Afghanistan: Hearts and Minds v. Blood and Anger (Mull)

EA correspondent Josh Mull is the Afghanistan Blogging Fellow for The Seminal and Brave New Foundation. He also writes for Rethink Afghanistan.

Our troops in Afghanistan have some questions about the strategy in Afghanistan. Spencer Ackerman reports:

Some considered the war a distraction from broader national security challenges like Iran or China. Others thought that its costs — nearly ten years, $321 billion, 1243 U.S. deaths and counting — are too high, playing into Osama bin Laden’s “Bleed To Bankruptcy” strategy. Still others thought that it doesn’t make sense for President Obama simultaneously triple U.S. troop levels and announce that they’re going to start coming down, however slowly, in July 2011. At least one person was convinced, despite the evidence, that firing Gen. Stanley McChrystal meant the strategy was due for an overhaul, something I chalked up to the will to believe.

But if there was a common denominator to their critiques, it’s this: None understood how their day-to-day jobs actually contributed to a successful outcome. One person actually asked me if I could explain how it’s all supposed to knit together.

Afghanistan Follow-Up: US Government v. Karzai (and the CIA) on “Corruption” (Miller/Partlow)
How Do You Solve A Problem Like Pakistan in Afghanistan? (Mull Responds to Ackerman)

I'm wondering the same thing. It's never been clear to me exactly how a massive foreign military occupation translates to a stable, secure and democratic society in Afghanistan. How does one lead to the other, how do we get from A to B?

Take a look at this incident from Bagram air base:

U.S. troops fired warning shots to disperse a protest in eastern Afghanistan over the arrest of a religious leader suspected of a rocket attack, NATO said Tuesday.

The alliance said no civilian injuries were reported from the protest Monday, but Gen. Faqir Ahmad, the deputy police chief of Parwan province, said one civilian was killed by shots fired from an unknown source.

NATO said about 300 people surrounded a patrol and attacked vehicles with rocks and iron bars outside the massive coalition air base at Bagram, in Parwan province.

Or this at a NATO base in Badghis province:

Two Spanish police and an interpreter were killed when an Afghan policeman they were training turned on them before he was shot dead, officials said, as protests against the killing turned violent on Wednesday.

The incident appeared to be the latest in a string of recent attacks by "rogue" police and soldiers, underlining the pressure as NATO-led troops try to train Afghan forces rapidly to allow the handover of security responsibility to begin from mid-2011.

And here's video of the "protests" in Badghis, although "riot" might be more appropriate:

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MJC05D5Sj78[/youtube]

These angry and violent demonstrations raise the same questions our troops were asking: how does our war connect to our objective?

How many more troops, for how many years, will it take to make the men in that video loyal to the Karzai mafia? How many more bombs and rockets do we have to drop on women and children to convince them that democracy is the way to go? Which one of the KFC's or Burger Kings in our gargantuan airbases is going to convince these Afghans not to sympathize with the Taliban?

The special forces operatives kicking in some random Afghan's door at 3 in the morning --- how are they solving the endemic corruption? The bombers, gunships, and drones pounding Afghan villages --- how do these contribute to a sense of hope and security for Afghan citizens?

I could go on forever with these questions. Our strategy just has nothing at all to do with what we hope to accomplish in Afghanistan. I hate to boil this down to a cliche, but war is not the answer.

Seamus O'Sullivan writes:

A cross section of Afghans interviewed from six provinces perceive a gap between the virtues of democratization as idealized by western experts and Afghan government bureaucrats and its “manifestations,” which are widely seen as having been “externally imposed” during nine years of military occupation, said researcher Anna Larson earlier this week. Despite its promises, the purported democratization of the nation has not produced peace, prosperity, or equal treatment under the rule of law, according to the study. Western notions of individual freedom are often seen as without limitations, which creates conflicts in a culture that places a high value on loyalty to extended family and community, Larson said.

We are not going to bomb Afghanistan into a democracy. We're not going to make it a peaceful country with a violent military occupation. That's just not how it works.

Put yourself in the shoes of an Afghan. If a member of your family was killed by a NATO bomb, or a special forces night raid, or even an errant bullet from a distant battlefield - how do you think you would react? Would you submit to the crooked mafia dons in Karzai's presidential palace? Would you relent and volunteer for the Afghan police or army? Would you shun the local Taliban resistance who've vowed revenge against the NATO occupiers? Would you register to vote?

Or more likely, would you be one of those furious and humiliated Afghans mobbing the gates of the nearest NATO base, hurling stones and bricks and setting fires?

War is not politics, it is violence - murder - on an enormous scale. It does not lead to democracy, security, or good governance, it leads to anger, humiliation, and above all else, more violence.

Let's go back to Ackerman's report:

What they wanted to hear was a sure path — any path — to winning it. Or even just a clear definition of success. If the goal is stabilizing Afghanistan, what does that have to do with defeating al-Qaeda? If this is a war against al-Qaeda and al-Qaeda is in the untouchable areas of tribal Pakistan, where the troops can’t go, why not just draw down to a few bases in the east in order to drop bombs and launch missiles? Even if we can’t just do that, what will Afghans consider “stable,” anyway? Is all of this vagueness just a cover so we can decide at a certain point that we can withdraw in a face-saving way, declaring victory as it suits us to cover up a no-win situation? If so, why not just do that now?

That's a damn good idea, let's do it now. Get our troopers out of there, they're quite aware of the fact that the jobs they're doing have nothing to do with our objectives in Afghanistan - whether that's on the low end of stopping Al-Qa'eda or the high end of creating a stable and secure Afghan democracy. We have to stop lying to them, and stop lying to ourselves.

There's nothing wrong with wanting to stop Al-Qa'eda and there's nothing wrong with wanting to develop Afghanistan. What's wrong here is our policy of war and occupation. It's time to end it, for our sake, for the troops' sake, and for the sake of the Afghans themselves.

How Do You Solve A Problem Like Pakistan in Afghanistan? (Mull Responds to Ackerman)

EA correspondent Josh Mull is the Afghanistan Blogging Fellow for The Seminal and Brave New Foundation. He also writes for Rethink Afghanistan:

How are we going to deal with Pakistan when they are openly flaunting their proxy war against the United States? How should we respond when they say stuff like "we know where the [Taliban] shadow government is"? Or this:

“We picked up Baradar and the others because they were trying to make a deal without us,” said a Pakistani security official, who, like numerous people interviewed about the operation, spoke anonymously because of the delicacy of relations between Pakistan, Afghanistan and the United States. “We protect the Taliban. They are dependent on us. We are not going to allow them to make a deal with Karzai and the Indians.”

Pakistan: Floods, Bombings, & A Drone Strike (Cole)

Pakistan protects the Taliban. That's in addition to them training and equipping various Taliban militias and even funding suicide attacks and improvised explosive devices against American troops. We, as in you the American taxpayer, give Pakistan billions of dollars in aid and weaponry, including directly reimbursing them for their army operations (down to paying for the bullets fired). And yet they're killing our troops and protecting insurgents/terrorists.

Our relationship with Pakistan is deeply, deeply flawed. How do we fix this?

Spencer Ackerman suggests diplomacy, and I wholeheartedly agree. The American people are howling at the gates of congress to end these trillion-dollar, decade-long wars of occupation and aggression, and there is simply no conceivable military solution to any of our problems, whether that's Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, or Iran. Diplomacy has to be the way to go.

Ackerman writes:

An envoy from the administration needs to say: "We’re on board with that sentiment 100 percent! Pakistan should under no circumstances be cut out of a deal. We’re happy to see that you guys talk to Hamid Karzai’s government now without the binding mechanism of our trilateral summitry. Believe us, we want you doing that, because it should convince you that Pakistan has an interlocutor in Karzai, not an obstacle to Pakistani interests in a post-conflict Afghanistan.

Look, we get it: you sponsor the Taliban because you want strategic depth on your eastern border. You can get that from Karzai; and we’re here to help you get it! Pakistan can have a role in South Asia commensurate with the great power that it is!

And because we’re so sincere about that, we want you involved in the peace talks in a very specific way. We want you to deliver the Taliban and the Haqqanis to the table, under whatever circumstances of amnesty work for you. Then we want you to guarantee that in a post-war Afghanistan, they’re not backsliding on their commitments to backsliding on al-Qaeda. We’re going to put that on you. Look at that: you get an important role in Afghanistan, and it allows us to bring the war to a steady conclusion on mutually-agreeable terms. You win, we win, Karzai wins, the Taliban… kind of win (yeah, we said it), our mutual enemies in al-Qaeda (and the Pak Taliban!) lose. Now who wants flood relief?

Oh, and in case we need to say it: if we start seeing al-Qaeda slipping back into the country, it’s wrath-of-God time."

"We're on board 100 percent!" Boy, that should really scare the hell out of the Pakistanis. Ackerman, for whatever reason, seems to interpret "diplomacy" as "giving Pakistan everything it could possibly want". This is the wrong approach. In negotiations, you start with the extreme of what you want, and then negotiate down to a compromise. Ackerman has done exactly the opposite.

Let's take the statement line by line.

We’re on board with that sentiment 100 percent! Pakistan should under no circumstances be cut out of a deal. We’re happy to see that you guys talk to Hamid Karzai’s government now without the binding mechanism of our trilateral summitry.

If I were Pakistan, I'd stop you right there. "You agree 100 percent? Good, then shut up and keep the money coming. Make the check out to General Kayani, that's K-A-Y..."

Look, we get it: you sponsor the Taliban because you want strategic depth on your eastern border. You can get that from Karzai; and we’re here to help you get it! Pakistan can have a role in South Asia commensurate with the great power that it is!

So much wrong here. First of all, it's not enough to "get it" that Pakistan's national security policy is based on support for violent militias and terrorist organizations. The reason some of us have been shouting "strategic depth" from the rooftops is because that policy is illegal, destabilising, and unimaginably dangerous both regionally and globally. It is not OK: we already "get" why they do it, we have to figure out a way to stop it.

Next, Ackerman suggests that Pakistan can get their strategic depth from Karzai, with America even offering to help. There's no other way to read that than as a blatant concession that the US does not consider Afghanistan to be a sovereign country, but rather as an Imperial Colony of Pakistan and the United States ruled by a pliant puppet government. Forget all that stuff about democratic elections, about standing up a stable, non-corrupt Afghan government, about creating a secure Afghanistan capable of protecting itself from terrorists. We were just kidding, we actually think Karzai is just on our strings and that Pakistan should be able to inflict as much violence and terrorism on Afghanistan as it wants.

We'll skip over the part about Pakistan being a "great power" since it is one of the most corrupt, violent, unstable countries on Earth, as well as the premier state sponsor of terrorism in Central Asia, if not the entire globe. But then again, I guess if Ackerman believes that total capitulation = diplomacy, then sure, corrupt, terrorist-supporting tyrants = great power. Why not? Words don't mean anything.

And because we’re so sincere about that, we want you involved in the peace talks in a very specific way. We want you to deliver the Taliban and the Haqqanis to the table, under whatever circumstances of amnesty work for you. Then we want you to guarantee that in a post-war Afghanistan, they’re not backsliding on their commitments to backsliding on al-Qaeda. We’re going to put that on you.

We want Pakistan involved in peace talks in whatever way works for them? That's already happening. Remember the New York Times article about how they're using Baradar's capture as leverage in the peace talks? It's dumb enough to concede everything the Pakistanis want, but then it's even stupider to "offer" them things they already have to begin with.

And just how is Pakistan supposed to keep its guarantees on Al-Qa'eda? We've already conceded strategic depth, and their support of Al-Qa'eda affiliates is part of that, so what is this "backsliding" stuff we're talking about?

This is why you don't open negotiations, "Sure, we agree with everything!" There are no guarantees or backsliding after you give them everything. That's what "100 percent" means. It means all of it. You can't say "OK, you can support terrorists, but make sure you don't support terrorists."

Look at that: you get an important role in Afghanistan, and it allows us to bring the war to a steady conclusion on mutually-agreeable terms. You win, we win, Karzai wins, the Taliban… kind of win (yeah, we said it), our mutual enemies in al-Qaeda (and the Pak Taliban!) lose.

Pakistan won when we opened with "we're on board 100 percent". We "win" because...why? We got nothing, we just gave Pakistan everything it wanted, including what they already have now. Karzai "wins" because he gets to be a US and Pakistani puppet.

And Al-Qa'eda, how do they lose? Magic, I suppose. As for the Pakistani Taliban, they aren't even mentioned.

Who actually loses from all of this? The people of Afghanistan and Pakistan, of course, since they're left to either the "great powers" in Islamabad who support terrorism and militancy or to our corrupt puppet Hamid Karzai in Kabul.

But wait, Ackerman isn't done showing us how diplomacy works.

Now who wants flood relief?

Get it? We're conditioning our flood relief for the tens of millions of affected people in Pakistan entirely on our selfish foreign policy goals. Do we not understand the difference between General Kayani and a displaced, starving child in a refugee camp? Sure, the floods are a national security issue for the United States, but they are not an opportunity to extract a price from the victims.

Oh, and in case we need to say it: if we start seeing al-Qaeda slipping back into the country, it’s wrath-of-God time.

Just what the hell is that supposed to mean? Are we threatening Pakistan? If so, with what? Didn't we open this conversation by establishing that there is NO military solution? If all it takes to eradicate terrorism and militancy in Afghanistan and Pakistan is "wrath-of-God time", then by all means, do it now. Except this is bulls**t; it doesn't mean anything.

Pakistan's Army Chief, General Kayani, and the head of its intelligence service, General Pasha, arenot starry-eyed national security bloggers who think that the words "wrath-of-God time" are impressive or intimidating. The people we're dealing with have their own army (bigger than ours), their own airplanes, their own special forces, and, of course, their own terrorist and insurgent organizations. They're not afraid of us or our hollow threats. If they were, they wouldn't be saying things in the newspaper like "we know where the shadow government is".

If we have a specific threat, then spit it out. Will we invade the tribal areas? Will we drone strike General Kayani? Carpet bomb Rawalpindi and Islamabad? What is it exactly that we mean by "wrath-of-God time"?

All together, what do we have? Our "diplomacy" looks like giving Pakistan everything it wants and then capping it off with threatening them. That's not really diplomacy, is it? It's the status quo and a military threat. Would it be over-the-top to just write FAIL?

So what are some real options for dealing with Pakistan? Here are a few suggestions, keeping in mind that you open negotiations with the most extreme options and then work backwards.

• Call a peace summit with all relevant players, including representatives from Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Jammu & Kashmir, Russia, United States, Saudi Arabia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, China, and Iran


• Cut off all military aid to Pakistan


• Cut off all (non-disaster) civilian aid to Pakistan


• Blacklist the Pakistan Army and intelligence services as terrorist organizations


• Pursue United Nations or unilateral economic sanctions against the top leadership of the Pakistani Army, the intelligence services, as well as ruling elites in the ruling PPP political party


• Call for new, internationally monitored and vetted elections in Pakistan and condition all (non-disaster) aid on the legitimacy of these elections


• Provide economic and diplomatic support for Pakistani opposition groups, including grassroots (the Lawyers movement) and political parties (PML-N)


• Publicly release/de-classify all US intelligence on Pakistan's support of terrorism, including wiretap audio and satellite imagery


• Publicly call for an end to the Pakistani occupation of Balochistan and Kashmir


• Provide diplomatic and economic support, including recognition, of an autonomous Balochistan


• Provide diplomatic and economic support, including recognition, of an Independent Kashmir


• Dramatically increase civilian and military aid to India (call it "Strategic Depth")


• Offer India a permanent seat on the United Nations security council


• Allow India to utilize American military bases in Afghanistan and Central Asia for "training exercises"


• Invite India to the NATO mission in Afghanistan, requiring some contribution of security forces

Crazy stuff, right? But it's not giving Pakistan whatever it wants, and it's not threatening military action against them either. Either they give up their support of terrorism and militancy, or we start talking about the options above.

Ackerman wrote:

When people mouth the truism that There’s No Military Solution To The Afghanistan War, they’re both right and typically uncreative about thinking through what A Political Solution To The Afghanistan War looks like. I submit that the imagined diplomatic proposal above is an opening gambit.

I wouldn't say my options are as "creative" as Ackerman's suggestion to give Pakistan whatever it wants, but consider the options I listed above as my response to his "opening gambit".