Thursday
Feb112010
Iran: A Beginner's Guide to The Post-Election Conflict
Thursday, February 11, 2010 at 3:00
Enduring America has been working with the University of Birmingham to provide a Briefing Note for those who are beginning to notice the developments in Iran. I thought that, for some new readers, this might be of use on a most important day:
Thursday in Iran is 22 Bahman, the anniversary of the 1979 Islamic Revolution. The day is also likely to see the biggest demonstrations, both for and against the Government, since June’s disputed Presidential election. The size of the protests are a matter for expectation: hundreds of thousands will be on the streets in Tehran and in cites across Iran, but one estimate, based on a Government source, is that three million people will be marching in Tehran alone.
The core immediate issue is the “legitimacy” of the Government of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. “Green Movement” protests last summer focused on the election, amidst claims of fraud and ballot-rigging that denied a runoff to challenger Mir Hossein Mousavi.
However, as Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, insisted on inaugurating Ahmadinejad and as Government tried to crack down on dissent, the issue of legitimacy spread far wider. Demonstrations, including not only Mousavi but former President Mohammad Khatami, Presidential candidate Mehdi Karroubi, senior clerics, and reformist politicians, demanded action over detentions, trials, and abuse of prisoners and sought guarantees for justice, freedom of speech, and political activity.
In short, by last autumn, the protest had evolved from a challenge to an election into a civil rights movement, made up of many different groups. The “Green Movement” no longer claimed to be led by a Mousavi but to be a grassroots organisation seeking change from “the bottom up”.
Despite the regime’s attempts to suppress protest through arrests, prison sentences, and even executions, as well as through disruption of communications, the waves of demonstrations have continued, marked by the “hijacking” of Iran’s holidays and celebrations. Key moments have included the “40th Day” memorial for post-election victims including Neda Agha Soltan (30 July), the Qods Day rallies (18 Sept.), the marches of 13 Aban (4 November), and the protests on Students Day (7 December). Most significantly, on one of Iran’s holiest days, Ashura (27 December), demonstrators not only came out in number but pushed back security forces.
The opposition to President Ahmadinejad is no longer confined to an “opposition”. Key politicians such as former President Hashemi Rafsanjani, who should be considered politically a “free agent” moving between factions, and even “conservative” members of Iran’s establishment, such as Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani, are now criticising the President and perhaps plotting for his removal. It is likely that the pressure from many sides will force the Supreme Leader to curb Ahmadinejad’s authority and may even lead to the President’s removal from office.
Will that be enough, however, to restore “legitimacy”? That is an important, unanswered question. Had the Supreme Leader and key groups in the Iranian system recognised the complaints and rights of protesters last summer, then the challenge might have been one of “reform” within the Islamic Republic. However, in a paradox, the attempt to quell dissent may have not only bolstered it but widened its demands: factions of the Green movement are now seeking the modification or even abandonment of velayat-e-faqih, the system of ultimate clerical supremacy.
So 22 Bahman is unlikely to be the end of this post-election drama. Instead, it will be a significant act in the middle of the play: if the opposition can mobilise a mass presence, then it will be confirmed as a long-term force for change in Iran. If, however, the protest can be minimised and dispersed, then --- for now --- the Ahmadinejad Government and military forces such as Iran’s Revolutionary Guard may be able to hang onto a semblance of authority.
Thursday in Iran is 22 Bahman, the anniversary of the 1979 Islamic Revolution. The day is also likely to see the biggest demonstrations, both for and against the Government, since June’s disputed Presidential election. The size of the protests are a matter for expectation: hundreds of thousands will be on the streets in Tehran and in cites across Iran, but one estimate, based on a Government source, is that three million people will be marching in Tehran alone.
The core immediate issue is the “legitimacy” of the Government of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. “Green Movement” protests last summer focused on the election, amidst claims of fraud and ballot-rigging that denied a runoff to challenger Mir Hossein Mousavi.
However, as Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, insisted on inaugurating Ahmadinejad and as Government tried to crack down on dissent, the issue of legitimacy spread far wider. Demonstrations, including not only Mousavi but former President Mohammad Khatami, Presidential candidate Mehdi Karroubi, senior clerics, and reformist politicians, demanded action over detentions, trials, and abuse of prisoners and sought guarantees for justice, freedom of speech, and political activity.
In short, by last autumn, the protest had evolved from a challenge to an election into a civil rights movement, made up of many different groups. The “Green Movement” no longer claimed to be led by a Mousavi but to be a grassroots organisation seeking change from “the bottom up”.
Despite the regime’s attempts to suppress protest through arrests, prison sentences, and even executions, as well as through disruption of communications, the waves of demonstrations have continued, marked by the “hijacking” of Iran’s holidays and celebrations. Key moments have included the “40th Day” memorial for post-election victims including Neda Agha Soltan (30 July), the Qods Day rallies (18 Sept.), the marches of 13 Aban (4 November), and the protests on Students Day (7 December). Most significantly, on one of Iran’s holiest days, Ashura (27 December), demonstrators not only came out in number but pushed back security forces.
The opposition to President Ahmadinejad is no longer confined to an “opposition”. Key politicians such as former President Hashemi Rafsanjani, who should be considered politically a “free agent” moving between factions, and even “conservative” members of Iran’s establishment, such as Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani, are now criticising the President and perhaps plotting for his removal. It is likely that the pressure from many sides will force the Supreme Leader to curb Ahmadinejad’s authority and may even lead to the President’s removal from office.
Will that be enough, however, to restore “legitimacy”? That is an important, unanswered question. Had the Supreme Leader and key groups in the Iranian system recognised the complaints and rights of protesters last summer, then the challenge might have been one of “reform” within the Islamic Republic. However, in a paradox, the attempt to quell dissent may have not only bolstered it but widened its demands: factions of the Green movement are now seeking the modification or even abandonment of velayat-e-faqih, the system of ultimate clerical supremacy.
So 22 Bahman is unlikely to be the end of this post-election drama. Instead, it will be a significant act in the middle of the play: if the opposition can mobilise a mass presence, then it will be confirmed as a long-term force for change in Iran. If, however, the protest can be minimised and dispersed, then --- for now --- the Ahmadinejad Government and military forces such as Iran’s Revolutionary Guard may be able to hang onto a semblance of authority.
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