The Latest from Iran (25 July): A President Retreats

NEW Iran Video: Zahra Rahnavard on Her Detained Brother
NEW A Turning Point in Iran: The Eclipse of the President
NEW Iran Timeline: How the Supreme Leader Vanquished His President
Iran: How the “New Media” Tore Down the Gates of the “Mainstream”
The Latest from Iran (24 July): Waiting for the Next Move

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0630 GMT (26 July): An apology for an exaggeration in the previous entry. The editor of Kayhan did not apologise for the publication of Khamenei's letter; however, he regretted calling First Vice President Rahim-Mashai an "agent of the velvet coup" and claiming that President Ahmadinejad had abandoned the line of the Supreme Leader".

The interpretation, therefore, is not of a Presidential fightback but of a (token) face-saver for Ahmadinejad so he can return to his proper (now very limited) Presidential role in the current political battle.

2120 GMT: A Presidential Fightback? Evening news is dominated by the "United4Iran" demonstrations in 100+ cities across the world, but one intriguing development on the homefront. Ahmadinejad's advisors, through Press Secretary Ali Akbar Javanfekr,  have been criticising the media for publishing the Supreme Leader's letter about Vice President Rahim-Mashai yesterday.

They may have had some effect. This evening. the editor of Kayhan, Hossein Shariatmadari, appeared to apologise for the public attention given to the Khamenei order.


1720 GMT: The Opposition Politicians and Qom. More on the important news of the day, the Khatami-Mousavi-Karroubi letter to Grand Ayatollahs asking them to intervene to free detainees. Keeping the Change has an incisive analysis on both the immediate issue and the wider significance: "Should the Reformists be able to win over a majority of the marjahs [high-ranking clerics], it...would constitute the serious religiously-based challenge to the regime's behavior that the Reformists have been after, but have heretofore been unable to obtain."

1715 GMT: The Confessions Pressure Escalates. Allaeddin Boroujerdi, the head of the Parliamentary commission on national security and foreign policy has also stated his objections to broadcasting the confessions of detainees. Boroujerdi said that, during the meeting of this committee last week with Minister of Intelligence Ejeie, the minister stated "that legal issues make this broadcasting impractical".

1605 GMT: The Next Achilles' Heel? Member of Parliament Ali Motahari has stated: "If the confessions of the detainees are to be broadcast, all instances in which the interrogators have broken the law during the process which sometimes has lead to fatalities must also be investigated".

The statement, echoing the clerical fatwas of Ayatollah Sanei and Bayat-Zanjani, continues, "If these confessions were obtained under normal conditions they would have a useful role in enlightening the public, however, if they are obtained under irregularites they have no use at all....It is possible that the arrests themselves may be legal, but the important issue is whether the detainees have been treated according to islamic regulations, and have they been subjected to mental and physical pressures....We all must uphold the law and try to improve the current situation."

The significance is that Motahari, like Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani, is considered a "principlist", the political bloc in Iran distinct from both "conservative" and "reformist" factions. With clerical pressure on the Government increasing, this could be an indication that some outside the Green Movement will be focusing on detentions and interrogations to demand changes in the system.

1600 GMT: Defending the Nation. The lead Iran story on Press TV's website today has been the statement by Revolutionary Guard commander General Mohammad Ali Jafari: "Iranian missiles have the capacity to target Israeli soil if the Zionist regime commits such stupidity including its nuclear sites."

I am sure that the content and timing of Jafari's statement have nothing to do whatsoever with the domestic blows to the Ahmadinejad Presidency, with which the Revolutionary Guard has been closely associated, in the last 48 hours.

1545 GMT: Reports of protests, and action by security forces to break them up, in Vanak and Azadi Squares in Tehran.

1340 GMT: Mir Hossein Mousavi's staff have vigorously denied any contact with foreign embassies over Iran's post-election conflict. The allegation was made on Friday both by Minister of Intelligence Ejeie and Ayatollah Ahmad Khatami, the leader of Tehran's prayers.

1330 GMT: Report that Mohammad Reza Yazdan Panah, a journalist and member of the Islamic Iran Participation Front, has been released from detention.

1035 GMT: I am in the midst of an interesting and challenging discussion with Kevin Sullivan of Real Clear World, sparked by a column by Joe Klein of Time. Which should come first: a focus on Iran and the nuclear issue or consideration of the internal political dynamics between the Government and the post-election Green Movement?

0950 GMT: How serious was the argument over the First Vice President? The head of Iran's armed forces, Major General Seyed Hassan Firouzabadi, had written President Ahmadinejad to ask for Rahim-Mashai's dismissal.

0935 GMT: The resignation letter of former First Vice President Rahim-Mashai has been published. Ahmadinejad's response has also appeared: " I had hoped that with the elimination of some negative pressure, you could remain in the First Deputy position."

0900 GMT: Our correspondent Mani sends in important news:

In an open letter, a number of reformist politicians led by Mohammad Khatami, Mir-Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi have asked the Grand Ayatollahs of Qom to remind "relevant segments of the establishment" of "the dire consequences" of their "anti-legal methodologies". The letter asks the Grand Ayatollahs to intervene to free the current post-election detainees.

The reformist politicians, stating that arrests have been done with "no legal justification" and have "blackened the name of the Islamic Republic both within Iran and abroad", declare, "The only solution to this situation would include the following: A clear and serious effort to stop the post-election atmosphere of fear and coercion caused by the increased presence of security forces, freeing all detainees, and restoration of the mechanisms by which the accusations of election irregulariites can be legally addressed."

They add, "The families of the detainees have been stonewalled by officials when they have tried to obtain legal recourse; this has caused many problems for these families". The "disturbing news" regarding the physical and mental well-being of the prisoners has exacerbated the level of anxiety already felt by these families.

The authors also challenge state media, calling Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting "the propaganda machine of the coerced confessions project". IRIB, "by broadcasting staged confessions, is attempting to prove spurious charges that have been made against a popular movement".

0725 GMT: Protests are being held in more than 100 cities across the world today in support of the Green Movement. Information is available on the United4Iran website.

0720 GMT: Amidst the uncertainty over how many of the 86 members of the Assembly of Experts have turned against Hashemi Rafsanjani (see 0645 GMT), one has made his position clear. Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Akbar Qoreyshi has written an open letter criticising Rafsanjani for not separating himself from the post-election opposition: “After the Leader’s strong defense [of you] in his Friday Prayers sermon, I told you in a letter that the leader’s defense had solved everything and it would be best that you apologize to him and tell the nation that you have nothing to do with your child or children’s actions....Unfortunately my letter was ignored.”

0710 GMT: More on Karroubi and Iran's Security Forces (see 0645 GMT). Mehdi Karroubi has criticized the treatment of detainees by the security forces in an open letter to Minister of Information Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejeie. Karroubi said recent information from reliable sources caused him deep concern about the conditions of confinement and demanded that Ejeie, carrying out his responsibilities, identify all parties responsible for recent horrific events and asserts that this is the minister's responsibility.

Karroubi, adidng that the withholding of information from the families of detainees is also a cause for great concern, concluded that it is a sorry state of affairs that citizens are treated so poorly by an Islamic Government.

0645 GMT: A relatively quiet Friday sprang into life during the afternoon with the emerging opposition, not only from the Supreme Leader but from across "conservative" ranks, to President Ahmadinejad over the Vice-Presidential appointment of Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai. Ahmadinejad's capitulation last night is so significant that we've covered it in a separate analysis.

Meanwhile, Ayatollah Yousef Sanei has extended his public support of the protest movement with a fatwa moving religious blame from the detainee to the Iranian authorities:

1) If you are under arrest, coerced and put under extreme pressure and forced to make a false confession to stop torture, your false confession is not a sin. However, those responsible for such methods have committed a sin;
2) Confessions that are obtained under duress and torture have absolutely no validity in an Islamic court;
3) Under Islamic and Shia law, interminable interrogations, especially those done arround midnight, are absolutely forbidden.

Ayatollah Hossein-Ali Montazeri has issued a fatwa condemning the behaviour of the security forces towards Mehdi Karroubi as he arrived at Friday prayers in Tehran last week. In an incident picked up in widely-distributed photographs, Iranian police jostled Karroubi, knocking off his turban.

Covering the other side of the clerical debate, Keeping the Change digs into this week's supposed declaration of the 86-member Assembly of Experts reaffirming support of the Supreme Leader and, more importantly, seeking the dismissal of Hashemi Rafsanjani as head of the Assembly. The analysis notes the discrepancy between only 16 signatures and state media's claim that 50 clerics (in other words, a majority) support the declaration. In contrast to our own interpretation that this is a power-play by an important pro-regime minority on the Assembly, Keeping the Change concludes:

Many of the Assembly's members owe their positions to Khamanei and have deep loyalties to the Supreme Leader. For them to support the letter, while withholding their names, may be a compromise position that suits both their political passivity and their fidelity to Khamanei.

A Turning Point in Iran: The Eclipse of the President

Iran Timeline: How the Supreme Leader Vanquished His President
The Latest from Iran (25 July): A President Retreats

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Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is now President of the Islamic Republic of Iran in little more than name. Last night's dramatic turn of events, with the First Vice President Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai "resigning", was the most public of humiliations for Ahmadinejad, even if many in the non-Iranian media were slow to figure out what had occurred.

We were saying as early as 16 June that the President was a relatively weak actor in the post-election play. His position was almost completely dependent on the Supreme Leader's decision to declare his electoral "victory", and after his far too-bold declaration of triumph over the "dust" of his opposition on 13-14 June, he quickly disappeared from the central stage. There were halting attempts to regain some authority,  such as a national television address and an appearance in Mashaad, but these turned from serious political drama into farce. (In retrospect, the moment when a Giant Mysterious Bug defeated Ahmadinejad during his TV speech may be the symbolic moment when the President was put in his place, although the YouTube video of Mahmoud and his Multi-Coloured Charts should not be missed, either.)

Many in the media, however, especially in the "West", relied upon the simple formula of Supreme Leader + President = Regime, thus missing the reality of Ahmadinejad's parlous situation. Thus, it was only yesterday, when many journalists belatedly noticed Ayatollah Khamenei's opposition to the Rahim-Mashai appointment, that the President's weakness was exposed. This was not just a case of a Supreme Leader slapdown; Ahmadinejad had alienated a large number of his political and religious supporters. "Conservative" politicians, members of parliaments, senior clerices, and even students in the Basiji movement were publicly insisting that the Vice President be dismissed as soon as possible.

So exit Stage Right, Mahmoud, for your loss is our gain. With the apparent resolution of this dispute within the regime, the battlefront again becomes the extent of the opposition's challenge to the regime. Does the Green Movement and powerful figures like Hashemi Rafsanjani concentrate on the continued pounding of Ahmadinejad into "dust" or do they go further, calling for institutional change to reduce the Presidency to near-vassal status? I doubt that will be the case (no least because one Hashemi Rafsanjani may still have Presidential ambitions, either for himself or a close ally, as does one Mir Hossein Mousavi).

So how do the opposition leaders re-position the Presidency in relation to the Supreme Leader? And will the activists in the Movement, both behind the scenes and on the street, accept the extent of the reform?

Put bluntly, will the weakening of the President now lead to the prospect of the weakening of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei?

Iran Timeline: How the Supreme Leader Vanquished His President

A Turning Point in Iran: The Eclipse of the President
The Latest from Iran (25 July): A President Retreats

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Your cut-out-and-keep guide to the final victory of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei over President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in the dispute over the appointment of First Vice President Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai:

1502 in Tehran (1032 GMT): Iranian Students News Agency posts Ayatollah Ahmad Khatami's address at Friday prayers in Tehran.

1745 Tehran (1315 GMT): Iranian press summarises Khatami address. Two sentences stand out: "I wish the President would accept the friendly criticisms of his friends. We consider this government to be legitimate and we support it, however it is our kindly and supportive concern for the president that leads us to request him to reconsider his decision."

2011 Tehran (1541 GMT): Khabar Online publishes a response form Ahmadinejad's Press Secretary, Ali Akbar Javanfekr, denying that the Supreme Leader has given the President a directive ordering the dismissal of the First Vice President:

Mr Ahmadinejad is a strong arm of the Supreme Leader for serving the higher ideals of the people and the establishment, however some individuals are attempting to break this useful and competent arm. Amongst those who are against Mashai's installment, there are individuals for whom Mashai is irrelevant and their goal is to break the will of the President. Experience has proven that the president and Mr. Ahmadinejad's government defer to the supreme leader and if the Supreme Leader sends a directive we will obviously obey.

Is it the job of the Deputy Speaker of Parliament or the Speaker of Friday Prayers to deliver these directives to the President?....Whenever the Supreme Leader wishes to make his opinion known he announces it personally or he sends a directive missive from his office....If the Supreme Leader has this opinion, the problem will be resolved by consultations.

2041 Tehran (1611 GMT): The official text of Khamenei's order, written five days earlier, to Ahmadinejad is published in Fars News. Publication follows in Tabnak ( 2050). Khabar Online (2113), and Etemade Melli (2210).

The publication of the statement sends the message to the President: You are dishonest, as it has been five days since you received this order.

Midnight Tehran (1930 GMT): A reader sends Enduring America an urgent e-mail. Fars News is reporting the statement of Ahmadinejad's senior assistant: Rahim-Mashai has resigned as First Vice President.

Iran: How the "New Media" Tore Down the Gates of the "Mainstream"

The Latest from Iran (24 July): Waiting for the Next Move

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This afternoon, the headlines have blared out about a sudden crisis within the Iranian regime: CNN "Iran's supreme leader tells Ahmadinejad to dump deputy"; Reuters "Iran supreme leader wants vice president sacked"; BBC English "Iranian leader 'orders dismissal'". All the reports accurately summarise the story, in line with our updates today, that the Supreme Leader has sent a letter to President Ahmadinejad demanding the removal of the First Vice President Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai.

There's only one catch: all these news outlets are reporting about an event that took place on Tuesday. From our update at 1600 GMT that day:

According to Parleman News, the Supreme Leader ordered President Ahmadinejad to remove his choice as Vice President, Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai, who is also the father of Ahmadinejad’s daughter-in-law: “Without any delay, the dismissal order or Mashaei’s resignation must be announced by the President.”

OK, but what's the big deal? Better late than never to the story, right?

Well, from a political point of view, the problem with the sudden appearance of the stories is that they give a simple portrayal of a sudden dispute between Ayatollah Khamenei and the President. The true story is that the letter was sent to Ahmadinejad privately but that sources with an interest in the battle quickly leaked the news to Iranian newspapers. For the rest of Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday, as we've been noting on EA, there has been manoeuvring and clashing between the Supreme Leader's camp, the President's supporters, and other "conservative" factions. The significance of today is that Khamenei has raised the stakes once more by allowing the letter to go public.

None of that context, and thus analysis, is possible with the "out of the blue" narrative of the mainstream media. For example, none of the stories note that Ahmadinejad threw Khamenei's letter back at the Supreme Leader later on Tuesday, with the President declaring that he was standing by Rahim-Mashai. Whereas CNN, BBC, etc. are at the starting gate on this story, the actual dispute is already halfway around the track.

From a media point of view, the lesson seems to go beyond the stories EA has been running about the place of "new media" in this crisis and those to come. This is no longer a question of who is more reliable because the mainstream media aren't necessarily even in the competition.

In this case, the mainstream media only "found" the story when one of the news services (I suspect, though am not sure, that it was Reuters) lifted the news from Iranian state television and news agencies. Of course, none of the mainstream outlets have correspondents in Iran, given the Government's restrictions, but --- more importantly in this case --- it appears that none of them have reporters reading the Iranian press, much of which is not run by State agencies but is linked to political factions. The story on Parleman News apparently never made it on the radar of CNN, BBC, etc. (What's more, it appears that the mainstream outlets are not even keeping an eye on English-language websites covering Iran. The Parleman News report showed up quickly on the site of the National Iranian American Council.)

In contrast, "new media" like Enduring America or the "Green Brief" of Anonymous Iran, as well as bloggers like Nico Pitney at The Huffington Post, rely upon a web of sources who have sent in or analysed material from across not only the Iranian press but regional media and websites. The point about Twitter and other devices such as Google Reader, from my perspective, is that has made this web possible. Whereas the hardest-working journalist might be able to monitor only a handful of sources even a few years ago, now dozens quickly come into play. Thus the disadvantage for most of the new media  --- namely that we don't have any money for full-time staff --- becomes a marked advantage: we don't have to rely on a Reuters to put out the story before we'll write and publish.

This is no longer a matter of "to Twitter or not to Twitter". The mainstream news services are no longer the gatekeepers of the stories because they are not at the gates. The sharpest, up-to-date coverage is coming from a new network of citizen journalists, activists, and even readers who are quick to pass on important breaking stories. It is that network that has presented the post-election Iran crisis as a continuing story, with ripples and fluctuations, rather than the mainstream media's sudden ups and downs of "the Green Movement is here"; "the Green Movement is dead"; "the Green Movement is back". And, now that the story is no longer of the Government v. the Movement but of tensions and shifts within the Government and regime, it is that network that will be the daily port of call to find out what is happening and what may happen.

Because when the gates are down, the view is less, not more, restricted.

Iran: A Clerical Front Against the Supreme Leader?

Iran: Your Easy-to-Use Ayatollah Scorecard
The Latest from Iran (24 July): Waiting for the Next Move

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The Arabic-language newspaper Asharq al-Awsat is reporting today, based on statements from "a prominent member of the reformist party" that there is now a co-ordinated move amongst leading clerics against not only the Government but also the authority of the Supreme Leader.

The source claims, "The Grand Ayatollahs of Iran, such as Ayatollahs Sanei, Bayat-Zanjani, Montazeri and Javadi-Amoli, as well as other high-ranking clerics such as Ayatollah Rafsanjani, Seyed Mohammad Khatami, and Mehdi Karroubi and "businessmen, intellectuals, and eminent thinkers", have started a new movement. The goal of this movement is not limited to questioning the legality of this recent election and condemning the recent violence that the government has commited upon the protesters, but aims to question the legality of Khamenei's position as the supreme leader, thereby neutralizing him."

The confidential source also asserts that Mohammad Khatami's suggestion of a referendum on the post-election legitimacy of the Government must have the tacit support of these Grand Ayatollahs. The reformist activist adds, "In recent days the political activities of these individuals has undergone a major increase."

There are numerous reasons for caution with this story. It is based on a single confidential source, making verification almost impossible. Much of the Arabic-language media is hostile to the Iranian Government. (The English-language version of Asharq al-Awsat does not carry the story, although it has written about "a fight for power within the ruling religious establishment itself".) On the substance of the story, the protest of individual clerics over the Government's conduct is far different from the more substantial step of forging an activist front, and a challenge to Ayatollah Khameini is far beyond fatwas criticising the President. And, even if the story is true, the question remains whether the group of ayatollahs named can gather more support from bodies like the Assembly of Experts, given that pro-Government clerics such as Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi and Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi can still put out statements of support for Khamenei (and denunciation of Rafsanjani) in the Assembly's name.

Still, the Grand Ayatollahs listed have come out in support of the demonstrations (Javadi-Amoli has been listed by other reliable outlets as "relatively neutral", but our own information indicates he is critical of the Government --- see "Easy-to-Use Ayatollah Scorecard"). It is not only a case of the longer that this crisis goes on, the more scope there is for higher-profile protest; recent steps such as the argument over the appointment of the First Vice President, Rahim-Mashai, and the lack of flexibility in the Supreme Leader's statements offer a foundation for further challenges.

I wouldn't go as far as Asharq al-Awsat to frame this as a challenge to the "legality" of Ayatollah Khamenei, but he may soon be facing the choice of distancing himself from the President (and accepting at least limited "reform) or of preparing himself for the biggest fight of his 20 years as Supreme Leader.