Tuesday
Aug112009
Iran: Sifting Through Rafsanjani's Decision
Tuesday, August 11, 2009 at 15:33
The Latest from Iran (11 August): Rafsanjani’s Decision
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UPDATE 1800 GMT: The Iranian Labor News Agency reports that Hashemi Rafsanjani, meeting with an attorneys' organisation today, emphasised the protection of the rights of defendants. Press TV is playing up the story, "Rafsanjani Demands Prisoner Rights amid Accusations [of Mistreatment", with the extract from his statement, “Judgment...as well as the rights of the accused can provide guarantees for the presence of justice in the final verdict.”
After a day of confusion and speculation, former Hashemi Rafsanjani confirmed publicly this morning, in a brief statement on his website, that he will not lead Friday prayers in Tehran “to avoid possible conflict”.
The immediate reading of the decision, as well as the politics around it, is that my Enduring America colleagues got it right in our last update yesterday. Rafsanjani had made his decision 24 hours ago but held back from confirmation while there was a battle over how it would be presented. Those behind the regime, both within the system (the head of the Friday Prayers Committee) and in the media, quickly put out the line that Rafsanjani had stepped down because of the threat of opposition manipulation of the event. The former President’s advisors countered by implying that he withdrew because of the threat of violence, as security forces tried to prevent a mass gathering around the prayer site.
That publicity contest will play out today, but I think it is already surpassed by the fallout from this decision. This is a blow for the opposition movement, even as President Ahmadinejad struggles and possibly sinks, and it may mark a re-arrangement of the forces in the post-election conflict.
First, the immediate winner. Step up, Supreme Leader.
The fear of Khamenei has always been that Rafsanjani would work closely with the leaders and protestors of the Green movement. That is why he paid special attention to the former President in his Friday Prayers address of 19 June, trying to split off Rafsanjani from those irresponsibility challenging the election result. Initially, Rafsanjani did remain quiet, waiting more than two weeks before making a guarded statement, as the conflict was defined between the Green Wave and the regime.
Then two events occurred. In mid-July, a group of “hard-line” clerics tried to take Rafsanjani out of the picture, attempting to remove him from leadership of the Assembly of Experts. That effort backfired badly, with other clerics rallying around Rafsanjani. The former President did lead Friday prayers on 17 July, bringing a massive opposition rally to the site and on the streets. And his address was no longer so guarded — this was a challenge to the position of President Ahmadinejad and a criticism of the system that Ayatollah Khamenei was leading.
The 17 July address boosted the Green movement, as it found the energy for new demonstrations, and it gave support to a growing number of secular and religious figures — not just from the movement but from “principlist” and “conservative” factions — focusing on the Government’s use of violence and detentions. The inauguration of Ahmadinejad became a peripheral event. More importantly, there was talk that the Supreme Leader’s ultimate authority might be challenged.
The fear for the regime must have been that Rafsanjani’s appearance this Friday, even if his words were again guarded, would give the platform for a confrontation which is no longer about the 12 June result but about the legitimacy of the current system. That has now been removed. The Supreme Leader again has a “breathing space” amidst the ongoing political manoeuvres.
Second, the opposition. The post-election challenge has always been two halves of a walnut. One half has been the public show of anger over the current situation and of hope that changes could be made. The other half has been the less dramatic, often behind-the-scenes political manoeuvres.
Rafsanjani’s importance has been not so much that he is part of that public movement but that, as a former President and current head of the Assembly of Experts and Expediency Council, he is a key member of the Establishment. He had a political base not available to Mehdi Karroubi, Mir Hossein Mousavi, or even former President Mohammad Khatami. And his own resumé, as an Ayatollah and a long-time political leader, brings together the clerical and secular dimensions within the Islamic Republic.
So before 17 July, the former President was a potential symbol bringing together the two halves of the challenge and, after 17 July, he was a very real force galvanising resistance. Opposition leaders and protestors have to confront the cold fact this morning that this may no longer be the case.
There was an incident this week which pointed to this difficulty. Two days ago, Mehdi Karroubi’s advisors published a letter from the Presidential candidate to Rafsanjani that had been written at the end of July. Karroubi had asked Rafsanjani to pursue an enquiry into the abuses of detainees, giving graphic examples. Apparently the former President never replied, so on Monday the letter was posted in the newspaper of Karroubi’s party. The underlying question to Rafsanjani was now on the surface: are you really with us?
In the short term, the reactions of Mousavi, Karroubi, Khatami, and other leading politicians and clerics will be worth watching. In the longer term, however, the response will have to go beyond these leaders, just as it has to move beyond Rafsanjani: can the movement find the strength and the occasion for another public display of opposition?
And finally (for now), Rafsanjani. Had this been any other politician stepping down, the headline would be “Defeat”. When Rafsanjani skipped his turn in the rota for Friday prayers on two occasions in June/July, he did so from a position of control, considering his next moves. This time, the withdrawal looks like it was forced upon him by the regime.
This, however, is not any other politician. This is Rafsanjani, one of the prominent figures in (and for almost all of) post-1979 Iranian politics. This is a man who, even after his defeat by Ahmadinejad in the 2005 election, has continued to inspire admiration from his supporters and fear from his opponents. This is “The Shark”.
So what is his move? Personally, I’m not sure that he can mend relations with the leaders of the Green movement. So is his manoeuvre, including this withdrawal, an indication that he is positioning for compromise with leaders within the system, including the Supreme Leader? Is there an expectation that, with a possibly terminally wounded President, there may be a space for Rafsanjani to move again for even higher offices than the ones he now occupies? Or, for once, did he simply get wrong-footed and pushed into a defensive reaction, one where he will have to reconsider his position?
Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis
UPDATE 1800 GMT: The Iranian Labor News Agency reports that Hashemi Rafsanjani, meeting with an attorneys' organisation today, emphasised the protection of the rights of defendants. Press TV is playing up the story, "Rafsanjani Demands Prisoner Rights amid Accusations [of Mistreatment", with the extract from his statement, “Judgment...as well as the rights of the accused can provide guarantees for the presence of justice in the final verdict.”
After a day of confusion and speculation, former Hashemi Rafsanjani confirmed publicly this morning, in a brief statement on his website, that he will not lead Friday prayers in Tehran “to avoid possible conflict”.
The immediate reading of the decision, as well as the politics around it, is that my Enduring America colleagues got it right in our last update yesterday. Rafsanjani had made his decision 24 hours ago but held back from confirmation while there was a battle over how it would be presented. Those behind the regime, both within the system (the head of the Friday Prayers Committee) and in the media, quickly put out the line that Rafsanjani had stepped down because of the threat of opposition manipulation of the event. The former President’s advisors countered by implying that he withdrew because of the threat of violence, as security forces tried to prevent a mass gathering around the prayer site.
That publicity contest will play out today, but I think it is already surpassed by the fallout from this decision. This is a blow for the opposition movement, even as President Ahmadinejad struggles and possibly sinks, and it may mark a re-arrangement of the forces in the post-election conflict.
First, the immediate winner. Step up, Supreme Leader.
The fear of Khamenei has always been that Rafsanjani would work closely with the leaders and protestors of the Green movement. That is why he paid special attention to the former President in his Friday Prayers address of 19 June, trying to split off Rafsanjani from those irresponsibility challenging the election result. Initially, Rafsanjani did remain quiet, waiting more than two weeks before making a guarded statement, as the conflict was defined between the Green Wave and the regime.
Then two events occurred. In mid-July, a group of “hard-line” clerics tried to take Rafsanjani out of the picture, attempting to remove him from leadership of the Assembly of Experts. That effort backfired badly, with other clerics rallying around Rafsanjani. The former President did lead Friday prayers on 17 July, bringing a massive opposition rally to the site and on the streets. And his address was no longer so guarded — this was a challenge to the position of President Ahmadinejad and a criticism of the system that Ayatollah Khamenei was leading.
The 17 July address boosted the Green movement, as it found the energy for new demonstrations, and it gave support to a growing number of secular and religious figures — not just from the movement but from “principlist” and “conservative” factions — focusing on the Government’s use of violence and detentions. The inauguration of Ahmadinejad became a peripheral event. More importantly, there was talk that the Supreme Leader’s ultimate authority might be challenged.
The fear for the regime must have been that Rafsanjani’s appearance this Friday, even if his words were again guarded, would give the platform for a confrontation which is no longer about the 12 June result but about the legitimacy of the current system. That has now been removed. The Supreme Leader again has a “breathing space” amidst the ongoing political manoeuvres.
Second, the opposition. The post-election challenge has always been two halves of a walnut. One half has been the public show of anger over the current situation and of hope that changes could be made. The other half has been the less dramatic, often behind-the-scenes political manoeuvres.
Rafsanjani’s importance has been not so much that he is part of that public movement but that, as a former President and current head of the Assembly of Experts and Expediency Council, he is a key member of the Establishment. He had a political base not available to Mehdi Karroubi, Mir Hossein Mousavi, or even former President Mohammad Khatami. And his own resumé, as an Ayatollah and a long-time political leader, brings together the clerical and secular dimensions within the Islamic Republic.
So before 17 July, the former President was a potential symbol bringing together the two halves of the challenge and, after 17 July, he was a very real force galvanising resistance. Opposition leaders and protestors have to confront the cold fact this morning that this may no longer be the case.
There was an incident this week which pointed to this difficulty. Two days ago, Mehdi Karroubi’s advisors published a letter from the Presidential candidate to Rafsanjani that had been written at the end of July. Karroubi had asked Rafsanjani to pursue an enquiry into the abuses of detainees, giving graphic examples. Apparently the former President never replied, so on Monday the letter was posted in the newspaper of Karroubi’s party. The underlying question to Rafsanjani was now on the surface: are you really with us?
In the short term, the reactions of Mousavi, Karroubi, Khatami, and other leading politicians and clerics will be worth watching. In the longer term, however, the response will have to go beyond these leaders, just as it has to move beyond Rafsanjani: can the movement find the strength and the occasion for another public display of opposition?
And finally (for now), Rafsanjani. Had this been any other politician stepping down, the headline would be “Defeat”. When Rafsanjani skipped his turn in the rota for Friday prayers on two occasions in June/July, he did so from a position of control, considering his next moves. This time, the withdrawal looks like it was forced upon him by the regime.
This, however, is not any other politician. This is Rafsanjani, one of the prominent figures in (and for almost all of) post-1979 Iranian politics. This is a man who, even after his defeat by Ahmadinejad in the 2005 election, has continued to inspire admiration from his supporters and fear from his opponents. This is “The Shark”.
So what is his move? Personally, I’m not sure that he can mend relations with the leaders of the Green movement. So is his manoeuvre, including this withdrawal, an indication that he is positioning for compromise with leaders within the system, including the Supreme Leader? Is there an expectation that, with a possibly terminally wounded President, there may be a space for Rafsanjani to move again for even higher offices than the ones he now occupies? Or, for once, did he simply get wrong-footed and pushed into a defensive reaction, one where he will have to reconsider his position?