Afghanistan: Hearts and Minds v. Blood and Anger (Mull)

EA correspondent Josh Mull is the Afghanistan Blogging Fellow for The Seminal and Brave New Foundation. He also writes for Rethink Afghanistan.

Our troops in Afghanistan have some questions about the strategy in Afghanistan. Spencer Ackerman reports:

Some considered the war a distraction from broader national security challenges like Iran or China. Others thought that its costs — nearly ten years, $321 billion, 1243 U.S. deaths and counting — are too high, playing into Osama bin Laden’s “Bleed To Bankruptcy” strategy. Still others thought that it doesn’t make sense for President Obama simultaneously triple U.S. troop levels and announce that they’re going to start coming down, however slowly, in July 2011. At least one person was convinced, despite the evidence, that firing Gen. Stanley McChrystal meant the strategy was due for an overhaul, something I chalked up to the will to believe.

But if there was a common denominator to their critiques, it’s this: None understood how their day-to-day jobs actually contributed to a successful outcome. One person actually asked me if I could explain how it’s all supposed to knit together.

Afghanistan Follow-Up: US Government v. Karzai (and the CIA) on “Corruption” (Miller/Partlow)
How Do You Solve A Problem Like Pakistan in Afghanistan? (Mull Responds to Ackerman)

I'm wondering the same thing. It's never been clear to me exactly how a massive foreign military occupation translates to a stable, secure and democratic society in Afghanistan. How does one lead to the other, how do we get from A to B?

Take a look at this incident from Bagram air base:

U.S. troops fired warning shots to disperse a protest in eastern Afghanistan over the arrest of a religious leader suspected of a rocket attack, NATO said Tuesday.

The alliance said no civilian injuries were reported from the protest Monday, but Gen. Faqir Ahmad, the deputy police chief of Parwan province, said one civilian was killed by shots fired from an unknown source.

NATO said about 300 people surrounded a patrol and attacked vehicles with rocks and iron bars outside the massive coalition air base at Bagram, in Parwan province.

Or this at a NATO base in Badghis province:

Two Spanish police and an interpreter were killed when an Afghan policeman they were training turned on them before he was shot dead, officials said, as protests against the killing turned violent on Wednesday.

The incident appeared to be the latest in a string of recent attacks by "rogue" police and soldiers, underlining the pressure as NATO-led troops try to train Afghan forces rapidly to allow the handover of security responsibility to begin from mid-2011.

And here's video of the "protests" in Badghis, although "riot" might be more appropriate:

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MJC05D5Sj78[/youtube]

These angry and violent demonstrations raise the same questions our troops were asking: how does our war connect to our objective?

How many more troops, for how many years, will it take to make the men in that video loyal to the Karzai mafia? How many more bombs and rockets do we have to drop on women and children to convince them that democracy is the way to go? Which one of the KFC's or Burger Kings in our gargantuan airbases is going to convince these Afghans not to sympathize with the Taliban?

The special forces operatives kicking in some random Afghan's door at 3 in the morning --- how are they solving the endemic corruption? The bombers, gunships, and drones pounding Afghan villages --- how do these contribute to a sense of hope and security for Afghan citizens?

I could go on forever with these questions. Our strategy just has nothing at all to do with what we hope to accomplish in Afghanistan. I hate to boil this down to a cliche, but war is not the answer.

Seamus O'Sullivan writes:

A cross section of Afghans interviewed from six provinces perceive a gap between the virtues of democratization as idealized by western experts and Afghan government bureaucrats and its “manifestations,” which are widely seen as having been “externally imposed” during nine years of military occupation, said researcher Anna Larson earlier this week. Despite its promises, the purported democratization of the nation has not produced peace, prosperity, or equal treatment under the rule of law, according to the study. Western notions of individual freedom are often seen as without limitations, which creates conflicts in a culture that places a high value on loyalty to extended family and community, Larson said.

We are not going to bomb Afghanistan into a democracy. We're not going to make it a peaceful country with a violent military occupation. That's just not how it works.

Put yourself in the shoes of an Afghan. If a member of your family was killed by a NATO bomb, or a special forces night raid, or even an errant bullet from a distant battlefield - how do you think you would react? Would you submit to the crooked mafia dons in Karzai's presidential palace? Would you relent and volunteer for the Afghan police or army? Would you shun the local Taliban resistance who've vowed revenge against the NATO occupiers? Would you register to vote?

Or more likely, would you be one of those furious and humiliated Afghans mobbing the gates of the nearest NATO base, hurling stones and bricks and setting fires?

War is not politics, it is violence - murder - on an enormous scale. It does not lead to democracy, security, or good governance, it leads to anger, humiliation, and above all else, more violence.

Let's go back to Ackerman's report:

What they wanted to hear was a sure path — any path — to winning it. Or even just a clear definition of success. If the goal is stabilizing Afghanistan, what does that have to do with defeating al-Qaeda? If this is a war against al-Qaeda and al-Qaeda is in the untouchable areas of tribal Pakistan, where the troops can’t go, why not just draw down to a few bases in the east in order to drop bombs and launch missiles? Even if we can’t just do that, what will Afghans consider “stable,” anyway? Is all of this vagueness just a cover so we can decide at a certain point that we can withdraw in a face-saving way, declaring victory as it suits us to cover up a no-win situation? If so, why not just do that now?

That's a damn good idea, let's do it now. Get our troopers out of there, they're quite aware of the fact that the jobs they're doing have nothing to do with our objectives in Afghanistan - whether that's on the low end of stopping Al-Qa'eda or the high end of creating a stable and secure Afghan democracy. We have to stop lying to them, and stop lying to ourselves.

There's nothing wrong with wanting to stop Al-Qa'eda and there's nothing wrong with wanting to develop Afghanistan. What's wrong here is our policy of war and occupation. It's time to end it, for our sake, for the troops' sake, and for the sake of the Afghans themselves.

Afghanistan Follow-Up: US Government v. Karzai (and the CIA) on "Corruption" (Miller/Partlow)

Yesterday we posted an article from The New York Times on the battle between the US and Kabul over whether an aide to Afghan President Hamid Karzai should face trial for corruption. We suggested it pointed "to how difficult and vicious the politics may become".

Guess what? Less than 24 hours later, we have our proof. And here's the twist: Obama Administration officials are not only sniping at Karzai. They're also ready to take down the CIA. Greg Miller and Joshua Partlow report for The Washington Post:

Afghanistan: Latest US v. Karzai Fight over Corruption (Filkins/Mazzetti)

The CIA is making secret payments to multiple members of President Hamid Karzai's administration, in part to maintain sources of information in a government in which the Afghan leader is often seen as having a limited grasp of developments, according to current and former U.S. officials.

The payments are long-standing in many cases and designed to help the agency maintain a deep roster of allies within the presidential palace. Some aides function as CIA informants, but others collect stipends under more informal arrangements meant to ensure their accessibility, a U.S. official said.

The CIA has continued the payments despite concerns that it is backing corrupt officials and undermining efforts to wean Afghans' dependence on secret sources of income and graft.

The U.S. official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said a significant number of officials in Karzai's administration are on the payroll. Paul Gimigliano, a CIA spokesman, disputed that characterization, saying, "This anonymous source appears driven by ignorance, malice or both."

A former agency official said the payments were necessary because "the head of state is not going to tell you everything" and because Karzai often seems unaware of moves that members of his own government make.

The disclosure comes as a corruption investigation into one of Karzai's senior national security advisers - and an alleged agency informant - puts new strain on the already fraying relationship between Washington and Kabul.

Read full article....

Afghanistan: Latest US v. Karzai Fight over Corruption (Filkins/Mazzetti)

Dexter Filkins and Mark Mazzetti offer a tale, in The New York Times, of the fight between US officials and Afghan President Hamid Karzai over alleged corruption, pointing to how difficult and vicious the politics may become.

Indeed, in a story centred on Karzai's aide, Mohammad Zia Salehi, arrested for taking a bribe but soon released after the President's intervention, Filkins and Mazzetti are too polite to spell out the tactics in the battle. Some officials in the US Government, frustrated that the charges against Salehi have been blocked, is trying to bring him down by sticking the label of "CIA agent" on him:

The aide to President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan at the center of a politically sensitive corruption investigation is being paid by the Central Intelligence Agency, according to Afghan and American officials.

How Do You Solve A Problem Like Pakistan in Afghanistan? (Mull Responds to Ackerman)

Mohammed Zia Salehi, the chief of administration for the National Security Council, appears to have been on the payroll for many years, according to officials in Kabul and Washington. It is unclear exactly what Mr. Salehi does in exchange for his money, whether providing information to the spy agency, advancing American views inside the presidential palace, or both.

Mr. Salehi’s relationship with the C.I.A. underscores deep contradictions at the heart of the Obama administration’s policy in Afghanistan, with American officials simultaneously demanding that Mr. Karzai root out the corruption that pervades his government while sometimes subsidizing the very people suspected of perpetrating it.

Mr. Salehi was arrested in July and released after Mr. Karzai intervened. There has been no suggestion that Mr. Salehi’s ties to the C.I.A. played a role in his release; rather, officials say, it is the fear that Mr. Salehi knows about corrupt dealings inside the Karzai administration.

The ties underscore doubts about how seriously the Obama administration intends to fight corruption here. The anticorruption drive, though strongly backed by the United States, is still vigorously debated inside the administration. Some argue it should be a centerpiece of American strategy, and others say that attacking corrupt officials who are crucial to the war effort could destabilize the Karzai government.

The Obama administration is also racing to show progress in Afghanistan by December, when the White House will evaluate its mission there. Some administration officials argue that any comprehensive campaign to fight corruption inside Afghanistan is overly ambitious, with less than a year to go before the American military is set to begin withdrawing troops.

“Fighting corruption is the very definition of mission creep,” one Obama administration official said.

Others in the administration view public corruption as the single greatest threat to the Afghan government and the American mission; it is the corrupt nature of the Karzai government, these officials say, that drives ordinary Afghans into the arms of the Taliban. Other prominent Afghans who American officials have said were on the C.I.A.’s payroll include the president’s half brother, Ahmed Wali Karzai, suspected by investigators of playing a role in Afghanistan’s booming opium trade. Earlier this year, American officials did not press Mr. Karzai to remove his brother from his post as the chairman of the Kandahar provincial council. Mr. Karzai denies any monetary relationship with the C.I.A. and any links to the drug trade.

Mr. Salehi was arrested by the Afghan police after, investigators say, they wiretapped him soliciting a bribe — in the form of a car for his son — in exchange for impeding an American-backed investigation into a company suspected of shipping billions of dollars out of the country for Afghan officials, drug smugglers and insurgents.

Mr. Salehi was released seven hours later, after telephoning Mr. Karzai from his jail cell to demand help, officials said, and after Mr. Karzai forcefully intervened on his behalf.

The president sent aides to get him and has since threatened to limit the power of the anticorruption unit that carried out the arrest. Mr. Salehi could not be reached for comment on Wednesday. A spokesman for President Karzai did not respond to a list of questions sent to his office, including whether Mr. Karzai knew that Mr. Salehi was a C.I.A. informant.

A spokesman for the C.I.A. declined to comment on any relationship with Mr. Salehi.

Read full article....

How Do You Solve A Problem Like Pakistan in Afghanistan? (Mull Responds to Ackerman)

EA correspondent Josh Mull is the Afghanistan Blogging Fellow for The Seminal and Brave New Foundation. He also writes for Rethink Afghanistan:

How are we going to deal with Pakistan when they are openly flaunting their proxy war against the United States? How should we respond when they say stuff like "we know where the [Taliban] shadow government is"? Or this:

“We picked up Baradar and the others because they were trying to make a deal without us,” said a Pakistani security official, who, like numerous people interviewed about the operation, spoke anonymously because of the delicacy of relations between Pakistan, Afghanistan and the United States. “We protect the Taliban. They are dependent on us. We are not going to allow them to make a deal with Karzai and the Indians.”

Pakistan: Floods, Bombings, & A Drone Strike (Cole)

Pakistan protects the Taliban. That's in addition to them training and equipping various Taliban militias and even funding suicide attacks and improvised explosive devices against American troops. We, as in you the American taxpayer, give Pakistan billions of dollars in aid and weaponry, including directly reimbursing them for their army operations (down to paying for the bullets fired). And yet they're killing our troops and protecting insurgents/terrorists.

Our relationship with Pakistan is deeply, deeply flawed. How do we fix this?

Spencer Ackerman suggests diplomacy, and I wholeheartedly agree. The American people are howling at the gates of congress to end these trillion-dollar, decade-long wars of occupation and aggression, and there is simply no conceivable military solution to any of our problems, whether that's Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, or Iran. Diplomacy has to be the way to go.

Ackerman writes:

An envoy from the administration needs to say: "We’re on board with that sentiment 100 percent! Pakistan should under no circumstances be cut out of a deal. We’re happy to see that you guys talk to Hamid Karzai’s government now without the binding mechanism of our trilateral summitry. Believe us, we want you doing that, because it should convince you that Pakistan has an interlocutor in Karzai, not an obstacle to Pakistani interests in a post-conflict Afghanistan.

Look, we get it: you sponsor the Taliban because you want strategic depth on your eastern border. You can get that from Karzai; and we’re here to help you get it! Pakistan can have a role in South Asia commensurate with the great power that it is!

And because we’re so sincere about that, we want you involved in the peace talks in a very specific way. We want you to deliver the Taliban and the Haqqanis to the table, under whatever circumstances of amnesty work for you. Then we want you to guarantee that in a post-war Afghanistan, they’re not backsliding on their commitments to backsliding on al-Qaeda. We’re going to put that on you. Look at that: you get an important role in Afghanistan, and it allows us to bring the war to a steady conclusion on mutually-agreeable terms. You win, we win, Karzai wins, the Taliban… kind of win (yeah, we said it), our mutual enemies in al-Qaeda (and the Pak Taliban!) lose. Now who wants flood relief?

Oh, and in case we need to say it: if we start seeing al-Qaeda slipping back into the country, it’s wrath-of-God time."

"We're on board 100 percent!" Boy, that should really scare the hell out of the Pakistanis. Ackerman, for whatever reason, seems to interpret "diplomacy" as "giving Pakistan everything it could possibly want". This is the wrong approach. In negotiations, you start with the extreme of what you want, and then negotiate down to a compromise. Ackerman has done exactly the opposite.

Let's take the statement line by line.

We’re on board with that sentiment 100 percent! Pakistan should under no circumstances be cut out of a deal. We’re happy to see that you guys talk to Hamid Karzai’s government now without the binding mechanism of our trilateral summitry.

If I were Pakistan, I'd stop you right there. "You agree 100 percent? Good, then shut up and keep the money coming. Make the check out to General Kayani, that's K-A-Y..."

Look, we get it: you sponsor the Taliban because you want strategic depth on your eastern border. You can get that from Karzai; and we’re here to help you get it! Pakistan can have a role in South Asia commensurate with the great power that it is!

So much wrong here. First of all, it's not enough to "get it" that Pakistan's national security policy is based on support for violent militias and terrorist organizations. The reason some of us have been shouting "strategic depth" from the rooftops is because that policy is illegal, destabilising, and unimaginably dangerous both regionally and globally. It is not OK: we already "get" why they do it, we have to figure out a way to stop it.

Next, Ackerman suggests that Pakistan can get their strategic depth from Karzai, with America even offering to help. There's no other way to read that than as a blatant concession that the US does not consider Afghanistan to be a sovereign country, but rather as an Imperial Colony of Pakistan and the United States ruled by a pliant puppet government. Forget all that stuff about democratic elections, about standing up a stable, non-corrupt Afghan government, about creating a secure Afghanistan capable of protecting itself from terrorists. We were just kidding, we actually think Karzai is just on our strings and that Pakistan should be able to inflict as much violence and terrorism on Afghanistan as it wants.

We'll skip over the part about Pakistan being a "great power" since it is one of the most corrupt, violent, unstable countries on Earth, as well as the premier state sponsor of terrorism in Central Asia, if not the entire globe. But then again, I guess if Ackerman believes that total capitulation = diplomacy, then sure, corrupt, terrorist-supporting tyrants = great power. Why not? Words don't mean anything.

And because we’re so sincere about that, we want you involved in the peace talks in a very specific way. We want you to deliver the Taliban and the Haqqanis to the table, under whatever circumstances of amnesty work for you. Then we want you to guarantee that in a post-war Afghanistan, they’re not backsliding on their commitments to backsliding on al-Qaeda. We’re going to put that on you.

We want Pakistan involved in peace talks in whatever way works for them? That's already happening. Remember the New York Times article about how they're using Baradar's capture as leverage in the peace talks? It's dumb enough to concede everything the Pakistanis want, but then it's even stupider to "offer" them things they already have to begin with.

And just how is Pakistan supposed to keep its guarantees on Al-Qa'eda? We've already conceded strategic depth, and their support of Al-Qa'eda affiliates is part of that, so what is this "backsliding" stuff we're talking about?

This is why you don't open negotiations, "Sure, we agree with everything!" There are no guarantees or backsliding after you give them everything. That's what "100 percent" means. It means all of it. You can't say "OK, you can support terrorists, but make sure you don't support terrorists."

Look at that: you get an important role in Afghanistan, and it allows us to bring the war to a steady conclusion on mutually-agreeable terms. You win, we win, Karzai wins, the Taliban… kind of win (yeah, we said it), our mutual enemies in al-Qaeda (and the Pak Taliban!) lose.

Pakistan won when we opened with "we're on board 100 percent". We "win" because...why? We got nothing, we just gave Pakistan everything it wanted, including what they already have now. Karzai "wins" because he gets to be a US and Pakistani puppet.

And Al-Qa'eda, how do they lose? Magic, I suppose. As for the Pakistani Taliban, they aren't even mentioned.

Who actually loses from all of this? The people of Afghanistan and Pakistan, of course, since they're left to either the "great powers" in Islamabad who support terrorism and militancy or to our corrupt puppet Hamid Karzai in Kabul.

But wait, Ackerman isn't done showing us how diplomacy works.

Now who wants flood relief?

Get it? We're conditioning our flood relief for the tens of millions of affected people in Pakistan entirely on our selfish foreign policy goals. Do we not understand the difference between General Kayani and a displaced, starving child in a refugee camp? Sure, the floods are a national security issue for the United States, but they are not an opportunity to extract a price from the victims.

Oh, and in case we need to say it: if we start seeing al-Qaeda slipping back into the country, it’s wrath-of-God time.

Just what the hell is that supposed to mean? Are we threatening Pakistan? If so, with what? Didn't we open this conversation by establishing that there is NO military solution? If all it takes to eradicate terrorism and militancy in Afghanistan and Pakistan is "wrath-of-God time", then by all means, do it now. Except this is bulls**t; it doesn't mean anything.

Pakistan's Army Chief, General Kayani, and the head of its intelligence service, General Pasha, arenot starry-eyed national security bloggers who think that the words "wrath-of-God time" are impressive or intimidating. The people we're dealing with have their own army (bigger than ours), their own airplanes, their own special forces, and, of course, their own terrorist and insurgent organizations. They're not afraid of us or our hollow threats. If they were, they wouldn't be saying things in the newspaper like "we know where the shadow government is".

If we have a specific threat, then spit it out. Will we invade the tribal areas? Will we drone strike General Kayani? Carpet bomb Rawalpindi and Islamabad? What is it exactly that we mean by "wrath-of-God time"?

All together, what do we have? Our "diplomacy" looks like giving Pakistan everything it wants and then capping it off with threatening them. That's not really diplomacy, is it? It's the status quo and a military threat. Would it be over-the-top to just write FAIL?

So what are some real options for dealing with Pakistan? Here are a few suggestions, keeping in mind that you open negotiations with the most extreme options and then work backwards.

• Call a peace summit with all relevant players, including representatives from Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Jammu & Kashmir, Russia, United States, Saudi Arabia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, China, and Iran


• Cut off all military aid to Pakistan


• Cut off all (non-disaster) civilian aid to Pakistan


• Blacklist the Pakistan Army and intelligence services as terrorist organizations


• Pursue United Nations or unilateral economic sanctions against the top leadership of the Pakistani Army, the intelligence services, as well as ruling elites in the ruling PPP political party


• Call for new, internationally monitored and vetted elections in Pakistan and condition all (non-disaster) aid on the legitimacy of these elections


• Provide economic and diplomatic support for Pakistani opposition groups, including grassroots (the Lawyers movement) and political parties (PML-N)


• Publicly release/de-classify all US intelligence on Pakistan's support of terrorism, including wiretap audio and satellite imagery


• Publicly call for an end to the Pakistani occupation of Balochistan and Kashmir


• Provide diplomatic and economic support, including recognition, of an autonomous Balochistan


• Provide diplomatic and economic support, including recognition, of an Independent Kashmir


• Dramatically increase civilian and military aid to India (call it "Strategic Depth")


• Offer India a permanent seat on the United Nations security council


• Allow India to utilize American military bases in Afghanistan and Central Asia for "training exercises"


• Invite India to the NATO mission in Afghanistan, requiring some contribution of security forces

Crazy stuff, right? But it's not giving Pakistan whatever it wants, and it's not threatening military action against them either. Either they give up their support of terrorism and militancy, or we start talking about the options above.

Ackerman wrote:

When people mouth the truism that There’s No Military Solution To The Afghanistan War, they’re both right and typically uncreative about thinking through what A Political Solution To The Afghanistan War looks like. I submit that the imagined diplomatic proposal above is an opening gambit.

I wouldn't say my options are as "creative" as Ackerman's suggestion to give Pakistan whatever it wants, but consider the options I listed above as my response to his "opening gambit".

The Latest from Iran (6 August): The Campaign Against Ahmadinejad's Aide

1925 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. The Lede, the blog of The New York Times, has now noted the hunger strike of the 17 detainees in Evin Prison.

1915 GMT: The No-Longer-Missing Lawyer. Human rights lawyer Mohammad Mostafaei is under European diplomatic protection after Turkish authorities released him today from a detention center for illegal immigrants.

An Amnesty International  official says Mostafaei is expected to travel to Norway.

1730 GMT: Looks like we should name this the "Attacking Rahim-Mashai" thread. Another prominent member of Parliament (and Ali Larijani ally), Ahmad Tavakoli, has joined the criticism of the President's Chief of Staff, Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai, for his statements putting forth Iran rather than Islam as a source of emulation for other countries.

Tavakoli has insisted the Parliament will not remain silent in the face of the remarks.

NEW Iran-US Special: The 4-Step Collapse of Obama’s “Engagement” Into Confusion
Iraq and Iran: Has Ayatollah Sistani Challenged the Supreme Leader’s Authority? (Nafisi)
Iran-US Special: Obama Extends His Hand “Engagement, Not Conflict”
Iran Feature: Free Speech (and Some Laughs) in the Theatre (Tehran Bureau)
The Latest from Iran (5 August): Challenges

1625 GMT: Re-packaging the Friday Prayer. Press TV's entry on the Friday Prayer by Ayatollah Ahmad Khatami (see 1325 GMT) changes the priority to the message that "a possible US attack on the Islamic republic will jeopardize American interests in the world". Khatami's attack on Presidential advisor Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai, highlighted in other media accounts, seems to have disappeared.

1325 GMT: Your Friday Prayer Update. In a shocking development, the US was not the main target of today's Tehran Friday Prayer, delivered by Ayatollah Ahmad Khatami.

So who got the honour?

Why, it's President Ahmadinejad's chief of staff and brother-in-law, Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai!

Khatami, without naming Rahim-Mashai --- or, as Fars put it carefully, "an implicit reference to the words of a Government official" --- criticised those who put Iranian nationalism before Islam.

Earlier this week, Rahim-Mashai has said that it was Iran, rather than Islam, that now stood as an example for emulation by the rest of the world.

Elsewhere in the speech, Khatami went after the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mike Mullen, for his confirmation that the US had war plans for Iran. But, you know, that just couldn't match up with the apparent transgression of the President's favourite advisor.

(And what do you know? Moments later, I spot an article from Parleman News on Rahim-Mashai as the cause of division amongst principalists. And Tabnak is reporting the comments of conservative member of Parliament Ali Motahari that Ahmaidnejad must question Rahim-Mashai about his remarks.)

1200 GMT: The Battle Within. Ali Asghari, a member of the Expediency Council, has warned that principalism without reformism ends up in dictatorship.

1055 GMT: Talking Tough Today. The commander of Iran's army, Major General Ataollah Salehi, has warned enemies of a "crushing defeat" if they attack: "The army is ready to deal a heavy blow to any aggressors against Iran territories."

0955 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Ayatollah Bayat-Zanjani has issued a statement of support for the 17 hunger strikers in Evin Prison and their families.

0935 GMT: Economy Watch. Khabar Online claims that only 20% of workers are receiving their food supplies for the holy month of Ramadan.

0930 GMT: Fretting. Looks like Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi is a bit worried: he has warned the board of Tarbiat Modarres University of the possibility of a "stronger" sedition. He declared that if young people are not religious, then the Revolution will be weakened.

0920 GMT: The Sale of History. Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance Seyed Mohammad Hosseini has declared, "We must promote the Iranian culture to find purity, because the world is hungry for this." He announced that he would give permits for books seeking this aim.

Hosseini may want have a word about his cultural mission with the President's chief of staff Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai: according to Rooz Online, the Cultural Heritage Organization, headed by Rahim-Mashai, plans to sell some of Iran's historic artifacts.

0915 GMT: Backing the President? Ayatollah Haeri Shirazi of the Assembly of Experts, one of the most vocal supporters of the Government, has given Mahmoud Ahmadinejad mixed support against claims from "hard-liners" that he has been soft on cultural issues. Haeri Shirazi, criticising Western values in Iranian education, refers to the President's campaign to "Islamise" schools but leaves the impression that Ahmadinejad has not been up to the mark in enforcing hijab.

Haeri Shirazi also made a spirited defence of the Supreme Leader's authority.

0910 GMT: Oil Crash and Squeeze. Peyke Iran is reporting that two planes of the National Iranian Oil Company have collided at Mehrabad Airport in Tehran.

Citing Reuters, the website adds that Turkey's exports of gasoline to Iran have increased.

0640 GMT: A Message to Washington. Reformist member of Parliament Amir Taherkhani has said the US is unwise 2 let "Zionists" have a free hand, warning that adventurism will cause a crisis.

0633 GMT: Missiles and False News. Peyke Iran, quoting Deutsche Welle, claims that the "news" of delivery of four S-300 anti-aircraft missiles to Iran --- two from Belarus and two from an unspecified source --- was removed by Fars News within two hours of publication.

0629 GMT: No Justice. In an interview with the mother and lawyer of Neda Agha Soltan, the woman shot to death by a Basij militiaman on 20 June 2009, Fereshteh Ghazi claims that the suspect in the case has disappeared.

0625 GMT: The Guards and the Economy. Mehdi Eliasi, writing in Rooz Online, has evaluated how the increasing involvement of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps in the economy is undermining the foundations of the private sector.

0615 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. A group of students and alumni of Azad University of Tehran have released a statement objecting to Ali Malihi’s four-year prison sentence and his detention in solitary confinement, expressing concern over his physical and psychological state and well-being.

Malihi has been detained for seven months, spending about 40 days in solitary. He is one of the 17 political prisoners now on hunger strike.

0605 GMT: The Campaign Against Jannati. It is not just opposition clerics and politicians who are pressing Ayatollah Jannati, the head of the Guardian Council, after his recent claim of $1 billion given to the Green "leaders" and another $50 billion promised by the US and Saudi Arabia for regime change. Conservative member of Parliament Nayyereh Akhavan has also declared that Jannati should show the documents proving his allegation.

0545 GMT: Mousavi and the Hunger Strike. Mir Hossein Mousavi has praised the resistance of 17 political prisoners on hunger strike in Evin Prison, while asking them to end it:

All seekers of freedom and righteousness have heard your message and have witnessed your resistance for your humanitarian and legitimate demands.

Now that that your message and your families’ struggle has spread across the globe and within the country, the nation is concerned about your health as Green assets for the country. We urge you to end your hunger strike and call on prison officials to respect the rights of all prisoners based on the flawed rule and regulations that exist and not to allow for the country’s reputation to be further tarnished in the eyes of the world’s nations.

The 17 strikers include Bahman Ahmadi Amooei (journalist), Hossein Nourinejad (journalist and member of Islamic Iran Participation Front), Abdollah Momeni (student activist and spokesperson for the Office for Fostering Unity), Ali Parviz (student activist), Hamidreza Mohammadi (political activist), Jafar Aghdami (civil activist), Babak Bordbar (photojournalist), Ebrahim (Nader) Babaei (civil activist and wounded veteran of the Iran-Iraq war), Kouhyar Goudarzi (human rights activist and weblog writer), Keyvan Samimi (journalist), and Mohammad Hossein Sohrabi Rad.

0535 GMT: International Front. Presidents Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan and Emomali Rahman of Tajikistan were in Tehran on Thursday at the opening of the “Fourth Meeting of Persian-Speaking Countries”, and meet with high-ranking Iranian officials, including the Supreme Leader and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

There were few substantive details in Fars News, which said Karzai and Rahman supported peaceful nuclear energy and agreements were signed to combat terrorism and fight drug trafficking. However, Karzai's visit comes as the US is escalating its effort in Afghanistan and may be looking for Iranian co-operation.

0525 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Green Voice of Freedom claims that authorities are putting pressure on political prisoners by "exiling" them to prisons distant from their hometowns, thus hindering the ability of families to visit them.

Student activist Atafeh Nabavi, who was detained in the mass protest of 15 June 2009 and is serving a four-year sentence, has written an open letter to the 17 hunger strikers in Evin Prison:

I know that when you began your action, you knew that any protest in this country will have disproportionate costs. I honor your stance and your weakened existence, and I wish that you get what you deserve in this unfair battle.

0515 GMT: After a break last night, we start by noting yesterday's attack, possibly by Basij militia members, on opposition figure Mehdi Karroubi.

Karroubi was attending a funeral at Nour Mosque in Tehran when it was surrounded by individuals, allegedly armed, who threw eggs at the cleric when he left. His bodyguards tried to scatter the assailants by shooting into the air.

The news was first reported by Fars but was later confirmed by Karroubi's Taghi.

Mehdi Karroubi has been attacked by pro-government groups several times since the 2009 election, most recently in June when he was visiting Grand Ayatollah Sane'i, another critic of the Government. He was uninjured in yesterday's incident.