UPDATED Afghanistan Special: Mr Obama's Wild Ride --- Why?

OBAMA WITH AMBASSADOR EIKENBERRY AND COMMANDER MCCHRYSTAL

UPDATE 0925 GMT: We've added new information and analysis.

So let me get this right. The President of the US devotes 25 hours to a round-trip flight to spend six hours in Afghanistan, of which a total of 20 minutes is with the Afghan President?  

Why? 

Afghanistan Video: Obama Speech to US Troops (28 March)

1. Was Obama delivering a message to Afghan leader Hamid Karzai that he could trust to no one else? If so, what could that important message be? A dressing down of Karzai? (But note that Obama's special envoy Richard Holbrooke, who is persona non grata in Afghanistan after last August's post-election shouting match with Karzai, did not make the trip.) Confirmation that the US military was going to pursue the offensive, long dangled before the media, against the southern Afghan city of Kandahar? 


2. Or was this just a giant pep talk/photo opportunity for Obama in front of US troops overseas? 

3. Or both? 

Have to honest here: I don't have an answer to this puzzle. Nor, however, do many in the "mainstream" media. The BBC, in stolid BBC tones, tried to get away with "reassurance to Afghan allies" who had not been visited by Obama during his Presidency --- frankly, that's pretty lame, since the President could have done this in a more organised and less last-minute fashion. (Even this was muddled in White House statements to the press: some advisors said the Afghans only had an hour's notice; some said Karzai's office was told last Thursday.) CNN has no information beyond the asserted "need to wipe out terror networks". 

Helene Cooper of The New York Times proclaims: 

President Obama personally delivered pointed criticism to President Hamid Karzai in a face-to-face meeting on Sunday, flying here for an unannounced visit that reflected growing vexation with Mr. Karzai as America’s military commitment to defeat the Taliban insurgency has deepened.... 

While Mr. Obama said “the American people are encouraged by the progress that has been made,” as he stood beside Mr. Karzai at the heavily fortified presidential palace, Mr. Obama also emphasized that work remained to be done on the governance issues that have frustrated American officials over the past year. “We also want to continue to make progress on the civilian process,” Mr. Obama said. He mentioned several areas, including anticorruption efforts and the rule of law. 

The problem with Cooper's supposed scoop of an answer is that it is based on cherry-picking Obama's public statement to the press after his brief encounter with Karzai. As she admits --- lower in the story --- "the language used by Mr. Obama and Mr. Karzai in their private discussions was not disclosed". So here's the key message: 

Gen. James L. Jones, the national security adviser, told reporters on Air Force One en route to Afghanistan that the administration wanted Mr. Karzai to “understand that in his second term, there are certain things that have not been paid attention to, almost since Day 1.” 

General Jones said that the Afghan president “needs to be seized with how important” the issue of corruption, in particular, is for American officials.

Washington Post reporters take the same line, quoting Jones, "In [Karzai's] second term, there are certain things that have not been paid attention to, almost since Day One." More significantly, the Post gets confirmation from a Karzai adviser and former Foreign Minister, Rangin Spanta, that the discussion with Obama focused on corruption, reconstruction, and "strengthening Afghan state entities". 

An EA reader passes on the slightly different take on Al Jazeera English TV that the President's message was that Karzai should take on a more commander-in-chief role regarding the war so that it eventually becomes Karzai’s war instead of Obama’s. Al Jazeera English's website, however, sticks with the corruption-first theme.

Whichever of the versions you choose above, here's the take-away point: the Americans are now so distrustful of Karzai that the President had to personally lay down the law, taking more than a day out to deliver the message. The supposedly regular conference calls between Obama and Karzai just wouldn't do. If true, that tells you how solid this US-Afghan relationship is and/or how big the stakes are going to be in the near-future.

But then pause for a moment: if this was really the key meeting to declare the big push against the Taliban and other insurgents, why no more than 30 minutes? Surely a momentous decision like this would merit just a bit more discussion. Did Obama take only a half-hour because he wanted to show who was boss, giving Karzai no more of his time? Or did Karzai --- the man who secured a dubious election win in defiance of the US Government, who sent Obama's envoy packing, who has reduced the US Ambassador to a shamed figurehead --- set the limit?

My suspicion is that Washington, on the verge of a military show that will test Obama's decision to follow his commanders and go boots-first in the US intervention, still isn't secure about the Afghan President. If so, however, the Obama Administration has just fired its biggest shot possible, short of trying to toss Karzai out. There is no more political space if Karzai continues to be a corruption/drug/mismanagement/backroom-dealing problem. 

And in the case, the American ride will be far wilder than that taken by Mr Obama in the last 48 hours.

The Latest from Iran (16 March): Fire and Politics

2100 GMT: Chahrshanbeh Suri. An activist reports a conversation with a relative in Gisha in Tehranm, who said basiji were roaming the streets on their bikes and tried to stop people celebrating. Told of a report that said nothing political had happened tonight, the relative answered, "In Iran everything is political."

2010 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. More temporary releases --- Behzad Nabavi, a leader of the Mojahedin of Islamic Revolution Party serving a five-year term for "crimes against national security", and journalist and economist Saeed Laylaz have been freed until 4 April. Laylaz posted $500,000 bail.

NEW Iran Document: Mousavi Speech on “Patience and Resistance” (15 March)
NEW Latest Iran Video: The Attack on Karroubi’s House (14 March)
Iran Breaking: Ban on Reformist Political Party
Your Super-Special Iran Caption Contest
Iran: The Opposition’s Campaign in the US — Sequel With Revelations and A Lesson
The Latest from Iran (15 March): Breaking Human Rights

2000 GMT: Chahrshanbeh Suri Reza Sayah of CNN reports, via a Tehran witness, that police are spray painting passing cars that toss firecrackers out of windows. Basiji used tasers and batons to chase away 300 partiers near Mehr Park in Farmanieh.


1840 GMT: Justice. We had asked a couple of days what Tehran Prosecutor Abbas Jafari Doulatabadi was doing in Qom with marjas (senior clerics).

Here's one answer: Grand Ayatollah Safi Golpayegani told Doulatabadi to try the culprits of Kahrizak Prison's abuses as soon as possible, "so that the people feel the judiciary can act freely". Criticising advisors such as Presidential Chief of Staff Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai, Safi Golpayegani advised Doulatabadi to "treat the people kindly and fairly... [for] if Islamic principle is shattered, the whole system is gone".

1830 GMT: Larijani Pushing for Nuclear Deal? Looks like Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani is putting out a signal that he wants the "West" to come back to the table on uranium enrichment talks:

Iran's parliament (Majlis) speaker Ali Larijani advises the West to pursue a diplomatic approach in resolving their differences with Tehran on the issue of its nuclear program.

Speaking at a press conference in Tehran Tuesday, Larijani reiterated that the US, France, Britain and Germany have sought to delay the supplying of fuel to Iran for Tehran's research reactor through "mischievous" acts.

"They eventually came to the understanding that Iran is only willing to act according to the [International Atomic] agency's framework; so they abandoned the 'carrot and stick' approach, only to resort to sanctions," he added.em>

1825 GMT: There is a lot of chatter about clashes in Tehran. We are holding off on reports pending confirmation. A rumour spread of a fire at the house of Mehdi Karroubi's son Hossein is false.

1819 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Saeed Jalalifar, a member of the Committee of Human Rights Reporters, has been released on $100,000 bail. Jalalifar, a student at Zanjan University, was arrested on 30 November.

Azar Mansouri of the Islamic Iran Participation Front has been released from prison for a period of twenty days.

1815 GMT: Unconfirmed reports of clashes in Karaj.

1800 GMT: Back from an extended academic break. Thanks to readers for updating on the events of Chahrshanbeh Suri.

CNN's Reza Sayah is reporting, from a witness, "Light traffic on major roads. Parties in side streets with music and dancing. Police patrol major roads and squares but allowing parties along side streets. No reports of clashes."

Another activist reports, "Aryashahr (in Tehran) is just like a war zone, sound of fireworks is constant and security forces have pulled out of the area for now."

1345 GMT: We have posted, courtesy of the Los Angeles Times, the English text of Mir Hossein Mousavi's speech to the Islamic Iran Participation Front on "a year of patience and resistance".

1325 GMT: An Arrest Within the Regime. The son of senior Revolutionary Guards commander Esmail Gha’ani has been arrested, according to Green Voices of Freedom. Ali Gha’ani is an electrical engineering student at the Islamic Azad University of Mashhad. GVF speculates that, as the younger Gha'ani has no experience of political activity, the arrest is due to his father’s criticism of Government action after the June election.

1310 GMT: Today's Cyber-Propaganda. Press TV offers the platform:

After a 30-member US-backed cyber network was dismantled in Iran, members of the Parliament (Majlis) have praised efforts to bust one of the main gangs and cyber networks in the country.

[Editor's note: Is it my imagination or did Press TV just rename the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps?]

"The joyful news about the arrest and dismantling of one of the biggest and main groups of cyber networks backed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which worked to gather information, once again disclosed another conspiracy against the Islamic Republic," said 220 parliamentarians in a letter to the Islamic Republic Guards Corps (IRGC).
1210 GMT: Iran's Threat to Britain (and Its Students). The Foreign Ministry has issued a warning this morning that it will be reducing its links with Britain, specifically by restricting the movement of Iranian students to the United Kingdom.

1200 GMT: The Mousavi Message. Two notes about Mir Hossein Mousavi's speech (see 0655 GMT), made to the Islamic Iran Participation Front, calling for "a year of patience and resistance".

First, note our revised translation, based on an EA correspondent, with "resistance" replacing "endurance". That is a much stronger message of opposition,

Second, Mousavi's timing and language is a blatant attempt to pre-empt the Supreme Leader, whose Nowruz (Iranian New Year) message will call for "a year of...."

Although it is the Karroubi statement that is getting more attention outside Iran today, Mousavi's message --- in connection with the banning of the IIPF --- may have more resonance inside the country.

1045 GMT: Karroubi Watch. Maybe it's the definition of "irony" or just a crafty campaign: only days after an opposition PR move by "a senior aide" to Mehdi Karroubi fell flat in the US, the Western media are rushing to feature the cleric. First it was Sunday's attack on his house, now it is Karroubi's statement (see 0645 GMT) denouncing the despotism of the Iranian Government.

0945 GMT: The IRGC Gets A Contact --- Correction. Yesterday we reported that the engineering firm connected with the Revolutionary Guards just received an $850,000 oil pipeline contract. A reader noted, "The Revolutionary Guard would never settle for such a paltry amount!"

He's right. It's $850 million.

0725 GMT: Winning the Compromise. The Parliament and President Ahmadinejad may have reached an immediate resolution of next year's budget, with Ahmadinejad getting $20 billion of the $40 billion he wanted from subsidy reductions, but the political battle continues. The pro-Larijani Khabar Online pronounces, "The Government Discreetly Withdraws from Executing Subsidy Plan".

0723 GMT: Production assistant Mehdi Pourmousavi, who was arrested in the raid of director Jafar Panahi's house, has been released. Panahi is still detained.

0720 GMT: Watching the Crackdown. Satirist Ebrahim Nabavi's latest --- "I arrest, therefore I am!"

0710 GMT: Endure (cont.). Ahmad Batebi's website posts a statement from Human Rights Activists in Iran on the regime's crackdown and accusations of "cyber-war".

0655 GMT: Endure. Rah-e-Sabz has a lengthy report of Mir Hossein Mousavi's speech to members of the banned Islamic Iran Participation Front. The takeaway line: "1389 (the forthcoming Iranian year) is the year of our patience and endurance".

0645 GMT: Karroubi Watch. We've posted the video of the attack on Mehdi Karroubi's house on Sunday.

The cleric is undaunted, however. In a meeting with students of his party, Etemade Melli, he emphasised that the elections were "unnatural" and that they confirmed "there will be no more real elections in Iran." Karroubi asserted, "This government doesn't rely on people's votes....The Islamic Republic has been struck by dictatorship, only her name remains.

0620 GMT: Today is Chahrshanbeh Suri, the Fire Festival on the eve of the Iranian New Year. It will be an occasion for street celebrations, though it is unclear whether these will take on a political tone. While there has been a great deal of chatter outside Iran about use of the occasion, there have been few signs that the movement within will seek a mass protest.

Perhaps more pertinent is whether the regime politicises the event through ill-considered attempts to condemn the festival. The Supreme Leader has already risked po-faced overreaction with his denunciation of a ceremony without religious roots or value.

Meanwhile, the big political event may be the banning of Iran's largest reformist political party, the Islamic Iran Participation Front. We began tracking the development yesterday afternoon and have posted a separate entry. Given the regime has declared that it has already overcome the post-election crisis, this seems a curious move. Why risk a provocation that further exposes the lack of political freedom in Iran and could bring open conflict?

More arrests to balance the regime's strategy of releasing detainees on bail if they keep their silence. Only Democracy For Iran has a summary of political prisoners in Babol in northern Iran. The head of Mir-Hossein Mousavi’s election campaign, Alireza Shahiri, and Ali Akbar Soroush, a university professor and member of the Islamic Iran participation Front, have been arrested.  Student activists Mohsen Barzegar, Iman Sadighi, and Mohammad Esmailzadeh have been moved to solitary confinement.

UPDATED Afghanistan: The Execution of the Handcuffed?

UPDATE 14 MARCH: A statement from the International Security Assistance Force has rejected Starkey's latest report as "categorically false". Later it attributes the claims of bound and killed civilians were due to "confusion" from "initial operational reports".

UPDATE 13 MARCH: Jerome Starkey, the reporter who broke the story of the handcuffed and executed civilians, makes another claim today: "A night raid carried out by US and Afghan gunmen led to the deaths of two pregnant women, a teenage girl and two local officials in an atrocity which Nato then tried to cover up, survivors have told The Times."



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Dave Lindorff writes for Counterpunch:

When Charlie Company’s Lt. William Calley ordered and encouraged his men to rape, maim and slaughter over 400 men, women and children in My Lai in Vietnam back in 1968, there were at least four Americans who tried to stop him or bring him and higher officers to justice. One was helicopter pilot Hugh Thompson Jr., who evacuated some of the wounded victims, and who set his chopper down between a group of Vietnamese and Calley’s men, ordering his door gunner to open fire on the US soldiers if they shot any more people. One was Ron Ridenhour, a soldier who learned of the massacre, and began a private investigation, ultimately reporting the crime to the Pentagon and Congress. One was Michael Bernhardt, a soldier in Charlie Company who witnessed the whole thing, and reported it all to Ridenhour. And one was journalist Seymour Hersh, who broke the story in the US media.

Afghanistan: Getting the Real Point Of The Marja “Offensive”

Today’s war in Afghanistan also has its My Lai massacres.


It has them almost weekly, as US warplanes bomb wedding parties, or homes “suspected” of housing terrorists that turn out to house nothing but civilians. But these My Lais are all conveniently labeled accidents. They get filed away and forgotten as the inevitable “collateral damage” of war. There was, however, a massacre recently that was not a mistake--a massacre which, while it only involved fewer than a dozen people, bears the same stench as My Lai. It was the execution-style slaying of eight handcuffed students, aged 11-18, and a 12-year-old neighboring shepherd boy who had been visiting the others, in Kunar Province, on 26 December.

Sadly, no principled soldier with a conscience like pilot Hugh Thompson tried to save these children.  No observer had the guts of a Michael Brernhardt to report what he had seen. No Ron Ridenhour among the other serving US troops in Afghanistan has investigated this atrocity or reported it to Congress. And no American reporter has investigated this war crime the way Seymour Hersh investigated My Lai.

There is a Seymour Hersh for the Kunar massacre, but he’s a Brit. While American reporters like the anonymous journalistic drones who wrote CNN’s 29 December report on the incident, took the Pentagon’s initial cover story--that the dead were part of a secret bomb-squad--at face value, Jerome Starkey, a reporter in Afghanistan working for The Times of London and The Scotsman, talked to other sources --- the dead boys’ headmaster, other townspeople, and Afghan government officials --- and found out the real truth about a gruesome war crime--the execution of handcuffed children.

And while a few news outlets in the US like The New York Times did mention that there were some claims that the dead were children, not bomb-makers, none, including CNN, which had bought and run the Pentagon’s lies unquestioningly, bothered to print the news update when, on 24 February, the US military admitted that in fact the dead were innocent students. Nor has any US corporate news organization mentioned that the dead had been handcuffed when they were shot.

Starkey reported the US government’s damning admission. Yet still the US media remain silent as the grave.

Under the Geneva Conventions, it is a war crime to execute a captive. Yet in Kunar on December 26, US-led forces, or perhaps US soldiers or contract mercenaries, cold-bloodedly executed eight hand-cuffed prisoners.  It is a war crime to kill children under the age of 15, yet in this incident a boy of 11 and a boy of 12 were handcuffed as captured combatants and executed. Two others of the dead were 12 and a third was 15.

I called the Secretary of Defense’s office to ask if any investigation was underway into this crime or if one was planned, and was told I had to send a written request, which I did. To date, I have heard nothing.  The Pentagon PR machine pretended to me on the phone that they didn't even know what incident I was talking about, but without their "help" I have learned that what the US military has done--no surprise--is to pass the buck by leaving any investigation to the International Security Assistance Force--a fancy name for the US-led NATO force fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan. It’s a clever ruse. The ISAF is no more a genuine coalition entity than was  George Bush's Iraq War Coalition of the Willing, but this dodge makes legislative investigation of the event impossible, since Congress has no authority to compel testimony from NATO or the ISAF as it would the Pentagon. A source at the Senate Armed Services Committee confirms that the ISAF is investigating, and that the committee has asked for a “briefing”--that means nothing would be under oath--once that investigation is complete, but don’t hold your breath or expect anything dramatic.

I also contacted the press office of the House Armed Services Committee to see if any hearings into this crime have been planned. The answer is no, though the press officer asked me to send her details of the incident (Not a good sign that House members and staff are paying much attention--the killings led to country-wide student demonstrations in Afghanistan, to a formal protest by the office of President Hamid Karzai, and to an investigation by the Afghan government, which concluded that innocent students had been handcuffed and executed, and no doubt contributed to a call by the Afghan government for prosecution and execution of American soldiers who kill Afghan civilians.)

There is still time for people of conscience to stand up in the midst of this imperial adventure that may now appropriately be called Obama’s War in Afghanistan.  Plenty of men and women in uniform in Afghanistan know that nine Afghan children were captured and murdered at America’s hands last December in Kunar. There are also probably people who were involved in the planning or carrying out of this criminal operation who are sickened by what happened. But these people are so far holding their tongues, whether out of fear, or out of simply not knowing where to turn (Note: If you have information you may contact me). There are also plenty of reporters in Afghanistan and in Washington who could be investigating this story. They are not. Don’t ask me why. Maybe ask their editors.

The Day After the Iraq Election: "Politics Takes Over"

1220 GMT: The excellent analyst Marc Lynch has just made the immediate point, "All the Iraqi lists appear to be claiming victory. I'd wait for official results, which will be a while." His comment comes a few hours after a CNN correspondent pondered, "Each TV station corresponding to each political bloc saying that they are the winners...hmmm...."

The “Violent Semi-Peace”: Elections in Iraq, Escalation in Afghanistan
Iraq LiveBlog: Election Day

This is the real politics of Iraq, a day after the headlines of bombings and "democracy". With no party in the position to establish a national majority and indeed, outside Kurdistan, even a regional dominance, the negotiations, coercions, and manipulations take over, even before the preliminary results are announced on Thursday.

In Kurdistan, there is an intriguing contest between the Kurdistan List --- made up of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, led by Kurdish Prime Minister Masoud Barzani and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan led by Iraq President Jalal Talabani --- and the Gorran Party, established to break the stranglehold of the KDP and PUK on Kurdish politics. An activist says that Gorran narrowly won in the city of Suleymaniyah and lost in province of the same name; however, Gorran is claiming fraud in the provincial vote. Another activist says that Gorran has also secured seats in Diyala, Mosul, and Salahaddin; however, the Kurdistan List has triumphed by a 2:1 margin in Erbil.


Juan Cole offers an overview:

Sunday's vote for a new parliament in Iraq on Sunday could result in two possible geopolitical futures for that country.

If the Iraqi National List of former interim prime minister Iyad Allawi did well enough to come to power, that would reorient Iraq radically, taking it back in some ways to 2002. Allawi's coalition is largely made up of Arab nationalists who would see Iran as a threat and would ally with Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt. Baghdad would go back to helping contain Iran. Sunni Arab radicalism would likely be tamped down. For Washington, it would be the best of all possible worlds-- a pro-American Iraqi government headed by a former CIA asset that is willing to help pressure Iran for the West. Internally, an Allawi government that depends heavily on Sunni Arab constituencies would find it difficult to compromise with the Kurds on the disputed province of Kirkuk or on Kurdistan's interests in Ninevah and Diyala, setting the stage for a potential civil war.

If, on the other hand, Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki manages to hold on to power, Iraq will remain firmly in Shiite hands, and will likely have warm relations with Tehran. Certainly, Baghdad would have no interest in helping contain Iran. Relations with Saudi Arabia will continue to be bad. As the US withdraws, Iranian influence could ramp up and fill the vacuum. Al-Maliki also has his tensions with the Kurds, but his relatively bad relations with the Sunni Arabs of Mosul mean that he could deal with the Kurds without incurring much more enmity from the Sunni Arabs than he already does.

So those are the two possibilities facing Iraq-- roughly, reintegration into the Sunni-dominated Arab League, or an Iran alliance. In a way, the choices replicate those of the 1930s, Iraq's first decade of independence from Britain. The government of PM Hikmat Sulaiman in 1936-1937 rejected Arab nationalism and developed good relations with Iran. Sulaiman was a Turkmen and he served under the military dictatorship of Bakr al-Sidqi, a Kurd. There is a sense in which the al-Maliki-Talibani condominium of the past 4 years revives many geopolitical themes of the Sulaiman-Sidqi period. Their dire enemies were the Arab nationalist officers, who were focused on Palestine and felt more kinship with Egypt than with Iran. Allawi is more in that Arab nationalist tradition, though he is by heritage a Shiite.

Here is why I think the return of Allawi as prime minister is unlikely despite an apparently strong showing for his party in the elections.

The Saudi-owned pan-Arab London daily "The Middle East" [al-Sharq al-Awsat] is reporting that its correspondents are conveying an (unscientific) impression from exit polling that the Iraqi National List of Allawi is doing extremely well in the Sunni Arab provinces, and is running a strong second in the Shiite south (Kurds in the north typically vote only for Kurdish parties.) The report is rather breathless and I think the numbers are almost certainly exaggerated. It also alleges that current prime minister Nuri al-Maliki's State of Law coalition is getting 40% of votes in the Shiite south, which may be true for Baghdad and Basra (it did nearly that well in the provincial elections last year), but it would represent a major change in voting patterns in rural Shiite provinces such as Maysan and Dhi Qar.

Even so, without an unexpected landslide in the south, Allawi is unlikely to become prime minister. He will need 163 seats out of 325 to govern, and there is probably no way for his coalition to deliver them. Even leading lists will likely get less that 100 seats, and so will need post-election coalition partners. That small parties willing to ally with Allawi would have as many as 75 seats to deliver to him seems unlikely. So he'd have to deal with the big three--the State of Law, the National Iraqi Alliance, and the Kurdistan Alliance (or the Kurdistan parties generally). But they might well decline to deal with him, and could seek to exclude him instead.

Al-Maliki's State of Law list campaigned hard against the resurgence of Baathism, and Allawi and many on his list are ex-Baathists, so al-Maliki would have to eat a lot of crow to accept a junior position in an Allawi government. It seems unlikely, even if politics makes for strange bedfellows.

The Shiite religious parties grouped in the National Iraqi Alliance are said by the exit polls (for the little they are worth) to be coming in third. They are also highly unlikely to ally with Allawi, since he is an old-time CIA asset and ex-Baathist whose interim government was hostile to the Shiite religious authorities and to Iran.

Allawi appears to be attracting strong support in Ninevah Province in the north, which returned an Arab nationalist party in the provincial elections of 2009. Ninevah has a Sunni Arab majority and a Kurdish minority, but the Kurds had been dominant in provincial government and the security forces because the Sunnis had sat out the provincial elections of January 2005. There is very bad blood between the Arabs and Kurds in Ninevah.

So Allawi will find it difficult to ally with the Kurds while keeping his Sunni Arab nationalist base. But not only would he need the Kurds to get a simple majority if the other two big coalitions spurned him, but it will take a multi-party coaltion of 215 or so members of parliament to elect a president.

Whereas the numbers don't easily add up for Allawi, it seems likely that the State of Law, the Shiite fundamentalist parties of the NIA, and some smaller parties willing to join the two of them, could easily get to over 163, and they have a proven ability to work with the Kurds and independents to get to 215. In order to block this scenario, Allawi's list would have to get well over 100 seats and be united and disciplined.

As I suggested Sunday, one price al-Maliki might have to pay to gain the National Iraqi alliance as a partner is to agree to accelerate the US troop withdrawal (a key demand of the Sadr faction in the NIA).

Whatever the outcome of the voting (and a projected result based on one-third of the votes is scheduled to be announced on Wednesday), it may not be easily accepted by the losers. There is tremendous anxiety in Iraq about the possibility of ballot fraud in the wake of Sunday's parliamentary elections. The Iranian Arabic-language satellite station al-Alam reported on Sunday that the Shiite fundamentalist Sadr movement was alarmed to hear that ballot boxes were being transported from the provinces to Baghdad by US troops, and insisted that the US be kept away from those boxes. (They must have heard about Florida in 2000). Allawi is on Al Jazeera complaining about irregularities. He didn't say this, but campaigning continued through Sunday althought it was supposed to be forbidden after Friday late afternoon. In Basra, al-Hayat reports that anti-Allawi pamphlets were dropped by helicopter on Saturday and Snday.

Bottom line, another Allawi prime ministership is unlikely even if his list turns in strong performance.

Video: General Petraeus on Iran and Iraq (7 March)

General David Petraeus, the head of US Central Command, interviewed by Fareed Zakaria of CNN. We'll have an analysis on Monday:

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9MTSVbX4DBQ&feature=youtu.be[/youtube]