Iran: "Arrests" and the Regime's Sword of Damocles

It is now 9:30 a.m. in Tehran, and the arrest of Mir Hossein Mousavi has still not occurred. After a weekend of tension, nervousness, and speculation, he remains free, or rather restricted given the Government's efforts to limit his mobility and communications. The students are still demonstrating on their campuses, and plans are still being made for a show of protest during the holy month of Moharram, beginning Friday.

At the same time, the warning from the regime was clear. Perhaps the line on the Revolutionary Guard's website about punishing the leaders of dissent can be dismissed as bluster, but the Supreme Leader's speech yesterday, even with its invocation to his audience to "keep calm", has to be recognised --- with the live broadcast and attendant publicity --- as a high-profile message to those who continue to take to the streets and defy the injunction to be quiet.

Iran Analysis: Sifting the Propaganda – Government About to Arrest Opposition Leaders?

So what does it all mean, if we are still in this state of political suspension, the Sword of Damocles still dangling above the head of the Green movement(s)?

First things first: threats like these are not made from a position of strength. If victory is assured or imminent, you don't need to keep up the fist-shaking. Instead, you can strike a tone of triumph or  even reconciliation with vanquished foes. Ayatollah Khamenei may have put on his "Dirty Harry" face --- as Mr Smith summarised, it was a "Make My Day" speech --- but he did so after six months of failure to put away the bad guys.

More and more it appears that the protests of 16 Azar have shaken the regime. At first glance, I found that curious because the demonstrations were largely confined to students on and around campuses. Mousavi, Karroubi, Khatami were nowhere to be seen, and even amidst the tens of thousands who turned out last Monday, there was the hanging question, "Where next?" with the objectives of the movement.

But, trying to read it from the regime's side, even that defiance is beyond a disturbance and verging on a perpetual threat. We have written repeatedly of the Supreme Leader, the President, the Revolutionary Guard, and other security forces throwing their best punch and failing to knock out the opposition. So it proved again on 16 Azar. And this time, there were the visual signs that the protesters were upping the political challenge --- once again, Khamenei's image was defaced and mocked and now Iranian flags without the central symbol of the Islamic Republic were being waved.

So anxious and worried, the regime's media began running over and over again the one video clip that showed not only Khamenei but Imam Khomeini being symbolically immolated, their portraits lit up by a "protester" with a lighter. We may never know if that incident was genuine --- what mattered is that it would now be displayed as the "real", ugly face of the Green movement for days by the regime. And what mattered even more is that it seems to have failed to extinguish the protest. Indeed, it does not even seem to have tarred it as "anti-Republic"; after a series of statements from prominent individuals and groups denying the burning of Khomeini, his picture was being waved with acclamation by demonstrators yesterday.

So anxious and worried, elements in the regime began muttering that it was time to stop this once and for all. Hard-line newspapers raised the rhetoric against Mousavi and Karroubi. State television devoted blocks of broadcast time to the "threat". The Revolutionary Guard made its threat. This might not have constituted a "plan" to detain Mir Hossein Mousavi, but it was enough for his website to issue its alert on Saturday night.

And then, most importantly, the Supreme Leader decided to give a partial stamp of approval to the threats with his speech yesterday.

(There may or may not be a dramatic side issue here: as the regime was playing its Khomeini card, the claimed letter/audio from Army and Air Force units, "standing with the Iranian people" if violence continued, emerged. It is still a matter of heated debate whether the letter and audio are genuine. The point is that, if the regime believes it might be genuine, then the prospect of military dissent arises. And this in turn might have been a supporting catalyst for the Supreme Leader's invocation for everybody to shut up and get in line.)

We've been here before. A week after the election, Khamenei stood up at Friday prayers in Tehran and said it was time to accept the election and stop the complaining. He stretched out a hand to Hashemi Rafsanjani but made it clear that all should accept President Ahmadinejad.

The outcome? The next day there were mass protests in Tehran. Neda Agha Soltan was killed and became a symbolic martyr. And a crisis of days had become one of weeks and possibly months.

Strategically, Khamenei's move yesterday may also be compared with a private initiative he took in September, despatching Ali Larijani to Mehdi Karroubi to tell the cleric to stay out of sight before the protests of Qods Day in Spetember. In that sense, the escalation of private message to public warning yesterday could be a "decapitation" strategy: split off Mousavi and Karroubi from the Green movement and, leaderless, it will run itself into the ground.

It should not be underestimated that, to an extent, the regime has achieved this aim since June. Through the disruptions of the high-level reformist and Green organisations, extending to the detentions of its top officials, it has fragmented the demonstrations, preventing a single, mass gathering. It has kept Mousavi, Khatami, and, more recently, Karroubi off to the side of those demonstrations.

Ironically, however, that partial success may have led to a risky miscalculation. It is not just the possibility that Mousavi's arrest might spur the Green movement(s) through the creation of a political martyr. Even more, it is the belief that the movement cannot exist without a publicly-active Mousavi.

All the opposition discussion of "Where Next?", with its heated and sometimes confused consideration of objectives, should not obscure one of the emerging motives for that discussion: the belief that the movement is now beyond a single figure like a Mousavi. Ironically, that belief has only been reinforced with the regime's efforts to suppress and decapitate the opposition: the marches still took place, they still had an impact even as its supposed leaders were shut away in their offices.

So Mousavi and Karroubi may not have to risk a central presence in the forthcoming public activity from the start of Mosharram (18 December) through Ashura (27 December) and beyond. They can issue statements from a distance and let the "grassroots" of the movement take the public lead.

Then the crunch question: what if, despite the Supreme Leader's threats, the protesters still come out? What if they persist in challenging the legitimacy of this regime (but not necessarily the "Islamic Republic")?

What does the Supreme Leader and the Revolutionary Guard then do with a Sword which, for all the detentions and all the propaganda, dangles not as a sign of its threat but of (for now) its impotence?

Iran: "The Military Will Stand with the Iranian People"? (with Audio)

UPDATE 1225 GMT: The prominent Iranian exile, Mohsen Sazegara, has declared in a video message that the claimed letter and audio will be significant in assuring people that Iranian military forces are with them.

UPDATE 0845 GMT: The claimed audio of the announcement of the eight regiments has now been posted.

The letter, on the reformist website Gooya, appeared last evening: "The Army is the Refuge of the People". This morning it is still causing excitement and uncertainty: is a section of the Iranian army and air force preparing to stand against the Government and "with the Iranian people" if the regime's violence continues?

Translation of the letter, purportedly signed by eight military units, from HomyLafayette:

In the name of pure God (NB Instead of the Arabic Allah, the word Yazdan is used. Yazdan is derived from the ancient Iranian language of Pahlavi. This may indicate that the author(s) of the statement are more patriotic than religious. It may also indicate that the author(s) want to target military personnel who are more patriotic than religious.)

The military is the refuge of the nation

In the years of the Sacred Defense (NB The Iran-Iraq War, 1980-1988) when, alongside our Revolutionary Guards brothers, we defended this land, we were in reality defending the honor and dignity and lives and possessions of the Iranian people. The country is precious because the Iranian nation is precious. The weapons of the Revolutionary Guards and the military must be employed in the service of this nation and the lives [of their servicemen] should be sacrificed for the people of Iran. In the days when, alongside our Revolutionary Guards brothers, we were giving our lives for this nation, we never imagined that a day would come when a group of Guardsmen, contrary to the wishes of the vast majority of the true and devoted personnel of the Revolutionary Guards, would use the might of their weapons against this nation.

The military considers itself the refuge of the nation and has never submitted to the demands of politicians to oppress the people. It has remained faithful to its vow to not interfere in politics, but it cannot remain silent while its countrymen are persecuted and violated. For this reason, to those individuals who have been imposed on the Revolutionary Guards and who are engaged in aggression and tyranny against the lives and dignity and honor of the Iranian people and who, more than anyone, have betrayed the blood of the martyrs of our country's armed forces, whether it be the Revolutionary Guards or the military, we issue a serious warning that if they do not change course, they will be faced with the reaction of the military's selfless men. The military is the refuge of the people, and it will defend, to its last drop of blood, the peaceful people of Iran against any aggressor.

[signed]
- A group of pilots and personnel of the aviation division of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army (Havanirooz)
- A group of commanders and personnel of the 33rd artillery division of Isfahan
- A group of pilots and servicemen of the Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (Nahaja)
- The Shahid Sattari University of the the Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (Nahaja)
- A group of the personnel of the command staff of the Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (Nahaja)
- A group of the personnel of the support training center of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army
- A group of the professors and officials of the Imam Ali University for officers
- A group of the personnel and officials of the command center of the military

EA sources (and our readers, who picked up on the story several hours ago) have noted that 36 military generals 24 military officers were reportedly arrested in July for planning to attend Hashemi Rafsanjani's Friday Prayer speech in full military uniform, showing solidarity with demonstrators.

None of the regiments is Revolutionary Guard, and this morning the question is large: how much support do these eight regiments have in the rest of the Army and Air Force?

Iran Analysis: Are Rafsanjani and National Unity Plan "Spent Forces"?

Many thanks to readers and EA colleagues who gave valuable feedback and criticism on yesterday's analysis of the meetings between clerics and Hashemi Rafsanjani discussing moves for a National Unity Plan manoeuvring between the Ahmadinejad Government and the Green opposition.

A basic but, I think, important start to a reply: there is a big difference between questioning whether meetings took place and questioning whether those meetings will be effective.

Iran Exclusive: Clerics and Rafsanjani Plan The “Third Way” of Unity
The Latest from Iran (10 December): Reading the Chessboard

Almost all the reaction has focused on that second question. Some readers noted, quite rightly, that Nasser Makarem-Shirazi is the only Ayatollah who has gone public, and then in general terms regarding "unity" rather than in reference to the meetings. That's a fair point, even though we have information that other senior clerics have been involved in the discussions.

Some readers have questioned whether any Plan can get the approval of the Supreme Leader or, alternatively, the Revolutionary Guard.

Again, that is a necessary challenge, but any Plan is likely to be a tactical move against the authority of the President rather than a strategic approach for re-alignment or major change in the Iranian system. The question then becomes not whether Ayatollah Khamenei will defy any proposal revising velayat-e-faqih but whether he will side with the "third way" against Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. (I agree that, if the Revolutionary Guard rather than the Supreme Leader are in charge that even this is problematic, but I don't start from that assumption at this point.)

Note: there is a related issue here as to whether the Supreme Leader is in an unshakeable position where he can wield a veto without any repercussions on his position. So far, I think that is true, but there have been rumblings during this crisis aimed at Khamenei's undisputed authority. While these seemed to have been quelled, a firm No No No by the Supreme Leader to a Plan which has wide support could risk a backlash such as that against his 19 June speech trying to close off the Presidential election.

Perhaps the most significant criticism, however, is that neither the clerics nor Rafsanjani now have that much influence. As one EA colleague put it bluntly yesterday, Grand Ayatollah Makarem-Shirazi is a "spent force" and Rafsanjani "no longer has substantial power".

That, to me, is a telling statement. Throughout this crisis, one of the recurrent assumptions has been that Rafsanjani --- the master political operator, "the Shark" --- could play a decisive role in this conflict. That assumption underlay the excitement around his mid-July Friday Prayer speech and the disappointment over his non-appearance at prayers in August (and since) and the weak statement of the Assembly of Experts under his leadership.

In September, however, protesters were chanting on Qods Day, "Hashemi, where are you?". The possibility arose that they were chanting this not because they needed Rafsanjani but because they now felt they could get along without him.

In October we carried the news, offered by Habibollah Asgharoladi, that Rafsanjani had taken the National Unity Plan to the Supreme Leader. Since nothing more was heard, that approach was probably rebuffed.

So, to me, it is quite likely that Rafsanjani has tried to re-establish not only the Plan but his own place in Iranian politics with the recent meetings. Arguing that the Plan is likely to go nowhere implies that Rafsanjani, amidst the continued threats to his family and his own retreat from public apprearances since August, is likely to go nowhere. He is now an isolated as well as a spent force.

But is that the case? An EA source reports that Asgharoladi, in addition to his recent meeting with Rafsanjani, also saw the President. He criticised Ahmadinejad for his weak relationships with the senior clerics and Rafsanjani and for his support of the controversial former 1st Vice President and current Chief of Staff Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai.

An EA colleague cautions that Asgharoladi and his party are now marginal political actors, but the Deputy Speaker of Parliament Mohammad Reza Bahonar renewed his attack on Ahmadinejad yesterday. He criticised Ahmadinejad for the way the President has dealt with and treated the parliament, and he also derided the interference of the Revolutionary Guard in politics and the economy. It may be far from incidental that Bahonar had been a supporter of the National Unity Plan earlier in the autumn.

An EA colleague may have gotten to the heart of the matter and any "Third Way": "The one element that could tip the balance, as said in the past, would be the Larijani brothers swaying towards the Rafs camp. That has hasn't happened yet."

Yet. Ali Larijani, as Speaker of Parliament, could be a catalytic force given the hostility to Ahmadinejad amongst key Parliamentary members. His brother Sadegh, head of Iran's judiciary, may also have a role: yesterday, the newspaper Jomhoori Islami --- owned by Masih Mohajeri, who accompanied Rafsanjani to the Mashhad meetings last week --- asked Sadegh Larijani, "Why don’t you take action against Ahmadinejad and his friends who corrupt and play with people's religious beliefs?"

After 24 hours of reflection, the easy decision is to stand by the exclusive we published yesterday: at least in the eyes of those who met last week --- clerics, Asgharoladi, and Rafsanjani --- the National Unity Plan is not a "spent force".

The tougher analysis is: what next? Given the caveats that readers put yesterday, it is time to put away any thought of Rafsanjani --- for all his past prowess --- being the Shark who changes the political waters. More big fish are needed.

But will they surface?

Iran, the Greens, and the ex-Bushman: With Washington Friends Like These, Who Needs....?

Staff and readers of EA have had a full and frank discussion in recent weeks on the Green Movement and how it is viewed by the US. It's helpful to get a timely reminder today that, while that discussion might have been heated at points, at least it has been amongst people who have had a long-standing interest in reform in Iran, rather than a Johnny-come-lately, ill-informed claim of friendship for the movement.

Step up, Mr Michael Gerson, former speechwriter for George W Bush, current colunnist for The Washington Post. On the surface, one might think that Gerson's claim, "President Obama has seemed to view Iran's ongoing democratic uprising as a pesky obstacle to engagement", might be a genuine expression of concern that the US Government is not doing enough to back calls for rights, justice, and political fairness.

Iran: How Washington Views the Green Opposition — The Next Chapter
The Latest from Iran (3 December): Normal Service?

Keep reading --- and do so with a bit of historical memory.

For Mr Gerson's simple view is that Iran has been on a one-way path for 30 years: "We are seeing the consolidation of a military dictatorship. Since the Iranian revolution of 1979, the nation's clerical leaders have had a military arm -- the Revolutionary Guard Corps -- that has acted as their ideological enforcers."

One might forgive Mr Gerson for his contemporary summary, gleaned from a quick reading of the headlines, "In reaction to mass protests after the fraudulent presidential election in June, the Guard's control has expanded comprehensively," since there is a more than a grain of truth that the IRGC has expanded its political and economic interests. But to portray this as a steady, downhill process linked to the "mullahs" (you know, the "mullahs" like Montazeri, Dastgheib, Karroubi, Sane'i, Bayat Zanjani who have criticised the regime of violence) seems a bit sweeping. And it kind of obliterates not only leaders like Hashemi Rafsanjani but also Mohammad Khatami.

You know, the Mohammad Khatami who sought a thaw in relations with the United States and who was rewarded by the Bush Administration --- the Bush Administration that Gerson served --- with a cut-off of talks, threatening rhetoric, and even consideration of regime change. The Mohammad Khatami who was left to dangle in Iranian domestic politics when his assurances that an engagement with the West would be productive turned into political dust.

OK, maybe we can let Gerson off the hook for his historical amnesia given that he just scribbled speeches, rather than framed policy. But, in the present day, there is this: "The administration has reduced funding for human rights programs in Iran and looked the other way as exiled opponents of the Iranian regime have been attacked within Iraq."

Ahh, so support of the Green movement means support for the "exiled opponents" who happen to be the Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MKO), the movement carrying out acts of violence since Gerson's 1979 starting point to topple the Iranian Government. The Mujahedin-e-Khalq who are still listed as a "terrorist" organisation by the State Department. In that context, Gerson's next sentence takes astounding to a new level: "In addition to serious economic and military pressure, Obama could try the strategy the Iranian regime most fears: supporting, overtly and covertly, the democratic resistance against military rule."

So the best way to confront an Iranian Government that tries to prop up its shaky position by screaming "velvet revolution" is to support a "velvet revolution" including an organisation whose acitivities put it, even for many Iranians who are opposed to the current Government, beyond the acceptable? Even the dimmest student in my second-year course on The CIA and US Foreign Policy wouldn't put forth this plan.

I'm not sure whether Mr Gerson is being cynical in his reduction of history and his advocacy of regime change or if he is just ignorant about Iran. I do know, however, that he is deceptive if he claims to be a friend of the Green Movement.

For if the nuclear issue didn't exist, Gerson wouldn't give a rat's-ass about the Iranian opposition. The dreaded prospect of Iran With Bombs is the subject of the first eight paragraphs of a ten-paragraph article. The "democratic uprising" only makes an entrance when Gerson decides that other possibilities for a nuclear victory --- sanctions "would require a number of unreliable nations to sacrifice large economic interests"; "direct military options are uncertain" --- won't work.

Even the headline writer for Gerson's piece doesn't fall for the author's false love of Iranian democracy and reform, putting on the title, "Green Leverage over Iran". Leverage? If I weren't such a Southern gentleman, I'd tell Mr Gerson where he could stick his leverage.

But I return to the start of this piece: thank you, sir, for a timely reminder. A reminder not only that, for all my concerns about the Obama Administration, its predecessor offered no hope and only the prospect of more damage. And a reminder that the Green Movement, for all the tensions over its plans and objectives, is far more than the pawn put forward by false friends.

The Latest from Iran (1 December): A Week of Expectation

2115 GMT: Hacking the State Media. HomyLafayette has the story of today's cyber-attack on Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting:

At least a dozen web sites connected to the Islamic regime's radio and television broadcasters were hacked early this morning in an orchestrated operation. The attacked web sites include Radio Javan, Radio Payam, Radio Varzesh, Radio Tehran, Radio Qoran, the literary section of the state radio-television's web site, and the Jomeh Irani (NB Iranian Friday) program.

The hackers, calling themselves Y! Underground, substituted the homepages of the attacked web sites with the above image. The Farsi text reads, 'We will stand until the end.' The title of the pages became 'Defaced by Y! Underground.' Most of the web sites were quickly closed down by their technical staff....

Astonishingly, the literary section of IRIB's web site continues to show the image placed on it by the hackers.

2100 GMT: Ahh, This is Why Mahmoud's Upset. Full credit to Reuters for getting the possible story behind the Ahmadinejad warning to Russia tonight (see 2040 GMT). A "senior Russian diplomatic source" has said, "If there is a consensus on Iran sanctions, we will not stand aside."

This appears to be a continued Russian balancing act rather than a shift behind US-led sanctions. "Consensus" may mean that Russia will accept the measures only if China also is willing. And the source cautioned that economic punishment was a longer-term prospect: "We will be thinking about sanctions but this is not an issue of the next few hours or weeks. We would rather have Iran cooperating more openly and consistently with the IAEA and showing clear steps to lift concerns -- which are gaining greater foundation -- than introducing sanctions against Iran."

2040 GMT: More on Ahmadinejad's Defiance. If nothing else, these lines from the President's televised interview are attention-grabbing: ""[Western countries] need us more than we need them. It is psychological warfare and isolating Iran is impossible. Any finger which is about to pull the trigger will be cut off."

More significant may be Ahmadinejad's warning to Moscow to come back into line --- no sanctions, renewed co-operation --- with Tehran, as he criticised the Russian vote on the IAEA resolution criticising Iran's nuclear programme: "Russia made a mistake. It does not have an accurate analysis of today's world situation."

Iran: How Washington Views the Green Opposition — The Next Chapter
Video: The Bahari Interview on CNN (Part 2)
The Latest from Iran (30 November): Nuclear Distraction, Trashing the Greens?

1940 GMT: The Ahmadinejad Speech. After a 24-hour postponement, the President appeared on national television this evening. He offered, in the words of one viewer, "a geography lesson" for his tour of Latin America, comparing Iran favourably to its partners in Venezuela and Brazil.

Then, in the passage that Western media will pick up, Ahmadinejad declared, "Iran's nuclear issue has been resolved....We will hold no talks (with major powers) over this issue. There is no need for talks." He said that Tehran might allow inspectors to some sites or to none at all.

1715 GMT: And Today's Propaganda Warning. Islamic Republic News Agency, besides waving a finger at Hashemi Rafsanjani (1700 GMT) also gives a threatening push to Mir Hossein Mousavi. IRNA uses an interview with a Hojatoleslam to warn Mousavi that, if he keeps helping the enemies of Islam, he might suffer the fate of Abolhassan, Banisadr, the first President of the Islamic Republic who is now in exile in France.

1700 GMT: The Battle over Rafsanjani. Despite the explicit warning of Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani to back off, member of Parliament Ali Reza Zakani has maintained his assault on the family of former President Hashemi Rafsanjani, declaring that Rafsanjani's son Mehdi Hashemi is still the subject of a criminal investigation.

1645 GMT: It's not only EA readers who have debating which way forward for the Iranian opposition. Grand Ayatollah Montazeri has replied to four questions about the Green movement.

1630 GMT: The Prison Doctor's Death. A twist in the case of Ramin Pourandarjan, the doctor at Kahrizak Prison who died in November. After claims by authorities that Pouranjdarjan committed suicide or was the victim of a heart attack, Tehran Prosecutor General Abbas Jafari Doulatabadi now says that the doctor died of poisoning. Only two weeks ago Doulatabadi's office said Pourandarjan had not been poisoned.

1335 GMT: The Potential Significance of the British Sailor Story. Mr Smith cuts through the stories (see 1155 GMT) to get to the possible importance of the detention of the five British sailors:

As I suspected, the sailors were indeed taken by the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps. Guess they want to boast their prowess in the Persian Gulf and warn about they will do inside or outside Iranian territorial waters in case of nuclear strike or even tougher sanctions.

That may be only the start of the matter, however. The IRGC could also use this case to flex their muscle against internal challengers. Conversely, other key figures, including President Ahmadinejad and the Supreme Leader, may have to consider their manoeuvres versus the Revolutionary Guard.

Which is not dissimilar to the "British sailor" incident of two years ago, when 15 of Her Majesty's finest ---military in this case --- were detained. That ended, of course, with the release of the 15, an accomplishment for which Ahmadinejad took credit (although Ali Larijani was a central figure in the negotiations).

Two years on, and in a very different political context, will the IRGC again step back?

1145 GMT: Another Distraction. Looks like the international press will also be mesmerised by the story of the five British (civilian) sailors who have been detained after straying into Iranian waters. The standard line taken by Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai, chief of staff to President Ahmadinejad, "The judiciary will decide about the five ... naturally our measures will be hard and serious if we find out they had evil intentions," is racing across "Western" newspapers as an ominous sign.

The distraction extends to some rather fatuous speculation, as in this from The Guardian of London, "If the sailors arrested in the Persian Gulf are being punished for being British, Tehran's fear of the BBC could be a factor".

1015 GMT: Playing Down The Bluff. Less than 48 hours after shaking its fist with the "10 enrichment plants" declaration, the Iranian Government is edging away. Foreign Ministry spokesman Ramin Mehmanparast said this morning that there's not much to see here: If we do not get guarantees (for the delivery of the fuel), naturally we will have plans to move towards self-sufficiency. This is nothing unusual. Officials of some countries have rushed into adopting stances which may be indicative of the fact that they are concerned or angry." (CNN, incidentally, misses the story completely, distorting a general Mehmanparast statement ---"We will not do away with our rights" --- into "Iranian Legal Threat over Nuclear Plans.")

Meanwhile, something for the US to think about if it wants to push confrontation: a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman drew the line against further sanctions, "We should properly resolve this issue through dialogue. All parties should step up diplomatic efforts."

0715 GMT: Better Late than Never. The Associated Press has caught up with the politics of Iran's "10 enrichment plants" declaration, headlining, "Iran Nuke Plans Largely Bluster, Experts Say".

0710 GMT: Iran Contest of the Day. If the Supreme Leader's life was commemorated by Hollywood (see 0655 GMT), what would the title be?

0655 GMT: International news will be dominated today by President Obama's speech on US policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Indeed, it will be interesting to see if there is a breathing space for the Administration on its next steps towards Iran, as everyone in Washington --- including Congressmen and activists pressing for a cut-off of  talks and tougher sanctions --- switch their attention to the Af-Pak political and military corridor.

Which, of course, does not mean that life stops in Iran. Amidst the debate about the state of the Green Movement and its goals, the plans for the demonstrations on 16 Azar are taking shape. Revised routes have now been posted. Here, for example, are the paths of protests in Tehran:

1. Azadi Square - Revolution Square - Tehran University


2. Hafte-Tir Square - St., Karim Khan - Asr Square - Keshavarz Blvd - Street workers - Tehran University


3. Tehran University dormitory complex - North Kargar Ave - Tehran University


4. Amir Kabir University - Cross-Asr - Tehran University


5. Ferdowsi Square - Street Revolution - Tehran University.

There are notes of activities at universities, and you can even follow a second-by-second countdown clock.

Meanwhile, the Supreme Leader took on another enemy on Monday. He stared down "Hollywood" in a meeting with with artists and directors of the Iranian television series "Hazrat Yousuf," a story from the Koran. The challenge to "Western" film was another setpiece in Ayatollah Khamenei's campaign for cultural purity from the arts to the universities to the seminaries.