Virtual Gaza: Breaking the Information Blockade

We've just learned about the website Virtual Gaza, which tries to get information about conditions in the area to the world. The testimony, photographs, and videos are set on the platform of a bird's-eye view of the territory: a combination of Google Earth with witness reports and investigative journalism.

Diplomatic Question of the Day: What Exactly is Dennis Ross In Charge Of?

Related Post: One to Watch - Iran Tests First Nuclear Plant

Yesterday we noted the anti-clamactic appointment of Dennis Ross (pictured) as "special adviser to Hillary Clinton, the US secretary of state, on the Gulf region”. Ross had long been expected to be one of the Obama envoys, taking responsibility for Iran, but the shifting US approach to Tehran precluded that assignment. But he had to be given something after the promises made --- heck, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, where Ross is a director, had congratulated him weeks ago on his move to the State Department --- so he was given "a remit so broad that it threatens to be vague".

Beyond vague, in fact. Try and follow this exchange with State Department spokesman Robert Wood after the announcement of Ross's appointment:

QUESTION: Dennis Ross?

MR. WOOD: Yeah.

QUESTION: What is he in charge exactly of?

MR. WOOD: Well, Dennis is –

QUESTION: Is it Iran? And if it's not Iran – if it's Iran, why is it not written in the statement?

MR. WOOD: Well, let me just start off by saying, the Secretary is very happy that Dennis Ross agreed to serve as her special advisor for the Gulf and Southwest Asia. What Dennis is going to be charged with doing is trying to integrate policy development and implementation across a number of offices and officials in the State Department. And, you know, he is going to be providing the Secretary with strategic advice. He will be also trying to ensure that there's a coherence in our policies and strategies across the region. Let me be clear, he's not an envoy. He will not be negotiating. He'll be working on regional issues. He will not be – in terms of negotiating, will not be involved in the peace process. But again, he is going to be advising the Secretary on long-term strategic issues across the region.

QUESTION: Can you give us – well, what is the State Department's definition geographically of Southwest Asia? What countries does that include?

MR. WOOD: Matt, I didn't --

QUESTION: No, you guys named an envoy for Southwest Asia. I presume that you know what countries that includes.

MR. WOOD: Yes. Of course, we know. I just – I don't have the list to run off – you know, right off the top of my head here. But obviously, that's going to encompass – that region encompasses Iran. It will – you know, it'll deal with --

QUESTION: Does it include Iraq?

MR. WOOD: Indeed, it does. He is going to be, again, as I said, providing her with advice – strategic advice, looking at the long term, the bigger picture and how we can make sure that our policies are coherent across the board in the region. And as I said, the Secretary is very pleased that Dennis has agreed to do this. He's got years of experience in the region. And, you know, it's a daunting task, but it's one that she felt was necessary.

QUESTION: And so, does it include parts of the Middle East?

MR. WOOD: Yes.

QUESTION: It does? Does it include Syria, and it includes Israel and it includes Jordan?

MR. WOOD: Well, he'll be looking at the entire region that will include, you know –

QUESTION: Where does that stop? I mean, you know, you have NEA which, you know, runs all the way to Morocco. So does it include –

MR. WOOD: Well, he's going to be in touch with a number of officials who work on issues throughout this region.

QUESTION: Does it include Morocco, Algeria, Egypt, countries that are within the – within the Middle East or within the Near Eastern Affairs Bureau, but are not necessarily technically part of Southwest Asia?

MR. WOOD: He will be providing advice to the Secretary on a – across that entire region, where appropriate, where she needs it, and that's the position he will serve.

QUESTION: So he's going to meet with the leaders in the region as well, so you said he is going to offer an assessment --

MR. WOOD: That's right. At some point, he will.

QUESTION: -- including the Iranians?

MR. WOOD: Well, I'm not sure at this point. But again, our policy with regard to Iran is under review, so once that review is completed, we'll be able to go forward vis-à-vis Iran. But until that time --

QUESTION: Well, was there a consideration at some point that you would have a special envoy for Iran? And why didn't you now go in that direction?

MR. WOOD: Well, a decision was made by the Secretary that she needed broad strategic advice to look at a range of issues across the entire region that we just talked about. And it was felt that his skills could be better used to do that type of work, given the years of experience that he's had dealing with the Middle East, other parts of the world. And so, again, as I said, Iran will be one of those countries that he will be, you know, looking at in his portfolio. But --

QUESTION: The military sometimes refer to parts of the -stans, Central Asia, as Southwest Asia. Are those included in your --

MR. WOOD: Well, look --

QUESTION: Can you find out? Because, I mean, this is --

MR. WOOD: We can get you that. Yeah, we can get you a breakdown of -- QUESTION: I mean, does this – is there a geographic limit to his portfolio, or is it really an issues-based thing so that he could be dealing with Morocco and Algeria --

MR. WOOD: Yeah.

QUESTION: -- and Tunisia --

MR. WOOD: I would look at it, Matt, as more of a regional --

QUESTION: -- and Kyrgyzstan, and the -stans that are not covered by Ambassador Holbrooke? And does it include Turkey? Does it – you know, there are a lot of unanswered questions from – from the statement last night as to exactly what he's going to be doing. I mean, I presume it's all of the Gulf – Saudi Arabia, that makes sense. But does it include Somalia, which is – you know, that there is – does it include – I don't know --

QUESTION: Or is it (inaudible) Iran?

MR. WOOD: Your question is – you know, let me answer your --

QUESTION: It could be anything. Or is he limited by the geographic --

QUESTION: Or did you just not want to put Iran in the name, and so this is your clever way of doing that?

MR. WOOD: Can I speak now?

QUESTION: Sure.

MR. WOOD: Thank you, and thank you. Look, it's more – he's going to be providing advice to the Secretary on a number of regional issues, and I would not try to limit Dennis's advice to, you know, just those regions. He may have other – you know, he may have advice that he wants to give the Secretary on other issues. I don't think we're trying to narrow it here. If you're looking for a geographical breakdown of those countries that he will be looking --

QUESTION: It would be nice to find out what the State Department considers to be Southwest Asia.

MR. WOOD: We can certainly do that for you.

QUESTION: Thank you.

QUESTION: And why Iran was not mentioned in the statement? And why was it published at 9:00 p.m.?

MR. WOOD: Well, it was published at 9:00 p.m. because we – that was the time when we had it ready to go. And so there was no – somebody had said to me in an email or something that we were trying to hide something, and that's absolutely not the case. That's when it was ready to go, and that's when we – the Secretary wanted that announcement to go out at some point yesterday, and it did.

QUESTION: Yeah, but when she --

MR. WOOD: We just couldn't get it out until late.

QUESTION: When she wants to announce the nomination of Richard Holbrooke, the President comes for announcing that. So it's not the same kind of announcement. It's very different. Why?

MR. WOOD: It's different because the duties are different here. He is serving as an advisor to the Secretary. And the reason why we didn't mention Iran specifically is because his duties are going to engage the entire region, as I mentioned. So it's not just Iran. It's other countries in the region, other issues.

QUESTION: Robert, does he have a specific role in the Iran review? And when you talk about the Afghanistan review, you've got Holbrooke and Bruce Riedel and others. Is there a similar structure for the Iran review? And would he have a certain status in that review?

MR. WOOD: Well, he will certainly – the Secretary will certainly seek out his advice with regard to, you know, Iran. There's no question about that. There's not a similar structure in place, you know, for this type of review. You know, we don't have a cookie – you know, what do you call it, a cookie-cutter approach to, you know, doing reviews. You involve the people who you think are necessary and can provide you with the appropriate expertise and advice, and that's how you conduct them.

"Violent Semi-Peace" Update: US Soldiers Shot by Iraqi Police

Update (25 February): One of the US soldiers has died of his injuries. Details of the incident are still unclear.

Update (5:30 p.m.): The four US soldiers shot by Iraqi policemen were wounded, not killed. Their translator was slain.


In the "new Iraq", the narrative of a sharp decrease of violence, combined by the sheer length of the conflict from 2003, has mentioned that even the deaths of American troops get little notice. For example, today's New York Times headlines, "Iraq Accuses 12 Policemen in a String of Killings", and then mentions, "The announcement came as sporadic violence continued across Iraq, including the deaths of three American soldiers and their interpreter" in Diyala Province, north of Baghdad.

Another story is about to make its own headlines, however. Breaking news indicates that US soldiers and an interpreter have been shot by Iraqi policemen at a checkpoint on a bridge in Mosul. There are conflicting accounts over the numbers of dead and wounded.

Twisting the Syria Tale: The Suspected Missile Facility

Hours after we posted an analysis of Washington's engagement with Syria, the story started fluttering across the Internet that Damascus had built a missile facility on the site of the alleged nuclear plant bombed by Israel in October 2007.

According to sources, Syrian representative Ibrahim Othman (pictured) told members of the International Atomic Energy Agency about the facility. He was responding to a question if there was a nuclear operation, but he did not disclose if the missile facility was operational or when it had been constructed.

Motive? It could be that Othman was simply responding to the call in the IAEA's report for Syria to be more forthcoming about its plans and activities. He could have been throwing up a screen to cover any resumption of a nuclear programme. Damascus may have been striking a tough pose in advance of any talks with Israel or the US.

But what about the other side of the equation --- who leaked the story and why? Again, no answers here, only a range of possibilities. Those seeking engagement with Syria may have putting Damascus on notice that this would far from a no-cost process; President Bashir al-Assad would have to recognise that his country and its military plans were still under scrutiny.

Or, of course, those opposed to any rapprochement with Syria --- for all the political calculations that point towards the value of that course --- may have ensured that Othman's disclosure was circulated.

Watch this space.

Damascene Conversions: The Engagement of Syria

Joshua Landis has a complementary (and complimentary) perspective on Tisdall's analysis on Syria Comment.

Simon Tisdall, writing in The Guardian of London on Monday, offered a valuable analysis of the recent dynamics surrounding US-Syrian relations and events in the Middle East. Tisdall noted (rightly, in my opinion) the "realist" outlook of Obama and Co. and suggested that "improved US relations with Syria could hold the key" three vital issues: avoidance of military confrontation with Iran, management of the Iraq withdrawal, "and some kind of half-credible peace process between Israel and its Arab neighbours". He supported this reading with the signals of engagement: Syrian President Bashir al-Assad's interviews welcoming a US "re-entry" into the Middle East peace process, Senator John Kerry's visit to Damascus last week, and conciliatory words from Arab states such as Saudi Arabia.

What can and should be added to Tisdall's analysis are the recent events that have not only promoted this engagement but strengthened Syria's position in negotiations. In December 2008, the foundations for direct Israel-Syria talks had been laid but the wider context for the diplomacy was still the call for Damascus to end its support of groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas and to limit, if not cut, its ties with Iran.

Then the Olmert Government decided to gamble with the invasion of Gaza. The direct talks with Syria were suspended of course, alienating Turkey in the process, as Tel Aviv effectively hand-in-hand with Egypt and probably Saudi Arabia on the challenge to Hamas.

The significance was not only that this challenge failed but that it spurred a re-alignment which put Syria in the Middle Eastern ascendancy. By giving vocal and visible support to Hamas, Assad set himself up as the defender of Arab resistance to Israeli aggression, a position buttressed by the damage to Egypt's reputation. With Turkey and Iran recognising that position, as they quickly sent representatives to Damascus, and with platforms such as the Qatar Summit, the Syrians could look to a reconfigured diplomatic scene in the aftermath of Gaza.

Few have noted, for example, that there is no more talk of bringing Syrian leaders to account for the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri in 2005. It is also notable that no one, especially the US, is making a fuss about the alleged Syrian nuclear facility destroyed by Israel in October 2007, even though an International Atomic Energy Agency report last week pointed to the presence of uranium.

Instead, renewed Israeli-Syrian talks are being pursued so vigorously that Uzi Mahnaimi, who should be considered more a conduit for the Israeli military and intelligence services than a journalist for The Sunday Times, is writing: "Reports compiled by Mossad, the overseas spy agency, and by military intelligence, that strongly advocate opening negotiations with President Bashar al-Assad of Syria."

Which brings us back to the wider of the Damascene conversion of Gaza into a re-aligned position not only on its direct relations with Tel Aviv but on relations with Hamas, Hezbollah, and Tehran. Tisdall sees a trade-off: a new Israeli Government will have to engage in meaningful talks with Syria to maintain its isolation of Hamas: "If, as seems likely, [Benjamin Netanyahu] obstructs the Palestinian track, the Likud leader may have to give ground elsewhere, literally."

That might have been possible up to December, but no longer. Syria now has the cards for its territorial aims vis-a-vis Israel but for an inclusion of Hamas in the discussions on Palestine. The attempt to curb Hezbollah through talks with Damascus, which always was a curious exercise mssing the complexities of Lebanese politics and society, will now be kicked into touch. And the breaking of a supposed Syria-Iran axis is now less likelu than a dynamic in which engagement with both Damascus and Tehran takes place.

In 2003, chatter in Washington was "Baghdad, Then Turn Left". That thought of rolliing regime change can now be consigned to the dustbin of George W. Bush's history. It's envoys, not tanks, that are the talismen of this New Middle East Order.