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Tuesday
Jan122010

Middle East Arms Triangle: The US, "Moderate" Arabs, & Israel

On 6 January, we reported that the Netanyahu government had concerns over Washington's sale of about $6 billion of arms to four "moderate" Arab states (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the United Arab Emirates) and Washington. We asked whether the Israelis were pursuing  the complaint to argue the argument that the regional balance of power would collapse because of the arms shipments, regardless of how "moderate" the Arabs states are.

The background to the current manoeuvres lies in Israel's concerns over a $20 billion arms deal between Saudi Arabia and the George W. Bush Administration. On that occasion, Tel Aviv used its concerns as leverage to receive advanced F-35 fighter jets and to limit American arms sales to Lebanon amidst the re-emergence of Hezbollah. So far, no arms deal with Israel have been signed under Obama, and there is the issue of  shipment of higher-tech arms under the 2007 Memorandum of Understanding, which promised $30 billion to Tel Aviv over the following 10 years.

In that context, perhaps the immediate postures over the US-Arab deals should situated under the US-Israel strategic relationship. The Jewish Daily Forward has noted:
Leaders in Washington and Jerusalem have publicly locked horns over the issue of West Bank settlements. And Israeli public opinion has largely viewed America’s new administration as unfriendly. But behind the scenes, strategic security relations between the two countries are flourishing.
Tuesday
Jan122010

Iran & Social Media: Dispelling Fear, Uncertainty, and Doubt (Parsons)

Following our recent posts on Iran and Twitter, including yesterday's contributions by Josh Shahryar and Mike Dunn, Christopher Parsons posts a thorough review on his blog of censorship, surveillance, and social media.

Since the election of incumbent president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the world has witnessed considerable political tension in Iran. Protests over the questionable electoral resultsbeatings and deaths of political protestors, recurring protests by Iranians associated with the Green Revolution, and transmissions of information amongst civil- and global-actors have been broadcast using contemporary communications systems. Twitter, blogs, Facebook, and mobile phone video has enabled Iranians to coordinate, broadcast, and receive information. The existence of Web 2.0 infrastructure has set the conditions under which the Green Revolution operates.

Iran & Twitter: Last Words on The Hell of Heaven (Shahryar)
Iran & Twitter: Myth v. Reality of Security and “Deep Packet Inspection”


The Iranian government quickly recognized the power of cheap social coordination technologies and, in response, drastically reduced the capacity of national Internet links – the government, in effect, closed the nation’s Internet faucet, which greatly reduced how quickly data could be transmitted to, and received from, the ‘net as a whole. This claim is substantiated by Arbor Networks’ (Internet) border reports, which demonstrate how, immediately after the presidential election, there was a plummet in the data traffic entering and exiting the nation. (It should be noted that Arbor is a prominent supplier of Deep Packet Inspection equipment.)

Prior to trying to dispel the Fear, Uncertainty, and Doubt (FUD) surrounding the contemporary Iranian ISP-surveillance system that is regularly propagated by the media, I need to give a bit of context on the telecommunications structure in Iran.

Read rest of article....
Monday
Jan112010

The Latest from Iran (11 January): Reading the Regime

2045 GMT: Sanctions La-Dee-Dah. Associated Press is a-quiver over this statement by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, though I'm not sure why:
It is clear that there is a relatively small group of decision makers inside Iran. They are in both political and commercial relationships, and if we can create a sanctions track that targets those who actually make the decisions, we think that is a smarter way to do sanctions. But all that is yet to be decided upon.

That's not a breakthrough declaration, only a holding one. The White House does not want the sweeping sanctions proposed by Congress and will go for a "targeted" approach. It's just not clear who is being targeted with what.

1945 GMT: Journalist Mohammad Reza Nourbakhsh has been sentenced to three years in jail by an appeals court for participating in rallies on 15 June. Nourbakhsh was originally given a six-year prison term.

1940 GMT: Beaten in Detention. Kalemeh claims Mehdi Mahmoudian, a senior member of the reformist Islamic Iran Participation Front, has been beaten by the authorities in Evin Prison.

NEW Iran Exclusive: The Latest Nuclear Riddle — Renewed Talks with “West”?
NEW Iran Analysis: Beyond the Headlines, The Regime Battles Itself
NEW Iran & Twitter: Myth v. Reality of Security and “Deep Packet Inspection”
NEW Iran & Twitter: Last Words on The Hell of Heaven (Shahryar)
Latest Iran Video: Military Commander Mullen on US Options (10 January)
Iran Special Analysis: A US Move to “Sanctions for Rights”?
Iran: Challenge to The Government in “The Heartlands”?
The Latest from Iran (10 January): “Middle” Ground?


1935 GMT: The Detained. Back from an academic break to find that an Iranian activist has posted the names of 156 people arrested between the religious days of Tasoa and Ashura (26-27 December) and 9 January.

1635 GMT: Spinning Rafsanjani. Hashemi Rafsanjani, speaking as chairman of the Expediency Council, has made another general call for reconcilation.

Press TV portrays this as "the Iranian nation should follow the rule of the law and avoid taking extrajudicial measures as not to obstruct the path of justice". While this could be applied as an injunction to both the opposition and Government forces, the state outlet puts the emphasis is on following the guidance of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic: "If [this is] obeyed, balance will return to the society and there will be no room left for frictions. Foreign enemies have clung to the current state of affairs in the country as it is apparent in their tone."

The website also tries to rebut the claim, made by Rafsanjani's brother this weekend, that the former President has been pressured into silence. Instead, it claimed that "Rafsanjani rejected the notion and said he was always trying to resolve the problems away from media hype".

1615 GMT: Those Wacky Leveretts. They may have had their pro-Government, anti-Green movement opinion, published in The New York Times, shredded by analyst after analyst, but that doesn't stop Flynt and Hillary Mann Leverett from returning to their defence of the regime.

On their website, the Leveretts crudely twist a Wall Street Journal article (which was considered in an EA analysis yesterday on the US policy on sanctions, Iran's nuclear programme, and a "rights-first" approach) into "THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION MOVES TOWARD REGIME CHANGE IN ITS IRAN POLICY". They select and crop quotes, to the point of distortion, but this is their sleight-of-hand claim:
Buying into the proposition that the Islamic Republic is imploding has the effect of driving the policy argument toward support for “regime change” in Tehran.

Umm, no. There is a difference between analysis --- in this case, evaluating the internal difficulties in the Iranian regime --- and advocacy. It's the "is-ought" difference, one which should be picked up by an undergraduate student, let alone a supposed foreign-policy expert: noting that something "is" happening is not the same as declaring it "ought" to happen.

The Leveretts are not undergraduate students, so they know what they are doing. By putting out this claim, "whether President Obama and his advisers want to call their policy “regime change”, that is precisely the direction in which they are moving", they will buttress the propaganda line of the Iranian Government that the opposition can all be attributed to "foreign instigation". (I heard this declaration loud and clear in two presentations, including one by an  academic who works with the Leveretts, at the Beirut conference I attended last week.)

Since the survival of the Iranian regime rests in part on making that allegation stick, and since the Leveretts support the quest for that survival, let's just recognise this piece for what it is: an "ought" piece of advocacy rather than an "is" contribution to analysis.

(P.S. to Flynt and Hillary: Throwing in a picture of Senator Joseph Lieberman, who is calling for a "rights-based" approach to sanctions, with Ahmad Chalabi of Iraq "regime change" infamy, is a really nice touch.)

1505 GMT: Today's Fist-Shaker. It's Iran Prosecutor General Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejeie making an appearance to tell Tehran Prosecutor General Abbas Jafari Doulatabadi that it's time for measures against "elements behind the recent sedition....It is expected that the demands ... that those who were leading the post-election sedition are put on trial, are met."

1500 GMT: The "Reformist" Push. Former President Mohammad Khatami has put out his own statement, following that of Mehdi Karroubi, calling for an end to the "extreme violence" and dialogue over political, social, and economic issues.

1455 GMT: A Day for Analyses. Not sure why, but a lot of information seems to be falling into place today. The latest topic is Iran's nuclear manoeuvres with "the West" --- we've got an exclusive on Tehran's latest attempt to keep the discussions going.

1340 GMT: Waving Sticks. EA readers have offered comments considering the reasons for this weekend's declaration by General David Petraeus, the head of the US military's Central Command, that all military options are open in contingency plans for Iran (see yesterday's updates).

For the Iranian Government, however, there is a simple reading. The Foreign Ministry spokesman declared today, "[Petraeus'] comments are thoughtless and it is better that any statement made in this regard take a constructive approach."

1315 GMT: The Karroubi Statement (see 1150 GMT). Reuters has picked up on Mehdi Karroubi's declaration with takeaway quotes such as....
[I am] prepared for any disaster.....Some are thinking that they can block the reform course by closing down newspapers and putting reformers in jail ... but I remain firm in the path that I have chosen....I announce that such threats will not frighten me and will not weaken me in this path.

Agence France Presse has a shorter but similar article. Inexplicably, both Reuters and AFP miss the even more important part of Karroubi's statement, the 5-point proposal for resolution.

1200 GMT: We've posted a special analysis, based on latest developments and speech, of the battles within the Iranian regime. The conclusion? This will only be resolved "when someone stabs Ahmadinejad in the back".

1150 GMT: Karroubi's "5-Point" Plan. First it was Mir Hossein Mousavi with a 5-point post-Ashura proposal for political resolution; now it's Mehdi Karroubi.

Karroubi has written an open letter proposing 1) admission by Government officials of injustices; 2) adherence to the values of the Islamic Revolution through guarantees such as freedom of the press and legal rights; 3) adherence to non-violence for reform and acceptance of the Supreme Leader; 4) acceptance of criticism and an end to violence against those who dissent; 5) a national debate so Iranian people can make a free and informed decision about the way forward for the country.

1145 GMT: Rah-e-Sabz reports that 56 professors at Elm-o-Sanat University in Tehran have written in support of students, asking that they are able to take examinations without fear of disciplinary action over protests.

The intervention follows an open letter by almost 90 professors at Tehran University to the Supreme Leader, asking for a cessation of violence against demonstrations.

1130 GMT: The "Incomplete" Detainees Report. Parallelling and extending the "reformist" criticism that the Parliament report on detainee abuse is incomplete, Ayande News --- which is far from reformist --- is claiming that Iranian state media have not given a full account of the report and its discussion in the Majlis. Ayande even asks whether those responsible for the abuses at Kahrizak Prison are also responsible for output on Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting.

1110 GMT: Foreign Presence. The Government's overseas push is in Syria, as Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki visits Damascus. No significant news has come out of the talks so far.

0920 GMT: No major news this morning, but a lot of individual developments with deeper meanings this weekend. The Supreme Leader's speech, President Ahmadinejad's appearance in Parliament, the arrest of the Mothers of Mourning and their supporters in Laleh Park, the Parliamentary report on the abuse of detainees: all have gotten headline coverage, but the intra-regime tensions that they reveal have yet to be analysed, if recognised. We'll make a start on that analysis later today.

Meanwhile, Josh Shahryar and Mike Dunn have special analyses trying to put away the recent mis-information on #IranElection, Twitter, and security. Shahryar offers final words of reply to Will Heaven, the blogger for The Daily Telegraph who tried to blame "Twitterati" for endangering the Iranian people, while Dunn separates myth from reality over "Deep Packet Inspection".
Monday
Jan112010

Iran Exclusive: The Latest Nuclear Riddle --- Renewed Talks with "West"?

It all started with a story this morning in Israel's Haaretz: "Iran has suspended its uranium enrichment program for two months, Iranian media sources reported on Monday, saying the move was meant as a gesture of good will toward Western powers."

The only problem with the report is that "the Iranian media sources" were not cited, and analysts, including EA contacts, could not recall seeing any news of a suspension.

Iran Special Analysis: A US Move to “Sanctions for Rights”?
The Latest from Iran (11 January): Reading the Regime


Finally, another Israeli website clarified the source:

....statements made by Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Ramin Mehmanparast to quasi-official news agency ILNA [Iranian Labor News Agency] last week. The report was first published in Tehran Times, which is considered the mouthpiece of the Iranian regime.

"A number of neutral countries asked Iran not to enrich uranium for two months in order to give the West time to respond to Iran's proposals. We agreed to this request in order to show our good will to the international community," said Mehmanparast.

According to him, of the two months granted to the West, one month has already passed: "If the other side responds to Iran's requests (to carry out the agreement according to its requests) in the remaining time, we will start working. Otherwise, we will make the necessary decision."

Officials in the West told Ynet that they "are unaware if this kind of suspension was indeed carried out."

That, however, is not the entire story. According to Laura Rozen of Politico, US officials are very much aware of an Iranian attempt to find an agreement: "A U.S. nonproliferation hand confirmed Sunday that Iran had offered a formal response [on third-party enrichment of Iran's uranium] in late December or early January."

The issue is that Iran's preference for an uranium "swap" inside the country is unacceptable to Washington:
While the Iranian fuel-swap response was said to have been conveyed by the highest levels of the Iranian government, U.S. officials contacted Sunday gave no public indication that they have any interest in the counter-offer.

“The Iranians have been saying different things for weeks, but what matters is whether they will accept the IAEA's proposed TRR deal, which they agreed to in principle on October 1 but then walked away from,” an administration official said. “They know what they need to do to satisfy the international communities concerns and to date they have not done so.”

The Tehran Research Reactor proposal, or TRR, calls on Iran to immediately send 1,200 kg of its LEU to Russia, and France would in return supply Iran with nuclear fuel cells for medical use.

Put it all together, and the Ahmadinejad Government has far from closed the doors on discussion. Indeed, needing "legitimacy" in the face of internal troubles, it is Tehran now pressing for a deal.

The Obama Administration, however, does not appear to need to make any concessions to Iran. With the US Congress playing "bad cop" and proposing sweeping sanctions, the White House can be "good cop" and say "the third-party enrichment deal is the best you will get".
Monday
Jan112010

Iran Analysis: The Regime Beyond the Headlines

The world is once again watching Iran. A series of weekend developments are in the global press this morning. Thomas Erdbrink of The Washington Post covers the Parliamentary report on the abuse of detainees, headlining the allegations against former Tehran Prosecutor General and current Presidential aide Saeed Mortazavi, "An Iranian parliamentary probe has singled out a former Tehran prosecutor as being responsible for the violent deaths of three protesters in a now-closed prison facility after anti-government demonstrations in July." Nazila Fathi of The New York Times writes on the same lines.

Credit to both reporters and to others for picking up on the development. Credit also for coverage of the Supreme Leader's weekend address as well as notice of President Ahmadinejad's presentation of his five-year National Development Plan to Parliament.

The Latest from Iran (11 January): Reading the Regime


However, all the information deserves a much closer look. Below the surface of pronouncement and public reports, there are powerful currents swirling within the Establishment. This is no less than an attempt, perhaps the last one before showdown reaches the highest levels of the regime, to find a way out of the political conflict.

There are hints tucked away in today's stories. Erdbrink, for example, has this enticing quote from Abbas Abdi, a former journalist critical of the Government: 
Mortazavi is the highest official the parliament could accuse without getting in trouble. If they would go after lower-level officials, their probe would have been meaningless." It is now up to the judiciary to press official charges against the former prosecutor.

Fathi goes for the line of a sop to the Green movement:
One analyst, a former senior official who spoke on condition of anonymity, said that in pinning the blame on Mr. Mortazavi, the government was trying to pacify the opposition.

“They might go as far as sacrificing Mortazavi, but I don’t think this is going to fool the opposition,” he said. “This does not mean a major compromise. It is just a tactic, and they are willing to sacrifice him because he crossed the lines.”

Both soundbites are half-right: Mortazavi now wears the title of Number One Scapegoat for the post-election excesses.

This, however, has little to do with concessions to the opposition. The regime's tough response to the Saturday march of Mothers of Mourning and their supporters, putting 33 in prison and reportedly injuring several, backs up the rhetoric that continues to come from Ministers, officials, Parliamentary leaders like Ali Larijani, and the Supreme Leader. No more demonstrations. No more resistance.

(At best, there may be an argument that the Parliamentary report is a signal to Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, who raised the abuse charges back in July, that they should come in from the opposition cold and strike a deal. However, even that possibility --- raised in last week's letter from conservative/principlist leader and Presidential candidate Mohsen Rezaei to Ayatollah Khamenei --- has not been borne out by any other Government moves.)

And the Abdi line is incomplete, either in its reading or its representation by Erdbrink. The idea that Mortazavi is the biggest fish/scapegoat (pardon the mixing of animal metaphors) and therefore that the investigations and the allegations stop with the former prosecutor is a misunderstanding: the Parliamentary challenge to Ahmadinejad has come too far to stop with Mortazavi's punishment.

Remember, the President's response to this report --- after it was presented to Parliament --- was to proceed with the official ceremony for Mortazavi's appointment as the head of the unit investigating smuggling of currency and drugs. That's a come-and-get-me taunt to those in and close to the Majlis --- Rezaei, Ali Motahari, Ahmad Tavakoli, even Ali Larijani --- who want the President, not one of advisors, to admit errors and injustices. Motahari made that clear in his video interviews last week.

So leave the Green opposition to the side for the moment. One of two scenarios happens:

1. Mortazavi falls, and Ahmadinejad takes a blow to this authority. His Parliamentary and political foes will either then accept that they have contained Mahmoud or, smelling blood and victory, they will press on.

2. Ahmadinejad will not sacrifice Mortazavi, and the fight gets even more intense.

Into this mix let's throw in the Supreme Leader. His speech last Saturday was difficult to read because it had two apparently conflicting messages. On the one hand, as we initially updated, he was warning protesters to shut up and go away, a repetition of his 19 June line that tried to validate the Presidential election. On the other, he was indicating that there had to be some acceptance of excessive measures by security forces and assurances that they would not be repeated.

How to reconcile those signals? Well, by recognising to whom they are directed. The first is simply to keep the opposition at bay and, indeed, far, far away while the regime tries to sort itself out. The second, more immediately important message is to those who nominally support Khamenei. Read it carefully, and I think you've got the Supreme Leader lending some backing to the Parliamentary/political criticism of the Presidential office and, therefore, telling Ahmadinejad and the security forces aligned with him: Be Careful.

Another reminder: this isn't new. Rewind to July and August and there are a series of power plays and disputes between Parliament and the President and even the Supreme Leader and Ahmadinejad. Mahmoud and Company won some of those battles, getting more influence in ministries like Intelligence, and lost some, for example, with the forced climbdown over the appointment of Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai as First Vice President. At that time, however, Ahmadinejad's biggest victories were getting to be President, with his inauguration in August, and getting his big Cabinet picks the following month.

All of this is back in play, however. As a very well-informed source told me last week, "The only way this ends is if and when some [expletive deleted] stabs Ahmadinejad in the back."