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Entries in Iran Elections 2009 (85)

Saturday
Jul112009

Iran: Rebellion of the Clerics? Not So Fast

The Latest from Iran (10 July): What Next?

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QOMOne area of the Iranian post-election crisis that we've been watching carefully is the possibility of clerical opposition to the regime. On the one hand, we're wary of stories --- such as the wayward New York Times article last Sunday --- that portray a rebellion of the clerics. On the other, we do think the opposition of some ayatollahs may have some significance, especially if that intersects with other political moves against the current leadership.

Mehdi Khalaji of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, in contrast, dismisses the notion of a clerical challenge, at least for now:

While a handful of marginal clerics and religious groups dispute the official result of Iran’s recent presidential election, the Shiite clerical establishment as a whole currently supports Iran’s top leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Although this support has been demonstrated through silence, the fact that most Shiite clerics have not intervened in the public debate over the election or the government’s use of force against protesters has been particularly effective in strengthening Khamenei’s position.

The Establishment

Iran’s clerical establishment consists of about 200,000 members, and its hierarchy includes many midlevel clerics called hojjat ol-eslam (”proof of Islam”) and around a thousand ayatollahs (”sign of God”), who are leaders recognized for their scholarship. Ranking above ayatollahs are roughly fifteen grand ayatollahs, who are revered as sources of emulation, or as religious guides, for many followers.
Khamenei was a mere hojjat ol-eslam when he was elevated to the rank of ayatollah, in a controversial move aimed at making him constitutionally fit to succeed Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic, as Iran’s principal leader. Khamenei’s authority stems from the principal of velayat-e faqih (guardianship of the jurist), which combines political and religious power into one supreme authority.


Dissent Only from the Margins

The ayatollahs in Qom and Isfahan who have criticized the recent presidential election are isolated, with no significant role in the clerical establishment; they lack both financial resources and religious popularity. Although these ayatollahs held key political and juridical positions during the first decades of the Islamic Republic, they were sidelined first by Khomeini and then later by Khamenei.

A small marginal group, the Association of Researchers and Teachers of Qom Seminary, is the only clerical group that has explicitly referred to the presidential election as illegitimate. The association was founded in 1998, and its central council consists of eighteen midranking clerics and one ayatollah. This group plays no role in the administration of the clerical establishment, and none of its members are considered to be sources of emulation. The association was originally created to support former president Muhammad Khatami, but its support has remained symbolic rather than practical. The group’s secretary, the controversial Seyyed Hossein Moussavi Tabrizi, was involved in the execution of many of the regime’s opponents and political prisoners while he was the general prosecutor of the Revolutionary Court during the first decade of Islamic Republic,


Coopting the Clerical Establishment

Iran’s current clerical establishment has little similarity to what it was prior to 1979 Islamic Revolution. Historically, the clerical class was a semiautonomous political institution with independent financial resources from religious taxes collected directly from followers. But after the revolution, and especially since Khamenei became leader twenty years ago, the establishment became totally dependent on the government’s financial resources, social authority, networking, organization, and political status. Iran’s leader is not only the head of the judiciary, intelligence services, and the armed forces, he is also the head of Iran’s Shiite clerics.

Clerics receive hefty regular stipends from the government, and many ayatollahs have exclusive privileges for numerous profit-making transactions. The government has modernized and bureaucratized the clerical establishment by creating the Center for Seminary Management, which is under direct supervision of Khamenei and is in full control of clerical finances, the seminary’s educational system, and the political direction of the establishment. Even Iraq’s Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, along with other influential Shiite leaders, allegedly runs his offices within the framework of the Center.

To control clerics politically, the government created the Special Court of Clerics — an organization that works outside the judiciary branch of government and is headed by an appointee of Khamenei — to deal with dissenting clerics. This independent court does not operate within the country’s legal system; it has own set of procedures and maintains its own prisons in most Iranian cities.

Politically defiant clerics who oppose certain government decisions work outside the clerical establishment and usually have a track record of supporting Iran’s reform movement. Although several prominent reformist figures, such as former president Muhammad Khatami and former speaker of the Iranian parliament Mehdi Karrubi, are clerics, their words and actions have little or no impact on the clerical establishment and pose no threat of causing political splits.

Conclusion

The Shiite clerical establishment, which stretches across the Middle East, is highly unlikely to initiate any sort of opposition to Khamenei’s authority. Various Shiite leaders may not be happy with the Iranian government’s policies, but publicizing their differences might jeopardize the social, political, and financial advantages they now receive from Iran. For example, during his Friday sermon immediately after the Iranian election, Seyyed Mohammad Hossein Fazlallah, a prominent Shiite ayatollah in Lebanon, stated his support for the government’s official result and voiced his admiration of the Iranian people for their participation in the election. In Iraq, al-Sistani kept silent about the election result and has not reacted to the postelection crisis. Both ayatollahs have offices in Qom and benefit from the support of the Iranian government.
Inside Iran, support for Khamenei, although mostly silent, is also evident. Morteza Moqtadai, the head of Center for Seminary Management, announced that the election result was approved by “God and the Hidden Imam,” and stated that Khamenei’s words are the “Hidden Imam’s words; when he says there was no manipulation in the election, he should be heard as the ultimate arbiter.”
Khamenei — for the moment — is in a strong position. The clerical establishment’s prevailing silence, however, could eventually work against him. If the political tide begins to turn, the establishment could be rendered powerless and its support ineffective, leaving Khamenei and his followers in a vulnerable position.
Friday
Jul102009

Iran: Protest Through "The Rooftop Project"

The Latest from Iran (10 July): What Next?

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One of the distinctive features of the post-election protest has been the nightly calls from rooftops of "Allahu Akhbar" (God is Great). Now "The Rooftop Project" is trying to compile and present a record of the Allahu Akhbars from just before the election to the present. There are a few days "missing", which the organisers are hoping to fill with the help of readers and viewers:

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LumNtGTi_W0[/youtube]
Friday
Jul102009

Getting Iran (Loudly) Wrong: Posturing for Mr Ahmadinejad and Mr Hitchens

The Latest from Iran (10 July): What Next?

NEW Iran: How Big Were the 18 Tir Protests?
The Latest from Iran (18 Tir/9 July): Day of Reckoning?
LATEST Video: The 18 Tir Protests (9 July)

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IRAN 18 TIRA couple of fine examples of how to wedge events in Iran into personal and political prejudices and agendas. In Asia Times Online, Mahan Abedin charts "The Rise and Rise of Ahmadinejad" with the claim:
[He is] the most formidable leader of a faction that has incrementally broadened and deepened the scope of its reach and influence within the regime to the point where it is now completely dominant. Factional politics in the Islamic Republic - as we know it - has collapsed....All the other factions, particularly the once-powerful Islamic left, are in complete disarray. Their leaders have been exposed as losers and their supporters have been left demoralized by the entire state machinery's acquiescence in the final victory of the Islamic right.


To call this analysis "quirky", in light of Ahmadinejad's political floundering in the last three weeks would be generous. A less charitable reading would be that Abedin wants to wipe out any alternative to the President: "The biggest loser of all is former prime minister Mousavi....Another great loser is former president and arch-oligarch Rafsanjani....Many other core establishment figures, including losing presidential contender Mehdi Karroubi and former Majlis (parliament) speaker Nategh Nouri, are expected to be edged out."

Which means that, presto magico!, Ahmadinejad stands atop "a new consensus" in Iran: "While the contours of a broader political alliance have still to be worked out, there are indications that at the grassroots level at least a substantial number of Islamic left personalities and activists are willing to fall behind Ahmadinejad and accept the public hegemony of the Islamic right."

Meanwhile, swerving violently from the other direction, Christopher Hitchens in Salon finally finds the moment to vindicate his 7-year "liberation of Iraq" shout-out by linking it to the "liberation of Iran". Unfortunately, that moment is based on the wildly inaccurate New York Times story of 5 July that "the most important clerical group" in Iran had come out against the regime:
So it is very hard to overstate the significance of the statement made last Saturday by the Association of Teachers and Researchers of Qum, a much-respected source of religious rulings, which has in effect come right out with it and said that the recent farcical and prearranged plebiscite in the country was just that: a sham event. (In this, the clerics of Qum are a lot more clear-eyed than many American "experts" on Iranian public opinion, who were busy until recently writing about Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as the rough-hewn man of the people.)

This shaky pretext self-justifies Hitchens in the ignorance of every internal dynamic in Iran, apart from Ayatollah Khomeini's "good" grandon Sayeed, in favour of an Iraqi platform:
Did the overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime, and the subsequent holding of competitive elections in which many rival Iraqi Shiite parties took part, have any germinal influence on the astonishing events in Iran? Certainly when I interviewed Sayeed Khomeini in Qum some years ago, where he spoke openly about "the liberation of Iraq," he seemed to hope and believe that the example would spread. One swallow does not make a summer. But consider this: Many Iranians go as religious pilgrims to the holy sites of Najaf and Kerbala in southern Iraq. They have seen the way in which national and local elections have been held, more or less fairly and openly, with different Iraqi Shiite parties having to bid for votes (and with those parties aligned with Iran's regime doing less and less well). They have seen an often turbulent Iraqi Parliament holding genuine debates that are reported with reasonable fairness in the Iraqi media. Meanwhile, an Iranian mullah caste that classifies its own people as children who are mere wards of the state puts on a "let's pretend" election and even then tries to fix the outcome. Iranians by no means like to take their tune from Arabs—perhaps least of all from Iraqis—but watching something like the real thing next door may well have increased the appetite for the genuine article in Iran itself.

The silver lining in this cloud of promoting, posturing and preening analysis is that it's much easier to expose by going to the real "experts" in this story, the folks getting information out of Iran by any means necessary. So, farewell, "Rise and Rise of Ahmadinejad". Bye bye, Christopher. Hello, new media.
Friday
Jul102009

Iran: How Big Were the 18 Tir Protests?

The Latest from Iran (10 July): What Next?

The Latest from Iran (18 Tir/9 July): Day of Reckoning?
LATEST Video: The 18 Tir Protests (9 July)

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IRAN 18 TIR 3We're not certain about the extent of the marches in Tehran yesterday (and, to be honest, I think the symbolic significance of the show of opposition outweighs any number), but others are trying to establish the size of the rallies.

CNN's assertion of 2,000 to 3,000 appears to be based on little more than a scattering of information and has not been updated for many hours. The New York Times, from either caution or an inability to establish what is happening, sticks with "thousands".

Far more insight, and possibly accuracy, comes from the "alternative" media on the Internet. Fintan Dunne offers a "guesstimate", based on videos, reports, and a knowledge of Tehran's geography, of 25,000. Josh Shahryar's "Green Brief", with an excellent summary of the day's events, puts out a figure of 35,000 in Tehran and, with less apparent support, "slightly more than twice as much...all over the country". (Thanks to Shahryar for the note he just sent me, clarifying that he means a total of more than 70,000 protesters across Iran, including the numbers in Tehran.)

Shahryar offers the valuable information, if true:
Large protests were fully confirmed in Ahvaz, Mashhad, Rasht, Isfahan, Tabriz, Sari, Hamadan, Babol, Kerman, Dezfol and Shiraz. Reports from Shiraz indicate that the protest there was probably the largest. Isfahan was a close second in terms of the number of people on the streets.
Thursday
Jul092009

The Latest from Iran (18 Tir/9 July): Day of Reckoning?

The Latest from Iran (10 July): What Next?

LATEST Video: The 18 Tir Protests (9 July)
The Latest from Iran (8 July): The Day Before….?
Iran: A Counter-coup against the Supreme Leader’s Son Mojtaba?
Iran: Human Rights Watch Statement on Abuse of Detainees

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IRAN 18 TIR

1945 GMT: Thanks to Fintan Dunne: my interview with him (summarised at 1910 GMT) is now on-line.

1935 GMT: Tehran Bureau reports on an attack by security forces on the dormitories at Amir Kabir University.

1910 GMT: Earlier this evening, I chatted with Fintan Dunne about the day's events and their political significance. He'll be posting the audio on his blog later, but a couple of points that stood out for me:

1. If a "victory" had to be declared, it went to the opposition challenge. Despite all the Government detentions, threats, and disruptions of communications, thousands (and, while exact numbers cannot be determined, it appears from reports and video footages to be thousands rather than hundreds) gathered at locations across Tehran. The weeks of pressure had not broken the protests.

There were "bonuses" for the opposition as well in a reduction in violence by security forces (for whatever reason), which bolstered confidence amongst demonstrators as the day developed, the lack of any indication that the protesters were sponsored by "foreign enemies", and the first significant video footage in weeks to come out of Tehran. And, while one has to be cautious in generalising from the audio on that footage, there were bold chants of "Ya Hossein, Mir Hossein" and criticism of the Supreme Leader's son, Mojtaba Khamenei.

2. That, however, is only part of the story. There are two halves to the challenge: the public protest and the manoeuvres of the political leadership. So far Mir Hossein Mousavi, Mehdi Karroubi, and Mohammad Khatami have not followed up the marches with statements and indications of next steps.

3. And what of the political manoeuvres within the regime? Already attention moves from today to tomorrow. The issue at Friday prayers at the University of Tehran is not only who will be leading them but who will not. Has former President Hashemi Rafsanjani declined and does that mark, in addition to this week's criticism of the government as "illegitimate" by a political party linked to him, his challenge to President Ahmadinejad and pressure for changes in the Iranian system?

1900 GMT: This, word for word, is Press TV English's current summary of today's demonstrations in their "News in Brief", under the headline "No Major Protests in Tehran": "
A few hundred demonstrators have gathered on the sidewalks in the streets leading to Tehran University. Police used tear gas in one locality to disperse the crowd. Security has been tight in the streets of downtown Tehran Thursday but onlookers did gather to watch the demonstrations.

The website summary puts out a similar line.
1840 GMT: Reports that "Allahu Akhbars" (God is Great) are ringing out from Tehran rooftops.

1730 GMT: CNN's website offers a summary of the account of Iason Athanasiadis, the Anglo-Greek journalist detained for three weeks in Iran.

1710 GMT: The pattern of demonstrations reported earlier (1345 GMT) appears to have continued throughout day. Rather than one large demonstration, there were a series of gatherings --- either by design or in reaction to the security forces' preventing a mass grouping --- throughout Tehran. The reports of clashes, including alleged use of tear gas and gunfire to disperse crowds, are still sketchy. It is also unclear how much activity there was outside Tehran.

1700 GMT: Just going through latest reports and posting latest claimed video of today's demonstrations. Meanwhile, Tehran Bureau, Fintan Dunne, and Nico Pitney at Huffington Post offer useful updates.

1500 GMT: Cellphone reception now blocked in central Tehran.

1445 GMT: Reports of demonstrations at Vanak Square, Vali-e Asr Square, Ferdosi, Tehran University, and Polytechnic University.

1430 GMT: Amidst the news of the demonstrations, it should be noted that Mohammad Ali Dadkhah, a human rights lawyers and founder of Nobel Peace Prize laureate Shirin Ebadi's human rights group, has been arrested.

1345 GMT: There are general reports from various sources of security forces "beating" protesters. Unconfirmed reports of use of tear gas and gunshots at Enqelab and/or Vanak Square. Clashes at Karegar Shomali Street nearr Enqelab Square.

It is not possible at this point to measure both the size of the demonstrations and the scale of the violence. Some "mainstream" media are rushing out the story that "only 250" people have gathered. That appears to be a limited, if not wholly inaccurate, view. What appears to be happening, instead, is that groups of people are meeting at different locations (latest report is several hundred in front of the Polytechnic in Tehran).

1315 GMT: Latest Situation. Reports of Army units replacing police at key points such as Enqelab Square. The square is not completely closed, but police are trying to identify "key" protesters. Also people gathering at Vanak Square. A Revolutionary Guard unit has been placed in front of the Interior Ministry.

Unconfirmed reports of protests in Shiraz, Isfahan, Ahwaz, Babol, Kerman, Mashaad, and Sari.

1145 GMT: It is now after 4 p.m. local time in Iran. Reports:

There is a "heavy presence of security forces at Enqelab Square", with military helicopters flying over Enqelab Square, Azadi Square, and Laleh Park. Main entrances to Tehran University have been blocked. Phone service has been disrupted.

Meanwhile, Iraq's Government says US military officials have transferred to Iraqi custody five Iranians held since March 2007 in an American raid in Kirkuk in northern Iraq.

0815 GMT: A Kind and Gentle Reminder to Those Who Might Protest. Morteza Tamedon, the Governor of Tehran (not to be confused with the Mayor, Mohammad-Baqer Qalibaf), has told the Islamic Republic News Agency, "No permission for a gathering or march has been requested or issued. But if some people make moves that are contrary to security initiatives under the influence of anti-revolutionary networks, they will be trampled under the feet of our alert people."

0615 GMT: Battle of the Broadcasters. No significiant news yet from Tehran. Meanwhile, Press TV English sets out its strategy: don't mention any demonstrations but do mention Western interference, using the misleading and outdated claim that the US Government has authorised "hundreds of millions of dollars" for regime change (the reality under the Obama Administration is far less dramatic) and highlighting the claim that the US is supporting the insurgent group Jundallah (probably true in the past, but of little relevance to the post-election events).

CNN counters by raising the question of a split amongst the clerics and giving a brief historical perspective through the 18 Tir demonstrations of 1999.

Another big clue to the US-centred view of Iran comes in the online newspaper, The Daily Beast, which highlights an interview by Reza Aslan (one of the most prominent US-based commentators on Iranian affairs) of Ahmad Batebi, the student activist whose picture became an icon of the 1999 demonstrations.

0530 GMT: Today is the day that may continue or close "Phase 1" of the post-election conflict in Iran. For more than a week, opposition efforts have pointed towards mass marches on 18 Tir, the date in the Iranian calendar, which is the 10th anniversary of student-led demonstrations that called for reform and were suppressed violently. Josh Shahryar's "Green Brief" summarises, "Cities confirmed to protest include: Ahvaz, Arak, Adrabil, Bandar Abbas, Birjand, Bojnurd, Bushehr, Esfehan, Ghazvin, Ghom, Gorgan, Hamedan, Ilam, Kerman, Kermanshah, Khorramabad, Mashhad, Rasht, Sanandaj, Sari, Semnan, Shahrekord, Shiraz, Tabriz, Urmieh, Yasuj, Yazd, Zahedan and Zanjan."

If the marches take place, despite all the Government efforts to block them through detentions, limits on communications, and open threats, then the public protest over the 12 June Presidential election continues. If they fizzle out into scattered gatherings with no cohesive centre, then the regime will have succeeded in its immediate effort to curb the challenge not only to President Ahmadinejad but to the  Iranian system of politics and governance.

Yet, even if the demonstrations are limited, the "Phase 1" analysis remains. Those opposed to the election of President Ahmadinejad and to a system that has suppressed dissent have promised that they will maintain their resistance through general, often symbolic, action. Equally important, inside the system, there have been politicians and clerics who have been unsettled by the developments. Added to those who were already challenging the Presidency and even (though often in a limited way) the Supreme Leader, that disquiet points to continued manoeuvres for power.

Those manoeuvres are now cloaked in uncertainty and rumour. Later today, we'll update our entry on the resistance allegedly provoked by the role of the Supreme Leader's son Mojtaba in events on and after 12 June (put bluntly, we think The Guardian of London story, based on a single source, that summarised a serious challenge is exaggerated and came via "Western" channels rather than directly from Tehran). We'll also be looking carefully at the claim that former President Hashemi Rafsanjani is refusing to lead Friday prayers. And we're reading through a lengthy, challenging analysis that claims the idea of a clerical opposition to the post-election conduct of the regime has been exaggerated --- we'll post the analysis and our thoughts later this morning.