The Latest from Iran (7 February): Tremors

2045 GMT: Kalemeh is reporting that more than 1000 students at Sharif University demonstrated today over detentions of their classmates.

2030 GMT: Ali Kalai of the Committee of Human Rights Reporters has been re-arrested, and journalist Ehsan Mohrabi is reported to have been detained tonight.

1950 GMT: Criticising Khomeini. That's right --- days before the celebration of the anniversary of the 1979 Revolution, 180 members of Parliament have signed a statement denouncing the Imam's grandson, Seyed Hassan Khomeini. The dispute arose when Khomeini wrote the head of Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting, Ezzatollah Zarghamai, complaining about "censorship" of his grandfather's speeches.

1930 GMT: Conservative Mischief. Ayande News stirs the pot with a story claiming that Ahmadinejad Chief of Staff Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai went to Switzerland recently, not only to promote a "uranium swap" on Iran's Kish Island but also to pursue secret meetings on other issues, presumably with US officials. The paper, quoting French and Swiss newspapers, ponders what covert messages Rahim-Mashai brought.

No prizes here to guess the propaganda: the "conservative opposition" wants to stick Ahmadinejad, through his right-hand man, with the label of appeaser of Washington.

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Iran Document: Karroubi’s Open Letter for 22 Bahman (6 February)
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The Latest from Iran (6 February): Eyes on the Real Prize

1925 GMT: After all our frustration with the media coverage of the Ahmadinejad nuclear moves this week, full marks to Borzou Daragahi and Julian Barnes of the Los Angeles Times for nailing the story: "In a possible move to deflect attention from Iran's political woes, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad on Sunday ordered the nation's atomic energy agency to begin enriching uranium from 3.5% to 20% purity to serve as fuel for a Tehran medical reactor."


1900 GMT: Oh Dear G** (cont.). We've posted the video of Sarah Palin's political advice to Barack Obama: "Bomb Iran".

1715 GMT: Oh Dear G**. Sometimes objectivity has to give way before the train-wreck of politics and media coverage. This morning's charade plays out, as the head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, Ali Akhbar Salehi, dutifully responding to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's call, says, "As Iranian president [Mahmoud Ahmadinejad] announced, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran will start enriching uranium to a level of 20 percent if talks on fuel swap fail to achieve an outcome."

Instead of calling out the pretence in the Ahmadinejad game --- if Iran can enrich uranium to 20 per cent and thus does not need a deal with the West, why haven't they been doing so for many months? --- the Western media chase this without question. Indeed, CNN elevates this to a crisis moment --- "a fresh challenge to Western powers bidding to rein in Tehran's galloping nuclear drive" --- never noticing the internal situation behind the President's move.

About the only political/media stunt more distressing/humourous than this is a woman named Sarah Palin, who today advises President Obama to ensure his re-election by bombing Iran.

1555 GMT: Revolving Door. While the regime is sweeping up activists and journalists, there have been releases as well. Ali Gholi Tabar and Morteza Saremi, members of the reformist Mojahedin of Islamic Revolution have been released on bail.

1415 GMT: More Detained Journalists (see 1205 GMT). Mahsa Jazini of Iran newspaper has been detained.

1400 GMT: The Other Side of the Mottaki Visit. While the international media was dwelling on the nuclear issue during Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki's jaunt to the Munich Security Conference, others were highlighting the internal situation in no uncertain terms.



A United for Iran activist explains the issues in an interview with Germany's Welt TV.

1300 GMT: Here We Go. The Islamic Republic News Agency is featuring a statement from the Ministry of Intelligence, putting out the grand narrative --- four days before the demonstrations of 22 Bahman --- of protesters supported by the US and Israel:

Seven people organisationally linked to the counter-revolutionaries, the Zionist media and elements of the sedition have been arrested....A number of them were officially hired by the U.S. intelligence agency, the CIA.

The detainees, who were not named, were allegedly involved with the US Government-backed Farsi-language station Radio Farda and received training in Istanbul and Dubai in disrupting public order, spreading rumors and conducting sabotage. The seven supposedly played a significant role in "post-election riots", especially on Ashura (27 December).

1205 GMT: Latest arrests include journalists Zeinab Kazemkhah, Samiyeh Momeni, Ahmad Jalali-Farihani of Mehr, and Akbar Montajab of Etemade-Melli.


1155 GMT: Coming Out for 22 Bahman. Rah-e-Sabz has published a summary of calls from reformist and Green groups, including the Mohajedin of Islamic Revolution and Etemade Melli parties, for people to demonstrate this Thursday.

An English translation of the statement of the reformist Association of Combatant Clerics has now been posted.

1145 GMT: This Has Nothing to Do with 22 Bahman. Really. I can only report this "straight" and let everyone draw their own judgements. From Agence France Presse:

Iran said on Sunday its Internet connections will remain slow this week due to technical problems, ahead of anticipated protests by opposition supporters. Connections have been slow since last week and some email accounts have been unavailable for several hours each day.

"The cause of the reduced Internet speed in recent days is that part of the fibre-optic network is damaged," Communications Minister Reza Taghipour told Iran's state broadcaster. "The breakage will be repaired by next week and the Internet speed will be back to normal". ["Next week" begins 13 February.]

Taghipour said the undersea optic fibre across the Gulf between the Iranian port of Jask and Fujairah in the United Arab Emirates had been damaged due to shipping traffic and anchoring. He also acknowledged that text messaging in Iran had been disrupted, blaming it on "changing software."

0940 GMT: Nuclear Fiddling (cont.). So why did Ahmadinejad shift again this morning on Iran's enrichment of uranium (see 0835 GMT)? Consider the setting, the exhibition of Laser Science and Technology Achievements: you can't exactly prove you're setting the scientific/technological worlds on fire if you put forward dependency on the "West" for your advances.

And consider the immediate cause: Ahmadinejad's declaration of self-sufficiency, as framed by state media, was "to meet the demands of the country's cancer patients". In other words, Iran is on the verge of running out of 20-percent uranium for its medical research reactors. That is the same concern that took it to the International Atomic Energy Agency last June with the offer to negotiate. And that concern is still very much present.

0840 GMT: Economy in the Pocket of Government? The Iranian Labor News Agency, in the context of the Government's budget proposals, offers an interesting overview of the Iranian economy.

0835 GMT: Nuclear Fiddling While XXX Burns. Days after he tried the headline approach of a deal on uranium enrichment with the West, President Ahmadinejad doubles back this morning in a televised speech with the declaration that Iran can be self-sufficient:

We had told them (the West) to come and have a swap, although we could produce the 20 percent enriched fuel ourselves. We gave them two-to-three months' time for such a deal. They started a new game and now I (ask) Dr Salehi (the head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization) to start work on the production of 20 percent fuel using centrifuges....The doors for interaction are still open.

I leave it  for readers, in light of our analysis this morning, to fill in the XXXs with their interpretation. Meanwhile, the non-Iranian media --- apparently oblivious to the internal developments in Iran in the last 24 hours --- are following over themselves to feature Ahmadinejad's latest statement without considering why he made it.

0830 GMT: Journalist Jamileh Darolshafaie and her sister, music teacher Banafsheh Darolshafaie, have been arrested.

0815 GMT: We begin this Sunday morning, four days before 22 Bahman and the anniversary of the 1979 Revolution, trying to put together the dramatic and somewhat unexpected developments from the declarations of the opposition to the letter from a key MP to Mir Hossein Mousavi seeking the deal "Accept Khamenei, Reject Ahmadinejad". Our special analysis sets out why all of this is a sign of regime weakness.

A couple more supporting pieces of evidence this morning: Ayatollah Dastgheib, a persistent critic of the Government and indeed of the system, has declared, "One Person Cannot Rule 70 Million People". That's a pretty direct challenge to the Supreme Leader and velayat-e-faqih (clerical supremacy). Dastgheib, echoing the demands for freedoms made in last night's manifesto of Mehdi Karroubi's Etemade Party, declared:

It seems like today all the affairs of the country is in the hands of Revolutionary Guards and police and people have no say or will and this is the basis of the diversion from the principles of the revolution....

The armed forces, police, Revolutionary Guards and military should consider people’s benefit not their own benefit; they should guard people’s lives, belongings and dignity....The police should support the religious figures and scholars and not do something to isolate them, leaving no dignity for anyone except those who obey them.

Iran: "Conservative Opposition" Offer to Mousavi "Back Khamenei, We Sack Ahmadinejad"

At the end of an intriguing political day, another twist: the high-profile member of Parliament, Ali Motahhari, an ally of Ali Larijani and a critic of the Ahmadinejad Government, has written an open letter to Mir Hossein Mousavi. (Note "open", which raises this to a very public signal of the position of the "conservative opposition".)

The summary of the letter, published in The Tehran Times, deserves to be quoted in full. At one level, the reason for publication is obvious: Motahhari is asking Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi to make clear their allegiance to the Supreme Leader and the system of velayat-e-faqih (ultimate clerical supremacy). There is another level of significance, however, Motahhari's unsubtle implication is that, if Mousavi and Karroubi come "within the system", then the abusers in the Government can be dealt with --- and "dealt with" may include the President himself

It is left up to readers to consider whether this move is linked to our analysis last month of a post-Ashura plan, involving Speaker of Parliament Larijani, Tehran Mayor Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, and Secretary of the Expediency Council and Presidential candidate Mohsen Rezaei, to isolate and possibly remove Ahmadinejad:

I have read your interview in the Kalemeh website and saw positive and negative points in your remarks. I believe that you have stated the pains well, but you have not suggested remedies appropriately. The gist of your remarks is that you have entered the scene for making reforms not for seeking power, taking revenge, or devastating (the country). This approach can be the pivot of unity and the common cause to deal with the current political crisis, especially when one of the bases of the Islamic teachings is continuous social reform.


You in your statements have talked about the administration’s tendencies for breaking law and an inclination towards totalitarianism. You have said that the administration does not account for his actions to the Majlis (Parliament) and the judiciary. You have also mentioned explicitly and implicitly the violent treatments towards the protestors and a negligence by those who been managing the crisis.

Don’t you think that those who are blamed for such offences are seeking to make the current situation continue? Don’t you think that unity and calm are a deadly poison for them? Don’t you think the current situation makes it hard for the Majlis and the judiciary to deal with lawbreakers? For example in the current situation, it is possible to ask the president questions about some lawbreaking and cultural liberalism, but currently such legal actions are regarded as joining the leaders of protesters and attempting to intensify the crisis.

So you and Mehdi Karroubi have become obstacles in the path of making reforms that you and other considerate revolutionary figures call for. I am pretty sure that the grand Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution will deal with the offenses of the respected President, the totalitarians, and some extremists who claim to uphold principlism, if he has peace of mind about the actions of you two respected (figures). At least try (my advice) for several months, if it was not the case, then you can continue your path; the path that I believe is futile and damaging.

Some positive points and unifying steps are seen in your interview such as denouncing the foreign-based media outlets, distancing yourself from anti-Islamic slogans, and emphasizing to be committed to the Constitution. But according to the Constitution, the Leader says the last word on the political and social issues, even if some people are not convinced (about the decision). You have not heeded this principle in your interview duly. Some sections of your interview reveal that you are not willing that the crisis end and you think you are defending people’s rights.

However, by preparing the ground for lawbreaking, people’s rights are violated. The foreign enemies will take advantage (of the current situation) and our system and national interests are undermined. Our gracious Leader in his recent speech has mildly described the actions of you and Karroubi as “negligence.” These are signals for you to change your position with the aim of strengthening national unity. Even if you are right about the recent events, you should take Imam Ali (AS) as a model and give up your rights for Islamic unity and the preservation of Islam, and the public’s rights will be pursued somewhere else. This expectation from you who has a good revolutionary record is not a remote possibility.

The Latest from Iran (4 February): The Relay of Opposition

2200 GMT: To close the day, a video --- courtesy of The Flying Carpet Institute --- of a workers' demonstration in Arak on Wednesday:

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ri7KDzSP5n0[/youtube]

2155 GMT: The Amir Kabir student website, a valuable source of information throughout the post-election crisis, has been attacked by the Iranian Cyber Army.

2135 GMT: Brother, Where Art Thou (cont.)? Davoud Ahmadinejad, the brother of the President, has declared that he is ready to prove that the beliefs of Presidential Chief of Staff Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai, clash with Islam. Once again, the attack appears in Khabar Online, the publication close to Ali Larijani.

2125 GMT: Journalists and press managers have requested the freedom of Ali Ashraf Fathi, clergyman and writer of the Tourjaan weblog (named after the location where Fathi's father was killed during the Iran-Iraq War), who was arrested last week during the "40th Day" memorial for Grand Ayatollah Montazeri.

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The Latest From Iran (3 February): Picking Up the Pace

2110 GMT: Crackdown and Blackout. So the regime's strategy of breaking up any mass movement on 22 Bahman continues. Iranian activists and websites such as Reporters and Humanrights Activists in Iran continue to document arrests, and there is even a claim that three members of the Committee of Human Rights Reporters --- Mehrdad Rahimi, Saeed Haeri, and Shiva Nazar-Ahari --- have been charged with "mohareb" (war against God).

Reports continue to circulate that Internet service has slowed significantly and even been halted in parts of Iran. Official explanations have included disruptions because of the loss of a major cable and "developments and expansions in the Tehran-Mashad corridor".


1930 GMT: We started the day with a sceptical post about a set of old polls being pushed to argue for the legitimacy of the Ahmadinejad Government. We've now posted full video of Wednesday's two-panel seminar at the New America Foundation which featured those polls, "What Does the Iranian Public Really Think?"

1730 GMT: We've posted an analysis from Persian2English, of the latest numbers (and missing numbers) on the Iranian economy.

1700 GMT: Domestic Case of the Day. Ayande News claims that Mahdi Kalhour, the President's Media Advisor, was called into a police station after beating up his ex-wife, Masumah Taheri, last night. Taheri, claiming an injured neck, has decided to sue Kalhour; the court hearing will begin on Sunday.

A few months ago, Kalhour's daughter sought asylum in Germany.

1500 GMT: Greetings from Beirut. 90 Lebanese intellectuals have issued a statement of support for the Green Movement.

1420 GMT: Kalemeh is reporting that the Qoba Mosque in Shiraz, which is led by Ayatollah Ali Mohammad Dastgheib, a critic of the Government, was attacked again last night. Last month, Dastgheib's offices were temporarily closed after pro-Government groups took over the mosque. There is also an English-language summary on the Facebook page supporting Mir Hossein Mousavi.

1400 GMT: The Ashura Trial. An Iranian activist has posted a translation of Wednesday's proceedings for the "first defendant", student at Damghan University:

1st defendant was charged with Moharebeh (war against God), being a corrupting agent & collusive acts against national security, propagandizing against the Islamic Republic & insulting high ranking officials.

1st defendant admitted to chanting "Death to Dictator", saying it was aimed at the President. He testified that he participated in four different protests. The 1st protest was the 40th (Day) memorial ceremony of the martyrs (30 July?). He went to 7 Tir Square, stayed for about 20 minutes, chanted "Death to Dictator", "Death to the Deceptive Government", & Allahu Akhbar. He was surprised to hear the more radical chants.

1st defendant said, at the Friday Prayers presided [over] by Ayatollah Rafsanjani, he along with his father & younger brother went to Qods street & video taped & took pictures of the crowd. 1st defendant also testified that he participated in Qods Day (18 September) protests, chanted pro-Ayatollah Sane'i slogans. He also said he chanted the slogan, "Not Gaza, not Lebanon, my life for Iran I will sacrifice."

He also participated in Ashura protest & video taped the crowd. After police used teargas, the crowd scattered at first & than gathered again & set a trash bin on fire. PPL were throwing stones at the police . He said at that time he was only video taping the scene. He then participated in throwing stones at the police who were standing far from the crowd. Once the crowd started to dissipate he went inside a home, stayed there for 20 minutes then left. On his way back home he saw a few injured people. Along with others he helped the injured & took them to the hospital. He than proceeded to go home.

On the way home he saw scenes that looked like war scenes. He video taped the war scenes. He did not send the videos to anyone, only showed them to friends. He testified that in 2008 he joined the Islamic Society, he & his family had reformist tendencies. He continued explaining that the elites claimed there was cheating in the election, he emphasized the point that many of the elites were absent from the President's confirmation ceremonies, then they announced there is a political coup. They asked us to come to the streets to protest & take our rights back.

The judge asked him about throwing stones on Ashura. The defendant explained because he had believed there was cheating in the elections, he went to the streets to protest the results. The judge than asked him about the flyers he distributed at Damghan University. He said he signed two petitions that demanded Ahmadinejad to resign.

At this point the defense attorney gave his short defense & asked the court for leniency for his client.

Judge than asked the 1st defendant to give his last defense. 1st defendant said he was capable of making decisions admitting that he made two mistakes, the first one leading to the second mistake. He said his first mistake was not to have researched the news sources & some groups. Second mistake was that even though he believed in Imam's path but, as the interrogator reminded him, he had forgotten Imam said "Support Velayat-e-Faqih (the Supreme Leader) so no harm can come to the country".

1st defendant continued to apologize to the Leader & asked for forgivness.

1210 GMT: Arrests and Sentences (cont.). Rah-e-Sabz has a round-up, including the detention of journalist Noushin Jafari, who covers cultural affairs for Etemaad newspaper.

1205 GMT: The Regional Diversion. Meanwhile, the US-Iran game of power-posing plays out. Major General Hassan Firouzabadi, the chief of staff of Iran's armed forces, has responded to the US declaration that it is providing anti-missile capability to four states on the Arabian peninsula:

They don't want to see good and growing relations between Iran and its neighbors in the Persian Gulf and thus started a psychological war....It is not new for us ... we were informed when they were installed, including about their exact locations ... Patriot missile could be easily deactivated by using simple tactics.

1200 GMT: Breaking Activism. AUT News summarises part of the regime's strategy to "win" on 22 Bahman (11 February), the anniversary of the 1979 Revolution: in recent days, 15 former and current student activists have been arrested throughout Iran.

1030 GMT: Ahmadi's Nuke Gambit. Finally, some white smoke from the Islamic Republic News Agency, which runs a supportive article for the President's proposal to swap Iran's uranium abroad. An "unnamed senior diplomat" explains that the initiative shows Iran's "flexibility" in negotiations on the issue.

0945 GMT: An EA source from Iran reports that Omid Mehregan, a translator and intellectual in Tehran, was arrested last night. Soon after the election, Mehregan and Morad Fardhadpour wrote for the British periodical Red Pepper: "Misguided western leftists may have their doubts about the Iranian mass movement against President Ahmadinejad’s disputed election ‘victory’. They should put them aside in the face of the new politics of revolt."

0905 GMT: Student activist Maziar Samiee has been arrested.

0900 GMT: On the International Front. We've posted an analysis, from colleagues at Politics3.com, of how Turkey might be able to break the deadlock in nuclear talks between the "West" and Iran.

0800 GMT: Arrests and Sentences. Reporters and Humanrights Activists in Iran is providing regular updates, such as the four-year prison term for author and literary journalist Javad Maherzadeh.

0735 GMT: We've posted an article --- half in fun, half in academic horror --- at a mass e-mail and five-month-old (dubious) poll passing itself off as confirmation of the current legitimacy of the Iran Government.

(I might have let this go without comment --- why give more publicity to poor analysis? However, I noticed last night that Joshua Holland of AlterNet, a blogger whom I respect very much, subsequently wrote, "Polls Suggest Everything You Think You Know About Iran’s 'Tainted' Election Is Wrong".

I should add that Holland was on an advance press list, rather than a generic list of recipients, for the material on the polls and that he has interviewed the polling group on several occasions, for example, over their work in Iraq. Still, my worry was that a very shaky exercise would be refreshed as confirmation that the Ahmadinejad Government is on solid ground and faces little resistance.)

0600 GMT: It did not bring as much attention outside Iran as Mir Hossein Mousavi's statement on Tuesday or President Ahmadinejad's declaration of a shift in Tehran's position on its nuclear programme. Mehdi Karroubi certainly did not prompt the fevered reactions to his comments of the previous week, but make no mistake: his proclamation on Wednesday on the protest of 22 Bahman as a necessary if calm response to the abuses of the Government was the event of the day. It consolidated the latest rhetoric from leading opposition politicians and clerics, as The Los Angeles Times --- which, to its credit, was the US newspaper that recognised the declaration's importance --- signalled in this lengthy extract:

We are approaching the anniversary of the Islamic Revolution at a time when both the Islamism and republicanism of the regime have been seriously questioned. The 10th presidential election was tainted with fraud. Peaceful protests were met with violence and suppression, and finally the walls of trust between people and the establishment collapsed.

People's demands have to be taken seriously into account. Repression, mass detention of political activists, journalists and students, show trials, execution and heavy punishments and security crackdowns cannot contain the prevailing crisis.

Those in power should reconsider their methods, and keep in mind that neither silence nor retreat on our part, nor threats, intimidation and violence on their part, can resolve the problems.

The authorities take no step in favor of the people and give childish and bizarre images of the current bitter realities.

State corruption and discrimination are rife in the country. The leaders are incapable of dealing with simple domestic affairs, but they claim to be able to run the world.

Rigid-minded hard-liners continue to utter baseless accusations against the pillars of the regime and the faithful confidants of the late imam [Ayatollah Khomeini].

All articles of the constitution have to be fully implemented. All political prisoners have to be released unconditionally. Press restrictions have to be scrapped and criticism should be tolerated. The current climate of intimidation and fear has to change. These are the demands of the opposition movement.

In contrast, the regime --- while noting that it still has the far-from-minor weapon of sweeping up activists and putting them in prison, as it continued to do on Wednesday --- was caught up in another spate of indecision. After the posturing of the rocket launch yesterday morning, officials had to figure out what to do next with President Ahmadinejad's announcement, backed up by his Foreign Minister, that Iran would allow a "swap" of uranium stock outside the country to ensure 20% uranium for its civilian reactors.

The head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, Ali Akbar Salehi, tried to hold the line, "The discussions are still being conducted, and we will inform the nation of any final agreements," in the face of questions. Pressed who might host the "third-party enrichment", "he cited an Asian country, but would not specify which one". (Answer: it's Turkey.)

Further evidence that Ahmadinejad had spoken loudly but now had to back up the words by getting agreement from those within the regime came from Press TV, which could merely report last night, "The West has urged Iran to submit a formal offer to the UN nuclear watchdog after the Iranian president said his government was ready to negotiate over a fuel swap deal."

Iran Analysis: How Turkey Can Break the Nuclear Stalemate

Colette Mazzucelli and Sebnem Udum write for Politics3.com:

The proliferation of nuclear weapons among failing states and fundamentalist non-state actors is the immediate challenge of the decade in national and international security. In Iran, however, the elections of June 12, 2009 illustrate to the world the increasing futility of a narrow focus on proliferation at the expense of the larger picture—the evolution of what Ali Ansari identifies as “a particular idea of power” in the regime.

The threats to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) are much broader than Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Those who argue that Iranian goals are limited to a civilian nuclear program designed to address urgent domestic needs must increasingly confront Iran’s complicated internal power struggle, which is more fragmented each day. Indeed, domestic cleavages and elite factionalization have characterized Iranian politics since the 1979 Revolution. What has emerged more recently, however, as the contestation since the summer makes clearer, is that divisions within the Revolutionary Guards—the element of Iran’s military established after the Revolution of 1979—complicate internal policy making.

This development is particularly dangerous on the nuclear issue and further delimits the ability of other states, even those with strong regional and Muslim ties like Turkey, to mediate on a range of policies. And mediation is essential if Iran is to play a constructive role commensurate with its growing influence in the Middle East.


Domestic Cleavages and a Fragmental Elite

Ansari explains how the changes internal to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps made their co-optation by conservative elements within the Iranian government possible given the rise of the second generation Right in the 1990s. Over time, these changes strengthened the hand of a conservative leadership threatened by the reformers led by Khatami, who was elected president in 1997. Both the Revolutionary Guard and the Basij, a volunteer militia founded by the order of the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979, gradually became, in [Ali] Ansari’s words, “guardians, not so much of the revolution, but of a particularly hard-line interpretation of that revolution personified by the supreme leader.”

Of significance for those who must deal with elite leadership in Iran is the way in which the Guards were increasingly dominated by men loyal, above all, to the doctrine of velayat-e faqih. In the Shia Muslim religion Iranians practice, this doctrine asserts the population’s submission in all matters to the authority of one man, the Supreme Jurist, Ayatollah Khamenei. Velayat-e faqih, or the guardianship of the jurist, is the legal foundation of the Constitution of 1979, and the source of the supreme leader’s authority. İt is this foundation that places the current supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, in a relatively strong institutional position, despite his open, and contested, support of Ahmadinejad as president.

Iran’s domestic crisis is so intricate as to defy scholars’ ability to explain recent events. We may well ask if this is a crisis of an elite increasingly fractured, as Ansari explains, by its blatant pursuit of materialism. The tipping point is that the wealth acquired by the few can only be gained at the expense of the many, who suffer daily the loss of security, the loss of ideals for which the 1979 Revolution was fought and the loss of a future for the country’s youth. Machiavelli’s realism, which the scholar Michael Doyle explains as integral to fundamentalism, is only a starting point for interpreting the complex nature of individual and fragmented elite leadership within the Guards, its pervasive ambitions within the structure of government and society, and the many ways its influence is felt in an oppressive and dangerous regime decades after a revolution that, in Ansari’s reading, is open to “mercantilization".

Ahmadinejad’s election victory in 2005 may be situated in the context of various segments of the Iranian society, particularly among those Hamid Dabashi identifies in his volume, Iran A People Interrupted, as “the most disappointed, the most disenfranchised and the most impoverished” whose hopes were invested in the Revolution of 1979. His opponent, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, was one of the founders of the Islamic Republican Party, which was established to advocate an unrestricted theocracy. Rafsanjani, like numerous contemporary leaders within the protest movement, supports the regime created by the Revolution, starting with the doctrine of velayat-e faqih.

Further, the protest movement continues to illustrate Iran’s evolving demographics in which those under thirty years of age constitute almost 70 percent of the population. It is from that segment of educated and technologically savvy youth, and the experiences of the current protests, that new leadership is likely to emerge. Indeed, leaders are made from the crises of their time. And while the brutality of a narrow elite may succeed in suppressing most of the leadership that could emerge in the present context, it will not stop generational change, which includes the most disenfranchised in the Iranian society. This generation has the authority, borne of its own disillusionment with the failed promises of revolution, to create an obstacle from within, thereby countering the popular dictatorship, which President Ahmadinejad and the genuine power behind his incumbent position—the Ayatollah—increasingly embody for a growing number of protesters.

Nevertheless, attempts from outside Iran to alter the pace or course of change are likely to fail, given the dated narratives that have already created too much history, particularly between Iran and the United States—more specifically during the overthrow of Mossadeq in 1953 and the taking of hostages at the American Embassy in Iran during the 1979 Revolution. Along those lines, Ansari reveals that the Guards are “empowered by a war mythology, reinforced by a largely constructed fear of foreign subversion and given free reign by the Ahmadinejad administration” to indulge in an “extensive extortion racket,” which he defines as one of the realities of the “mafia state” Iran has become.

So what do these developments portend for a people who must develop in their own time and space within an increasingly complex regional and global environment? For now, only time will tell whether a national collective will remains united behind Ahmadinejad’s nuclear rhetoric and more specifically, a regime that persists in shifting the blame for economic stagnation and human rights abuses to those who foment a “velvet revolution” from beyond its borders.

In this context, direct engagement by the United States, Turkey or the P5 + 1 is difficult at best. If the deepening crisis of the regime perpetuates elite paranoia as economic stagnation worsens, the government’s traditional recourse to foreign policy and a nationalist rallying point, such as a nuclear crisis, is destined to confront an Iranian society less inclined to listen to the elite message. It is the timing of engagement by the Obama administration that is critical. Even though the road to sanctions complicates the broader U.S.-Iran relationship, we must consider the current government’s ability and inclination to deliver credibly on an international nuclear agreement. The brutality of the regime against its own, and the uncertainty about Iran’s capacity at present to negotiate in good faith, suggests a waiting game. So while the Obama administration has shown its willingness to engage, the ball is in Iran’s court.

Moreover, to be successful, sanctions must directly target the vast financial assets of the Revolutionary Guards and require the continual assent of China and Russia. Sanctions must also be perceived by the Iranian protesters as denying the Guards the resources to stifle all opposition to the regime in education and media, as well as politics.

Admittedly, however, it is unclear if sanctions that persistently target the Revolutionary Guards’ material wealth may buy time, as the nuclear clock keeps ticking, given the Guards’ dominance in nuclear thinking, the more blatant factional struggles on questions of nuclear policy and the problems Iranians are encountering to accomplish a “covert breakout” option. On the other hand, military strikes are less credible, particularly for Israel, given Iran’s vast network of tunnels which hide the various uranium enrichment facilities around the country.

What is emerging as a more plausible scenario is that Ahmadinejad will not be able consistently to play a card on the international stage, which he can no longer sell to a domestic audience. Popular contestation is a response in part to the leadership divisions within the Guards, whose older generation does not sanction force against the people.¹⁴ This divisiveness has led to a broadening of those segments in Iranian society, which focus more since June 12 on abuses of state and society in their struggle for voice.

Turkey’s Unique Role

Given the growing complexity of Iran’s nuclear ambitions, American engagement in the P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States), as well as the active involvement of Turkey, is the option more likely over the long term to counter proliferation from the inside out. The more immediate action, sanctions against the vested interests of the Guards, would also hurt the Iranian people although this is increasingly a matter of degree. The internal repression of the Guards is worse than the hardship of international sanctions.

Richard Haass argues in Newsweek that working-level negotiations on the nuclear question should continue. In this context, Turkey has genuine interests to play a mediatory role even in the face of resistance from the Republican Guards, as evidenced in the intervention to derail the construction of an international airport in Tehran. Ansari highlights that the airport project, which was being constructed with the involvement of Turkish partners, initially excluded the Guards who promptly acted out of material (not national security) interests and delayed its opening to travellers for months.

In addition, Turkey has other unique characteristics which may provide a lucrative starting point in furthering nuclear negotiations with Iran. First, Turkey pursued a policy of indifference towards the Middle East during the Cold War, and enjoyed stability in its Iranian border since the seventeenth century. Additionally, the rough military and strategic balance between Turkey and Iran has successfully prevented a hot war between the two countries.

Since 2002, when the concerns increased about Iran’s nuclear program and various options were put on the table to deal with it, Turkey has walked a tightrope. Its strategic relations with the United States and the course they went through in the pre-Iraq War period taught Ankara that it would not be alone in responding to security issues in its region. And while Turkey is concerned about the possibility of a nuclear Iran, it also wants to avoid being the target of retaliation should it cooperate with the United States, particularly for military measures against Iran.

In this context, Ankara favors diplomacy over other options. Indeed, Turkey’s geographical and political position between the East and the West is promising for a facilitating role in the negotiation process with Iran. That said, Ankara could play a meaningful role in breaking off the negative perceptions that hinder progress, and in building new ones that would make maintaining the non-nuclear-weapon status the “rational choice.”

Turkey views nuclear proliferation as a consequence rather than a cause of insecurity. It acknowledges the threats and risks of further proliferation in its region and beyond, and has been a committed member of international regimes on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.¹⁷ Ankara has plans to harness nuclear technology for electricity generation, and would be adversely affected by proliferation trends in the region. Additionally, its ties with the Middle East (historical and cultural) and the West, particularly its strategic relations with the United States and the accession process to the European Union, grant Turkey with the ability to “speak both languages.” More importantly, it is one of the countries that would incur the negative impact should negotiations with Iran fail and proliferation trends rise in the region. In sum, Turkey is fit to play an active role in negotiations and it is willing to do so.

The Trust Issue

While there have been several proposals to keep Tehran’s capabilities under control, the main issue that prevents effective cooperation is the lack of trust between the international community and Iran, a reality that reveals itself in the demands for more transparency¹⁸ and “equality” respectively. The international community, most notably the United States, is concerned about the possibility of a nuclear Iran, and believes that unless its nuclear program is completely transparent, (i.e. when Tehran ratifies the Additional Protocol) Iran could divert its enrichment capability to produce a sufficient amount of highly enriched uranium (HEU), which could be used to manufacture an atomic bomb. Tehran’s advances in ballistic missile capability only increase these concerns.

Hence, ratification of the Additional Protocol also has a symbolic meaning that denotes commitment to non-proliferation norms, and Iran’s reluctance to do so emboldens mistrust regarding its nuclear program. More importantly, the possibility of a nuclear Iran could stimulate proliferation in the region, hence instability. Such a trend would challenge the nuclear non-proliferation regime as other non-nuclear-weapon states would start questioning the effectiveness of the regime and the meaning of their status as a security asset.

Finally, as discussed, Iran does not trust extra-regional powers, particularly the United States. The experiences of 1953 and 1979 taught Iran that sovereignty is non-negotiable, and self-sufficiency is the primary asset for security. Therefore, it argues that it cannot be denied its “indisputable and legitimate right” to have and operate complete nuclear fuel-cycle, and believes that doing so would diminish its power both materially and ideationally.

In this context, mutual understanding of key concepts is integral throughout the negotiation process, because they have the power to mitigate the inherent lack of trust from all sides. Some of these concepts are cooperation, transparency, sovereignty and non-proliferation. Along those lines, Iran perceives that if it allows enhanced verification inspections of the IAEA, and halts its uranium enrichment program, it would mean unequal treatment and loss of power because this would compromise self-sufficiency and sovereignty. Iran also argues that the lack of focus on other nuclear states in the region is a double-standard if the real goal is non-proliferation.

The international community, on the other hand, interprets Iran’s reluctance to take steps as a tactic to buy time, and the more they diverge from cooperation, the more Iran becomes a threat to international security. To alleviate these discrepancies, a viable channel must be designed to communicate all of these concepts to both sides, and to overcome the cultural bulwarks that have been underestimated in the negotiation process. Ankara has the potential for such communication, particularly with its new foreign policy perspective that is based on cooperative security.

A Response: Why Venezuela Isn't Iran

The folks at The Flying Carpet Institute respond to Josh Shahryar's article, "Venezuela: Twitter Revolution’s Next Stop?":

Some pundits have recently tried to compare the recent upper middle-class mobilizations against the government of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela to the ones occurring in Iran since last summer’s Presidential election. As proof of the similarities, the author notes the technological aspects of the mobilization, such as activity on Twitter. He furthermore notes that Venezuela is "a population subjugated to ill-planned economics, a strongman unwilling to leave power, and a government ever more keen to restrict its citizens' rights to freedom of speech".

Venezuela: Twitter Revolution’s Next Stop?

This is a very superficial analysis of events that can be overturned with a range of empirical evidence. However, I will confine myself to some obvious facts. For instance, the Chavez Government hasn’t resorted to executions of opposition members like the Islamic Republican regime in Iran. The "curbed free press" of Venezuela isn’t actually that curbed. In no other country in the recent years has the ruling class shown its teeth so openly against a popular reformist government, through "Chilean" methods like assassinations, employer lock-outs, and pot-beating upper middle-class housewives. What Western media reports also fail to show are the (even if somewhat modest) attempts of the Chavez Government to support the growth of communal radio programmes that are intended to challenge the corporate media monopoly.

Let us now turn our heads to Iran. Here, the neoconservative Ahmadinejad regime, elected by the narrow confines of the system of Velayaat-i-faqih (ultimate clerical authority), has followed a policy not unlike the one followed by neoliberal governments throughout the rest of the world: it has privatized enterprises and tried to crush unionized labour by introducing contract labour. At the same time it has tried to cushion the results of its policies with populist measures. In Iran, those populist measures are called "free potatoes", in the US and elsewhere they are called "No more taxes!" or "charity".  Chavez was instrumental in forming the UNT trade union federation, the backbone of the Left in the Chavista movement. Ahmadinejad on the other hand, was responsible for the severe crackdown on organizations like the Tehran Bus Drivers´ Union.

So what does bring Venezuela and Iran together? One can and should criticise Chavez´s praises of Ahmadinejad. They have no relation to reality and are based on a completely absurd understanding of the situation. Ironically, they resemble the West’s depiction of Ahmadinejad as an uncompromising "radical", something that is far from the truth.  Islamic Iran has shown that it is able and willing to cooperate with the US and Israel on a number of issues when this suits its interest (Iran-Iraq War, Afghanistan, Iraq).

But it’s not the similarities of the systems that brought the two countries together. It’s the fact that they are both faced by an American onslaught. The Obama administration has shown its real colours by silently embracing the Honduran coup against Manuel Zelaya, making obvious that it is prepared to follow the same ends in Latin America as the previous Bush administration but with different means. Meanwhile, not a week goes by that doesn’t see verbal threats of sanctions (the US) or the possibility of an upcoming war in Lebanon (Israel) to finish off the Iranian challenge.

One should not forget that the US --- or anybody else in the West --- isn’t diametrically opposed to the concept of political Islam. Instead, what any imperial hegemon fears most is the concept of resistance, irrespective of its colours. To equate Venezuela with Iran is false. It implies that the Islamic regime is a consistent anti-hegemonic regime that empowers organized labour and supports forms of democratic self-organization, while enjoying genuine popular support among the mass of people.