Iran and the Clerics: Who are the "Association of Researchers and Teachers of Qom"?

UPDATED Iran: Solving the Mystery of The “Association of Researchers and Teachers of Qom”

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A confession. After several hours, we were still not certain of the significance of yesterday's statement by the Association of Teachers and Researchers of Qom, who declared that the Government was "illegitimate". Our initial thought was that the group was just one of a number of clerical factions, in this case a "reformist" faction such as the Assocation of Combatant Clerics linked to former President Khatami. We were not sure who the members were or what relationship they had to prominent critics of the Government such as Ayatollah Montazeri, Ayatollah Sane'i, or Ayatollah Taheri.

The Association's statement was elevated, however, by today's headline treatment in The New York Times, which declared that the Association was "the most important group of religious leaders in Iran". The statement was a "significant, if so far symbolic, setback for the government". There was a general statement from Stanford academic Abbas Milani and the assertion that the association was "formed under the leadership of the revolution’s founder, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Then "an Iranian political analyst who spoke on condition of anonymity because of fear of reprisal" declared, “The significance is that even within the clergy, there are many who refuse to recognize the legitimacy of the election results as announced by the supreme leader."

The problem with The Times' declaration was that it was based on little more than the minimal information behind our initial assessment. In other words, while there are signs of a substantial debate amongst the clergy not only about the specifics of the election but about the structure and systems of the Islamic Republic (a debate we've been highlighting as important for several days), there was nothing behind the spectre of the "Association".

Internet "chatter" today has offered few details on the group. The discussion area "Anonymous Iran", which features the excellent Josh Shahryar and his "Green Brief", has reached a dead end. So an Enduring America colleague did a bit of digging and came up with the following:

I have not found anything to suggest that this is the most important clerical group in Qom. I would say with reasonable confidence that it is not. This wiki site talks about "Society of Scholars and Teachers of Qom's Hawza":

"[Ayatollah Mohammad Va'ez] Abaee-Khorasani moved to Qom again [in 1997] as the head of Mohammad Khatami's presidential campaign office. The Qom campaign led to about 70% of the people of city voting for the reformist Khatami, which was unbelievable because of the supposedly conservative leanings of the citizens of the city. The local campaign team later became the founding members of Society of Scholars and Teachers of Qom's Hawza (majma'-e mohaghgheghin va modarresin-e howze-ye elmiyye-ye ghom), the political organization of reformist clerics of the city."

A very tentative conclusion? The Association's statement should not be dismissed. While the names and influence of those behind it are unclear, it is an indication of the complex but important manoeuvres linking politics and religion in Iran. And because those issues are complex, they should not be exaggerated and simplified in misleading headlines such as the one offered by The New York Times today.

Iran: The Post-Election Challenge from Qom's Clerics

Iran: The “Ghaffari Tape” Criticising the Supreme Leader
The Latest from Iran (1 July): The Opposition Regroups

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In the furour over the Presidential election, the most intriguing political contest may have taken place, behind the street scenes, in Iran's religious centre, south of Tehran in the dusty city of Qom.

Within 72 hours of the 12 June vote, the clerics of Qom's seminaries had taken their place on the political stage. Former President Hashemi Rafsanjani tried to mobilise them for a public challenge to President Ahmadinejad's victory. That initial attempt failed; indeed it is a key reasons why Rafsanjani then kept a careful silence before an equally careful, "balanced" return to public life with his speech last Sunday. There would be no mass movement of the religious leadership behind any campaign. Instead, factions already aligned to particular political movements would reassert their positions. The Association of Combatant Clerics would ally itself with the efforts of former President Mohammad Khatami and, thus, Mir Hossein Mousavi; Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, prominent on the Guardian Council, would bolster Ahmadinejad's position.

As the public demonstrations against the election swell, some Western media noted the possible significance of Qom, indeed over-dramatising a possible "split" in the Iranian system; conversely, as the public challenge has been contained, notions of a clerical challenge receded. That, too, is a mistake: the debate not only over the election but over the guardianship of Iran's Islamic Revolution continues.

While there still has been no significant show of support for the President (note Press TV's slightly strained attempt this morning, via an interview with a clerical member of Parliament, to say, "No one is talking about the election anymore), opposition has emerged in scattered but sometimes dramatic ways. The criticism of Ayatollah Montazeri, the one-time successor to Ayatollah Khomeini, was to be expected; the current regime, led by Montazeri's replacement, Ayatollah Ali Khameini, still keeps the cleric under house arrest. He is not alone, however. Ayatollah Bayat-Zanjani has claimed that the Iranian system is moving away from Khomeini's path and thoughts. Ayatollam Mousavi-Ardebili has criticised violence against the protestors and said recent events have weakened Iran's political and religious institutions. Ayatollah Javadi-Amoli has expressed displeasure. Ayatollah Makarem-Shirazi and Ayatollah Sane’i have made gentler interventions, and Ayatollah Haeri-Shirazi has written a careful but still challenging letter to the Supreme Leader. There are reports of "secret" meetings between Ayatollahs to consider developments and longer-term prospects.

The most dramatic challenge has come in a statement by Ayatollah Hadi Ghaffari on Ayatollah Khamenei. The leaked
audio on YouTube has created a stir with Ghaffari's criticism of the Supreme Leader's post-election conduct: Khamenei has ruined the honour of clerics with his handling of the political situation. (First reports said that Ghaffari had gone as far as to insult Khamenei as a "corpse-washer".) The ideals of Ayatollah Khomeini and the Islamic Revolution are not being defended but destroyed.

None of this points to a Qom-led coup against President Ahmadinejad and, more importantly, Khamenei. On the other hand, these concerns are part of a much wider, more significant story of years past and years to come.

The Western caricature of Iran is that of a "theocracy" in which the "mullahs" hold power, working with secular politicians. That misconception misses the reality that a large section of Iran's clerical establishment are no friends of Ahmadinejad, whose policies and pronouncements have been seen as a challenge to the Iran envisaged by Ayatollah Khomeini. Indeed, it is not even accurate to speak on a unified clerical movement behind the Supreme Leader, whose selection in 1989 was a surprise to many --- given his relative junior status --- and has been seen as a triumph of politicians (ironically, given recent events, as part of manoeuvres by Hashemi Rafsanjani for authority) rather than a religious succession.

No surprise then that another video has supposedly resurfaced, this one of Ayatollah Montazeri considering the Iranian system of clerical authority, Velayat-e-Faqih, as he criticises Ayatollah Khameini. The text is clear: religion's true and proper place in the growth of the Islamic Republic has become "politicised" and thus corrupted.

And that is why the Presidential vote has a lasting significance, whatever happens in the near future with the demonstrations. Those ballot boxes are a symbol of the wider corruption that Montazeri claimed was undermining the Revolution. And, long after they have been put away, their symbolism --- whatever actually happened on 12 June --- remains.

As pne of our correspondents noted, after a lengthy glance at Qom last week, "This is not over."