Beyond the Election: Talking Turkey to Iran?

The Latest from Iran (14 July): Ripples on the Surface

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Colette Mazzucelli, who has written for Enduring America and our partner website Libertas, has a challenging article (co-written with Sebnam Udum) in Atlantic Community on the next steps regarding Tehran in the international community: "UN Security Council members and Germany must turn to Turkey to successfully negotiate with Iran."

Why the West Should Talk Turkey with Iran

As Presidents Obama and Medvedev met in Moscow to agree in reductions on their strategic nuclear arsenal, events inside Iran continued to evolve. An increasing segment of the Iranian population worries about the disappearance of "semi-democracy" in favor of totalitarian rule. Influential clerics have indicated their lack of support for the results of the June 12 elections, which led to a second term for the incumbent, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

In the weeks after the election, cell phone images and Twitter accounts of a brutal government crackdown on the reform movement were uploaded to the Internet. Billions of people around the world continue to witness a regime, and the authority of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, losing the legitimacy established with the Islamic Revolution three decades ago.

It is too soon to know the ultimate outcome of these events, which may take years to play out in domestic politics. The transatlantic allies must remain proactive in nuclear diplomacy within the P5+1. There must be a readiness to engage Iran with a unified negotiating line should the leadership in Tehran decide to respond to the package on the table. President Obama is prudent to expect a signal from the Iranians by September as to their interest, or lack thereof, for serious engagement. Iran shows no sign of halting its nuclear aspirations as time passes.

Even though the ball is now in Iran's court, the transatlantic allies should not play a waiting game. There is much work to do particularly in the bilateral talks US diplomats conduct with Russia and China. The Obama Administration's seriousness about non-proliferation with the Russians demonstrates leadership by the power of example. E3 diplomacy with Russian and Chinese counterparts must also aim to unify negotiating positions vis-à-vis Iran. This is complicated during an election year for the Germans, who have significant economic relations with Iran. The accent must be on a package that highlights Iran's inherent right to a civilian nuclear program with a nuclear-fuel-cycle capability of its own under intensive International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) control and verification.

There is another player to which the transatlantic allies must now increasingly turn in the overall relationship with Iran after the events of June 12: Turkey. The absence of conflict between Iran and Turkey is due to the rough strategic balance between the two countries despite mutual threat perceptions from their respective political regimes. Turkey is concerned about Iran's missile and nuclear programs. The Turkish leadership defines threat as a combination of motivations and capabilities, which is why maintaining good neighborly relations with Tehran is important for Ankara.

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Iran: Rebellion of the Clerics? Not So Fast

The Latest from Iran (10 July): What Next?

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One area of the Iranian post-election crisis that we've been watching carefully is the possibility of clerical opposition to the regime. On the one hand, we're wary of stories --- such as the wayward New York Times article last Sunday --- that portray a rebellion of the clerics. On the other, we do think the opposition of some ayatollahs may have some significance, especially if that intersects with other political moves against the current leadership.

Mehdi Khalaji of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, in contrast, dismisses the notion of a clerical challenge, at least for now:

While a handful of marginal clerics and religious groups dispute the official result of Iran’s recent presidential election, the Shiite clerical establishment as a whole currently supports Iran’s top leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Although this support has been demonstrated through silence, the fact that most Shiite clerics have not intervened in the public debate over the election or the government’s use of force against protesters has been particularly effective in strengthening Khamenei’s position.

The Establishment

Iran’s clerical establishment consists of about 200,000 members, and its hierarchy includes many midlevel clerics called hojjat ol-eslam (”proof of Islam”) and around a thousand ayatollahs (”sign of God”), who are leaders recognized for their scholarship. Ranking above ayatollahs are roughly fifteen grand ayatollahs, who are revered as sources of emulation, or as religious guides, for many followers.
Khamenei was a mere hojjat ol-eslam when he was elevated to the rank of ayatollah, in a controversial move aimed at making him constitutionally fit to succeed Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic, as Iran’s principal leader. Khamenei’s authority stems from the principal of velayat-e faqih (guardianship of the jurist), which combines political and religious power into one supreme authority.


Dissent Only from the Margins

The ayatollahs in Qom and Isfahan who have criticized the recent presidential election are isolated, with no significant role in the clerical establishment; they lack both financial resources and religious popularity. Although these ayatollahs held key political and juridical positions during the first decades of the Islamic Republic, they were sidelined first by Khomeini and then later by Khamenei.

A small marginal group, the Association of Researchers and Teachers of Qom Seminary, is the only clerical group that has explicitly referred to the presidential election as illegitimate. The association was founded in 1998, and its central council consists of eighteen midranking clerics and one ayatollah. This group plays no role in the administration of the clerical establishment, and none of its members are considered to be sources of emulation. The association was originally created to support former president Muhammad Khatami, but its support has remained symbolic rather than practical. The group’s secretary, the controversial Seyyed Hossein Moussavi Tabrizi, was involved in the execution of many of the regime’s opponents and political prisoners while he was the general prosecutor of the Revolutionary Court during the first decade of Islamic Republic,


Coopting the Clerical Establishment

Iran’s current clerical establishment has little similarity to what it was prior to 1979 Islamic Revolution. Historically, the clerical class was a semiautonomous political institution with independent financial resources from religious taxes collected directly from followers. But after the revolution, and especially since Khamenei became leader twenty years ago, the establishment became totally dependent on the government’s financial resources, social authority, networking, organization, and political status. Iran’s leader is not only the head of the judiciary, intelligence services, and the armed forces, he is also the head of Iran’s Shiite clerics.

Clerics receive hefty regular stipends from the government, and many ayatollahs have exclusive privileges for numerous profit-making transactions. The government has modernized and bureaucratized the clerical establishment by creating the Center for Seminary Management, which is under direct supervision of Khamenei and is in full control of clerical finances, the seminary’s educational system, and the political direction of the establishment. Even Iraq’s Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, along with other influential Shiite leaders, allegedly runs his offices within the framework of the Center.

To control clerics politically, the government created the Special Court of Clerics — an organization that works outside the judiciary branch of government and is headed by an appointee of Khamenei — to deal with dissenting clerics. This independent court does not operate within the country’s legal system; it has own set of procedures and maintains its own prisons in most Iranian cities.

Politically defiant clerics who oppose certain government decisions work outside the clerical establishment and usually have a track record of supporting Iran’s reform movement. Although several prominent reformist figures, such as former president Muhammad Khatami and former speaker of the Iranian parliament Mehdi Karrubi, are clerics, their words and actions have little or no impact on the clerical establishment and pose no threat of causing political splits.

Conclusion

The Shiite clerical establishment, which stretches across the Middle East, is highly unlikely to initiate any sort of opposition to Khamenei’s authority. Various Shiite leaders may not be happy with the Iranian government’s policies, but publicizing their differences might jeopardize the social, political, and financial advantages they now receive from Iran. For example, during his Friday sermon immediately after the Iranian election, Seyyed Mohammad Hossein Fazlallah, a prominent Shiite ayatollah in Lebanon, stated his support for the government’s official result and voiced his admiration of the Iranian people for their participation in the election. In Iraq, al-Sistani kept silent about the election result and has not reacted to the postelection crisis. Both ayatollahs have offices in Qom and benefit from the support of the Iranian government.
Inside Iran, support for Khamenei, although mostly silent, is also evident. Morteza Moqtadai, the head of Center for Seminary Management, announced that the election result was approved by “God and the Hidden Imam,” and stated that Khamenei’s words are the “Hidden Imam’s words; when he says there was no manipulation in the election, he should be heard as the ultimate arbiter.”
Khamenei — for the moment — is in a strong position. The clerical establishment’s prevailing silence, however, could eventually work against him. If the political tide begins to turn, the establishment could be rendered powerless and its support ineffective, leaving Khamenei and his followers in a vulnerable position.

The Latest from Iran (18 Tir/9 July): Day of Reckoning?

The Latest from Iran (10 July): What Next?

LATEST Video: The 18 Tir Protests (9 July)
The Latest from Iran (8 July): The Day Before….?
Iran: A Counter-coup against the Supreme Leader’s Son Mojtaba?
Iran: Human Rights Watch Statement on Abuse of Detainees

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1945 GMT: Thanks to Fintan Dunne: my interview with him (summarised at 1910 GMT) is now on-line.

1935 GMT: Tehran Bureau reports on an attack by security forces on the dormitories at Amir Kabir University.

1910 GMT: Earlier this evening, I chatted with Fintan Dunne about the day's events and their political significance. He'll be posting the audio on his blog later, but a couple of points that stood out for me:

1. If a "victory" had to be declared, it went to the opposition challenge. Despite all the Government detentions, threats, and disruptions of communications, thousands (and, while exact numbers cannot be determined, it appears from reports and video footages to be thousands rather than hundreds) gathered at locations across Tehran. The weeks of pressure had not broken the protests.

There were "bonuses" for the opposition as well in a reduction in violence by security forces (for whatever reason), which bolstered confidence amongst demonstrators as the day developed, the lack of any indication that the protesters were sponsored by "foreign enemies", and the first significant video footage in weeks to come out of Tehran. And, while one has to be cautious in generalising from the audio on that footage, there were bold chants of "Ya Hossein, Mir Hossein" and criticism of the Supreme Leader's son, Mojtaba Khamenei.

2. That, however, is only part of the story. There are two halves to the challenge: the public protest and the manoeuvres of the political leadership. So far Mir Hossein Mousavi, Mehdi Karroubi, and Mohammad Khatami have not followed up the marches with statements and indications of next steps.

3. And what of the political manoeuvres within the regime? Already attention moves from today to tomorrow. The issue at Friday prayers at the University of Tehran is not only who will be leading them but who will not. Has former President Hashemi Rafsanjani declined and does that mark, in addition to this week's criticism of the government as "illegitimate" by a political party linked to him, his challenge to President Ahmadinejad and pressure for changes in the Iranian system?

1900 GMT: This, word for word, is Press TV English's current summary of today's demonstrations in their "News in Brief", under the headline "No Major Protests in Tehran": "

A few hundred demonstrators have gathered on the sidewalks in the streets leading to Tehran University. Police used tear gas in one locality to disperse the crowd. Security has been tight in the streets of downtown Tehran Thursday but onlookers did gather to watch the demonstrations.

The website summary puts out a similar line.
1840 GMT: Reports that "Allahu Akhbars" (God is Great) are ringing out from Tehran rooftops.

1730 GMT: CNN's website offers a summary of the account of Iason Athanasiadis, the Anglo-Greek journalist detained for three weeks in Iran.

1710 GMT: The pattern of demonstrations reported earlier (1345 GMT) appears to have continued throughout day. Rather than one large demonstration, there were a series of gatherings --- either by design or in reaction to the security forces' preventing a mass grouping --- throughout Tehran. The reports of clashes, including alleged use of tear gas and gunfire to disperse crowds, are still sketchy. It is also unclear how much activity there was outside Tehran.

1700 GMT: Just going through latest reports and posting latest claimed video of today's demonstrations. Meanwhile, Tehran Bureau, Fintan Dunne, and Nico Pitney at Huffington Post offer useful updates.

1500 GMT: Cellphone reception now blocked in central Tehran.

1445 GMT: Reports of demonstrations at Vanak Square, Vali-e Asr Square, Ferdosi, Tehran University, and Polytechnic University.

1430 GMT: Amidst the news of the demonstrations, it should be noted that Mohammad Ali Dadkhah, a human rights lawyers and founder of Nobel Peace Prize laureate Shirin Ebadi's human rights group, has been arrested.

1345 GMT: There are general reports from various sources of security forces "beating" protesters. Unconfirmed reports of use of tear gas and gunshots at Enqelab and/or Vanak Square. Clashes at Karegar Shomali Street nearr Enqelab Square.

It is not possible at this point to measure both the size of the demonstrations and the scale of the violence. Some "mainstream" media are rushing out the story that "only 250" people have gathered. That appears to be a limited, if not wholly inaccurate, view. What appears to be happening, instead, is that groups of people are meeting at different locations (latest report is several hundred in front of the Polytechnic in Tehran).

1315 GMT: Latest Situation. Reports of Army units replacing police at key points such as Enqelab Square. The square is not completely closed, but police are trying to identify "key" protesters. Also people gathering at Vanak Square. A Revolutionary Guard unit has been placed in front of the Interior Ministry.

Unconfirmed reports of protests in Shiraz, Isfahan, Ahwaz, Babol, Kerman, Mashaad, and Sari.

1145 GMT: It is now after 4 p.m. local time in Iran. Reports:

There is a "heavy presence of security forces at Enqelab Square", with military helicopters flying over Enqelab Square, Azadi Square, and Laleh Park. Main entrances to Tehran University have been blocked. Phone service has been disrupted.

Meanwhile, Iraq's Government says US military officials have transferred to Iraqi custody five Iranians held since March 2007 in an American raid in Kirkuk in northern Iraq.

0815 GMT: A Kind and Gentle Reminder to Those Who Might Protest. Morteza Tamedon, the Governor of Tehran (not to be confused with the Mayor, Mohammad-Baqer Qalibaf), has told the Islamic Republic News Agency, "No permission for a gathering or march has been requested or issued. But if some people make moves that are contrary to security initiatives under the influence of anti-revolutionary networks, they will be trampled under the feet of our alert people."

0615 GMT: Battle of the Broadcasters. No significiant news yet from Tehran. Meanwhile, Press TV English sets out its strategy: don't mention any demonstrations but do mention Western interference, using the misleading and outdated claim that the US Government has authorised "hundreds of millions of dollars" for regime change (the reality under the Obama Administration is far less dramatic) and highlighting the claim that the US is supporting the insurgent group Jundallah (probably true in the past, but of little relevance to the post-election events).

CNN counters by raising the question of a split amongst the clerics and giving a brief historical perspective through the 18 Tir demonstrations of 1999.

Another big clue to the US-centred view of Iran comes in the online newspaper, The Daily Beast, which highlights an interview by Reza Aslan (one of the most prominent US-based commentators on Iranian affairs) of Ahmad Batebi, the student activist whose picture became an icon of the 1999 demonstrations.

0530 GMT: Today is the day that may continue or close "Phase 1" of the post-election conflict in Iran. For more than a week, opposition efforts have pointed towards mass marches on 18 Tir, the date in the Iranian calendar, which is the 10th anniversary of student-led demonstrations that called for reform and were suppressed violently. Josh Shahryar's "Green Brief" summarises, "Cities confirmed to protest include: Ahvaz, Arak, Adrabil, Bandar Abbas, Birjand, Bojnurd, Bushehr, Esfehan, Ghazvin, Ghom, Gorgan, Hamedan, Ilam, Kerman, Kermanshah, Khorramabad, Mashhad, Rasht, Sanandaj, Sari, Semnan, Shahrekord, Shiraz, Tabriz, Urmieh, Yasuj, Yazd, Zahedan and Zanjan."

If the marches take place, despite all the Government efforts to block them through detentions, limits on communications, and open threats, then the public protest over the 12 June Presidential election continues. If they fizzle out into scattered gatherings with no cohesive centre, then the regime will have succeeded in its immediate effort to curb the challenge not only to President Ahmadinejad but to the  Iranian system of politics and governance.

Yet, even if the demonstrations are limited, the "Phase 1" analysis remains. Those opposed to the election of President Ahmadinejad and to a system that has suppressed dissent have promised that they will maintain their resistance through general, often symbolic, action. Equally important, inside the system, there have been politicians and clerics who have been unsettled by the developments. Added to those who were already challenging the Presidency and even (though often in a limited way) the Supreme Leader, that disquiet points to continued manoeuvres for power.

Those manoeuvres are now cloaked in uncertainty and rumour. Later today, we'll update our entry on the resistance allegedly provoked by the role of the Supreme Leader's son Mojtaba in events on and after 12 June (put bluntly, we think The Guardian of London story, based on a single source, that summarised a serious challenge is exaggerated and came via "Western" channels rather than directly from Tehran). We'll also be looking carefully at the claim that former President Hashemi Rafsanjani is refusing to lead Friday prayers. And we're reading through a lengthy, challenging analysis that claims the idea of a clerical opposition to the post-election conduct of the regime has been exaggerated --- we'll post the analysis and our thoughts later this morning.

UPDATED Iran: A Counter-coup against the Supreme Leader's Son Mojtaba?

The Latest from Iran (8 July): The Day Before….?

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UPDATE (9 JULY, 1200 GMT): After double-checking and reflecting on details, my opinion is that The Guardian story is an exaggeration of the tensions within the Iranian system. It is wrong in both factual details, such as Ali Larijani's position and that of Revolutionary Guard commander Jafari, but also in the general portrayal of a sweeping move against the Supreme Leader through the anger over Mojtaba Khameini.

But there is an important curiosity about the way this story appeared. Julian Borger is an excellent reporter and now Diplomatic Editor for The Guardian, but to my knowledge he has little experience in the Middle East and Iran. Robert Tait has been the long-time Tehran correspondent for the newspaper, and Ian Black, who has been the Middle Eastern correspondent, has filed recent stories. In contrast, Borger has generally been based in the US and Europe.

So how does a high-ranking Iranian politician come to Borger with the story? I suspect that there is a Western "broker" here, in other words, a Government or private institution (probably American or British) who knew of this Iranian politician's views and put him in contact with Borger or vice-versa.

That does not mean that The Guardian, Julian Borger, and the Iranian politician are just "puppets" of Western intrigue. Instead, it's a case of how very real internal tensions in Iran make their way out as "news".

So who is the source? The answer to that would tell you how serious this tale of a "counter-coup" could be.

On Wednesday afternoon, the website of The Guardian of London posts a story, based on “a politician with strong connections to the security apparatus”, publicising what has been discussed amongst Iranian activists for weeks: the Supreme Leader’s son, Mojtaba Khamenei (pictured), is now in charge of Iran’s paramilitary Basiji.

That, however, is only the beginning of the story. The Iranian source adds that victory over the protest — both on the streets and behind the scenes — has not been achieved, “This game has not finished. The game has only just started.”

Indeed, according to the politician, we may now be witnessing the counter-move against an election night seizure of power led by the Supreme Leader's son:

Mojtaba is the commander of this coup d'etat. The basiji are operating on Mojtaba's orders, but his name is always hidden in all of this. The government never mentions him. Everyone is angry about this. The maraji [Iran's most senior ayatollahs] and the clerics are angry, the conservatives are very angry and strongly critical of Mojtaba. This situation cannot continue with so many people on the top against it.

The source portrays a situation where, in part because of the anger against Mojtaba, the Supreme Leader can rely on only a minority of senior clerics, politicians like Ali Larijani, Mayor of Tehran Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, and Presidential candidate Mohsen Rezaei have been alienated, and key commanders of the Revolutionary Guard such as General Ali Jafari have been angered.

It must be emphasised that this is a single-source story. There are elements which are shaky: for example, General Jafari has swung behind the regime's crackdown on dissent. The extent of political opposition within the regime also seems exaggerated. Larijani, for one, appears to be sitting on the fence.

Still, there is much here which corresponds with our own sources on divisions in the clerical and political leadership. Definitely a story, if not the story, to watch in forthcoming days.

Iran: Human Rights Watch Statement on Abuse of Detainees

The Latest from Iran (8 July): The Day Before….?

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Reprint of the original report on the Human Rights Watch website:

8 July 2009

(New York) - The Iranian authorities are using prolonged harsh interrogations, beatings, sleep deprivation, and threats of torture to extract false confessions from detainees arrested since the disputed June 12 presidential election, Human Rights Watch said today. The confessions appear designed to support unsubstantiated allegations by senior government officials that Iran's post-election protests, in which at least 20 people were killed, were supported by foreign powers and aimed at overthrowing the government.

"The Iranian government is desperate to justify its vicious attacks on peaceful protesters," said Sarah Leah Whitson, Middle East and North Africa director at Human Rights Watch. "What better excuse does it need than confessions of foreign plots, beaten out of detainees?"

Human Rights Watch has collected accounts from detainees after their release illustrating how the authorities are mistreating and threatening prisoners in a deliberate effort to obtain false confessions.

A 17-year-old boy who was arrested on June 27 and released on July 1 told Human Rights Watch how his prison interrogator forced him and others to sign a blank statement of confession:

"On the first day, while blindfolded, the interrogator took me to a parking garage. They kept everyone standing for 48 hours with no permission to sleep. On the first night, they tied up our hands and repeatedly beat us and other prisoners with a baton. They kept cursing at the prisoners. The atmosphere was very frightening. Everyone had wet themselves from fear and stress. There were children as young as 15 and men as old as 70; they'd be begging and crying for mercy, but the guards didn't care.

"After two days of interrogation while blindfolded, we were asked about everything: where we had studied, what our parents do, who we voted for, who is educated in the family, if anyone in our family is part of the military. We were forced to give the names of everyone. It was a scary situation because they were threatening us and were very harsh. All we could hear were other people crying and screaming.

"They provided us with a big piece of bread once, but no water. On the last day, they took away the blindfold to force us sign a paper that was blank on top but said at the bottom: ‘I agree with all of the above statements.'"

Senior Iranian officials have said that detainees have confessed to their involvement in a foreign-backed plot to overthrow the government with a "velvet" revolution. Mojtaba Zolnour, the representative of the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in the Revolutionary Guard Corps, said on July 2 that all the prominent detainees except one had now confessed. During his July 3 Friday prayer sermon, Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, a high-ranking member of the Guardian Council, said that the government would make public some of the confessions obtained from detainees.

State-backed media already have broadcast the confessions of some detainees. Amir Hossein Mahdavi, editor of reformist newspaper Andishe No, confessed on Iranian TV on June 27 that reformist groups had laid plans to create unrest before the June 12 elections. Friends of Mahdavi who saw his confession told Human Rights Watch that it was clear from his demeanor that he confessed under duress.

Among the detainees who were recently forced to appear on Iranian television is Newsweek's correspondent in Iran, Maziar Bahari. He was detained on June 21 and is believed to be held in Tehran's Evin prison, where Human Rights Watch has documented cases of torture and detainee abuse in previous years. He has not been allowed to see a lawyer or his elderly mother, with whom he lives. No charges have been filed against Bahari, who holds dual Iranian and Canadian citizenship.

On June 30, the semi-official Fars news agency reported that Bahari had given a press conference where he denounced efforts of Western media to stage an uprising in Iran similar to the 1989 Czechoslovak "Velvet Revolution," and confessed to a role in covering these "illegal demonstrations." Newsweek has strongly defended Bahari's innocence and called for him to be released immediately.

Vajiheh Marsousi, the wife of dissident intellectual Saeed Hajjarian, whom authorities arrested on June 15, believes that he is under intense pressure to sign a false confession. After visiting him in Evin prison, she believes that his life is in danger due to his poor health and lack of medical care in prison.

Information about the abuse of Iranian detainees in custody continues to filter in. An eyewitness who visited the Revolutionary Court on July 1 told Human Rights Watch:

"Hundreds of the prisoners' families were gathered in front of the entrance of the court. On the court's wall, a piece of paper listed the names of 1,349 prisoners. This was a list of people that the court would be soon releasing. There was also a separate sheet with another 223 names. It said that the authorities were still investigating the people on this list and that their families should come back in a couple of weeks. In the few hours that I spent before outside the court, I witnessed a number of people being released. Almost all of them had bruised faces and hands. Some of the families, after seeing their sons/daughters in such bad condition, started to cry, while other families claimed their sons or daughters were missing and their names were not listed."

The authorities have arrested thousands of people in a nationwide crackdown aimed at ending mass street protests that started in Tehran and other cities on June 13 after the official results of the June 12 elections gave incumbent President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad a landslide victory. Although authorities subsequently released many of those detained, they have continued to make new arrests. Human Rights Watch has collected the names of 450 persons whom security forces have arrested since June 13, including more than a hundred political figures, journalists, human rights defenders, academics, and lawyers.

Most of the best-known detainees have now been held incommunicado for up to three weeks without access to lawyers or family members, raising serious concerns about the probability of mistreatment and pressure to make false confessions.

In the past, the Iranian government has frequently subjected political prisoners to various forms of pressure, including beatings, sleep deprivation, solitary confinement, torture, and threats of torture in an effort to force them to make confessions that they have then publicized in order to criminalize and discredit government critics.

Because of this past record of abuse, relatives, friends, and professional associates of several prominent detainees contacted by Human Rights Watch raised concerns about their probable mistreatment in detention and the likelihood that they would be forced to make false confessions.

International human rights law clearly protects detainees from mistreatment, including forced "confessions." Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which Iran is a party, states that every person charged with a criminal offense has the right "to communicate with counsel of his own choosing," and "not to be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt." Principle 21 of the UN Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment states that, "No detained person while being interrogated shall be subject to violence, threats or methods of interrogation which impair his capacity of decision or judgment." A fundamental rule of international human rights law is that all evidence, including confessions, obtained by torture or other ill-treatment must be excluded.