The Latest from Iran (6 February): Eyes on the Real Prize

2200 GMT: And The Pace Accelerates. Hard to keep up tonight --- Mehdi Karroubi's Etemade Melli party has now made another move for 22 Bahman, following up the cleric's declarations today with a list of proposals for reconciliation. We have posted them in a separate entry.

2100 GMT: An Extraordinary Offer? We have posted what we think might be a significant move by the "conservative opposition" to the President: an open letter to Mir Hossein Mousavi with the offer, "Back Khamenei and We Can Move Against Ahmadinejad".

1950 GMT: Another Attack on Ahmadinejad's Camp. Ayatollah Safi Golpaygani has effectively asked for the President's Chief of Staff, Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai, to be put on trial. Once again, the challenge is circulated through the pro-Rafsanjani Ayande News.

NEW Iran: The “Reconciliation” Proposals of Karroubi’s Etemade Melli Party
NEW Iran: “Conservative Opposition” Offer to Mousavi “Back Khamenei, We Sack Ahmadinejad”
NEW Iran Space Shocker: Turtle-Astronauts Defect to West
NEW Iran Document: Karroubi’s Open Letter for 22 Bahman (6 February)
NEW Iran: Quick! Look Over There! The Nuclear Distraction
NEW Iran Document: Iranian Journalists Write Their Overseas Colleagues About 22 Bahman
NEW The Netherlands: Court Throws Out Ban on Iranian Students
Latest Iran Video: Claimed Protest in Southern Iran (1 February)
Latest Iran Video: What Does the Iranian Public Really Think? (4 February)
Iran Analysis: The Missing Numbers in the Economy
The Latest from Iran (5 February): Into the Tunnel

1800 GMT: We're taking a break for a while, so we have posted a Saturday Special: "Iran's Turtle-Astronauts Defect to West".

1650 GMT: Not Us. Both Iran's head of police, Esmail Ahmadi-Moghaddam and his Tehran counterpart Ahmad-Reza Radan have declared they had no role in the Kahrizak Prison scandal.

1645 GMT: A Less Upbeat Approach for 22 Bahman. The Kargozaran Party, fostered by Hashemi Rafsanjani in the 1990s, has put out a different, pessimistic criticism of the Government, noting that the revolutionaries of 1979 are either without hope or in jail. It states that these are difficult times for the country and the people, whose rights are ignored, and difficult times for political parties who are under pressure. They have restated Ayatollah Khomeini's slogan "Islamic Republic, not a word less or more".

1640 GMT: No Conciliation from Khamenei. Reformist websites are featuring the claim that the Supreme Leader turned down a request from Ayatollah Mousavi-Ardebili to free top Mousavi advisor Alireza Beheshti, saying that he would not interfere in the case and was leaving it to Iran's judiciary.

1630 GMT: For What It's Worth. I suspect that --- at this point --- this is no more than posture, but Iran's Prosecutor General Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejei has announced that a second group of members of Parliament has sued Mir Hossein Mousavi.

And another warning from Sobh–e-Sadegh, the magazine of the Revolutionary Guard, which has condemned the Green movement leaders and asked them to repent before 22 Bahman or face being "confronted and punished harshly". (English-language summary)

1610 GMT: We have now posted Mehdi Karroubi's open letter, published today: "The common face of this movement is holding to the right to vote, free elections, a free press, the unconditional freedom of political prisoners, the reform of the work of governing and legislating and respect for the people’s civil rights."

1550 GMT: And From the Other Corner. After 72 hours of relative quiet, the "reformist" opposition has revved up today. Former President Mohammad Khatami has made another call for 22 Bahman (original in Parleman News):

We should not think that after the victory of the Islamic Revolution on 11 February everything is done, but the fact is that 11 February is only a beginning of the hard efforts of the people in order to achieve the goals and demands of the revolution.

Reform is nothing separate from this path and that is why we believe that it has deep roots and cannot be eliminated.

And here comes Mehdi Karroubi with a double declaration: we are about to post the full text of his latest statement on his website Saham News. Meanwhile, he has given an interview to the German magazine Der Spiegel, restating his defense of protest and condemnation of the Government in recent weeks:

The political prisoners must be set free, we need freedom of the press and freedom of assembly, our electoral law must be changed and a free election must take place. But then the current government would hardly be able to hold on to power.

1540 GMT: Now This is Getting Interesting (cont.): First there is Speaker of Parliament's Larijani assault on the President, then there is his deputy Mohammad Reza's Bahonar's criticism, as he warned Ahadminejad supporters, "At least for the sake of your own benefit do not condemn the previous Presidencies."

And there's more: Bahonar claimed that the Presidency of Hashemi Rafsanjani (1989-1997) was the "best and most productive time for the country since the Revolution". eras.

1525 GMT: Larijani Fights Back Against Ahmadinejad. Now this nuclear business is getting interesting. Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani, speaking at Tehran University, has put out a series of criticisms of talks on uranium enrichment: the claim of the "West" to be concerned about Iran's nuclear programme is just "political fraud"; its manoeuvres are “double-sided and prejudicial”; “Iranians are not so gullible" as to believe the negotiations are genuine.

A heads-up, however, to Western news agencies who headline: "Iran's Larijani Blasts West Over Nuclear Deal". It's not the West who is his primary target, but the one Iranian who is too "gullible" in this affair: a Mr. M. Ahmadinejad.

1205 GMT: Once Again, With Feeling. Iran's police chief Esmail Ahmadi-Moghaddam has issued another warning that protest on 22 Bahman will be put down:

Now that the different dimensions of the sedition are clear, we won't show any more tolerance. Police will act firmly to defend the society's security and those who break the law will be dealt with severely.

Moghadam also returned to his declaration that Iran's police would take control of the Internet and mobile-phone texting to break the demonstrations: ""The new technologies allow us to identify conspirators and those who are violating the law, without having to control all people individually."

1155 GMT: Back in Iran. Ahh, here comes the fight-back on Ahmadinejad's nuclear move. Ayande News passes on the objections of the "hard-line" Kayhan to any swap of Iran's uranium stock outside the country.

1125 GMT: And the Sideshow. Almost all media are now jumping the nuclear cliff, jumping into the phase of "Western" reaction to Foreign Minister Mottaki's statement last night. US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates takes the soundbite lead, "I don't have the sense we are close to an agreement" (watch to see if the Turks, whom Gates was meeting in Ankara, are as dismissive). The BBC adds more cold water from the German Foreign Minister, Guido Westerwelle, and the European Union's head of foreign policy, Catherine Ashton.

1010 GMT: The Main Event. Despite Iranian Foreign Manouchehr Mottaki's attempt to put attention on the nuclear issue (see separate entry) at the Munich Security Conference, the post-election crisis made the agenda during Mottaki's public discussion with Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt.

Mottaki insisted that most Iranians accepted the result of the June Presidential election "except a very few people who started violations, who did crimes, who burned houses and buses and damaged anything in the streets". He challenged the audience, "Are you tolerant in your countries to violations and crimes?"

Bildt asked Mottaki for a promise that nine political prisoners condemned to death would not be executed ---"that would clearly have the most detrimental effect on the other aspects of the (EU-Iran) relationship" --- but Mottaki returned to the refrain of an 85 percent turnout in the election and an Ahmadinejad victory by 11 million votes. The remark brought hisses and boos from the audience.

(This exchange was noted by The Earth Times. We're still looking for a sign that Western "mainstream" media, led by the nuclear issue, have taken any notice. Meanwhile, credit to the German television station which did put forward questions on the internal situation, as well as the nuclear matter, to Mottaki in an interview.)

0945 GMT: Where's Mahmoud? We apologise: it's not all nukes for the Iranian Government today. President Ahmadinejad visited a girls' school today to declare that more than 1200 educational and sports projects have been launched around Iran.

0940 GMT: The Committee on Human Rights Reporters updates on prominent writer and literary critic Khalil Darmanki, detained for almost 40 days in ward 209 of Evin Prison.

0935 GMT: We've split off our first update --- noting the Iran Government's effort, using a "deal" on the uranium enrichment issue, to turn eyes away from the forthcoming 22 Bahman protests --- as a separate entry.

0925 GMT: The International Human Rights Campaign in Iran highlights the case of seven students arrested after a protest at Tehran University, condemning the execution of Ehsan Fattahian, on 16 November. The whereabouts of Pakhshan Azizi, Amanj Heidari, Leila Mohammadi, Ahmad Ismaili, Sarveh Veisi, Abdullah Arefi, and Hajhar Yousefi are still unknown. Sources say three of the students have been on hunger strike amidst torture, intimidation, and threats of rape by Ministry of Information agents.

0915 GMT: 40 Nobel Prize laureates have taken out an advertisement in The New York Times denouncing "the repression of the Iranian people" by the Ahmadinejad Government.

0855 GMT: No! Look Over Here! More from Iran's state media: Defence Minister Ahmad Vahidi opened two new missile production plants on Saturday, just three days after Iran fired a rocket carrying live animals into space."

0840 GMT: Non-News of the Day (So Far). Despite heated and anxious rumours across the Internet, the regime did not carry out the executions of nine political prisoners (four pre-election, five post-election) sentenced to death for mohareb (war against God).

0835 GMT: Some of the News that the Iran Government Would Prefer You Not Notice. We've posted an open letter from Iranian journalists to their overseas colleagues, urging them to cover the most important stories --- rather than the State set-pieces --- on 22 Bahman (11 February).

Amnesty International has published a statement, "Unite for Human Rights in Iran on February 11th", declaring:

Since blogs and websites like Twitter and YouTube were virtually the only way the Iranian people could expose the horrific treatment being inflicted on them in the days following the contested Presidential election, we expect that Iranians will turn to the Internet once again to carry their messages. That is why we are asking everyone to show their solidarity online on February 11th – whether it’s on your blog, website, or social networking profile.

Iran Document: Iranian Journalists Write Their Overseas Colleagues About 22 Bahman

Dear Fellow Journalists,

We are writing to those of you who have been invited to go to Iran in February 2010 to provide media coverage to the celebrations of the anniversary of the victory of the Islamic Revolution. We are a group of Iranian journalists who have been forced to live in exile. There are many others like us around the world, 45 of whom will be in Iranian prisons when you arrive in Tehran. They will be under torturous conditions in Iranian prisons that are, as you know, among the most hideous in the world.

As imprisoned or exiled journalists our crime is nothing other than our desire to report freely on events in Iran, as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides.

Since the electoral coup that took place in Iran last summer, the Iranian regime has intensified its suppression of press freedom this year and along with it is striving to remove the country’s peaceful movement through sophisticated suppressive means.


After failing for eight months to achieve its goals, the illegal and fraudulent government has now prepared a new show. We have received precise information that Ahmadinejad’s electoral coup-perpetrated administration is busy preparing to muster its own crowd in Tehran through the use of all possible means and the government’s extensive resources.

Its plan is, on one hand, to prevent the pro-Green Movement million strong group from approaching the location of the celebrations in Azadi circle in Tehran where Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is scheduled to give a speech, while on the other, fill this area with pro-government demonstrators.

Inviting foreign journalists to provide media coverage of the anniversary of the 1979 revolution on February 11, 2010 is another part of the deceitful plan of Ahmadinejad’s illegal administration. As you know, this government has till now arrested many foreign journalists and accused them of being spies while banning the activities of most international media. Now, it is using them, through its invitation, so they can show the world that it is a government that enjoys popular support.

The goal of the Iranian government is to direct journalists towards the pro-government demonstrations and prevent them from going to other locale.

You are going to Iran not only as media representatives of the free world, but also as representatives of your Iranian fellow journalists who are either in prison or in exile outside Iran. Your host is a government that is anti freedom, anti free media, and one that practices the most basic human rights of people.

You will be stepping onto streets that still bear the blood of Iran’s best and the brightest. You must have seen the film that shows how Neda Soltani was murdered. This young woman is a symbol and representative of those who have been arrested, raped, tortured and murdered by Iran’s coup administration. While Neda and others like her were killed on the streets, there are hundreds of others who have been raped, tortured and murdered in dungeons, prisons or unknown places by this government.

We are providing you the names of Iranian journalists who are now in prison, based on the list prepared by Reporters Without Borders and request that you search for them and find them. Ask them and their prison wardens why are they in prison.

As you go to our country that is under a dictatorship not to be duped by the schemes of those who murder freedom.

We draw your attention to these points:

* Demonstrations will begin on the night of [before?] February 11. The Allaho Akbar cries that will fill the night in Iranian towns will be the cries of people’s protests and the start of the march of million green Iranians who will fill the streets at the invitation of Mohammad Khatami, Mir-Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karoubi.

* The main march will start from Enghelab street in east Tehran --- go through Imam Hossein Circle --- and end at Azadi Circle in west Tehran. The Passdaran Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) has already made plans to close the streets leading to Enghelab street and to crackdown people as a measure to prevent them from taking to these streets. The Green Movement should be visible around this route and all over Tehran and not only on the paths that pro-government demonstrators will be provided.

Like on other similar occasions, the coup government will attempt to control all the paths so that the only people that will come in view of your cameras will be the Basijis, who will present a caricature of the Iranian nation for your television cameras.

You will hear the protesting voice of the Iranian people clearer than ever if you look beyond the fences, cordons, and barriers and look at the real people of Iran.

We are confident that you will push aside the bloody hands of the coup perpetrators and that you will shake the hands of the suffered people of Iran. You are going to a historic trip. We will see you off with our hearts filled with dreams of freedom and eyes filled with tears.

We look forward to seeing the leading media headline in February 2010 be: “The Victory of a Nation”.

Do not be fooled by the deceptions of your hosts, look at everything that is worth looking at, expose their shows, and listen to the true calls of the Iranian people. And on this historic trip relay and report the innocence of the Iranian people. This is the expectation that your suffering fellow journalists have of you.

Nazi Azima, Samnak Aghai, Houshang Asadi, Nooshabeh Amiri,Asieh Amini, Farahmand Alipour, Shabnam Azar, Fariba Amini, Maryam Aghvami, Nima Amini, Massoud Behnoud, Arash Bahmani, Maziar Bahari, Babak Dad, Farzaneh Bazrpour, Hadi Ebrahimi, Pouyan Fakhrai, Farshid Faryabi, Fereshteh Ghazi, Maryam Ghavami, Saghi Ghahraman, Massoud Ghoraishi, Arash Ghafouri, Manouchehr Honarmand, Linda Hosseininejad, Vahid Jahanzadeh, Nikahang Kowsar, Maliheh Mohamadi, Javad Montazeri, Roozbeh Mirebrahimi, Mehdi Mohseni, Searajedin Mirdamadi, Hanif Mazroui, Ebrahim Nabavi, Javad Moghimi, Alireza Noorizadeh, Nahid Pilvar, Shahram Rafizadeh, Bahram Rafizadeh, Saman Rasoolpoor, Khosrow Raesi, Ferydon Shaibani, Mohamad Sefriyan, Beniamin Sadr, Vida Same, Mohamad Tajdolati, Hamed Yousefi….

The Latest from Iran (4 February): The Relay of Opposition

2200 GMT: To close the day, a video --- courtesy of The Flying Carpet Institute --- of a workers' demonstration in Arak on Wednesday:

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ri7KDzSP5n0[/youtube]

2155 GMT: The Amir Kabir student website, a valuable source of information throughout the post-election crisis, has been attacked by the Iranian Cyber Army.

2135 GMT: Brother, Where Art Thou (cont.)? Davoud Ahmadinejad, the brother of the President, has declared that he is ready to prove that the beliefs of Presidential Chief of Staff Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai, clash with Islam. Once again, the attack appears in Khabar Online, the publication close to Ali Larijani.

2125 GMT: Journalists and press managers have requested the freedom of Ali Ashraf Fathi, clergyman and writer of the Tourjaan weblog (named after the location where Fathi's father was killed during the Iran-Iraq War), who was arrested last week during the "40th Day" memorial for Grand Ayatollah Montazeri.

NEW Latest Iran Video: What Does the Iranian Public Really Think? (4 February)
NEW Iran Analysis: The Missing Numbers in the Economy
NEW Iran Analysis: How Turkey Can Break the Nuclear Stalemate
NEW Iran Spam, Spam, Lovely Spam: Mass E-mails, Old Polls, and “Analysis”
Iran Special: Full Text of Mousavi Answers for 22 Bahman (2 February)
Iran Snap Analysis: “Game-Changers” from Mousavi and Ahmadinejad
The Latest From Iran (3 February): Picking Up the Pace

2110 GMT: Crackdown and Blackout. So the regime's strategy of breaking up any mass movement on 22 Bahman continues. Iranian activists and websites such as Reporters and Humanrights Activists in Iran continue to document arrests, and there is even a claim that three members of the Committee of Human Rights Reporters --- Mehrdad Rahimi, Saeed Haeri, and Shiva Nazar-Ahari --- have been charged with "mohareb" (war against God).

Reports continue to circulate that Internet service has slowed significantly and even been halted in parts of Iran. Official explanations have included disruptions because of the loss of a major cable and "developments and expansions in the Tehran-Mashad corridor".


1930 GMT: We started the day with a sceptical post about a set of old polls being pushed to argue for the legitimacy of the Ahmadinejad Government. We've now posted full video of Wednesday's two-panel seminar at the New America Foundation which featured those polls, "What Does the Iranian Public Really Think?"

1730 GMT: We've posted an analysis from Persian2English, of the latest numbers (and missing numbers) on the Iranian economy.

1700 GMT: Domestic Case of the Day. Ayande News claims that Mahdi Kalhour, the President's Media Advisor, was called into a police station after beating up his ex-wife, Masumah Taheri, last night. Taheri, claiming an injured neck, has decided to sue Kalhour; the court hearing will begin on Sunday.

A few months ago, Kalhour's daughter sought asylum in Germany.

1500 GMT: Greetings from Beirut. 90 Lebanese intellectuals have issued a statement of support for the Green Movement.

1420 GMT: Kalemeh is reporting that the Qoba Mosque in Shiraz, which is led by Ayatollah Ali Mohammad Dastgheib, a critic of the Government, was attacked again last night. Last month, Dastgheib's offices were temporarily closed after pro-Government groups took over the mosque. There is also an English-language summary on the Facebook page supporting Mir Hossein Mousavi.

1400 GMT: The Ashura Trial. An Iranian activist has posted a translation of Wednesday's proceedings for the "first defendant", student at Damghan University:

1st defendant was charged with Moharebeh (war against God), being a corrupting agent & collusive acts against national security, propagandizing against the Islamic Republic & insulting high ranking officials.

1st defendant admitted to chanting "Death to Dictator", saying it was aimed at the President. He testified that he participated in four different protests. The 1st protest was the 40th (Day) memorial ceremony of the martyrs (30 July?). He went to 7 Tir Square, stayed for about 20 minutes, chanted "Death to Dictator", "Death to the Deceptive Government", & Allahu Akhbar. He was surprised to hear the more radical chants.

1st defendant said, at the Friday Prayers presided [over] by Ayatollah Rafsanjani, he along with his father & younger brother went to Qods street & video taped & took pictures of the crowd. 1st defendant also testified that he participated in Qods Day (18 September) protests, chanted pro-Ayatollah Sane'i slogans. He also said he chanted the slogan, "Not Gaza, not Lebanon, my life for Iran I will sacrifice."

He also participated in Ashura protest & video taped the crowd. After police used teargas, the crowd scattered at first & than gathered again & set a trash bin on fire. PPL were throwing stones at the police . He said at that time he was only video taping the scene. He then participated in throwing stones at the police who were standing far from the crowd. Once the crowd started to dissipate he went inside a home, stayed there for 20 minutes then left. On his way back home he saw a few injured people. Along with others he helped the injured & took them to the hospital. He than proceeded to go home.

On the way home he saw scenes that looked like war scenes. He video taped the war scenes. He did not send the videos to anyone, only showed them to friends. He testified that in 2008 he joined the Islamic Society, he & his family had reformist tendencies. He continued explaining that the elites claimed there was cheating in the election, he emphasized the point that many of the elites were absent from the President's confirmation ceremonies, then they announced there is a political coup. They asked us to come to the streets to protest & take our rights back.

The judge asked him about throwing stones on Ashura. The defendant explained because he had believed there was cheating in the elections, he went to the streets to protest the results. The judge than asked him about the flyers he distributed at Damghan University. He said he signed two petitions that demanded Ahmadinejad to resign.

At this point the defense attorney gave his short defense & asked the court for leniency for his client.

Judge than asked the 1st defendant to give his last defense. 1st defendant said he was capable of making decisions admitting that he made two mistakes, the first one leading to the second mistake. He said his first mistake was not to have researched the news sources & some groups. Second mistake was that even though he believed in Imam's path but, as the interrogator reminded him, he had forgotten Imam said "Support Velayat-e-Faqih (the Supreme Leader) so no harm can come to the country".

1st defendant continued to apologize to the Leader & asked for forgivness.

1210 GMT: Arrests and Sentences (cont.). Rah-e-Sabz has a round-up, including the detention of journalist Noushin Jafari, who covers cultural affairs for Etemaad newspaper.

1205 GMT: The Regional Diversion. Meanwhile, the US-Iran game of power-posing plays out. Major General Hassan Firouzabadi, the chief of staff of Iran's armed forces, has responded to the US declaration that it is providing anti-missile capability to four states on the Arabian peninsula:

They don't want to see good and growing relations between Iran and its neighbors in the Persian Gulf and thus started a psychological war....It is not new for us ... we were informed when they were installed, including about their exact locations ... Patriot missile could be easily deactivated by using simple tactics.

1200 GMT: Breaking Activism. AUT News summarises part of the regime's strategy to "win" on 22 Bahman (11 February), the anniversary of the 1979 Revolution: in recent days, 15 former and current student activists have been arrested throughout Iran.

1030 GMT: Ahmadi's Nuke Gambit. Finally, some white smoke from the Islamic Republic News Agency, which runs a supportive article for the President's proposal to swap Iran's uranium abroad. An "unnamed senior diplomat" explains that the initiative shows Iran's "flexibility" in negotiations on the issue.

0945 GMT: An EA source from Iran reports that Omid Mehregan, a translator and intellectual in Tehran, was arrested last night. Soon after the election, Mehregan and Morad Fardhadpour wrote for the British periodical Red Pepper: "Misguided western leftists may have their doubts about the Iranian mass movement against President Ahmadinejad’s disputed election ‘victory’. They should put them aside in the face of the new politics of revolt."

0905 GMT: Student activist Maziar Samiee has been arrested.

0900 GMT: On the International Front. We've posted an analysis, from colleagues at Politics3.com, of how Turkey might be able to break the deadlock in nuclear talks between the "West" and Iran.

0800 GMT: Arrests and Sentences. Reporters and Humanrights Activists in Iran is providing regular updates, such as the four-year prison term for author and literary journalist Javad Maherzadeh.

0735 GMT: We've posted an article --- half in fun, half in academic horror --- at a mass e-mail and five-month-old (dubious) poll passing itself off as confirmation of the current legitimacy of the Iran Government.

(I might have let this go without comment --- why give more publicity to poor analysis? However, I noticed last night that Joshua Holland of AlterNet, a blogger whom I respect very much, subsequently wrote, "Polls Suggest Everything You Think You Know About Iran’s 'Tainted' Election Is Wrong".

I should add that Holland was on an advance press list, rather than a generic list of recipients, for the material on the polls and that he has interviewed the polling group on several occasions, for example, over their work in Iraq. Still, my worry was that a very shaky exercise would be refreshed as confirmation that the Ahmadinejad Government is on solid ground and faces little resistance.)

0600 GMT: It did not bring as much attention outside Iran as Mir Hossein Mousavi's statement on Tuesday or President Ahmadinejad's declaration of a shift in Tehran's position on its nuclear programme. Mehdi Karroubi certainly did not prompt the fevered reactions to his comments of the previous week, but make no mistake: his proclamation on Wednesday on the protest of 22 Bahman as a necessary if calm response to the abuses of the Government was the event of the day. It consolidated the latest rhetoric from leading opposition politicians and clerics, as The Los Angeles Times --- which, to its credit, was the US newspaper that recognised the declaration's importance --- signalled in this lengthy extract:

We are approaching the anniversary of the Islamic Revolution at a time when both the Islamism and republicanism of the regime have been seriously questioned. The 10th presidential election was tainted with fraud. Peaceful protests were met with violence and suppression, and finally the walls of trust between people and the establishment collapsed.

People's demands have to be taken seriously into account. Repression, mass detention of political activists, journalists and students, show trials, execution and heavy punishments and security crackdowns cannot contain the prevailing crisis.

Those in power should reconsider their methods, and keep in mind that neither silence nor retreat on our part, nor threats, intimidation and violence on their part, can resolve the problems.

The authorities take no step in favor of the people and give childish and bizarre images of the current bitter realities.

State corruption and discrimination are rife in the country. The leaders are incapable of dealing with simple domestic affairs, but they claim to be able to run the world.

Rigid-minded hard-liners continue to utter baseless accusations against the pillars of the regime and the faithful confidants of the late imam [Ayatollah Khomeini].

All articles of the constitution have to be fully implemented. All political prisoners have to be released unconditionally. Press restrictions have to be scrapped and criticism should be tolerated. The current climate of intimidation and fear has to change. These are the demands of the opposition movement.

In contrast, the regime --- while noting that it still has the far-from-minor weapon of sweeping up activists and putting them in prison, as it continued to do on Wednesday --- was caught up in another spate of indecision. After the posturing of the rocket launch yesterday morning, officials had to figure out what to do next with President Ahmadinejad's announcement, backed up by his Foreign Minister, that Iran would allow a "swap" of uranium stock outside the country to ensure 20% uranium for its civilian reactors.

The head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, Ali Akbar Salehi, tried to hold the line, "The discussions are still being conducted, and we will inform the nation of any final agreements," in the face of questions. Pressed who might host the "third-party enrichment", "he cited an Asian country, but would not specify which one". (Answer: it's Turkey.)

Further evidence that Ahmadinejad had spoken loudly but now had to back up the words by getting agreement from those within the regime came from Press TV, which could merely report last night, "The West has urged Iran to submit a formal offer to the UN nuclear watchdog after the Iranian president said his government was ready to negotiate over a fuel swap deal."

Iran Analysis: How Turkey Can Break the Nuclear Stalemate

Colette Mazzucelli and Sebnem Udum write for Politics3.com:

The proliferation of nuclear weapons among failing states and fundamentalist non-state actors is the immediate challenge of the decade in national and international security. In Iran, however, the elections of June 12, 2009 illustrate to the world the increasing futility of a narrow focus on proliferation at the expense of the larger picture—the evolution of what Ali Ansari identifies as “a particular idea of power” in the regime.

The threats to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) are much broader than Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Those who argue that Iranian goals are limited to a civilian nuclear program designed to address urgent domestic needs must increasingly confront Iran’s complicated internal power struggle, which is more fragmented each day. Indeed, domestic cleavages and elite factionalization have characterized Iranian politics since the 1979 Revolution. What has emerged more recently, however, as the contestation since the summer makes clearer, is that divisions within the Revolutionary Guards—the element of Iran’s military established after the Revolution of 1979—complicate internal policy making.

This development is particularly dangerous on the nuclear issue and further delimits the ability of other states, even those with strong regional and Muslim ties like Turkey, to mediate on a range of policies. And mediation is essential if Iran is to play a constructive role commensurate with its growing influence in the Middle East.


Domestic Cleavages and a Fragmental Elite

Ansari explains how the changes internal to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps made their co-optation by conservative elements within the Iranian government possible given the rise of the second generation Right in the 1990s. Over time, these changes strengthened the hand of a conservative leadership threatened by the reformers led by Khatami, who was elected president in 1997. Both the Revolutionary Guard and the Basij, a volunteer militia founded by the order of the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979, gradually became, in [Ali] Ansari’s words, “guardians, not so much of the revolution, but of a particularly hard-line interpretation of that revolution personified by the supreme leader.”

Of significance for those who must deal with elite leadership in Iran is the way in which the Guards were increasingly dominated by men loyal, above all, to the doctrine of velayat-e faqih. In the Shia Muslim religion Iranians practice, this doctrine asserts the population’s submission in all matters to the authority of one man, the Supreme Jurist, Ayatollah Khamenei. Velayat-e faqih, or the guardianship of the jurist, is the legal foundation of the Constitution of 1979, and the source of the supreme leader’s authority. İt is this foundation that places the current supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, in a relatively strong institutional position, despite his open, and contested, support of Ahmadinejad as president.

Iran’s domestic crisis is so intricate as to defy scholars’ ability to explain recent events. We may well ask if this is a crisis of an elite increasingly fractured, as Ansari explains, by its blatant pursuit of materialism. The tipping point is that the wealth acquired by the few can only be gained at the expense of the many, who suffer daily the loss of security, the loss of ideals for which the 1979 Revolution was fought and the loss of a future for the country’s youth. Machiavelli’s realism, which the scholar Michael Doyle explains as integral to fundamentalism, is only a starting point for interpreting the complex nature of individual and fragmented elite leadership within the Guards, its pervasive ambitions within the structure of government and society, and the many ways its influence is felt in an oppressive and dangerous regime decades after a revolution that, in Ansari’s reading, is open to “mercantilization".

Ahmadinejad’s election victory in 2005 may be situated in the context of various segments of the Iranian society, particularly among those Hamid Dabashi identifies in his volume, Iran A People Interrupted, as “the most disappointed, the most disenfranchised and the most impoverished” whose hopes were invested in the Revolution of 1979. His opponent, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, was one of the founders of the Islamic Republican Party, which was established to advocate an unrestricted theocracy. Rafsanjani, like numerous contemporary leaders within the protest movement, supports the regime created by the Revolution, starting with the doctrine of velayat-e faqih.

Further, the protest movement continues to illustrate Iran’s evolving demographics in which those under thirty years of age constitute almost 70 percent of the population. It is from that segment of educated and technologically savvy youth, and the experiences of the current protests, that new leadership is likely to emerge. Indeed, leaders are made from the crises of their time. And while the brutality of a narrow elite may succeed in suppressing most of the leadership that could emerge in the present context, it will not stop generational change, which includes the most disenfranchised in the Iranian society. This generation has the authority, borne of its own disillusionment with the failed promises of revolution, to create an obstacle from within, thereby countering the popular dictatorship, which President Ahmadinejad and the genuine power behind his incumbent position—the Ayatollah—increasingly embody for a growing number of protesters.

Nevertheless, attempts from outside Iran to alter the pace or course of change are likely to fail, given the dated narratives that have already created too much history, particularly between Iran and the United States—more specifically during the overthrow of Mossadeq in 1953 and the taking of hostages at the American Embassy in Iran during the 1979 Revolution. Along those lines, Ansari reveals that the Guards are “empowered by a war mythology, reinforced by a largely constructed fear of foreign subversion and given free reign by the Ahmadinejad administration” to indulge in an “extensive extortion racket,” which he defines as one of the realities of the “mafia state” Iran has become.

So what do these developments portend for a people who must develop in their own time and space within an increasingly complex regional and global environment? For now, only time will tell whether a national collective will remains united behind Ahmadinejad’s nuclear rhetoric and more specifically, a regime that persists in shifting the blame for economic stagnation and human rights abuses to those who foment a “velvet revolution” from beyond its borders.

In this context, direct engagement by the United States, Turkey or the P5 + 1 is difficult at best. If the deepening crisis of the regime perpetuates elite paranoia as economic stagnation worsens, the government’s traditional recourse to foreign policy and a nationalist rallying point, such as a nuclear crisis, is destined to confront an Iranian society less inclined to listen to the elite message. It is the timing of engagement by the Obama administration that is critical. Even though the road to sanctions complicates the broader U.S.-Iran relationship, we must consider the current government’s ability and inclination to deliver credibly on an international nuclear agreement. The brutality of the regime against its own, and the uncertainty about Iran’s capacity at present to negotiate in good faith, suggests a waiting game. So while the Obama administration has shown its willingness to engage, the ball is in Iran’s court.

Moreover, to be successful, sanctions must directly target the vast financial assets of the Revolutionary Guards and require the continual assent of China and Russia. Sanctions must also be perceived by the Iranian protesters as denying the Guards the resources to stifle all opposition to the regime in education and media, as well as politics.

Admittedly, however, it is unclear if sanctions that persistently target the Revolutionary Guards’ material wealth may buy time, as the nuclear clock keeps ticking, given the Guards’ dominance in nuclear thinking, the more blatant factional struggles on questions of nuclear policy and the problems Iranians are encountering to accomplish a “covert breakout” option. On the other hand, military strikes are less credible, particularly for Israel, given Iran’s vast network of tunnels which hide the various uranium enrichment facilities around the country.

What is emerging as a more plausible scenario is that Ahmadinejad will not be able consistently to play a card on the international stage, which he can no longer sell to a domestic audience. Popular contestation is a response in part to the leadership divisions within the Guards, whose older generation does not sanction force against the people.¹⁴ This divisiveness has led to a broadening of those segments in Iranian society, which focus more since June 12 on abuses of state and society in their struggle for voice.

Turkey’s Unique Role

Given the growing complexity of Iran’s nuclear ambitions, American engagement in the P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States), as well as the active involvement of Turkey, is the option more likely over the long term to counter proliferation from the inside out. The more immediate action, sanctions against the vested interests of the Guards, would also hurt the Iranian people although this is increasingly a matter of degree. The internal repression of the Guards is worse than the hardship of international sanctions.

Richard Haass argues in Newsweek that working-level negotiations on the nuclear question should continue. In this context, Turkey has genuine interests to play a mediatory role even in the face of resistance from the Republican Guards, as evidenced in the intervention to derail the construction of an international airport in Tehran. Ansari highlights that the airport project, which was being constructed with the involvement of Turkish partners, initially excluded the Guards who promptly acted out of material (not national security) interests and delayed its opening to travellers for months.

In addition, Turkey has other unique characteristics which may provide a lucrative starting point in furthering nuclear negotiations with Iran. First, Turkey pursued a policy of indifference towards the Middle East during the Cold War, and enjoyed stability in its Iranian border since the seventeenth century. Additionally, the rough military and strategic balance between Turkey and Iran has successfully prevented a hot war between the two countries.

Since 2002, when the concerns increased about Iran’s nuclear program and various options were put on the table to deal with it, Turkey has walked a tightrope. Its strategic relations with the United States and the course they went through in the pre-Iraq War period taught Ankara that it would not be alone in responding to security issues in its region. And while Turkey is concerned about the possibility of a nuclear Iran, it also wants to avoid being the target of retaliation should it cooperate with the United States, particularly for military measures against Iran.

In this context, Ankara favors diplomacy over other options. Indeed, Turkey’s geographical and political position between the East and the West is promising for a facilitating role in the negotiation process with Iran. That said, Ankara could play a meaningful role in breaking off the negative perceptions that hinder progress, and in building new ones that would make maintaining the non-nuclear-weapon status the “rational choice.”

Turkey views nuclear proliferation as a consequence rather than a cause of insecurity. It acknowledges the threats and risks of further proliferation in its region and beyond, and has been a committed member of international regimes on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.¹⁷ Ankara has plans to harness nuclear technology for electricity generation, and would be adversely affected by proliferation trends in the region. Additionally, its ties with the Middle East (historical and cultural) and the West, particularly its strategic relations with the United States and the accession process to the European Union, grant Turkey with the ability to “speak both languages.” More importantly, it is one of the countries that would incur the negative impact should negotiations with Iran fail and proliferation trends rise in the region. In sum, Turkey is fit to play an active role in negotiations and it is willing to do so.

The Trust Issue

While there have been several proposals to keep Tehran’s capabilities under control, the main issue that prevents effective cooperation is the lack of trust between the international community and Iran, a reality that reveals itself in the demands for more transparency¹⁸ and “equality” respectively. The international community, most notably the United States, is concerned about the possibility of a nuclear Iran, and believes that unless its nuclear program is completely transparent, (i.e. when Tehran ratifies the Additional Protocol) Iran could divert its enrichment capability to produce a sufficient amount of highly enriched uranium (HEU), which could be used to manufacture an atomic bomb. Tehran’s advances in ballistic missile capability only increase these concerns.

Hence, ratification of the Additional Protocol also has a symbolic meaning that denotes commitment to non-proliferation norms, and Iran’s reluctance to do so emboldens mistrust regarding its nuclear program. More importantly, the possibility of a nuclear Iran could stimulate proliferation in the region, hence instability. Such a trend would challenge the nuclear non-proliferation regime as other non-nuclear-weapon states would start questioning the effectiveness of the regime and the meaning of their status as a security asset.

Finally, as discussed, Iran does not trust extra-regional powers, particularly the United States. The experiences of 1953 and 1979 taught Iran that sovereignty is non-negotiable, and self-sufficiency is the primary asset for security. Therefore, it argues that it cannot be denied its “indisputable and legitimate right” to have and operate complete nuclear fuel-cycle, and believes that doing so would diminish its power both materially and ideationally.

In this context, mutual understanding of key concepts is integral throughout the negotiation process, because they have the power to mitigate the inherent lack of trust from all sides. Some of these concepts are cooperation, transparency, sovereignty and non-proliferation. Along those lines, Iran perceives that if it allows enhanced verification inspections of the IAEA, and halts its uranium enrichment program, it would mean unequal treatment and loss of power because this would compromise self-sufficiency and sovereignty. Iran also argues that the lack of focus on other nuclear states in the region is a double-standard if the real goal is non-proliferation.

The international community, on the other hand, interprets Iran’s reluctance to take steps as a tactic to buy time, and the more they diverge from cooperation, the more Iran becomes a threat to international security. To alleviate these discrepancies, a viable channel must be designed to communicate all of these concepts to both sides, and to overcome the cultural bulwarks that have been underestimated in the negotiation process. Ankara has the potential for such communication, particularly with its new foreign policy perspective that is based on cooperative security.

A Response: Why Venezuela Isn't Iran

The folks at The Flying Carpet Institute respond to Josh Shahryar's article, "Venezuela: Twitter Revolution’s Next Stop?":

Some pundits have recently tried to compare the recent upper middle-class mobilizations against the government of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela to the ones occurring in Iran since last summer’s Presidential election. As proof of the similarities, the author notes the technological aspects of the mobilization, such as activity on Twitter. He furthermore notes that Venezuela is "a population subjugated to ill-planned economics, a strongman unwilling to leave power, and a government ever more keen to restrict its citizens' rights to freedom of speech".

Venezuela: Twitter Revolution’s Next Stop?

This is a very superficial analysis of events that can be overturned with a range of empirical evidence. However, I will confine myself to some obvious facts. For instance, the Chavez Government hasn’t resorted to executions of opposition members like the Islamic Republican regime in Iran. The "curbed free press" of Venezuela isn’t actually that curbed. In no other country in the recent years has the ruling class shown its teeth so openly against a popular reformist government, through "Chilean" methods like assassinations, employer lock-outs, and pot-beating upper middle-class housewives. What Western media reports also fail to show are the (even if somewhat modest) attempts of the Chavez Government to support the growth of communal radio programmes that are intended to challenge the corporate media monopoly.

Let us now turn our heads to Iran. Here, the neoconservative Ahmadinejad regime, elected by the narrow confines of the system of Velayaat-i-faqih (ultimate clerical authority), has followed a policy not unlike the one followed by neoliberal governments throughout the rest of the world: it has privatized enterprises and tried to crush unionized labour by introducing contract labour. At the same time it has tried to cushion the results of its policies with populist measures. In Iran, those populist measures are called "free potatoes", in the US and elsewhere they are called "No more taxes!" or "charity".  Chavez was instrumental in forming the UNT trade union federation, the backbone of the Left in the Chavista movement. Ahmadinejad on the other hand, was responsible for the severe crackdown on organizations like the Tehran Bus Drivers´ Union.

So what does bring Venezuela and Iran together? One can and should criticise Chavez´s praises of Ahmadinejad. They have no relation to reality and are based on a completely absurd understanding of the situation. Ironically, they resemble the West’s depiction of Ahmadinejad as an uncompromising "radical", something that is far from the truth.  Islamic Iran has shown that it is able and willing to cooperate with the US and Israel on a number of issues when this suits its interest (Iran-Iraq War, Afghanistan, Iraq).

But it’s not the similarities of the systems that brought the two countries together. It’s the fact that they are both faced by an American onslaught. The Obama administration has shown its real colours by silently embracing the Honduran coup against Manuel Zelaya, making obvious that it is prepared to follow the same ends in Latin America as the previous Bush administration but with different means. Meanwhile, not a week goes by that doesn’t see verbal threats of sanctions (the US) or the possibility of an upcoming war in Lebanon (Israel) to finish off the Iranian challenge.

One should not forget that the US --- or anybody else in the West --- isn’t diametrically opposed to the concept of political Islam. Instead, what any imperial hegemon fears most is the concept of resistance, irrespective of its colours. To equate Venezuela with Iran is false. It implies that the Islamic regime is a consistent anti-hegemonic regime that empowers organized labour and supports forms of democratic self-organization, while enjoying genuine popular support among the mass of people.