The Latest from Iran (4 February): The Relay of Opposition

2200 GMT: To close the day, a video --- courtesy of The Flying Carpet Institute --- of a workers' demonstration in Arak on Wednesday:

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ri7KDzSP5n0[/youtube]

2155 GMT: The Amir Kabir student website, a valuable source of information throughout the post-election crisis, has been attacked by the Iranian Cyber Army.

2135 GMT: Brother, Where Art Thou (cont.)? Davoud Ahmadinejad, the brother of the President, has declared that he is ready to prove that the beliefs of Presidential Chief of Staff Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai, clash with Islam. Once again, the attack appears in Khabar Online, the publication close to Ali Larijani.

2125 GMT: Journalists and press managers have requested the freedom of Ali Ashraf Fathi, clergyman and writer of the Tourjaan weblog (named after the location where Fathi's father was killed during the Iran-Iraq War), who was arrested last week during the "40th Day" memorial for Grand Ayatollah Montazeri.

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Iran Special: Full Text of Mousavi Answers for 22 Bahman (2 February)
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The Latest From Iran (3 February): Picking Up the Pace

2110 GMT: Crackdown and Blackout. So the regime's strategy of breaking up any mass movement on 22 Bahman continues. Iranian activists and websites such as Reporters and Humanrights Activists in Iran continue to document arrests, and there is even a claim that three members of the Committee of Human Rights Reporters --- Mehrdad Rahimi, Saeed Haeri, and Shiva Nazar-Ahari --- have been charged with "mohareb" (war against God).

Reports continue to circulate that Internet service has slowed significantly and even been halted in parts of Iran. Official explanations have included disruptions because of the loss of a major cable and "developments and expansions in the Tehran-Mashad corridor".


1930 GMT: We started the day with a sceptical post about a set of old polls being pushed to argue for the legitimacy of the Ahmadinejad Government. We've now posted full video of Wednesday's two-panel seminar at the New America Foundation which featured those polls, "What Does the Iranian Public Really Think?"

1730 GMT: We've posted an analysis from Persian2English, of the latest numbers (and missing numbers) on the Iranian economy.

1700 GMT: Domestic Case of the Day. Ayande News claims that Mahdi Kalhour, the President's Media Advisor, was called into a police station after beating up his ex-wife, Masumah Taheri, last night. Taheri, claiming an injured neck, has decided to sue Kalhour; the court hearing will begin on Sunday.

A few months ago, Kalhour's daughter sought asylum in Germany.

1500 GMT: Greetings from Beirut. 90 Lebanese intellectuals have issued a statement of support for the Green Movement.

1420 GMT: Kalemeh is reporting that the Qoba Mosque in Shiraz, which is led by Ayatollah Ali Mohammad Dastgheib, a critic of the Government, was attacked again last night. Last month, Dastgheib's offices were temporarily closed after pro-Government groups took over the mosque. There is also an English-language summary on the Facebook page supporting Mir Hossein Mousavi.

1400 GMT: The Ashura Trial. An Iranian activist has posted a translation of Wednesday's proceedings for the "first defendant", student at Damghan University:

1st defendant was charged with Moharebeh (war against God), being a corrupting agent & collusive acts against national security, propagandizing against the Islamic Republic & insulting high ranking officials.

1st defendant admitted to chanting "Death to Dictator", saying it was aimed at the President. He testified that he participated in four different protests. The 1st protest was the 40th (Day) memorial ceremony of the martyrs (30 July?). He went to 7 Tir Square, stayed for about 20 minutes, chanted "Death to Dictator", "Death to the Deceptive Government", & Allahu Akhbar. He was surprised to hear the more radical chants.

1st defendant said, at the Friday Prayers presided [over] by Ayatollah Rafsanjani, he along with his father & younger brother went to Qods street & video taped & took pictures of the crowd. 1st defendant also testified that he participated in Qods Day (18 September) protests, chanted pro-Ayatollah Sane'i slogans. He also said he chanted the slogan, "Not Gaza, not Lebanon, my life for Iran I will sacrifice."

He also participated in Ashura protest & video taped the crowd. After police used teargas, the crowd scattered at first & than gathered again & set a trash bin on fire. PPL were throwing stones at the police . He said at that time he was only video taping the scene. He then participated in throwing stones at the police who were standing far from the crowd. Once the crowd started to dissipate he went inside a home, stayed there for 20 minutes then left. On his way back home he saw a few injured people. Along with others he helped the injured & took them to the hospital. He than proceeded to go home.

On the way home he saw scenes that looked like war scenes. He video taped the war scenes. He did not send the videos to anyone, only showed them to friends. He testified that in 2008 he joined the Islamic Society, he & his family had reformist tendencies. He continued explaining that the elites claimed there was cheating in the election, he emphasized the point that many of the elites were absent from the President's confirmation ceremonies, then they announced there is a political coup. They asked us to come to the streets to protest & take our rights back.

The judge asked him about throwing stones on Ashura. The defendant explained because he had believed there was cheating in the elections, he went to the streets to protest the results. The judge than asked him about the flyers he distributed at Damghan University. He said he signed two petitions that demanded Ahmadinejad to resign.

At this point the defense attorney gave his short defense & asked the court for leniency for his client.

Judge than asked the 1st defendant to give his last defense. 1st defendant said he was capable of making decisions admitting that he made two mistakes, the first one leading to the second mistake. He said his first mistake was not to have researched the news sources & some groups. Second mistake was that even though he believed in Imam's path but, as the interrogator reminded him, he had forgotten Imam said "Support Velayat-e-Faqih (the Supreme Leader) so no harm can come to the country".

1st defendant continued to apologize to the Leader & asked for forgivness.

1210 GMT: Arrests and Sentences (cont.). Rah-e-Sabz has a round-up, including the detention of journalist Noushin Jafari, who covers cultural affairs for Etemaad newspaper.

1205 GMT: The Regional Diversion. Meanwhile, the US-Iran game of power-posing plays out. Major General Hassan Firouzabadi, the chief of staff of Iran's armed forces, has responded to the US declaration that it is providing anti-missile capability to four states on the Arabian peninsula:

They don't want to see good and growing relations between Iran and its neighbors in the Persian Gulf and thus started a psychological war....It is not new for us ... we were informed when they were installed, including about their exact locations ... Patriot missile could be easily deactivated by using simple tactics.

1200 GMT: Breaking Activism. AUT News summarises part of the regime's strategy to "win" on 22 Bahman (11 February), the anniversary of the 1979 Revolution: in recent days, 15 former and current student activists have been arrested throughout Iran.

1030 GMT: Ahmadi's Nuke Gambit. Finally, some white smoke from the Islamic Republic News Agency, which runs a supportive article for the President's proposal to swap Iran's uranium abroad. An "unnamed senior diplomat" explains that the initiative shows Iran's "flexibility" in negotiations on the issue.

0945 GMT: An EA source from Iran reports that Omid Mehregan, a translator and intellectual in Tehran, was arrested last night. Soon after the election, Mehregan and Morad Fardhadpour wrote for the British periodical Red Pepper: "Misguided western leftists may have their doubts about the Iranian mass movement against President Ahmadinejad’s disputed election ‘victory’. They should put them aside in the face of the new politics of revolt."

0905 GMT: Student activist Maziar Samiee has been arrested.

0900 GMT: On the International Front. We've posted an analysis, from colleagues at Politics3.com, of how Turkey might be able to break the deadlock in nuclear talks between the "West" and Iran.

0800 GMT: Arrests and Sentences. Reporters and Humanrights Activists in Iran is providing regular updates, such as the four-year prison term for author and literary journalist Javad Maherzadeh.

0735 GMT: We've posted an article --- half in fun, half in academic horror --- at a mass e-mail and five-month-old (dubious) poll passing itself off as confirmation of the current legitimacy of the Iran Government.

(I might have let this go without comment --- why give more publicity to poor analysis? However, I noticed last night that Joshua Holland of AlterNet, a blogger whom I respect very much, subsequently wrote, "Polls Suggest Everything You Think You Know About Iran’s 'Tainted' Election Is Wrong".

I should add that Holland was on an advance press list, rather than a generic list of recipients, for the material on the polls and that he has interviewed the polling group on several occasions, for example, over their work in Iraq. Still, my worry was that a very shaky exercise would be refreshed as confirmation that the Ahmadinejad Government is on solid ground and faces little resistance.)

0600 GMT: It did not bring as much attention outside Iran as Mir Hossein Mousavi's statement on Tuesday or President Ahmadinejad's declaration of a shift in Tehran's position on its nuclear programme. Mehdi Karroubi certainly did not prompt the fevered reactions to his comments of the previous week, but make no mistake: his proclamation on Wednesday on the protest of 22 Bahman as a necessary if calm response to the abuses of the Government was the event of the day. It consolidated the latest rhetoric from leading opposition politicians and clerics, as The Los Angeles Times --- which, to its credit, was the US newspaper that recognised the declaration's importance --- signalled in this lengthy extract:

We are approaching the anniversary of the Islamic Revolution at a time when both the Islamism and republicanism of the regime have been seriously questioned. The 10th presidential election was tainted with fraud. Peaceful protests were met with violence and suppression, and finally the walls of trust between people and the establishment collapsed.

People's demands have to be taken seriously into account. Repression, mass detention of political activists, journalists and students, show trials, execution and heavy punishments and security crackdowns cannot contain the prevailing crisis.

Those in power should reconsider their methods, and keep in mind that neither silence nor retreat on our part, nor threats, intimidation and violence on their part, can resolve the problems.

The authorities take no step in favor of the people and give childish and bizarre images of the current bitter realities.

State corruption and discrimination are rife in the country. The leaders are incapable of dealing with simple domestic affairs, but they claim to be able to run the world.

Rigid-minded hard-liners continue to utter baseless accusations against the pillars of the regime and the faithful confidants of the late imam [Ayatollah Khomeini].

All articles of the constitution have to be fully implemented. All political prisoners have to be released unconditionally. Press restrictions have to be scrapped and criticism should be tolerated. The current climate of intimidation and fear has to change. These are the demands of the opposition movement.

In contrast, the regime --- while noting that it still has the far-from-minor weapon of sweeping up activists and putting them in prison, as it continued to do on Wednesday --- was caught up in another spate of indecision. After the posturing of the rocket launch yesterday morning, officials had to figure out what to do next with President Ahmadinejad's announcement, backed up by his Foreign Minister, that Iran would allow a "swap" of uranium stock outside the country to ensure 20% uranium for its civilian reactors.

The head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, Ali Akbar Salehi, tried to hold the line, "The discussions are still being conducted, and we will inform the nation of any final agreements," in the face of questions. Pressed who might host the "third-party enrichment", "he cited an Asian country, but would not specify which one". (Answer: it's Turkey.)

Further evidence that Ahmadinejad had spoken loudly but now had to back up the words by getting agreement from those within the regime came from Press TV, which could merely report last night, "The West has urged Iran to submit a formal offer to the UN nuclear watchdog after the Iranian president said his government was ready to negotiate over a fuel swap deal."

Iran Analysis: How Turkey Can Break the Nuclear Stalemate

Colette Mazzucelli and Sebnem Udum write for Politics3.com:

The proliferation of nuclear weapons among failing states and fundamentalist non-state actors is the immediate challenge of the decade in national and international security. In Iran, however, the elections of June 12, 2009 illustrate to the world the increasing futility of a narrow focus on proliferation at the expense of the larger picture—the evolution of what Ali Ansari identifies as “a particular idea of power” in the regime.

The threats to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) are much broader than Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Those who argue that Iranian goals are limited to a civilian nuclear program designed to address urgent domestic needs must increasingly confront Iran’s complicated internal power struggle, which is more fragmented each day. Indeed, domestic cleavages and elite factionalization have characterized Iranian politics since the 1979 Revolution. What has emerged more recently, however, as the contestation since the summer makes clearer, is that divisions within the Revolutionary Guards—the element of Iran’s military established after the Revolution of 1979—complicate internal policy making.

This development is particularly dangerous on the nuclear issue and further delimits the ability of other states, even those with strong regional and Muslim ties like Turkey, to mediate on a range of policies. And mediation is essential if Iran is to play a constructive role commensurate with its growing influence in the Middle East.


Domestic Cleavages and a Fragmental Elite

Ansari explains how the changes internal to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps made their co-optation by conservative elements within the Iranian government possible given the rise of the second generation Right in the 1990s. Over time, these changes strengthened the hand of a conservative leadership threatened by the reformers led by Khatami, who was elected president in 1997. Both the Revolutionary Guard and the Basij, a volunteer militia founded by the order of the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979, gradually became, in [Ali] Ansari’s words, “guardians, not so much of the revolution, but of a particularly hard-line interpretation of that revolution personified by the supreme leader.”

Of significance for those who must deal with elite leadership in Iran is the way in which the Guards were increasingly dominated by men loyal, above all, to the doctrine of velayat-e faqih. In the Shia Muslim religion Iranians practice, this doctrine asserts the population’s submission in all matters to the authority of one man, the Supreme Jurist, Ayatollah Khamenei. Velayat-e faqih, or the guardianship of the jurist, is the legal foundation of the Constitution of 1979, and the source of the supreme leader’s authority. İt is this foundation that places the current supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, in a relatively strong institutional position, despite his open, and contested, support of Ahmadinejad as president.

Iran’s domestic crisis is so intricate as to defy scholars’ ability to explain recent events. We may well ask if this is a crisis of an elite increasingly fractured, as Ansari explains, by its blatant pursuit of materialism. The tipping point is that the wealth acquired by the few can only be gained at the expense of the many, who suffer daily the loss of security, the loss of ideals for which the 1979 Revolution was fought and the loss of a future for the country’s youth. Machiavelli’s realism, which the scholar Michael Doyle explains as integral to fundamentalism, is only a starting point for interpreting the complex nature of individual and fragmented elite leadership within the Guards, its pervasive ambitions within the structure of government and society, and the many ways its influence is felt in an oppressive and dangerous regime decades after a revolution that, in Ansari’s reading, is open to “mercantilization".

Ahmadinejad’s election victory in 2005 may be situated in the context of various segments of the Iranian society, particularly among those Hamid Dabashi identifies in his volume, Iran A People Interrupted, as “the most disappointed, the most disenfranchised and the most impoverished” whose hopes were invested in the Revolution of 1979. His opponent, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, was one of the founders of the Islamic Republican Party, which was established to advocate an unrestricted theocracy. Rafsanjani, like numerous contemporary leaders within the protest movement, supports the regime created by the Revolution, starting with the doctrine of velayat-e faqih.

Further, the protest movement continues to illustrate Iran’s evolving demographics in which those under thirty years of age constitute almost 70 percent of the population. It is from that segment of educated and technologically savvy youth, and the experiences of the current protests, that new leadership is likely to emerge. Indeed, leaders are made from the crises of their time. And while the brutality of a narrow elite may succeed in suppressing most of the leadership that could emerge in the present context, it will not stop generational change, which includes the most disenfranchised in the Iranian society. This generation has the authority, borne of its own disillusionment with the failed promises of revolution, to create an obstacle from within, thereby countering the popular dictatorship, which President Ahmadinejad and the genuine power behind his incumbent position—the Ayatollah—increasingly embody for a growing number of protesters.

Nevertheless, attempts from outside Iran to alter the pace or course of change are likely to fail, given the dated narratives that have already created too much history, particularly between Iran and the United States—more specifically during the overthrow of Mossadeq in 1953 and the taking of hostages at the American Embassy in Iran during the 1979 Revolution. Along those lines, Ansari reveals that the Guards are “empowered by a war mythology, reinforced by a largely constructed fear of foreign subversion and given free reign by the Ahmadinejad administration” to indulge in an “extensive extortion racket,” which he defines as one of the realities of the “mafia state” Iran has become.

So what do these developments portend for a people who must develop in their own time and space within an increasingly complex regional and global environment? For now, only time will tell whether a national collective will remains united behind Ahmadinejad’s nuclear rhetoric and more specifically, a regime that persists in shifting the blame for economic stagnation and human rights abuses to those who foment a “velvet revolution” from beyond its borders.

In this context, direct engagement by the United States, Turkey or the P5 + 1 is difficult at best. If the deepening crisis of the regime perpetuates elite paranoia as economic stagnation worsens, the government’s traditional recourse to foreign policy and a nationalist rallying point, such as a nuclear crisis, is destined to confront an Iranian society less inclined to listen to the elite message. It is the timing of engagement by the Obama administration that is critical. Even though the road to sanctions complicates the broader U.S.-Iran relationship, we must consider the current government’s ability and inclination to deliver credibly on an international nuclear agreement. The brutality of the regime against its own, and the uncertainty about Iran’s capacity at present to negotiate in good faith, suggests a waiting game. So while the Obama administration has shown its willingness to engage, the ball is in Iran’s court.

Moreover, to be successful, sanctions must directly target the vast financial assets of the Revolutionary Guards and require the continual assent of China and Russia. Sanctions must also be perceived by the Iranian protesters as denying the Guards the resources to stifle all opposition to the regime in education and media, as well as politics.

Admittedly, however, it is unclear if sanctions that persistently target the Revolutionary Guards’ material wealth may buy time, as the nuclear clock keeps ticking, given the Guards’ dominance in nuclear thinking, the more blatant factional struggles on questions of nuclear policy and the problems Iranians are encountering to accomplish a “covert breakout” option. On the other hand, military strikes are less credible, particularly for Israel, given Iran’s vast network of tunnels which hide the various uranium enrichment facilities around the country.

What is emerging as a more plausible scenario is that Ahmadinejad will not be able consistently to play a card on the international stage, which he can no longer sell to a domestic audience. Popular contestation is a response in part to the leadership divisions within the Guards, whose older generation does not sanction force against the people.¹⁴ This divisiveness has led to a broadening of those segments in Iranian society, which focus more since June 12 on abuses of state and society in their struggle for voice.

Turkey’s Unique Role

Given the growing complexity of Iran’s nuclear ambitions, American engagement in the P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States), as well as the active involvement of Turkey, is the option more likely over the long term to counter proliferation from the inside out. The more immediate action, sanctions against the vested interests of the Guards, would also hurt the Iranian people although this is increasingly a matter of degree. The internal repression of the Guards is worse than the hardship of international sanctions.

Richard Haass argues in Newsweek that working-level negotiations on the nuclear question should continue. In this context, Turkey has genuine interests to play a mediatory role even in the face of resistance from the Republican Guards, as evidenced in the intervention to derail the construction of an international airport in Tehran. Ansari highlights that the airport project, which was being constructed with the involvement of Turkish partners, initially excluded the Guards who promptly acted out of material (not national security) interests and delayed its opening to travellers for months.

In addition, Turkey has other unique characteristics which may provide a lucrative starting point in furthering nuclear negotiations with Iran. First, Turkey pursued a policy of indifference towards the Middle East during the Cold War, and enjoyed stability in its Iranian border since the seventeenth century. Additionally, the rough military and strategic balance between Turkey and Iran has successfully prevented a hot war between the two countries.

Since 2002, when the concerns increased about Iran’s nuclear program and various options were put on the table to deal with it, Turkey has walked a tightrope. Its strategic relations with the United States and the course they went through in the pre-Iraq War period taught Ankara that it would not be alone in responding to security issues in its region. And while Turkey is concerned about the possibility of a nuclear Iran, it also wants to avoid being the target of retaliation should it cooperate with the United States, particularly for military measures against Iran.

In this context, Ankara favors diplomacy over other options. Indeed, Turkey’s geographical and political position between the East and the West is promising for a facilitating role in the negotiation process with Iran. That said, Ankara could play a meaningful role in breaking off the negative perceptions that hinder progress, and in building new ones that would make maintaining the non-nuclear-weapon status the “rational choice.”

Turkey views nuclear proliferation as a consequence rather than a cause of insecurity. It acknowledges the threats and risks of further proliferation in its region and beyond, and has been a committed member of international regimes on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.¹⁷ Ankara has plans to harness nuclear technology for electricity generation, and would be adversely affected by proliferation trends in the region. Additionally, its ties with the Middle East (historical and cultural) and the West, particularly its strategic relations with the United States and the accession process to the European Union, grant Turkey with the ability to “speak both languages.” More importantly, it is one of the countries that would incur the negative impact should negotiations with Iran fail and proliferation trends rise in the region. In sum, Turkey is fit to play an active role in negotiations and it is willing to do so.

The Trust Issue

While there have been several proposals to keep Tehran’s capabilities under control, the main issue that prevents effective cooperation is the lack of trust between the international community and Iran, a reality that reveals itself in the demands for more transparency¹⁸ and “equality” respectively. The international community, most notably the United States, is concerned about the possibility of a nuclear Iran, and believes that unless its nuclear program is completely transparent, (i.e. when Tehran ratifies the Additional Protocol) Iran could divert its enrichment capability to produce a sufficient amount of highly enriched uranium (HEU), which could be used to manufacture an atomic bomb. Tehran’s advances in ballistic missile capability only increase these concerns.

Hence, ratification of the Additional Protocol also has a symbolic meaning that denotes commitment to non-proliferation norms, and Iran’s reluctance to do so emboldens mistrust regarding its nuclear program. More importantly, the possibility of a nuclear Iran could stimulate proliferation in the region, hence instability. Such a trend would challenge the nuclear non-proliferation regime as other non-nuclear-weapon states would start questioning the effectiveness of the regime and the meaning of their status as a security asset.

Finally, as discussed, Iran does not trust extra-regional powers, particularly the United States. The experiences of 1953 and 1979 taught Iran that sovereignty is non-negotiable, and self-sufficiency is the primary asset for security. Therefore, it argues that it cannot be denied its “indisputable and legitimate right” to have and operate complete nuclear fuel-cycle, and believes that doing so would diminish its power both materially and ideationally.

In this context, mutual understanding of key concepts is integral throughout the negotiation process, because they have the power to mitigate the inherent lack of trust from all sides. Some of these concepts are cooperation, transparency, sovereignty and non-proliferation. Along those lines, Iran perceives that if it allows enhanced verification inspections of the IAEA, and halts its uranium enrichment program, it would mean unequal treatment and loss of power because this would compromise self-sufficiency and sovereignty. Iran also argues that the lack of focus on other nuclear states in the region is a double-standard if the real goal is non-proliferation.

The international community, on the other hand, interprets Iran’s reluctance to take steps as a tactic to buy time, and the more they diverge from cooperation, the more Iran becomes a threat to international security. To alleviate these discrepancies, a viable channel must be designed to communicate all of these concepts to both sides, and to overcome the cultural bulwarks that have been underestimated in the negotiation process. Ankara has the potential for such communication, particularly with its new foreign policy perspective that is based on cooperative security.

Iran Special: Full Text of Mousavi Declaration for 22 Bahman (2 February)

Translated by Khordaad 88 and posted on the Facebook page supporting Mir Hossein Mousavi. The Facebook page also has the Persian original of the answers to 10 questions put by Kalemeh:

Q: We are approaching the 31st anniversary of the Islamic Revolution. How can the recollection and commemoration of those days benefit us today?

MOUSAVI: First and foremost, I want to congratulate all of our people on the 31st anniversary of our [victory in the] Revolution, particularly the families of our martyrs, our [war] veterans and prisoners of war [with Iraq].

Iran Snap Analysis: “Game-Changers” from Mousavi and Ahmadinejad
Iran Document: The Rallying Call of Mousavi’s 14 Points (2 February)
The Latest From Iran (3 February): Picking Up the Pace

Analyzing the Islamic revolution has not come to an end yet. There have been thousands of books and articles written about it and many still to come. It is interesting that the recent elections and the events following it have brought forth new critiques of the Revolution.


Some of these analyses mainly focus on the similarities between [these events[, some explore the similarities as well as the differences, and others seek the roots of the Green Movement in the Islamic Revolution. In any case, these critiques are very beneficial, particularly for the younger generation who are the main moving force of the Green Movement.

There were many factors that converged in bringing together our people, particularly the marginalized [people], under the brilliant leadership of Imam Khomeini, and led to the [victory of the] Revolution. There is much to say about this, but what I think is particularly relevant to our current situation and would like to mention now, at the beginning of this interview, is that in the 1979 Revolution, all of our people had united and were present in shaping the Revolution. This unity was so strong that it even took over the military bases. The historic picture of the officers of the air force saluting Imam Khomeini on the 8th of February is important in documenting this.

In the days leading to the revolution we didn’t have two groups, a majority and a minority, in the streets. Because the unpopular and dictatorial regime of the Shah had completely lost the roots of its legitimacy , it had no base left, even among the military forces. In those days even specific political groups with very distinct positions lost their differences and, some even reluctantly, joined the masses of millions in asking for “independence, liberty, Islamic Republic”.

Q. Can we say that the fall of the Pahlavi regime was inevitable?

MOUSAVI: The regime had completely lost its legitimacy. Of course, the [regime’s forces] killing civilians on the streets had a lot to do with this. The murders of 17 Shahrivard [8 September 1978] were a defining moment. If we look back, we see that if the Pahlavi regime had not betrayed the achievements of the Constitutional Revolution [which saw the establishment of Parliament], the monarchy would have survived and continued to rule with the role that the Constitution had carved out for it, and with the backing of the people’s vote.

From the beginning, many warnings were given to the Pahlavis regarding [their disregard for the Constitution], and someone like the late [Ayatollah] Modarres sacrificed his life for this goal. But all these warnings and reminders were useless, and within a few years of the Constitutional Revolution, despotic governance had taken over once more, although this time with a modern façade. The relatively long rule of the Pahlavis shows that during the Constitutional Revolution, the roots of despotism were not completely destroyed. And these roots continued to live on, within cultural, social and political structures.

I remember that in those years, one picture which the Shah constantly used to promote himself was a photo of a farmer kissing the Shah’s feet. In his view, this demonstrated the deep love that the people had for him. But of course, wise men saw much more in that photo.

Q. Would you say that the elements which, according to you, reinforce despotic regimes were eliminated with the Islamic Revolution?

MOUSAVI: In the first years of the revolution, people were convinced that it had completely destroyed all of those structures through which despotism and dictatorship could be reinforced. And I was one of the people who believed this. But today, I no longer do.

Today we can identify those very structures which have lead to despotism [in the past]. We can also identify the resistance people have shown against a return to dictatorship. This is the invaluable inheritance of the Islamic Revolution, clearly demonstrated today with the people’s intolerance for deception, lies and corruption. Similarly, the tight control of newspapers and media, the overflowing prisons, and the brutal killing of innocent people who are peacefully requesting their rights all reveal the lingering roots of despotism.

The people are after justice and freedom. Moreover, they are aware that the arrests and executions are politically motivated and unconstitutional. They despise the monarchy but are also aware that people may be condemned to death based on frivolous accusations and without even being subject to a legal trial. [The people know that these executions are only carried out] so that a brutal, ruthless leader of Friday Prayers [Ayatollah Jannati], one who has constantly defended corruption, violence and deception, can applaud them. It matters not to him that there are abundant forced confessions, and he doesn’t care that [those executed] have had nothing to do with the election. For him, what matters is the power of the executions to generate fear. He is ignorant of the power of innocent blood. He doesn’t know that it was the blood of martyrs that caused the Pahlavi regime to collapse.

From the revolution onwards, people have believed in freedom, independence and the Islamic Republic. The courageous resistance and the strength of our people and our soldiers during the eight-year war [with Iraq, 1980-1988] was a sign of the fundamental changes that had taken place in our society. We should remember that parts of our country were lost in the wars, crises and political games created during the time of the shahs.The courageous resistance of our people during the eight-year war ended this vicious cycle. And now, in the courageous, defiant, and Green rows of people who demand their rights, we see a continuum of the very resistance we saw during the war and the 1979 revolution.

However, we can conclude that we were too optimistic at the beginning of the Revolution. We can see today that the government, its newspapers and its national broadcasting network easily lie. Our people can see that in reality, the security and military forces control cases in the judiciary, that the judiciary itself has become an instrument of the security forces.

I believe that the martyrdom of men like [Ayatollah] Beheshti, [Ayatollah] Motahhari, and others during the Islamic Revolution was [a result of] the extended despotic roots of the previous regime that had not been destroyed completely. Therefore, I do not believe that the Islamic Revolution has achieved its goals. The Fajr festival [the 11 days leading to 22 Bahman (11 February)] held each year is, in reality, [a medium for people] to be vigilant and reinforce [their] strength in order to remove the remaining roots of despotism. Today, people are actively present on the scene to pursue justice, freedom and [the right] to rule their own destinies. We should remember that our nation has produced hundreds of thousands of martyrs in the pursuit of these goals.

The Islamic Revolution is the result of the efforts and sacrifices of our great nation. [Even] a slight ignorance and retreat will lead us to a darker dictatorship than before, because dictatorship in the name of religion is the worst kind.On the contrary, [the pursuit of ] knowledge as well as the primary goals of the Islamic Revolution, [which include] serious demands for freedom and justice, will carry us from a dark past to a bright future. This will destroy the remaining residues of dictatorship and pave the way for life in a free [society] where diversity, pluralism, freedom of speech and human dignity are all respected. I believe that the understanding of Islam which encourages calling people goats and is responsible for social divisions is [actually] influenced by pre-revolution dictatorial culture. The right thing for the judiciary to do was to pay attention to these roots and [influences] instead of executing a number of young men and teenagers amid serious rumors regarding the ways in which they were forced to confess.

However, as I mentioned before, we have lost all hope in the judiciary. A system that imprisons an intellectual, freedom-loving and religious son [Alireza Beheshti] of Martyr Beheshti, as well as others like him, sitting him under his father’s photo in the hallways of the courtroom, has moved far away from the ideals defined during the revolution.

Today, the prison cells are occupied with the most sincere and devoted sons of this nation: students, professors and others. [Security forces] are trying to prosecute them with espionage or charges related to financial or sexual misconduct, charges based on expired formulas, while the real criminals and thieves who steal public money are free. Instead of looking for the real spies, they accuse decent religious people. I should take this opportunity to express my regret that all of my advisors who are decent, honest and educated individuals have been arrested and that I am not with them. These days, there is not a [single] night that I don’t think of Imam [Khomeini], Martyr Behesti and others. I whisper to them that what was achieved is far from what they wanted. I did not name any of my advisors in order to pay my respects to all political prisoners. Iran will remember their names and their sacrifices.

Q. Can you give some examples of despotic mentality that are evident in the behavior of officials?

MOUSAVI: One can see the influence of this mentality as well as the remains of the despotic regime alongside the spirit of awareness and freedom everywhere. But perhaps the best example we can observe is the distortion of logical and legal relations between [different] branches in the system. It is very obvious now that Parliament does not have enough sway over the government in matters that fall under its jurisdiction. This is not an argument made solely by those who oppose the Government. Moderate conservatives who are aware also complain about these issues. Not responding to issues raised by the Supreme Audit Court, lack of transparency in oil sales and revenue spending, disregard for the fourth [development] program, destruction of the budget office to avoid audits and reviews, and so on: all are clear examples of a return to the pre-Pahlavi time. There is no need to look too far. A few days ago it was in the media that a minister objected to a question asked by reporters about teachers’ incomes by saying that it is no one’s business how much they earn or if that figure is low. You can hear similar comments from other officials as well as security forces.

Also, while Parliament has [openly] discussed the unprecedented atrocities committed in Kahrizak [Prison], one official says that the issue has been blown out of proportion unnecessarily. Another example given these days is the relationship between the Judiciary and its so-called forces. It is a question of whether the judges make the decisions or the security forces? To what extent can the Judiciary exercise its privileges when, in the Constitution, a great emphasis has been placed on its independence? In my opinion, one of the obvious cases that demonstrates the persistence of a despotic mentality is the injustice done to the [roles of] the Judiciary and the Parliament. Can both divisions exercise all the power bestowed upon them in the Constitution?

The similarities between today’s elections and those held during [the time before the revolution] are another sign. Compare the voting process for Parliamentary elections during the early years of the Revolution with that of today’s to see if we have moved forward or backward.

Q. One of the perennial demands, reflected in the slogans of political parties, is social justice and economic equality in particular. Sometimes, freedom and justice have been interpreted as opposites. With this in mind, is it possible to recognize a specific trend in the Green Movement?

MOUSAVI: In the Constitutional Revolution, people were demanding justice, and from this justice, a desire for freedom was born. In the history of human thought, the desire for justice has always existed, to a point where some scholars and philosophers believe that justice is above all virtues. I do not believe we must choose between justice and freedom. Take a look at our society, you can see that the $850 poverty line and simultaneous existence of inflation and unemployment are limiting the pursuit for freedom.

It is exactly at this point of greed for dominance and repression of people that demands for freedom rise up to show themselves. It is because of declining family budgets that distributing potatoes and welfare economy turns into a means to attract votes [by exploiting the] needs of people. An examination of the country’s current situation shows that the tight grip of demands of justice, especially on economic justice, on demands for political freedom is a necessary connection between the two.

Before revolution, it was a principle that the revolutionary forces and the academic class defended the lower class. It was their honour to be their friend. In my opinion, the point that all of us should have in mind is that of supporting the hard-working class. Of course, [that is] not for the purpose of using them as instruments but with the intention that the movement’s destiny will be tied to the destiny of all the people and especially with the classes who are productive in economy and science: the workers, teachers, and the academics. I regret that the intense political problems resulted in less attention to the lower class of the society, their problems, and their rights. When people’s standard of living improves, the roots of the freedom grow deeper in the society and unity and growth flourishes among people.

Today, those who are responsible for the misery of our people and the backwardness of the nation, and those who are responsible for inflation and unemployment and economic ruin of the country, those who are responsible for closing huge projects and setting us back compared to our neighbors, are misusing this situation by carrying out distorted, deceptive policies like injecting painkillers [into a body]. They are taking the country to the verge of ruin with the way they are handling the justice shares and pensions and the incorrect methods with which Article 44 of the constitution [on privatisation] is carried out. The future of the Fourth Development Plan and the yearly budget is of great concern, especially with the [Government's] incompetence that has resulted in the probability of increased sanctions.

In any case, the underprivileged classes of the society who care for Islamic values potentially have the same demands as the Green Movement. Those who are after a national consensus for change should become more integrated with these classes and also pursue their concerns and demands. Additionally, today we should all follow and be sensitive to economic news and analyses, because the economy has such a determining and crucial role in the fate of our country. These days the quantity of social and economic stories we see in the news [about Iran] is far less than the politics, and people are not informed as much as they should on these issues.

Q. A number of people see the solution to the country’s difficulties in moving beyond the Constitution. In your opinion, is this a real solution to our problems?

A. God willing, all of us entered the arena in the cause of reform, not for the sake of revenge or obtaining power or to destroy things.

Solutions which involve a transition beyond the Constitution are fraught with difficulties. The first of those is that the proponents of such a request do not have the capacity to attract the interest of the majority of our people. Without attracting the interest of the majority and, I have to say, without the creation of a consensus, we should not expect any fundamental or meaningful changes.

For this reason some of the slogans which lean toward moving past the Constitution have been treated with suspicion by the devout and by traditionalist institutions. Unfortunately, it must be said that sometimes these kinds of extremist slogans harm the movement more than the extremism of the authoritarians [who repress the movement].

That you are opposed to superstitious leanings and petrified beliefs and practices is a good thing. That, however, in the middle of battle, a debate is opened up that is incompatible with the religion and faith of the people is something of dubious value.

The next reason why moving beyond the Constitution is problematic is that, with such a solution, we are simply stabbing in the dark. If we lose hold of this connecting cord, the product of the struggles and efforts of past generations, we will be turned into little fragments without any character. Then naturally we would see ordinary people turning away from all this disorder and movement in the dark.

Those who are pursuing aims based on moving from the Constitution may well have control of the loudspeakers today, but in the heart of the society their aims are viewed with deep suspicion. In particular,
alongside the heralds of [those] moving beyond the Constitution are to be found, whether their presence is wanted or not, the repugnant figures of some monarchists who have seized the opportunity to display their hatred for the people and the Revolution. Those who include monarchists in the programmes they announce have apparently forgotten that the people have an extremely good memory. In any case, everyone should expect to be accepted in accordance with his or her weight in society, and not more [than that].

The slogans that are useful today are those which unequivocally help to make clear the aims of the movement, or which attract the sympathy of ordinary people to stand alongside the elites and the middle classes. They have to know that a decisive majority of the people consider 22 Bahman and the Islamic Revolution as belonging to the hundreds of thousands of martyrs [of the revolution and especially the 1980-8 war with Iraq] and that the history and character of our nation is, in city and village, bound to the yesterday of the Revolution by the chain of these martyrs.

Seven months of television programming coming from abroad, which has unfortunately become important because of the restrictions placed on media inside the country and because of the excesses of state television, has had its effects. Yet these effects are too weak for the people to give up the interests of their nation and their religious and historic demands. They [the authorities] should not exploit such a weapon [claims made on foreign channels] as a pretext for accusing people and suppressing the realities of our society.

In my opinion, efforts to push people to chant limited and pre-prepared slogans are an insult to the people. Slogans must well up from the heart of popular movements, in a spontaneous manner, not an autocratic one, in the same way that in 1978/9 the slogan “Independence, Freedom, Islamic Republic” welled up naturally from people’s hearts.

Q. Is it not true that reliance on the Constitution would close options for the future?

MOUSAVIE: I have said before that the Constitution is not a something that cannot be changed. It has changed before in 1988, and it can change again. By considering what people think and demand and what their collective experience as a nation dictates, we can take steps to improve the constitution. Nevertheless, we must be aware that a good constitution by itself is not the solution. We must move towards a [political] structure that imposes a high cost on those who attempt to disobey or ignore the laws.

I believe that the Islamic Republic is meaningless without the Constitution. In addition to care in safeguarding against violations to the rule of the constitution, we must also consider lack of attention or ignoring of the rules as a violation to the Constitution. It is exactly for this reason that the demand of "unconditional execution of the constitutional rights" is one of the determining demands [of this movement].

Furthermore, for the same [reason], we must remind those who advocate the continuation of the Islamic Republic that if significant parts of the Constitution, especially those articles in the third section [on freedom and other right of people] are ignored, they would start to have consequences for the establishment in the form of other causes. We must all be aware [of this].

Violating the rights of people numerated in the Constitution and refraining from recognition of people as masters of their own destinies could lead to falsification of this invaluable national legacy. For example, those who promote spying and surveillance to such an extent that it is normal are destroying the establishment from its roots. Those who constrain the media and assume an exclusive control over national TV help destroy the pillars of the Islamic Republic.

In the 17th statement [of 1 January] I had alluded to springs [of clear water] that could calm the strong currents and clear the muddy and wavy river if they flow to the river. One of these clear paths is to officially announce that we want to return to the Constitution.

Q. For our last question, please give us your opinion about the rallies and demonstrations.

MOUSAVI: Rallies and nonviolent demonstrations are among the people’s rights. I don’t think that anyone --- men, women, middle-aged people, or seniors --- holds a grudge against the Basij [militia] and the security forces because they are seen as equals. Conflicts break out when these forces stand against a calm movement. You can produce a documentary out of the thousands of photos and video clips from the days of Ashura, as well as the days prior to it, that would demonstrate how these conflicts and tense environments are formed.

My advice to the basij and security forces is to be calm and kind in their treatment. My advice to followers of the Green Movement is to reduce their identifying features, whether they are used to help them stand out a little or a lot.

This movement has grown out of a people and it belongs to them. Everyone should be extremely mindful of beliefs, values, and traditions. But we should never forget our final goal --- to create a developed, independent, free, and united Iran. This goal can only be achieved with the collaboration of all men and women from all layers of society, of all opinions and [political] appetites.

Let me stress this point: when we say Iran, we must take into account all Iranians inside and outside who promote our land with its [ancient] culture and religious beliefs. God willing, the Green Movement will stop at nothing in its moral and nonviolent methods to fight the revival of our nation’s rights. This movement has always benefited from its choice of green: the color of the prophet and his family as well as the symbol of an Islam of love and affinity. The Green Movement respects human dignity, freedom of speech and the people’s right to hold different opinions. It welcomes all movements that aim to promote our nation’s development. It represents the [civil and constitutional] rights of citizens, among which is social justice.

Q. Do you have a representative or a spokesperson outside the country?

MOUSAVI: In the Green Movement, every citizen is a media outlet. But the green path does not have a representative or spokesperson outside the country. This is one of its beauties. Everyone can talk about their ideas and the movement expands within a collaborative environment. As one of the members of the movement, I too will express my comments and suggestions in this environment.

Q. You are sometimes quoted on websites, Facebook, and other online sources. To what extent do you approve these articles?

A. My pieces are written by me and are issued via very few websites. I do not have a personal weblog or anything of that sort. The quotes that you refer to are an inevitable results of virtual environments, and I am not associated with any of them.

The Latest from Iran (1 February): The Anniversary Begins

2120 GMT: The Most Important Story of the Day --- There Wasn't A Story. We'll probably lead with this in the morning analysis but let's be clear, especially with regime defenders continuing to hold onto the turnout of 30 December as proof of the Government's legitimacy:

Where were the events today on the first day of the Anniversary of the Revolution celebrations? Normally, Hashemi Rafsanjani would give a speech in a grand event in Imam Khomeini’s shrine, surrounded by people. This year there was a small gathering, mainly officials, in Behesht-e-Zahra cemetery; member of Parliament Gholam-Ali Haddad Adel gave the speech. Seyed Hassan Khomeini, the Imam's grandson, did not participate after his muted reception of President Ahmadinejad (see 1345 and 1430 GMT).

2105 GMT: Brother, Where Art Thou? For the second time in recent days, Davoud Ahmadinejad has indulged in a bit of criticism of his brother's Government. He has declared that it must answer the denunciations of prominent member of Parliament Ali Mottahari, as "freedom has not been defined".

2050 GMT: Well, That Settles It Then. Minister of Intelligence Heydar Moslehi has said that his ministry has found clues in the the case of "nuclear physicist" Masoud Ali Mohammadi. These establish that "a combination of Israelis and counter-revolutionaries" are involved, even though there have been no arrests.

2045 GMT: Khatami Comes Out for the Rallies. We've posted an English translation of Mohammad Khatami's statement today.

1905 GMT: Marking Out the Protests. Effectively defending the right of protesters to gather for rallies, including 22 Bahman (11 February), while staying within the system, former President Mohammad Khatami said today, "We have always invited the people to peacefulness."

NEW Iran Document: Khatami Statement on Rights and Protests (1 February)
NEW Latest Iran Video: Sunday Boxing – French Police v. Iranian Ambassador (31 January)
NEW Iran Football Special: Green Movement Shoots! It Scores!
NEW Latest Iran Video: Foreign Minister Mottaki on Elections & Protests (31 January)
Iran Analysis: Mousavi and Karroubi Answer the Regime — “Defiance”
Iran From the Outside: Helping Through “Active Neutrality”
The Latest from Iran (31 January): No Backing Down

1855 GMT: Really, They Were Very, Very Bad. The regime, trying to justify last week's executions of Mohammad Reza Ali Zamani and Arash Rahmanipour, has released details of their purported interrogations:

Rahmani-Pour, during his preliminary interrogation rounds, admitted to being a member of Tondar, an offshoot of Kingdom Assembly of Iran, as well as having plans to strike the Tehran Bazaar, the statement said.

He also confessed to making explosives to strike his targets but added that he was unable to carry out his plans due to the presence of Basij forces in the areas, it said.

Rahmani-Pour, who was executed on Thursday, told his interrogators that through his connections with the pro-monarchy group, he had been convinced that the Pahlavi regime should be reinstated in Iran. He then said that he had gathered more than 100 kilograms (220 lb) of chemicals to make explosives, the statement added.

In addition to his charges, amongst which he was blamed for the deadly bombing of a religious compound in Shiraz, he was accused of conducting an anti-revolutionary campaign.

According to the statement, the other man executed Thursday was Mohammad-Reza Ali-Zamani, who was also associated with Kingdom Assembly of Iran.

"Ali-Zamani had illegally entered Iraq's Kurdistan, where he applied for asylum. There, he met with Forood Fouladvand [the leader of the Kingdom Assembly of Iran]," read the statement.

It added that Ali-Zamani had received trainings regarding "nuclear terrorism" as well as making dirty bombs.

1655 GMT: In the midst of a long academic stint, so back with an evening update about 1930 GMT.

1520 GMT: Blaming the Professors. Today's academic news comes from Allameh Tabatabei University, where the President, Sadredin Shariati, has blamed faculty for stirring up unrest on Ashura (27 December). Shariati has singled out professors such as Mohammad Satarifar, a member of the Mousavi campaign team, as instigators.

Last month several staff of the University were effectively purged by Shariati, who obtained his position on the basis of his service as Friday Prayers leader at the University.

1430 GMT: More Khomeini News. Let's see the Government try to claim this legacy....

An EA source reported that, after snubbing President Ahmadinejad (see 1345 GMT), Seyed Hassah Khomeini went to the house of Alireza Beheshti, the detained chief advisor to Mir Hossein Mousavi and son of the late Ayatollah Beheshti, a hero of the 1979 Revolution.

1350 GMT: Where is Zeidiabadi (see 1025 GMT)? An Iranian activist claims that Ahmad Zeidiabadi, journalist and academic, has been moved to Rejaie Shahr Prison, which usually holds "hard core" criminals. Last week journalist Masoud Bastani was moved to the same facility.

1345 GMT: The Legacy of the Revolution? Kalemeh reports that Seyed Hassan Khomeini, the grandson of Ayatollah Khomeini, has snubbed Mahmoud Ahmadinejad during the President's speech at the Khomeini shrine.

1325 GMT: So Was The Cleric Arrested? Hojatoleslam Hadi Ghaffari has denied reports (see 0910 GMT) that he was detained. The "hardline" newspaper Kayhan had reported that Ghaffari was arrested because authorities had discovered a cache of weapons in the storage area of his Tehran mosque in Tehran. Ghaffari claims that the area was rented out to a respected businessman who stored rice and that any weapons belonged to a Basij unit which disbanded years ago.

1320 GMT: Walking the Tightrope. A day after issuing his defense of the trials and possible death penalties for those accused of "mohareb" (war against God), the head of Iran's judiciary, Sadegh Larijani, has reportedly tacked back and declared he would not give in to political pressure from "hardliners" to carry out more executions: "These demands (by hardliners) are political in nature and are against the law and Sharia."

Not sure this is much of a shift from Larijani, who also said on the judiciary's official website, "In reviewing detainees' cases, we will only consider the law and Islamic Sharia law." Feels more like an assertion of his authority of determining if and when a protester should die.

1050 GMT: Questioning the Detentions. Amnesty International have launched a new campaign, calling on the Iranian authorities to reveal the whereabouts of two music journalists, Behrang Tonekaboni and Kayvan Farzin.

Both Tonekaboni and Farzai were arrested at the offices of Farhang va Ahang, a monthly music journal, on 5 January. Tonekaboni’s mother Lili Farhadpour, 47, a journalist and a member of Mothers for Peace, was arrested at her home on 20 January.

1035 GMT: Condemning the Executions. More than 80 expatriate Iranian intellectuals have signed an open letter denouncing last Thursday's killings of Mohammad Reza Ali Zamani and Arash Rahmanipour.

1030 GMT: Today, we've had a football special; now we've got boxing. We've posted the video of the clash in Paris which ended in a fight between the Iranian Ambassador and French police.

1025 GMT: Ahmad Zeydabadi, the reformist academic, journalist, and activist, has been moved to an unknown location, probably with Evin Prison.

0915 GMT: Interpreting the Revolution. High-profile Tehran University academic Sadegh Zibakalam has said in a discussion on Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting that the 1979 Revolution was not for Islam, but for a freedom which people believed could be fulfilled through Islam.

0910 GMT: Cleric Detained? Rah-e-Sabz is reporting that Hojatoleslam Hadi Ghaffari has been arrested. In June, just after the Presidential election, Ghaffari rose to prominence when the audio and video of his criticism of the Government and Supreme Leader circulated on the Internet.

0840 GMT: We've posted one of our regular Iran Football specials, "The Green Movement Shoots! It Scores!", as supporters and a former Iran football manager "hijack" a programme on Iranian state television.

0720 GMT: Sunday's Modest Declaration "We Freed the Human Race". So said President Ahmadinejad in a Cabinet meeting:

The Islamic Revolution opened a window to liberty for the human race, which was trapped in the dead ends of materialism....If the Islamic Revolution had not occurred, liberalism and Marxism would have crushed all human dignity in their power-seeking and money-grubbing claws. Nothing would have remained of human and spiritual principles.

0715 GMT: Video Shows: Threat and Defiance. Footage has been posted of Saturday's trial of Ashura detainees.

0700 GMT: About an hour ago, Iranians marked the triumphant return of Ayatollah Khomeini from exile in Paris, as schools, trains, and boats were to rang their bells at 9:33 a.m., the local time when his plane touched down in 1979. Press TV gives the straightforward line of Iranian state media.

This is the first of 11 days of commemoration, celebration, and protest, culminating in the events of 22 Bahman (11 February). No mass events are planned by the Green movement today, but the regime continues to put out its threats against any show of resistance. Sunday it was the turn of Sadegh Larijani, the head of Iran's judiciary, to declare that trials and executions were within the "rule of law".

We have posted the video of Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki, speaking on CNN, putting out the same Government message.

Latest Iran Video: Sunday Boxing - French Police v. Iranian Ambassador (31 January)

Persian2English has an English-language summary of this incident which started when protesters gathered outside the house in Neuphle-le- Chateau where Ayatollah Khomeini stayed during 1978-9 and where Iranian officials were holding a banquet commemorating Khomeini's departure from France for Iran in 1979. It ended with the Iranian Ambassador punching a policeman and only escaping handcuffing and arrest when Embassy staff interceded.

(Hat-tip to Setareh Sabety)

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4csBwWO-MkM[/youtube]