Israel's Challenge: The Durban II Conference on World Racism

The Durban II Conference, also known as the Second World Conference against Racism, is going to commence on April 20. Since the articles of draft documents were being discussed and shaped during the preparatory meetings, the Israeli Foreign Minister, Tzip Livni, has warned the UN that Israel would not attend to the upcoming conference if the Israeli politics labeled as “Zionism”  were considered as racist again.

The latest draft resolution for the conference is remarkable in its criticism of Israel, even in  comparison to the declaration of the first conference. There is no attempt at a balance between the right of Israeli security and the right of self-determination of the Palestinians. Indeed, in addition to pointing out the one-sided racial discrimination against Palestinians, there are three significant references: the Gaza situation, the Israeli "Wall" running through the West Bank, and the Syrian Golan Heights. The worst-case scenario for Israel, is that these references will bring in the International Court of Justice, as the judicial body of the UN, to rule on the norms of international law under the Occupied Territories.

In 2001, both the Israeli and American delegations withdrew from the first World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, claiming that the language of the draft declaration was “anti-Semitic” and “full of hatred.” The "shocking" vote for the declaration was interpreted as a revival of the UN General Assembly Resolution 3379, adopted in 1975 but annulled in 1991, which stated that Zionism was a form of racism and racial discrimination.

Yet, the US and Israeli lobbies were successful in their "non-participation". The final text of the conference did not include the language accusing Israel of racism. Indeed, it aimed at neutrality in its treatment of the State of Israel and the Arab world. For instance:

• “63: We are concerned about the plight of the Palestinian people under foreign occupation. We recognize that inalienable right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and to the establishment of an independent State and we recognize the right to security for all States in the region, including Israel, and call upon al States to support the peace process and bring it to an early conclusion.”

• “61: We recognize with deep concern the increase in anti-Semitism and Islamophobia in various parts of the world, as well as the emergence of racial and violent movements based on racism and discriminatory ideas against Jewish, Muslim and Arab communities.”

• “150: Calls upon States, in opposing all forms of racism, to recognize the need to counter anti-Semitism, anti-Arabism and Islamophobia world-wide, and urges all States to take effective measures to prevent the emergence of movements based on racism and discriminatory ideas concerning these communities.”

This time, Israeli diplomats are expecting a tougher process. The draft resolutions of the Durban II conference, possibly bolstered by the Gaza War, are portraying Israel as an occupying state carrying out racist policies.

The latest revised version of the reviewed text issued on 23 January 2009 states:

“(Re-emphasizes the responsibility of the international community to provide international protection, in particular from racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, for (Palestinian) civilian populations under occupation in conformity with international human rights law and international humanitarian law;).”

“(Reiterates that the Palestinian people have the inalienable right to self-determination and that, in order to consolidate the (Israeli) occupation, they have been subjected to unlawful collective punishment, torture, economic blockade, severe restriction of movement and arbitrary closure of their territories. Also notes (with concern) that illegal settlements continue to be built in the occupied (Arab) territories (since 1967);)”

“Expresses deep concern at the plight of Palestinian refugees and other inhabitants of the Arab occupied territories as well as displaced persons who were forced to leave their homes because of war and racial policies of the occupying power and who are prevented from returning to their homes and properties because of a racially-based law of return. It recognizes the right of Palestinian refugees as established by the General Assembly in its resolutions, particularly resolution 194 of 11 December 1948, and calls for the return to their homeland in accordance with and in implementation of this right.”

In this text, only the Palestinian side that must be protected, and only they suffer from unlawfulness. Only they are oppressed because of war --- there is no reference to Hamas, Islamic Jihad or Fatah --- and because of Israel’s policies based on racial discrimination.

Specifically, the declaration asks the International Court of Justice to give its advisory opinion on the Israeli Wall in the West Bank as both a symbol and an instrument of the occupation:

“(Reiterates deep concern about the plight of the Palestinian people (as well as inhabitants of the other occupied territories) under foreign occupation, (including the obstruction of the return of refugees and displaced persons, and the construction of the segregation wall,) and urges respect for international human rights law, international refugee law and international humanitarian law, and calls fir a just, comprehensive and lasting peace in the region;)”

“Calls for the end of all actions violating international human rights and humanitarian law, the respect for the principle of self-determination and the end of all suffering; calls also for the implementation of international legal obligations including the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Wall and the international protection of the Palestinian people throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territory.”

The draft then offers a vital sentence in parentheses: “(Proposal to include reference to Gaza situation – language to be provided).” This inserted sentence could, for example, call for the Israeli officials who ordered Operation Cast Lead and the generals who carried it out as "war criminals" to be judged in the International Criminal Court.

The most important point outside the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is probably the reference to the Syrian issue. The drafting committee is underlines the Israeli occupation and the Israeli ‘racial discrimination policies’ against Syrian citizens in the Golan Heights:

“(Expresses deep concern at the practices of racial discrimination against the Palestinian people as well as (Syrian nationals of the occupied Syrian Golan) (other inhabitants of the Arab occupied territories) which have an impact on all aspects of their daily existence of all such practices;)”

Yet it is here that there may be a possibility for both Israel and a positive outcome. While Tel Aviv has urged the US, Italy and Canada to boycott the conference, American support on the sidelines for an approach to the Syrian issue may be acceptable to the Israelis. Indeed, both the US and Israel may see the Syrian initiative as an opening for dialogue between Israel and Palestinians, as well as loosening the ties between Damascus and Tehran that hve developed since 2001.

Only last week US Secretary of State sent two officials, Jeffrey Fletman and Daniel Shapiro, to Damascus. She also visited Turkey and announced that President Obama would be coming to Ankara in April. This pointed to Turkey's positive mediation role in the Israeli-Syrian dialogue and its place in the solution of the water problem arising from the use of Golan Heights between Syria and Israel.

The Latest from Israel-Palestine (12 March): Talks But No News

In contrast to the barrage of stories surrounding last month's negotiating manoeuvres between Israel, Hamas, and Fatah last month, yesterday's resumption of "reconciliation" talks in Cairo between Hamas, Fatah, and other Palestinian factions went almost unnoticed by US and British media.

In part, that is because the discussions have moved from the high-profile drama of delegations setting out broad positions for their leadership of Palestine to the more mundane exchanges in five committees on security, economics, and political structure.

In part, however, it is because the drama of December/January war and clashes between the Palestianian Authority, led by Fatah, and Hamas has given way to glacial progress, if not stalemate. Palestinian Authority leader Mahmoud Abbas wants the support of quick decisions for his flagging political position. So of course it is in the interests of Hamas to delay until it gets acceptance of its stance on border crossing and security arrangements as well as clear recognition that it is the equal of the PA.

That Hamas approach is being bolstered by the latest opinion poll which shows, for the first time, that Gaza Prime Minister Ismail Haniya is ahead of Abbas amongst those who would vote in the next (still unscheduled) Presidential election for Palestine. The margin is small --- 47 to 45 percent --- but it is evidence that the PA and Fatah cannot rely on their base support in the West Bank to maintain leadership. Equally important, the trend since the Gaza War is sharply against Abbas: in December, he led Haniya by 48 to 38 percent.

The US, Israel, and Charles Freeman: "A Chilling Effect" on Foreign Policy

One of the sharpest, strongest reactions to the withdrawal of the nomination of Charles Freeman (pictured) as head of the US National Intelligence Council has come from Stephen Walt in his blog on the Foreign Policy website. I generally share his views, but a reader offers further useful critique: "All good points, but a bit polemical. You know how this game works: I don't think Walt does Freeman any favours by framing the appointment as a victory over Zionists or as a balance to [the appointment of the State Department's Dennis] Ross. It would have been better to explain why Freeman was a worthy choice in the first place with his other experience and ability."

On Chas Freeman's withdrawal
STEPHEN WALT

First, for all of you out there who may have questioned whether there was a powerful "Israel lobby," or who admitted that it existed but didn't think it had much influence, or who thought that the real problem was some supposedly all-powerful "Saudi lobby," think again.

Second, this incident does not speak well for Barack Obama's principles, or even his political instincts. It is one thing to pander to various special interest groups while you're running for office -- everyone expects that sort of thing -- but it's another thing to let a group of bullies push you around in the first fifty days of your administration. But as Ben Smith noted in Politico, it's entirely consistent with most of Obama's behavior on this issue.

The decision to toss Freeman over the side tells the lobby (and others) that it doesn't have to worry about Barack getting tough with [past and future Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin] Netanyahu, or even that he’s willing to fight hard for his own people. Although AIPAC [American-Israeli Political Action Committee] has issued a pro forma denial that it had anything to do with it, well-placed friends in Washington have told me that it leaned hard on some key senators behind-the-scenes and is now bragging that Obama is a "pushover." Bottom line: Caving on Freeman was a blunder that could come back to haunt any subsequent effort to address the deteriorating situation in the region.

Third, and related to my second point, this incident reinforces my suspicion that the Democratic Party is in fact a party of wimps. I'm not talking about Congress, which has been in thrall to the lobby for decades, but about the new team in the Executive Branch. Don't they understand that you have to start your term in office by making it clear that people will pay a price if they cross you? Barack Obama won an historic election and has a clear mandate for change -- and that includes rethinking our failed Middle East policy -- and yet he wouldn't defend an appointment that didn't even require Senate confirmation. Why? See point No.1 above.

Of course, it's possible that I'm wrong here, and that Obama's team was actually being clever. Freeman's critics had to expend a lot of ammunition to kill a single appointment to what is ultimately not a direct policy-making position, and they undoubtedly ticked off a lot of people by doing so. When the real policy fights begin -- over the actual content of the NIEs [National Intelligence Estimates], over attacking Iran, and over the peace process itself -- they aren't likely to get much sympathy from [Director of National Intelligence Dennis] Blair and it is least conceivable that Obama will turn to them and say, "look, I gave you one early on, but now I'm going to do what's right for America." I don't really believe that will happen, but I'll be delighted if Obama proves me wrong.

Fourth, the worst aspect of the Freeman affair is the likelihood of a chilling effect on discourse in Washington, at precisely the time when we badly need a more open and wide-ranging discussion of our Middle East policy. As I noted earlier, this was one of the main reasons why the lobby went after Freeman so vehemently; in an era where more and more people are questioning Israel's behavior and questioning the merits of unconditional U.S. support, its hardline defenders felt they simply had to reinforce the de facto ban on honest discourse inside the Beltway. After forty-plus years of occupation, two wars in Lebanon, and the latest pummeling of Gaza, (not to mention [Israeli Prime Minister] Ehud Olmert's own comparison of Israel with South Africa), defenders of the "special relationship" can't win on facts and logic anymore. So they have to rely on raw political muscle and the silencing or marginalization of those with whom they disagree. In the short term, Freeman's fate is intended to send the message that if you want to move up in Washington, you had better make damn sure that nobody even suspects you might be an independent thinker on these issues.

This outcome is bad for everyone, including Israel. It means that policy debates in the United States will continue to be narrower than in other countries (including Israel itself), public discourse will be equally biased, and a lot of self-censorship will go on. America's Middle East policy will remain stuck in the same familiar rut, and even a well-intentioned individual like George Mitchell won't be able to bring the full weight of our influence to bear. At a time when Israel badly needs honest advice, nobody in Washington is going to offer it, lest they face the wrath of the same foolish ideologues who targeted Freeman. The likely result is further erosion in America's position in the Middle East, and more troubles for Israel as well.

Yet to those who defended Freeman’s appointment and challenged the lobby's smear campaign, I offer a fifth observation: do not lose heart. The silver lining in this sorry episode is that it was abundantly clear to everyone what was going on and who was behind it. In the past, the lobby was able to derail appointments quietly -- even pre-emptively -- but this fight took place in broad daylight. And Steve Rosen [of AIPAC], one of Freeman's chief tormentors, once admitted: "a lobby is like a night flower. It thrives in the dark and dies in the sun." Slowly, the light is dawning and the lobby's negative influence is becoming more and more apparent, even if relatively few people have the guts to say so out loud.  But history will not be kind to the likes of [Senator] Charles Schumer, Jonathan Chait [of the New Republic], Steve Rosen et al, whose hidebound views are unintentionally undermining both U.S. and Israeli security.

Last but not least, I cannot help but be struck by how little confidence Freeman's critics seem to have in Israel itself. Apparently they believe that a country that recently celebrated its 60th birthday, whose per capita income ranks 29th in the world, that has several hundred nuclear weapons, and a military that is able to inflict more than 1,300 deaths on helpless Palestinians in a couple of weeks without much effort will nonetheless be at risk if someone who has criticized some Israeli policies (while defending its existence) were to chair the National Intelligence Council. The sad truth is that these individuals are deathly afraid of honest discourse here in the United States because deep down, they believe Israel cannot survive if it isn't umbilically attached to the United States. The irony is that people like me have more confidence in Israel than they do: I think Israel can survive and prosper if it has a normal relationship with the United States instead of "special" one. Indeed, I think a more normal relationship would be better for both countries. It appears they aren't so sure, and that is why they went after Charles Freeman.

The Latest on Israel-Palestine (8 March): Fayyad Resigns

Morning Update (6:15 a.m. GMT; 8:15 a.m. Israel/Palestine): Palestinian Authority leader Salam Fayyad (pictured) "resigned" as Prime Minister of the West Bank on Saturday. Fayyad's appointment, like that of West Bank President Mohammad Abbas, formally expired on 9 January, but both men continued to claim political authority.

It is unclear what lies behind the resignation. The media spin is that this "may help smooth the way for a Palestinian unity government that would be acceptable to both Hamas and Fatah", the party of both Fayyad and Abbas, but the only basis for this is Fayyad's cursory statement of his reasons for stepping down.

Meanwhile, there were a series of Israeli airstrikes on Gaza, responding to six rockets launched from the area, on Saturday. The Israeli military said two "smuggling tunnels" on the southern Gaza border and one "weaponry storage site" in Gaza City were targeted.

Ms Clinton's Wild Ride: Is Dennis Ross in the Saddle on Iran?

Related Post: Ms Clinton’s Wild Ride - A US “Grand Strategy” on Israel-Palestine-Iran?

In our analysis today of a possible US "grand strategy" linking its approach on Israel and Palestine to a change in policy on Iran, we speculated, "One explanation for this shift is the long-awaited entry of Dennis Ross, who has long advocated “Diplomacy Then Pressure”, into the State Department." Jim Lobe takes up the theme:

Ross Is Clearly a Major Player

Since Secretary of State Clinton set out for the Middle East over the weekend, it has seemed increasingly clear to me that Dennis Ross, contrary to my earlier speculation, pretty much got the job that he and WINEP [the Washington Institute for Near East Policy] were hoping for. Not only has he claimed an office on the coveted seventh floor, but Obama’s conspicuous placement of Ross’ name between those of Mitchell and Holbrooke in his speech on Iraq at Camp Lejeune last week strongly suggested that he considers Ross to be of the same rank and importance as the other two.

More to the point is what Clinton and those around her have been saying during the trip, including, most remarkably, the report by an unnamed “senior State Department official” that she told the foreign minister of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) that she was “very doubtful” that diplomacy would persuade Iran to abandon its alleged quest for nuclear weapons. This, of course, very much reflects Ross’ own view (as well that of neo-conservatives) and will no doubt bolster hard-liners in Tehran who believe that Obama’s talk of engagement is simply designed to marshal more international support for eventual military action, be it a bombing campaign or a blockade to cut gasoline imports. That Obama essentially confirmed today’s New York Times report about a proposed deal with Moscow whereby it would go along with increasing sanctions against Iran in exchange for Washington’s non-deployment of anti-missile defenses in Poland and the Czech Republic only adds to the impression that some version of the Bipartisan Policy Center’s September ‘08 report on Iran strategy (drafted by hard-line neo-cons Michael Rubin and Michael Makovsky and signed by Ross), which I wrote about here, is in the process of being implemented. (I was going to write about this later this week, but the Moon of Alabama beat me to the punch. See also Stephen Walt’s analysis of Clinton’s scepticism on his Foreign Policy blog).

Adding to my growing sense that Ross occupies a critical role in policy-making, at least in the State Department, are what Clinton has had to say so far on her trip about Gaza, Hamas, and the Palestinian Authority. As Marc Lynch reports in his truly excellent blog, also on the Foreign Policy website, “her remarks suggest that rather than seize on the possibility of Palestinian reconciliation, Clinton prefers to double-down on the shopworn ‘West Bank first, Fatah only’ policy” strongly advocated by Ross. In that respect, you should definitely read Tuesday’s extended colloquy between Lynch, Brookings’ Tamara Wittes (who is more optimistic), and Carnegie’s Nathan Brown, who shares Lynch’s “disappointment” about Clinton’s performance. As Lynch notes, it seems that Clinton is stuck “in a bit of time-warp” regarding Hamas’ power in Gaza, the Palestinian Authority’s abject failure to enhance its legitimacy, and the Arab League’s renewed efforts to both unify itself and to reconstruct a Palestinian government of national unity. This insensitivity to Palestinian and Arab public opinion bears all the hallmarks of Ross’ failed Mideast diplomacy during the 1990’s.

I also have the impression that Ross and the so-called “Israel Lobby” whose interests he represents believe that enhancing conditions on the West Bank, combined with diplomatic engagement with Syria, will somehow be sufficient for Washington to regain its credibility in the region and rally the Sunni Arab states — along with the European Union, Russia, China, etc. — behind a policy of confrontation with Iran.