How Do You Solve A Problem Like Pakistan in Afghanistan? (Mull Responds to Ackerman)

EA correspondent Josh Mull is the Afghanistan Blogging Fellow for The Seminal and Brave New Foundation. He also writes for Rethink Afghanistan:

How are we going to deal with Pakistan when they are openly flaunting their proxy war against the United States? How should we respond when they say stuff like "we know where the [Taliban] shadow government is"? Or this:

“We picked up Baradar and the others because they were trying to make a deal without us,” said a Pakistani security official, who, like numerous people interviewed about the operation, spoke anonymously because of the delicacy of relations between Pakistan, Afghanistan and the United States. “We protect the Taliban. They are dependent on us. We are not going to allow them to make a deal with Karzai and the Indians.”

Pakistan: Floods, Bombings, & A Drone Strike (Cole)

Pakistan protects the Taliban. That's in addition to them training and equipping various Taliban militias and even funding suicide attacks and improvised explosive devices against American troops. We, as in you the American taxpayer, give Pakistan billions of dollars in aid and weaponry, including directly reimbursing them for their army operations (down to paying for the bullets fired). And yet they're killing our troops and protecting insurgents/terrorists.

Our relationship with Pakistan is deeply, deeply flawed. How do we fix this?

Spencer Ackerman suggests diplomacy, and I wholeheartedly agree. The American people are howling at the gates of congress to end these trillion-dollar, decade-long wars of occupation and aggression, and there is simply no conceivable military solution to any of our problems, whether that's Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, or Iran. Diplomacy has to be the way to go.

Ackerman writes:

An envoy from the administration needs to say: "We’re on board with that sentiment 100 percent! Pakistan should under no circumstances be cut out of a deal. We’re happy to see that you guys talk to Hamid Karzai’s government now without the binding mechanism of our trilateral summitry. Believe us, we want you doing that, because it should convince you that Pakistan has an interlocutor in Karzai, not an obstacle to Pakistani interests in a post-conflict Afghanistan.

Look, we get it: you sponsor the Taliban because you want strategic depth on your eastern border. You can get that from Karzai; and we’re here to help you get it! Pakistan can have a role in South Asia commensurate with the great power that it is!

And because we’re so sincere about that, we want you involved in the peace talks in a very specific way. We want you to deliver the Taliban and the Haqqanis to the table, under whatever circumstances of amnesty work for you. Then we want you to guarantee that in a post-war Afghanistan, they’re not backsliding on their commitments to backsliding on al-Qaeda. We’re going to put that on you. Look at that: you get an important role in Afghanistan, and it allows us to bring the war to a steady conclusion on mutually-agreeable terms. You win, we win, Karzai wins, the Taliban… kind of win (yeah, we said it), our mutual enemies in al-Qaeda (and the Pak Taliban!) lose. Now who wants flood relief?

Oh, and in case we need to say it: if we start seeing al-Qaeda slipping back into the country, it’s wrath-of-God time."

"We're on board 100 percent!" Boy, that should really scare the hell out of the Pakistanis. Ackerman, for whatever reason, seems to interpret "diplomacy" as "giving Pakistan everything it could possibly want". This is the wrong approach. In negotiations, you start with the extreme of what you want, and then negotiate down to a compromise. Ackerman has done exactly the opposite.

Let's take the statement line by line.

We’re on board with that sentiment 100 percent! Pakistan should under no circumstances be cut out of a deal. We’re happy to see that you guys talk to Hamid Karzai’s government now without the binding mechanism of our trilateral summitry.

If I were Pakistan, I'd stop you right there. "You agree 100 percent? Good, then shut up and keep the money coming. Make the check out to General Kayani, that's K-A-Y..."

Look, we get it: you sponsor the Taliban because you want strategic depth on your eastern border. You can get that from Karzai; and we’re here to help you get it! Pakistan can have a role in South Asia commensurate with the great power that it is!

So much wrong here. First of all, it's not enough to "get it" that Pakistan's national security policy is based on support for violent militias and terrorist organizations. The reason some of us have been shouting "strategic depth" from the rooftops is because that policy is illegal, destabilising, and unimaginably dangerous both regionally and globally. It is not OK: we already "get" why they do it, we have to figure out a way to stop it.

Next, Ackerman suggests that Pakistan can get their strategic depth from Karzai, with America even offering to help. There's no other way to read that than as a blatant concession that the US does not consider Afghanistan to be a sovereign country, but rather as an Imperial Colony of Pakistan and the United States ruled by a pliant puppet government. Forget all that stuff about democratic elections, about standing up a stable, non-corrupt Afghan government, about creating a secure Afghanistan capable of protecting itself from terrorists. We were just kidding, we actually think Karzai is just on our strings and that Pakistan should be able to inflict as much violence and terrorism on Afghanistan as it wants.

We'll skip over the part about Pakistan being a "great power" since it is one of the most corrupt, violent, unstable countries on Earth, as well as the premier state sponsor of terrorism in Central Asia, if not the entire globe. But then again, I guess if Ackerman believes that total capitulation = diplomacy, then sure, corrupt, terrorist-supporting tyrants = great power. Why not? Words don't mean anything.

And because we’re so sincere about that, we want you involved in the peace talks in a very specific way. We want you to deliver the Taliban and the Haqqanis to the table, under whatever circumstances of amnesty work for you. Then we want you to guarantee that in a post-war Afghanistan, they’re not backsliding on their commitments to backsliding on al-Qaeda. We’re going to put that on you.

We want Pakistan involved in peace talks in whatever way works for them? That's already happening. Remember the New York Times article about how they're using Baradar's capture as leverage in the peace talks? It's dumb enough to concede everything the Pakistanis want, but then it's even stupider to "offer" them things they already have to begin with.

And just how is Pakistan supposed to keep its guarantees on Al-Qa'eda? We've already conceded strategic depth, and their support of Al-Qa'eda affiliates is part of that, so what is this "backsliding" stuff we're talking about?

This is why you don't open negotiations, "Sure, we agree with everything!" There are no guarantees or backsliding after you give them everything. That's what "100 percent" means. It means all of it. You can't say "OK, you can support terrorists, but make sure you don't support terrorists."

Look at that: you get an important role in Afghanistan, and it allows us to bring the war to a steady conclusion on mutually-agreeable terms. You win, we win, Karzai wins, the Taliban… kind of win (yeah, we said it), our mutual enemies in al-Qaeda (and the Pak Taliban!) lose.

Pakistan won when we opened with "we're on board 100 percent". We "win" because...why? We got nothing, we just gave Pakistan everything it wanted, including what they already have now. Karzai "wins" because he gets to be a US and Pakistani puppet.

And Al-Qa'eda, how do they lose? Magic, I suppose. As for the Pakistani Taliban, they aren't even mentioned.

Who actually loses from all of this? The people of Afghanistan and Pakistan, of course, since they're left to either the "great powers" in Islamabad who support terrorism and militancy or to our corrupt puppet Hamid Karzai in Kabul.

But wait, Ackerman isn't done showing us how diplomacy works.

Now who wants flood relief?

Get it? We're conditioning our flood relief for the tens of millions of affected people in Pakistan entirely on our selfish foreign policy goals. Do we not understand the difference between General Kayani and a displaced, starving child in a refugee camp? Sure, the floods are a national security issue for the United States, but they are not an opportunity to extract a price from the victims.

Oh, and in case we need to say it: if we start seeing al-Qaeda slipping back into the country, it’s wrath-of-God time.

Just what the hell is that supposed to mean? Are we threatening Pakistan? If so, with what? Didn't we open this conversation by establishing that there is NO military solution? If all it takes to eradicate terrorism and militancy in Afghanistan and Pakistan is "wrath-of-God time", then by all means, do it now. Except this is bulls**t; it doesn't mean anything.

Pakistan's Army Chief, General Kayani, and the head of its intelligence service, General Pasha, arenot starry-eyed national security bloggers who think that the words "wrath-of-God time" are impressive or intimidating. The people we're dealing with have their own army (bigger than ours), their own airplanes, their own special forces, and, of course, their own terrorist and insurgent organizations. They're not afraid of us or our hollow threats. If they were, they wouldn't be saying things in the newspaper like "we know where the shadow government is".

If we have a specific threat, then spit it out. Will we invade the tribal areas? Will we drone strike General Kayani? Carpet bomb Rawalpindi and Islamabad? What is it exactly that we mean by "wrath-of-God time"?

All together, what do we have? Our "diplomacy" looks like giving Pakistan everything it wants and then capping it off with threatening them. That's not really diplomacy, is it? It's the status quo and a military threat. Would it be over-the-top to just write FAIL?

So what are some real options for dealing with Pakistan? Here are a few suggestions, keeping in mind that you open negotiations with the most extreme options and then work backwards.

• Call a peace summit with all relevant players, including representatives from Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Jammu & Kashmir, Russia, United States, Saudi Arabia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, China, and Iran


• Cut off all military aid to Pakistan


• Cut off all (non-disaster) civilian aid to Pakistan


• Blacklist the Pakistan Army and intelligence services as terrorist organizations


• Pursue United Nations or unilateral economic sanctions against the top leadership of the Pakistani Army, the intelligence services, as well as ruling elites in the ruling PPP political party


• Call for new, internationally monitored and vetted elections in Pakistan and condition all (non-disaster) aid on the legitimacy of these elections


• Provide economic and diplomatic support for Pakistani opposition groups, including grassroots (the Lawyers movement) and political parties (PML-N)


• Publicly release/de-classify all US intelligence on Pakistan's support of terrorism, including wiretap audio and satellite imagery


• Publicly call for an end to the Pakistani occupation of Balochistan and Kashmir


• Provide diplomatic and economic support, including recognition, of an autonomous Balochistan


• Provide diplomatic and economic support, including recognition, of an Independent Kashmir


• Dramatically increase civilian and military aid to India (call it "Strategic Depth")


• Offer India a permanent seat on the United Nations security council


• Allow India to utilize American military bases in Afghanistan and Central Asia for "training exercises"


• Invite India to the NATO mission in Afghanistan, requiring some contribution of security forces

Crazy stuff, right? But it's not giving Pakistan whatever it wants, and it's not threatening military action against them either. Either they give up their support of terrorism and militancy, or we start talking about the options above.

Ackerman wrote:

When people mouth the truism that There’s No Military Solution To The Afghanistan War, they’re both right and typically uncreative about thinking through what A Political Solution To The Afghanistan War looks like. I submit that the imagined diplomatic proposal above is an opening gambit.

I wouldn't say my options are as "creative" as Ackerman's suggestion to give Pakistan whatever it wants, but consider the options I listed above as my response to his "opening gambit".

Pakistan: Floods, Bombings, & A Drone Strike (Cole)

An item that caught our eye this morning: there have been 53 US drone strikes in Pakistan during 2010. That is equal to the total for all of 2009.

Juan Cole rounds up the latest news:

As Pakistan’s army and political elite focused on the catastrophic floods that have put a fifth of the country under water and displaced millions, militants in the mountainous northwest of the country struck on Monday with bombings that killed 32 persons and wounded 42.

Afghanistan Tangled: How Pakistan Used the US & an Arrest to Block Peace Talks with Taliban (Filkins)
Pakistan and the Floods: America’s Broken Response (Mull)

The violence targeted figures involved in mediation between local authorities and the Taliban, and were probably intended by extremists to end such negotiations. In Wana, South Waziristan, a suicide bomber attacked the seminary of Maulana Nur Muhammad, a former member of the Pakistani parliament from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas who ran on the ticket of the Party of the Association of Muslim Clerics (Jami’at Ulama-i Islam (Fazl)). This group is alleged to have helped produce the Taliban back in the 1990s so they are not exactly bleeding heart liberals and it is a little odd that the militants should have killed 22 persons at Nur Muhammad’s seminary. Dawn hints that the clergyman’s opposition to the Uzbek expatriates among the Pakistani Taliban may have led to the Uzbeks targeting him.

Also, as elders of Khurram in FATA met to settle a dispute over who owned a local school, they were blown up by a bomb on a delayed timer, with 7 killed and 6 wounded.

As if to add injury to insult, the United States fired a drone missile at a compound owned by the shadowy Haqqani network in North Waziristan, killing 13 militants and 7 civilians, including women and children.

Given the state of Pakistan, you would think that the US could afford to call a Ramadan ceasefire in its constant bombing of Pakistanis. The deaths of women and children and innocent men in these raids makes for bad feeling toward the US, but especially during the fasting month of Ramadan and in the midst of a major humanitarian crisis? That’s the headline you want, ’7 innocents killed by US drone’? Me, I don’t think that policy is appropriate to the moment.

The Washington Post explores the reasons for which the billions in US aid given since 2001 have not purchased for the US much good will in Pakistan. Washington has avoided iconic projects for fear they would be blown up by militants, and most aid is funneled through branches of the Pakistani government.

Back in Islamabad, President Asaf Ali Zardari said that it would take at least 3 years for Pakistan to recover from the deluge, though he admitted that in some ways the country might never be the same....

Read full article....

Afghanistan Tangled: How Pakistan Used the US & an Arrest to Block Peace Talks with Taliban (Filkins)

Dexter Filkins writes for The New York Times:

When American and Pakistani agents captured Abdul Ghani Baradar, the Taliban’s operational commander, in the chaotic port city of Karachi last January, both countries hailed the arrest as a breakthrough in their often difficult partnership in fighting terrorism.

But the arrest of Mr. Baradar, the second-ranking Taliban leader after Mullah Muhammad Omar, came with a beguiling twist: both American and Pakistani officials claimed that Mr. Baradar’s capture had been a lucky break. It was only days later, the officials said, that they finally figured out who they had.

Now, seven months later, Pakistani officials are telling a very different story. They say they set out to capture Mr. Baradar, and used the C.I.A. to help them do it, because they wanted to shut down secret peace talks that Mr. Baradar had been conducting with the Afghan government that excluded Pakistan, the Taliban’s longtime backer.

In the weeks after Mr. Baradar’s capture, Pakistani security officials detained as many as 23 Taliban leaders, many of whom had been enjoying the protection of the Pakistani government for years. The talks came to an end.

The events surrounding Mr. Baradar’s arrest have been the subject of debate inside military and intelligence circles for months. Some details are still murky — and others vigorously denied by some American intelligence officials in Washington. But the account offered in Islamabad highlights Pakistan’s policy in Afghanistan: retaining decisive influence over the Taliban, thwarting archenemy India, and putting Pakistan in a position to shape Afghanistan’s postwar political order.

“We picked up Baradar and the others because they were trying to make a deal without us,” said a Pakistani security official, who, like numerous people interviewed about the operation, spoke anonymously because of the delicacy of relations between Pakistan, Afghanistan and the United States. “We protect the Taliban. They are dependent on us. We are not going to allow them to make a deal with Karzai and the Indians.”

Some American officials still insist that Pakistan-American cooperation is improving, and deny a central Pakistani role in Mr. Baradar’s arrest. They say the Pakistanis may now be trying to rewrite history to make themselves appear more influential.

“These are self-serving fairy tales,” an American official said. “The people involved in the operation on the ground didn’t know exactly who would be there when they themselves arrived. But it certainly became clear, to Pakistanis and Americans alike, who we’d gotten.”

Other American officials suspect the C.I.A. may have been unwittingly used by the Pakistanis for the larger aims of slowing the pace of any peace talks.

At a minimum, the arrest of Mr. Baradar offers a glimpse of the multilayered challenges the United States faces as it tries to prevail in Afghanistan. It is battling a resilient insurgency, supporting a weak central government and trying to manage Pakistan’s leaders, who simultaneously support the Taliban and accept billions in American aid.

A senior NATO officer in Kabul said that in arresting Mr. Baradar and the other Taliban leaders, the Pakistanis may have been trying to buy time to see if President Obama’s strategy begins to prevail. If it does, the Pakistanis may eventually decide to let the Taliban make a deal. But if the Americans fail — and if they begin to pull out — then the Pakistanis may decide to retain the Taliban as their allies.

“We have been played before,” a senior NATO official said. “That the Pakistanis picked up Baradar to control the tempo of the negotiations is absolutely plausible.”

As for Mr. Baradar, he is now living comfortably in a safe house of Pakistan’s intelligence agency, the Pakistani official said. “He’s relaxing,” the official said.

Read full article....

The Latest from Iran (13 August): Letters to the Judiciary

1830 GMT: Your Belated Friday Prayer Update. Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, head of the Guardian Council, tried to bounce back from a recent rough patch --- you know, the $51 billion US-Saudi-opposition plot episode --- by taking the podium.

Lots of banter about bad America, but no apparent big numbers today, before Jannati laid down the reassurance that everyone was accountable in the Iranian system: "If you don't serve the people, they will not trust you and not vote for you. If they have committed the error to vote for you, they will take back their votes."

1825 GMT: The Battle Within. Mohammad Hashemi, member of the Expediency Council (and brother of former President Hashmei Rafsanjani), has declared that the President's duty is to implement laws, not to interpret them --- saying that he doesn't accept a law is illegal and outside of his duties.

1815 GMT: Ahmadinejad, Unifier-in-Chief. Declaration of the day comes from the President, who told Algerian counterpart Abdelaziz Bouteflika in a Friday telephone call that unity among Muslim nations will lead to the elimination of inequality and oppression everywhere.

1310 GMT: Black Economy Watch. Iran Focus claims that a leaked internal Islamic Revolution Guards Corps report confirms the IRGC is running a major smuggling network from the southern Iranian island of Qeshm in the Strait of Hormuz at the mouth of the Persian Gulf.

The report also says that the IRGC is building a large base at Roudkhaneh Sarbaz in the southeastern province of Sistan and Baluchistan as part of smuggling, including drugs, from Pakistan.

1300 GMT: The Nuclear Plant. Russian officials say that, after repeated delays, nuclear fuel will be loaded from 21 August into Iran's reactor at Bushehr.

Russian and Iranian specialists will spend 2-3 weeks putting uranium-packed fuel rods into the reactor:

"This will be an irreversible step," Sergei Novikov, a spokesman for Russia's state nuclear corporation, Rosatom, said. "At that moment, the Bushehr nuclear power plant will be certified as a nuclear energy installation."

Novikov said the first fissile reaction would take place in early October.

The Bushehr plant is monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agnecy and has no link with Iran's uranium enrichment programme. Tehran has agreed to return spent fuel to Russia.

1200 GMT: Parliament v. Government. MP Mehrdad Lahouti says the demand for impeachment of agriculture minister Sadegh Khalilian, with 22 signatories, will be handed over to Parliament on Sunday when it returns from summer vacation. The allegation is that Khalilian has inflicted heavy damage to domestic agriculture and caused severe irregularities in the sector.

Ahmad Tavakoli, speaking about the President's refusal to accept Parliament's authorisation of $2 million for the Tehran metro, has said that Ahmadinejad is "dictatorial in his decisions", breaking the law and the Constitution.

1145 GMT: Execution Watch ---Germany Gets Vocal (cont.). According to Die Welt , an (unnamed) official of Germany's Foreign Ministry has demanded the cancellation of the death sentence Sakineh Mohammadi Ashtiani.

1000 GMT: In Afghanistan. The Washington Post claims --- probably from a US Government official ---- that a "human intelligence asset", in a report for Afghanistan’s domestic intelligence agency, has said that Iran has supplied fresh batteries for about three dozen shoulder-fired SA-7 missiles stockpiled by Taliban forces in Kandahar, in anticipation of a U.S. attack.



The Post adds a note to the dramatic claim:

Any reports linking Iran to the Afghan conflict must be viewed with caution. A previous intelligence report, surfaced by WikiLeaks, describing a 2005 missile-buying mission to North Korea by rebel leader Gulbiddin Hekmatyar and a senior aide to Osama bin Laden, is now suspected of having been fabricated by elements in Washington or elsewhere who wanted to implicate Iran in the Afghan insurgency.

0900 GMT: Execution Watch --- Germany Gets Vocal. Leading Free Democrat politician Rainer Stinner, who visited Iran from 31 July to 3 August, has said that not only Tehran's sentences to death by stoning but its entire legal procedure are flagrant violations of human rights. He claimed that Iran cannot pretend this is a domestic affair, as it has ratified the International Human Rights Convention, and it is isolated by such practices.

The statement is a significant modification of the "live and let live" approach of the Free Democrats towards Iran in the 1990s.

0815 GMT: The Battle Within. Mehdi Khalaji, summarising many of the events covered by EA in recent weeks, writes an analysis for the Washington Institute on Near East Policy, "Internal Divisions among Iranian Hardliners Come to the Fore".

0755 GMT: International Affairs Update. Yesterday we noted the British Ambassador's diplomatic response to 1st Vice President Mohammad Reza Rahimi's rather un-diplomatic remarks about "England". We cited The Daily Telegraph as the source, but we have learned that the original story was by Martin Fletcher in The Times of London.

0715 GMT: US-Iran. We have posted a separate analysis by Greg Thielmann on the latest US intelligence and Iran's nuclear programme.

0710 GMT: Execution (Ashtiani) Watch. Human Rights Activists News Agency has more information on Wednesday's "confession" on Iranian state television by Sakineh Mohammadi Ashtiani, condemned to death for adultery and then complicity in murder of her husband. The New York Times, in an article by William Yong and Robert Worth, has also picked up on the article.

The Guardian of London reports that the execution by stoning sentence of Mariam Ghorbanzadeh, who allegedly miscarried after being beaten up in Tabriz prison this week, has been changed to hanging in a rapid judicial review.

0700 GMT: You Can't Go Home Again. Tehran has set new restrictions on Iranian expatriates coming into the country.

Mohammad Sharif Malekzadeh, head of the High Council of Iranian Expatriates, said Wednesday that Iranians residing abroad can return for academic reasons only after being approved by certain institutions. Asked if the "Iranian expatriates with political problems" who want to return would face any difficulties, Malekzadeh said that "certain institutions will do their duties in this regard".

0655 GMT: Sanctions(-Busting) Watch. Officials say recent UN Security Council and unilateral sanctions will not affect the €18 billion gas contract between the Swiss energy group EGL and the National Iranian Gas Export Company (NIGEC).

According to Fars News, Turkey's Energy Minister has said Ankara will respect its €1 billion deal wfor the construction of a 660km pipeline to transfer Iran's gas supplies to Europe.

The minister also reportedly said that Iran and Turkey will continue plans for the joint construction of power plants with a total capacity of 6,000 megawatts. And another minister has supposedly confirmed that Turkey paid Iran a $600 million fine for failing to import natural gas at the amount previously agreed between the two countries.

0645 GMT: Sensitive Journalism of the Day. The headline in Keyhan in an article on US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s recent remarks on human rights abuses in Iran: "Bill Clinton's Slave Defending the Murderers".

0640 GMT: All the President's Men. More on President Ahmadinejad's defence of his controversial chief of staff, Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai, against criticism from clerics, members of Parliament, and even Iran's top military commander:

There is an abnormal sensitivity against Mashai....I fully trust him....If someone has any criticism or believes what he says is wrong, he should invite Mr. Mashai to speak with him and even debate with him. Why all this row? Some want to change the issues of our enemies, illegal sanctions and enemies at home into secondary issues....

0630 GMT: International Affairs. Khabar Online writes of possible problems between the Foreign Ministry and the Government because the President's office is taking over the appointment of ambassadors.

(This is far from a new development, as Ahmadinejad's staff pushed out many Iranian ambassadors soon after thge 2005 election. What is interesting here is that Khabar would highlight this and the timing: only yesterday EA's Scott Lucas spoke with The National about Foreign Ministry disquiet over un-diplomatic statements by the President and 1st Vice-President Rahimi.)

0625 GMT: Economy Watch. MP Musalreza Sarvati has challenged the Minister of Works in Majlis that the official unemployment rate of 14.6% is untrue: "employed" includes people who work 1 hour per week and others who work 100 hours without being able to earn a living.

Sarvati claimed that every year 1.1 million new jobseekers are added in Iran.

0615 GMT: The Cleric's Apology. Ayatollah Dastgheib's has replied to a letter of prisoner families: "I, for my part, apologise for not being able to follow your pledges for justice."

Dastgheib warned Iran's ruling class they are "going the wrong way", asking them to "sit down for once" with a group of the people's representatives and senior clerics without harrassing them to explain the reasons for arresting the so-called "uproarers".

Dastgheib's message to these leaders? "This situation will pass, but your deeds will be documented by God and history."

0545 GMT: Friday is expected to be quiet in Iran, as the holy month of Ramadan begins, but news arrives that the head of the judiciary, Sadegh Larijani, has more work in his in-box....

The reformist Mosharekat (Islamic Iran Revolution) Party has demanded that the High Court to investigate the files, submitted by seven political prisoners and including a claimed audio proving manipulation by the Revolutionary Guard, of a rigged election:

The wide distribution of a tape of commander Moshfegh's speech, a high official of [Revolutionary Guard] Sarollah Forces, has proven the claims of Green leaders on the manipulation of 10th presidential elections. This person, who boldly and crudely describes the organisation of the putsch intoxicated by power, openly confesses to actions, which cannot be named other than a putsch according to all political schools of the world.

Families of former hunger strikers, having gone three days without news, have written Larijani: "Have our beloved outlived the hunger strike?"

The families of political prisoners have also asked Tehran Prosecutor General Abbas Jafari Doulatabadi:

How can we be sure of the physical condition of our lovedones after two grueling weeks of hunger strike? The only way we can be reassured of their well-being is if we are given the opportunity to hear their voices, if they are transferred back to the general ward at Evin (Prison), and when we are finally given permission to visit with them.

Students of three Tabriz univerisities have appealed to Larijani that it is time for him to break his silence in the face of major corruption committed by the "ruling body" of Iran. They complain about the lack of justice and the judiciary's independence, with silence amidst unpunished bloodshed, slander, insults, and lies.

Video & Transcript: US Military Chief Mike Mullen on Wikileaks, Afghanistan-Pakistan, & Iran

We've posted an analysis of the Iran section of this interview in a separate entry:

Visit msnbc.com for breaking news, world news, and news about the economy

Iran Analysis: Hyping the War Chatter — US Military Chief Mike Mullen Speaks
Afghanistan: Deeper into Stalemate? (Randall/Owen)

MR. GREGORY: Good morning. July is now the deadliest month for U.S. troops in the nearly nine-year war in Afghanistan. With us, our lead newsmaker interview this morning, the president's principal military adviser, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen.

Welcome back to MEET THE PRESS.

ADM. MULLEN: Good morning, David.

MR. GREGORY: We just played for our viewers very strong comments by you this week about these leaks. You indicated those who are responsible for making these secret documents public may already have blood on their hands, a strong statement. What specifically do you mean?

ADM. MULLEN: These --- the, the, the scope and the volume of these leaks are unprecedented, and, and the specifics of them, and I've been through some of them, but we've still got a lot of work to do to, to really put the details together. But I think the, the leaks themselves don't look clearly at the war that we're in. There is an ability to put this kind of information together in the world that we're living in and the potential for costing us lives, I think, is significant. I said, when it first occurred, I was appalled --- I remain appalled --- and that the potential for the loss of lives of American soldiers or coalition soldiers or Afghan citizens is clearly there.

MR. GREGORY: But how can that happen based on this?

ADM. MULLEN: Well, I would speak to--actually the Taliban spokesman has come out in the last day or so and said that they're looking at the names, and I think that's evidence of what that potential is. So...

MR. GREGORY: These are Afghans that they're looking at?

ADM. MULLEN: These are --- there are Afghan names that are, that are listed in the documents and specifically the Taliban spokesman said that they're going to look at that. I think people that aren't...
MR. GREGORY: They could be killed is the point.

ADM. MULLEN: They --- exactly. And people that aren't in, in a fight like this, that don't do this for a living, don't understand what the potential is for something like this in terms of the kinds of information. And a piece of information may seem very innocent in and of itself, and a lot of this is old information, but being able to net it together is--there's potential there that it could have a much bigger impact than just as is evident on the face of, of a piece of information.

MR. GREGORY: What endangers you as troops?

ADM. MULLEN: The, the fact that they would look at what our tactics are, how we report, where we're fighting, who's involved, the, the kinds of things that we do. And, and yet, there's --- the volume is such that we really haven't put it all together to be able to say this is exactly what the potential is in terms of that.

MR. GREGORY: You are looking at a suspect, a private who you believe may be responsible for obtaining this information, ultimately leaking it. What should happen to those responsible?

ADM. MULLEN: I think anybody in our --- in the, in the national security apparatus has, has got to take full cognizance of their responsibility for the safeguarding of classified information. I mean, I wouldn't go into the specific details of this investigation or of the case, the case of this private...

MR. GREGORY: But is it treason?

ADM. MULLEN: Again, I'll let the investigation run its course, and we'll see where it goes, specifically. But the concern, obviously, is for the leaking of classified information that is going to endanger people, operations and, potentially, depending on how serious it is, outcomes.

MR. GREGORY: There, there are some who have argued that the fixation about the leak perhaps is a distraction from the larger point of these documents, and that is that it goes in an unvarnished way to the core question of whether the strategy is actually working. The New York Times, as part of its reporting, made this piece of analysis --- and I'll put it up on the screen --- on Monday: "The documents --- some 92,000 reports spanning parts of two administrations from January 2004 through December 2009 --- illustrate in mosaic detail why, after the United States has spent almost $300 billion on the war in Afghanistan, the Taliban are stronger than at any time since 2001." Don't you think the public gets a look at these documents, and the bigger concern here is, not the leak, but the fact that this war may be a lost cause?

ADM. MULLEN: I don't think that the Taliban being stronger than they've been since 2001 is, is news. I mean, I've been concerned about the growing insurgency there for a number of years. We really are at a time in Afghanistan, after the president's review, where we've got the right strategy, the right leadership, and the right resources. And, and we really are in the second year of that aspect of Afghanistan. I certainly understand it is the ninth year, it is a long time, the sacrifices have been significant, and yet, at the same time, I think the strategy's right. And the release of these documents, best that I can tell, have not affected the strategy. Many of them were very, very old. That said, it's still --- I think we've got to work our way through exactly what the potential impact would be; and I think, from my perspective, we're headed in the right direction.

MR. GREGORY: But the reality is still the same, whether it's news or not, the disillusionment with the --- among the American people about the fact that the Taliban is stronger and not weaker--go back a year ago, nearly, you were on this program, and I asked you about the mission, and here's a portion of what you said.

(Videotape, August 23, 2009)

MR. GREGORY: We're rebuilding this nation?

ADM. MULLEN: To, to a certain degree, there is, there is some of that going on.

MR. GREGORY: Is that what the American people signed up for?

ADM. MULLEN: No, I'm --- right now, the American people signed up, I think, for support of getting at those who threaten us, and, and to the degree that, that the Afghan people's security and the ability to ensure that a safe haven doesn't recur in Afghanistan, there's focus on some degree of making sure security's OK, making sure governance moves in the right direction, and developing an economy which will underpin their future.

(End videotape)

MR. GREGORY: The problem with that a year on is that, again, the Taliban is stronger and there appears no evidence that they're willing to do the core thing, which is to turn their back on al-Qaeda. Isn't that the case?

ADM. MULLEN: Well, I think, again, that is the main mission is to make sure that, that Afghanistan can't become a safe haven again. They are indeed stronger. And yet the president approved additional forces, most of which are there, but there are still additional forces yet to come this year. So we've said for many, many months this would be a very difficult year; you pointed out the, the losses that have occurred in the month of July, the highest ever. We recognize that this is a tough fight, but we think we've got the resources right, the strategy right. There's also a regional piece of this, a lot of effort gone on the Pakistan side, a significant effort on the part of Pakistani leadership, Pakistani mil to address that --- military to address that as well. But we're not there. We're at a point now where, over the course of the next 12 months, it really is going to, I think, tell the tale which, which way this is going to go.

MR. GREGORY: But another problem area, in terms of achieving the goal, is indeed Pakistan. I've talked to people who say the strategy, in effect, boils down to this, with General Petraeus on the scene: Bloody the nose of the Taliban to the point that they are willing to turn their back on al-Qaeda, Pakistan can broker a deal where there is some power-sharing in the country where the, the Taliban have a seat at the table and control some part of that geography, and in return, al-Qaeda's out of the picture. That's still a big "if," and here's one of the reasons why: Look at Pakistan's record; start with this Pew Research Center survey poll from this week: "How do Pakistanis view the U.S.?" Nearly six in 10 see the United States as an enemy. We know that the Taliban is operating from within Pakistan, from safe havens, and escalating their attacks. David Cameron, the conservative leader now of the U.K., prime minister said this, as reported by the Financial Times on Wednesday: "The U.K. prime minister used his first public appearance in Bangalore to warn Pakistan to stop `promoting terror' or face isolation in the international community." And these, these documents demonstrate what a lot of people knew, which was the intelligence service for Pakistan was helping the Afghan Taliban. Is Pakistan working against our interests there?

ADM. MULLEN: I've said for a long time, clearly the --- a, a critical key to success in the region is going to be Pakistan and our relationship with Pakistan, which was one that was broken in the late '80s and which we've worked hard to restore. That there are elements of the Pakistani intelligence agency that are connected or have had relationships with extremists is certainly known and that has to change. I just came back from, I think, my 19th trip to Pakistan since I've been in this job, spending time particularly with military leadership, General Kayani. And he has, he has actually directed his military to take on the, the insurgent threat in his own country. We--and he's made great strides. We recognize that part of that is to focus on the Haqqani network and--as well as the other Afghan Taliban.

MR. GREGORY: They operate in that tribal area?

ADM. MULLEN: They do. And they, and they have a safe haven there, and that causes us great problems in Afghanistan as well. That we are anxious to have that addressed is, is well known to him. So this isn't going to turn overnight. And you, you laid out one possible outcome. I think it's a little early to say exactly what the outcome would look like specifically. Suffice it to say, I think we have to be in a stronger position in Afghanistan vis-a-vis the insurgency overall. We have to continue to develop this relationship and evolve this relationship with Pakistan. There's a regional approach here, and certainly India, which is where Prime Minister Cameron spoke from, India is certainly more than just concerned with the overall outcome here.

MR. GREGORY: But true or untrue, the big fear is that Pakistan's working against us and not with us?

ADM. MULLEN: In many ways, Pakistan is working with us. I mean, their, their military, their intelligence agency. I mean, we've got a very strong relationship in the positive sense with, with their intelligence agency. That doesn't mean there aren't some challenges with some aspects of it.

MR. GREGORY: They are actively supporting elements killing U.S. soldiers.

ADM. MULLEN: But they have, they have shared intelligence with us, they've killed as many or more terrorists as anybody, they've captured them. And certainly, the, the focus on changing the strategic shift, if you will, in that agency so that that doesn't happen at all, is a priority for us.

MR. GREGORY: Fair to say that among the outcomes you would look at would be a scenario where the Taliban would have some power in the country?

ADM. MULLEN: I think in any of these kinds of insurgency over history, in the political solution, those who have been insurgents at some point in time have been in a position of political influence at some point down the road. But I think we're way too early to say how--what that looks like or when it might happen.

MR. GREGORY: It --- it's --- it seems to be an important point, if you look at the cover of Time magazine, which has a pretty striking photograph of a young woman whose nose was cut off by the Taliban, a--just one indication of how brutal and horrific these people are. And, and they've done this when they were in power and, indeed, even when they've been out of power. The grim reality, if that's an argument for why the U.S. should not leave, is that our central mission, the central mission of the United States is not to protect the women of Afghanistan. Is that fair?

ADM. MULLEN: I think the central mission in Afghanistan right now is to protect the people, certainly, and that would be inclusive of everybody, and that in a, in an insurgency and a counterinsurgency, that's really the center of gravity.

MR. GREGORY: But you said a year ago our central mission was to get at those who threaten us. Our central mission is not to protect the women, who could still be brutalized if the Taliban comes into power in any fashion.

ADM. MULLEN: Well, the Taliban are incredibly unpopular with the Afghan people, even as we speak, and they have--as they have been for a long period of time. The mission --- the overall mission is to dismantle and defeat and disrupt al-Qaeda. But we have to make sure there's not a safe haven that returns in Afghanistan. Afghanistan has to be stable enough, has to have enough governance, have to --- has to create enough jobs, have an economy that's good enough so that the Taliban cannot return to the brutality of the kind of regime that you just showed.

MR. GREGORY: However, the United States could still withdraw and, and do so having achieved the mission, and yet women like, like those on the cover of that magazine could still be in danger.
ADM. MULLEN: Certainly, the, the, the long-term goal is to make sure that the --- with respect to the population in Afghanistan, that there's a governant --- governance structure that treats its people well. And I --- but to say exactly how that's going to look and what specifics would be involved, I think it's just way too early.

MR. GREGORY: I just want to ask you a couple of questions about Iran, another threat that this administration is facing. The consequences of Iran developing a nuclear weapon are vast, and something that the administration certainly wants to prevent. This is what you said back in April of 2010, I'll put it up on the screen, at Columbia University: "I think Iran having a nuclear weapon would be incredibly destabilizing. I think attacking them would also create the same kind of outcome." Keen analysis, but my question is, which is worse?

ADM. MULLEN: Actually, when I speak to that, I talk to unintended consequences of either outcome. And it's those unintended consequences that are difficult to predict in what is a, an incredibly unstable part of the world that I worry about the most. What I try to do when I talk about that is, is identify the space between those two outcomes, which is pretty narrow, in which I think the diplomacy, the kind of sanctions, the kind of international pressure that, that is being applied, I am hopeful works. I, I, I recognize that there isn't that much space there. But, quite frankly, I am extremely concerned about both of those outcomes.

MR. GREGORY: But leaders have to make a decision. You're a leader, the president's a leader. Which is worse, Iran with a nuclear weapon or what could happen if the United States attacks?

ADM. MULLEN: Well, certainly for our country, the president would be the one making those decisions, and I wouldn't be one that would, would pick one or the other along those lines. I think they both have great downside, potentially.

MR. GREGORY: The president has said he is determined to stop Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. He doesn't just say it's unacceptable, he says he's determined to stop it. Is force against Iran by the United States on the table in a way that it has not been even in our recent history, past six months, a year?

ADM. MULLEN: No, I, I think the military actions have been on the table and remain on the table, and certainly in that regard it's, it's one of the options that the president has. Again, I hope we don't get to that. But it's an important option, and it's one that's well understood.

MR. GREGORY: There was a concern among Israelis, among Americans, that there weren't very many good options when it came to attacking Iran, should it come to that. Is that still the case?

ADM. MULLEN: I think that's the case.

MR. GREGORY: There aren't very many good options.

ADM. MULLEN: No, no. I mean, there aren't --- it depends on what you mean by that. None of them are good in a sense that it's certainly an outcome that I don't seek, or that, that we wouldn't seek. At the same time, and for what I talked about before, is, is not just the consequences of the action itself, but the things that could result after the fact.

MR. GREGORY: But the military has a plan, should it come to that?

ADM. MULLEN: We do.

MR. GREGORY: Admiral Mullen, one final question of something I'm sure deeply troubles you, and that is the rate of suicides in the military. And the concern is not just that they have been increasing, but that commanders in the field have not been attentive enough to the, the problems that are leading to the suicides. What should be done about that?

ADM. MULLEN: Well, I, I think it was addressed this week very well by General Chiarelli, specifically. I mean, the purpose of the review, which was widely reported on, was to understand as much as we could about what the problem was. It is not a problem that exists just in the Army, because the suicide rate is up in all our services. And we don't have the answers. I'm one who believes that the pressure of these wars and the repeated deployments is a significant factor, but there's a significant population that have committed suicide that have not deployed. So it's a, it's an incredibly complex, vexing problem. I think what General Chiarelli did was, was correctly focus on leaders to be all-attentive to this in every single way and know that we certainly, we're not even close to solving it. It's an enormously complex problem nationally for us, and certainly we are a microcosm of that. But our rates now exceed the norm in the country, and it's something we absolutely have to continue to focus on.

MR. GREGORY: Admiral Mullen, thank you very much.

ADM. MULLEN: Thank you, David.