRI, and advocacy of the recuperation of the bravery of some of the protestors into a status-quoist regime realignment in favour of the reformists.

"There is nothing utopian or ideal about the Islamic Republic, but representing the conflict in Iran as many in the West --- or inside Iran --- have done as being between the "people" and the Islamic State, as though the people of Iran are one unit collectively engaged in an endeavor to transform a hated state is both incorrect and I believe dangerous."

I would of course reject any crass resource to the populist language of "the people". Likewise, I would also reject the naive belief (unfortunately promoted by many of the reformists supporters and sympathizers) that you can do away with the state through a "simple wish" or just "street mobilization". Here we at least can find some agreement. No, to bring down a system is a monumental affair. The idea that the IRI will just crumble when faced by street protest and intra-regime dissent is a laughable fallacy of our post-1989 world; informed by the entirely unhelpful analogy of the fall of Communism in the Eastern bloc. What is needed is genuine organization and the rebuilding of revolutionary organizations that can play the long game.

Politics, and more so revolution, needs to be constituted through a long ideological struggle. What the reformists and young liberals on the streets have as now failed to do (at least to my knowledge) is start to build these principled organizations, autonomous from the regime.