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Entries in New York Times (21)

Sunday
Mar212010

Middle East Analysis: Syria, Thomas Friedman, & "Why We Fail" (Narwani)

Sharmine Narwani writes in The Huffingon Post:

Nothing annoys me more about New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman than his tendency to scuttle his occasionally insightful commentary with fabricated assumptions to fit his narrative.

This makes it really hard for me to like him.

You know that irritation that grows under your skin when somebody is making a lot of sense and then suddenly -- wham -- they hit you with a doozy so ridiculous you feel disproportionately deflated?

Well, that is my Friedman experience time and time again. Not always though -- sometimes I am irritated from the get-go.



In his latest column on Tuesday, Friedman shines a light on a very true Middle East reality -- one that quite deliberately gets downplayed in Washington's power centers: The Mideast is now, for the first time since the Cold War ended, largely defined by two blocs of influence and their respective worldviews.

The first, is the US-led bloc consisting of Israel, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan -- the latter three often ignominiously referred to as the "moderate" Arab states. The second, is the grouping sometimes referred to as the "resistance" bloc that consists of Iran, Syria, Hezbollah and Hamas.

Friedman's column posits that there are five key actors in the Israeli-Palestinian equation today: Israel, America, the "moderate" Arabs, Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, and the resistance bloc.

Look, I can give him that -- I don't have a fundamental problem with the fact that he only includes one key individual from the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority to represent the entire Palestinian side. Fatah, on its own, is rather irrelevant these days, except in the minds of the US bloc. And kudos to Tom for recognizing this nuance.

Friedman then makes his main thrust, which is that only two of these actors actually have clear strategies for a Palestinian-Israeli solution:  Fayyad, the former World Bank economist who, peace or no peace, wants to create a de facto Palestinian state on the ground within two years -- and the resistance bloc. That's true enough. Friedman goes on to press the other three players to forge a clear, unified strategy -- preferably backing Fayyad's plan -- which can foil the agenda of the resistance bloc.

And then I did my double take. Iran... Hezbollah... Hamas... Where was Syria?

Ah, Thomas. You did that doozy-thing.

The Alliance of Syria, Iran, Hezbollah and Hamas

It is more than abundantly clear that in Washington, Tel Aviv, Riyadh and Cairo, all efforts are being made to wrest the reluctant Syria from this "resistance" bloc. It is equally obvious for those who live in the real world, that Syria has no intention of parting ways with its longtime friends.

When US President Barack Obama moved ahead with plans to reinstate an American ambassador in Damascus in 2009, the gleeful thinking in Washington was that Syria would prostrate itself in gratitude, jump at bilateral peace talks with Israel and walk into the US bloc's fold. Increasingly, however, even US analysts are grumpily acknowledging that the chances of this now happening are akin to Sarah Palin embracing a vegetarian diet.

But not our Thomas. He decided that this is how he wanted things to be, and so -- voila -- it just was.

As an opinion writer, Friedman still has the responsibility to convey the facts as they are - he can always spin his analysis around them or not include them in his deliberations if he wants to produce substandard commentary. But to just unilaterally change the facts? That isn't just wishful thinking -Friedman is trying to create the facts. And here is why his exclusion of Syria from this bloc is so completely disingenuous:

Syria Makes Its Position Clear

Renewed Syrian-US relations, rapprochement between Damascus and Riyadh, and Syria's disengagement from Lebanon brought hopes last year that the government of Bashar Al-Assad would take a more independent regional stance. When speculation reached a fevered pitch, Assad decided to nip it in the bud by staging a photo op worth a thousand words.

Last month, he convened a high-profile meeting with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejadand Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah just to underline the cohesiveness of this bloc and quash all speculation of potential rifts.

The message, according to savvy, Damascus-based political analyst, journalist and author Sami Moubayed, was two-fold. Firstly, it was a warning for Israel to abandon all thoughts of launching another war in the region -- as in Gaza in 2008/9 and Lebanon in 2006: "The meeting de-escalated tension in the region and served as a deterrent by reminding all parties that the amount of destruction that would result from any war would be too much to bear."

Secondly, the meeting represented a clear signal to the US that this alliance will stand firm and cannot be ruptured because of the will of external players. Moubayed explains:
You don't sever relations just because another party wants you to -- you only do so when you have been wronged or there is a state of war, and those conditions don't apply at all to Syrian-Iranian relations.

In fact, throughout the 1990s Syria enjoyed relationships with Iran, Saudi Arabia and the US -- relationships with one party never precluded relations with another. That is not the way of diplomacy.

London-based Syrian diplomat Jihad Makdissi concurs: "We have always enjoyed good relations with both Iran and the West, so why is there suddenly a necessity to break links? This Iranian-Syrian relationship is devoted to the stability and security of the region, and the West should take advantage of this friendship instead of antagonizing both countries."

Invest, Not Divide

What does this mean? In the world of realpolitik, far, far away from Friedman's Mideast musings, this means that the US and others can "use the leverage that Syria has within this group to moderate them", says Moubayed.

He believes that after over a year of active engagement with Syria, the US bloc has in effect tacitly surrendered to the notion that "if they can't break this alliance, the best possible alternative is to invest in it instead."

There is evidence of this "investment" already: in the past two years, Syrian backdoor diplomacy has gained the release of high-profile Western captives in both Iran and Gaza. And recognition of Syria's role has come from the highest quarters in European capitals.

As Moubayed notes, the departure of US troops in 2012 will leave a vacuum in Iraq, which Iran and Saudi Arabia will compete to fill. Secular Syria is in the enviable position of enjoying a "cross-confessional network of allies (read Shiites and Sunnis) which it can use to stablilize and normalize Iraq - to the collective benefit of Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United States".

Even if the Syrians and Israelis struck a deal to swap the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights for peace -- highly unlikely given the make-up of the current, right-wing Israeli government -- Jihad Makdissi insists that nothing would fundamentally change in relation to an alliance with Iran:
In Syria's view, for normality to prevail in the Middle East, Israel needs to withdraw from all occupied Arab land. The occupation is the problem in the region, not Iran.

So, Tom -- peace talks or not, nuke talks or not -- Syria is an active adherent of the increasingly popular regional worldview that includes Iran, Hezbollah and Hamas. All the wishful thinking in the world won't alter a relationship that has outlasted five US presidents, and provides vital strategic value to its participants.

In all fairness, Friedman is just doing something that has been a hallmark of US policy in the Middle East for decades. Denying inconvenient facts that have left us deaf, dumb and blind to the realities we face in the region. It is no wonder we cannot claim any lasting victories.

Blind spots everywhere, and then we wonder why we fail.
Friday
Mar192010

The Latest from Iran (19 March): Untamed?

2120 GMT: Mahmoud Goes to the Country? OK, it's not just Internet chatter. EA readers bring me up to speed: in a televised statement on Friday night, President Ahmadinejad set out the possibility of a referendum on his proposal to control $40 billion from subsidy reductions (the Parliament only gave him $20 billion).

And Ahmadinejad wasn't pulling punches: he said that his "conservative" opponents in Parliament were verging on "treason" with exaggerated statements of the inflationary potential of his plan. Fortunately, he reassured, their economic estimates were not correct.

NEW Iran: Ethnic Minorities and the Green Movement (Ghajar)
NEW Iran Academic Question: Suspending North American Studies?
Latest Iran Video: Mousavi’s and Rahnavard’s New Year Messages (18 March)
Iran: Reading Mousavi & Karroubi “The Fight Will Continue” (Shahryar)
Iran & the US: The Missed Nuclear Deal (Slavin)
The Latest from Iran (18 March): Uranium Distractions


2110 GMT: Containing the Poet. Another story to pick up --- National Public Radio has a profile of 82-year-old Simin Behbahani, the poet who is so dangerous that Iranian authorities seized her passport as she was about to board a flight for an awards ceremony in Paris.


2100 GMT: Back from a movie break. (Iran as Wonderland? Discuss.) Little happening this evening, though there is Internet chatter that Ahmadinejad may go to the country for a referendum on his subsidy reform proposals.

The break is useful to pick up on a couple of important stories. Persian2English has posted an English translation of the Committee on Human Rights Reporters statement of 17 March, responding to the regime's efforts to break human rights activists with charges of their role in US-backed "cyber-warfare":
Exaggerated claims that human rights activists are connected to foreign or political organizations have been repeatedly disseminated by Tehran’s prosecutor, domestic and military media, intelligence interrogators, and internet bandits. No plausible or credible evidence has been introduced to back their accusations of blatant lies....

The Committee of Human Rights Reporters has indicated in their mission statement, in interviews, and in their official announcements that their activities are limited to human rights issues, and they are proud of their work.


1615 GMT: And Via Satellite. European Union ambassadors have declared in Brussels that the EU is determined to end Iran's "unacceptable" jamming of satellite broadcasting and Internet censorship: "The EU calls on the Iranian authorities to stop the jamming of satellite broadcasting and Internet censorship and to put an end to this electronic interference immediately."

1520 GMT: Internet Diplomacy? Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, in an interview with Bloomberg, has highlighted the US Government's support of initiatives to get around Iranian restrictions on Internet access.

Clinton declared, “We’re doing a lot, let me just put it at that, because we think it is in the interests of American values and American strategic concerns to make sure that people have a chance to know what is going on outside of Iran." She claimed that a license had been issued to an (unnamed) company to boost access. Clinton added:
I’m sure that the Iranian authorities will do what they can to block any move that we make, so it’s like a chess game. We’ll go back and make another move, because we think we owe it to the Iranians, particularly during this period when there is so much at stake

1430 GMT: The President and the Clerics. An EA reader brings up to speed on the Ahmadinejad visit to Qom: Khabar Online has pictures of the President with Ayatollahs Mesbah Yazdi, Nouri-Hamedani and Jafar Sobhani, as well as a group shot.

Ahmadinejad's deputy for religious affairs claims that the meeting's atmosphere was good with the President "convincingly" answering some complaints from the clerics. The marjas brought up the people’s income problems, which should be solved, and cultural matters. AN promised to deal with these and also to transform Qom into the most beautiful town of the country.

Another meeting is planned with Jame’eye Modarressin (Association of the Teachers and Researchers of Qom).

1230 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Human Rights Activists in Iran have issued a list of 2560 detainees for the Iranian Year 1388 (March 2009-March 2010). The large majority were arrested after the election.

0855 GMT:  Political Prisoner Watch. Philosophy student Ali Moazzami has been released on bail; however, other detainees such as journalist Emadeddin Baghi remain behind bars for Nowruz.

0845 GMT: Remembering. Mourners gathered yesterday at the graves of post-election martyrs, placing flowers and cards.

In front of Evin Prison, relatives gathered to demand the release of detainees, including Ms Elham Ahsani, supporter of the Mothers of Mourning.

0825 GMT: Rafsanjani Watch. Here's the Rumour of the Day --- Islamic Republic News Agency claims Hashemi Rafsanjani flew to Kish Island to meet his son Mehdi Hashemi, who wants to return illegally to mainland Iran via Dubai.

AFP picks up on the news, which we reported last night, that Hossein Marashi, a relative of Rafsanjani's wife and an ally of the former President, has been jailed for one year for "spreading propaganda".

0820 GMT: Economy Watch. Jahangir Amuzegar offers a broad analysis of the state of Iran's economy and the problems it poses for President Ahmadinejad.

0815 GMT: Qom Absentee. Looks like one person who was not at the President's meetings with senior clerics (see 0645 GMT) was Ahmadinejad's Chief of Staff Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai. Khabar Online, unsurprisingly, surmises that this is because the President was firmly told to leave Rahim-Mashai behind.

0755 GMT: On the International Front. Lots of media attention to apparent tensions in Moscow between Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and her Russian hosts over Iran. The immediate focus is on whether Russia will finally help Tehran to bring the Bushehr nuclear power plant on-line (Helpful Hint: the Russians are playing a double game, trying to delay completion while publicly declaring that they will ensure Bushehr will start operations in 2010).

The wider issue --- overlooked in The New York Times summary --- is whether Russia will give public backing to an expanded sanctions programme. The dispute in Moscow moves the arrow towards "No".

0745 GMT: Taming the Internet? The New York Times highlights the ongoing battle of the opposition for access to and dissemination of information with "Iran’s Opposition Seeks More Help in Cyberwar With Government". The article highlights both the steps forward and the sizeable challenge that remains. The take-away quote from Mehdi Yahyanejad of the Persian-language news portal Balatarin:
The Islamic Republic is very efficient in limiting people’s access to these sources, and Iranian people need major help. We need some 50 percent of people to be able to access independent news sources other than the state-controlled media.

0730 GMT: Pick Your Analysis. In sharp contrast to the analyses of other "Western" observers, Scott Peterson of the Christian Science Monitor asks, "Does Iran’s most powerful man – whose official title is God’s Deputy on Earth, infallible to his ardent followers – think he is winning?"

Caution is needed here as well. Peterson's supporting evidence of "several close observers" is primarily two unnamed Iranian academics, and some of their declarations are sweeping:
[The Supreme Leader is] in triumphant mood right now. But deep down, he knows he’s lost the war of legitimacy and popularity....Deep inside –-- this is my belief –-- he does not have a very good sleep at night. He’s very angry –-- that’s what I can see in his face. The slogans they leveled against him, the image he’s got –-- he’s lost a lot of the popularity he had.

More useful may be assessments which don't rely on speculating inside Khamenei's head:
It’s almost like one voice coming out of the establishment, state-run television, all their hard-line newspapers, saying that "we managed to crush them”

At the same time, worries are clear to see. They are not in a state of panic [as] in the past, but are still on very high alert. They feel that enemies are organizing, and reformers are just pawns.

0645 GMT: We start the morning clearing away the underbrush of distorted or wayward analyses of Iran's internal situation.

Flynt and Hillary Mann Leverett have written another hit piece, with weakly-supported polemic posing as analysis, claiming the death of the Green Movement.

Far more seriously (since I am not sure key circles in Washington are still paying attention to the Leveretts' repetitions), Najmeh Bozorgmehr of the Financial Times, who has been a quality front-line journalist in Iran, has carried out an examination of the opposition which gets muddled in editing. Bozorgmehr's evaluation is sharp and incisive in places, such as "The Green Movement’s leaders have changed course, publicly urging followers to stop mass demonstrations, to avoid bloodshed and to win support of other social groups, notably lower-income people." She adds, "Iranian analysts and western diplomats doubt if the regime has snuffed out the challenge of the opposition."

However, Bozorgmehr also has some loose, unsupported sentences, "Reformists concede that the intensifying radicalism of demonstrations helped Mr Ahmadinejad to shore up support." And the headlines are caricatures: the Financial Times goes for "Iran's Regime Contains Opposition", while the Irish Times creates, "Hard Line Seems to Have Tamed Iran's Green Movement".

Elsewhere, others have not been tamed. Journalist and activist Isa Saharkhiz, who has been detained for eight months, has told his family that he went on hunger strike Thursday morning and that other prisoners in Section 350 of Evin Prison will join him to protest illegal detention and inhumane conditions.

And President Ahmadinejad has tried to carry out his own taming by visiting senior clerics in Qom. The Financial Times reports that Ahmadinejad met six marja but gives no details beyond that. There is only the cryptic sentence from an analyst, "A massive lobby by the most influential authorities happened to convince the clergy to see the president."

That just raises another question: which "most influential authorities"? We are monitoring.
Friday
Mar192010

Afghanistan: Why the Poppies Trouble the Marjah "Victory" (Foust)

A month after the hype of the "victory" of the US offensive for the town of Marjah in Helmand Provice, reality is proving troublesome. Th Associated Press has the counter-hype, "The Taliban have begun to fight back, launching a campaign of assassination and intimidation to frighten people from supporting the U.S. and its Afghan allies," while Asia Times Online reports that on 7 March, "Afghan President Hamid Karzai faced an angry reception from people" when he visited the southern town of Marjah following a major military assault against the Taliban.

Getting behind these headlines, Joshua Foust posts about the political and economic situation on Registan.net:

Afghanistan: Return of the Militias?


Two weeks ago, I wrote in the New York Times:
Good government will matter little, though, if the local economy is in a shambles. Marja’s agricultural base relies primarily on opium, and any new counternarcotics policies will wreak havoc; arresting or killing the drug traffickers will ultimately be the same as attacking local farmers. The timing of the offensive could not be more damaging: opium is planted in the winter and harvested in the spring, which means those who planted last year cannot recoup their investment.


In Helmand, opium is the only way farmers can acquire credit: they take out small loans, called salaam, from narcotics smugglers or Taliban officials, often in units of poppy seed, and pay back that loan in opium paste after harvest. If they cannot harvest their opium, they are in danger of defaulting on their loan — a very dangerous proposition.

Western aid groups distributed wheat seeds last fall, but there was little follow-up and it seems few farmers used them. This year, the aid workers should be prepared to pay farmers compensation for any opium crops they are unable to harvest as a result of the fighting, and the Western coalition should help the groups develop a microcredit system.

Behold:
The swift American-led military offensive that drove the Taliban from power in this southern Afghan farm belt came at an inopportune time for the area’s poppy farmers. That’s created a quandary for Marjah’s new, U.S.-backed leaders and for the American military as they try to transform this sweltering river valley, whose biggest cash crop is opium poppy, into a tranquil breadbasket.

“The helicopters are landing in my field,” the weathered farmer told Fennell as they sat in the dirt outside the Marines’ newest forward operating base in Marjah. “You have to stop landing there. Next time, the Taliban will put an IED in the field,” an improvised explosive device, the military’s term for a homemade bomb.

Unfortunately, the Marines are refusing to compensate farmers for any damage they cause to their poppy fields. This is counterproductive—as the farmer himself strongly hinted, there remain strong ties to the Taliban in the area (more on that below): the Taliban, in fact, rescued Marjeh from predatory government officials some time ago and had set up a relatively stable set of economic and judicial institutions. If the Marines are going to destroy those, and there are many reasons why they should, they have to immediately provide alternatives or risk brutalizing the very people they need to win over.

Unfortunately, the Marines in Marjah seem determined to stamp out opium—a far cry from the clear thinking that accompanied their first deployment to Helmand in 2008, when they vowed to resolutely ignore the opium and focus on more important things (seriously: focusing on opium instead of almost anything else badly misses the point).

There’s no time to waste. In that same NYT article, I wrote:
Last, progress on these other fronts will do nothing if the Taliban return, which means a significant number of troops must stay for at least a year. Gen. David Petraeus, head of the Central Command, has said that Marja was merely an “initial salvo” in an 18-month campaign to also retake neighboring Kandahar Province, the birthplace of the Taliban. Kandahar is Afghanistan’s second-largest city, so it is reasonable to assume that many troops will be pulled out of Marja for that campaign…

At a minimum, at least two battalions should stay in Marja permanently, to undergird the new government. They shouldn’t build a new base outside the town for this, or “commute” to the area from strongholds in Helmand like Camp Leatherneck. They should live right inside the town, providing security and guidance from within. You can’t have a “population-centric” counterinsurgency unless you take care of the people.

There are reports emerging from Marjeh that the Taliban is alreadyreasserting itself. While the military ferries Haji Zahir, the new “governor,” to and fro in a helicopter—quite the vote of confidence, considering Marjeh is an area of only a few dozen miles on a side—the Taliban have already begun posting night letters, and beating and even beheading people who cooperate too closely with the U.S. Even so, the barriers to the new government succeeding are basic enough to make me question whether ISAF was lying about having a government in a box ready to go.
“How may of us are from Marjah?” U.S. Marine Col. Randy Newman asked the two-dozen men taking part in the meeting. “None. The Taliban are from Marjah. They have earned some amount of trust of the people. The people trusted the Taliban justice. If we continue in this manner, we will not earn their trust.”

During Sunday’s meeting, the U.S. Army adviser working with Afghan forces told Zahir that the security forces were being constrained because there was no judicial system in place to jail suspected Taliban insurgents turned in by local residents.

We need to sit down and have a very strong discussion about how we’re going to deal with Afghan justice for these men we know are hurting people,” said Matt, who’s advising Afghan police in one section of Marjah. They look at me and smile because they know they’re going to be released within 24 to 48 hours.

“The people of southern Marjah are not going to be confident in our ability to bring security until we can permanently take those men off the battlefield,” he said. “That’s where we earn the population’s trust.”

Again: we destroyed a functioning government and replaced it with borderline-chaos. If the Marines cannot get this under control very quickly, it will turn against them in a very bloody way.
Thursday
Mar182010

UPDATED Info & Cyber-Battles: US Army v. Wikileaks

UPDATE 18 March: The New York Times has discovered the story, "Pentagon Sees a Threat From Online Muckrakers".



---
For those of us looking for the story behind the story, Wikileaks has been a valuable source since 2007. Its revelations are not limited to one Government or case; rather, in the name of openness, it has been a site for exposure of the misdeeds and manipulations of those in power from China to the US to the United Nations.


In its latest scoop, Wikileaks reveals how the US Government tried to cripple the activities of....Wikileaks. The website summarises a 32-page classified (Secret/No Foreign Dissemination) report from the US Army:

Linking to Wikileaks in Australia? The Fine is A$11,000



The report recommends, “The identification, exposure, termination of employment, criminal prosecution, legal action against current or former insiders, leakers, or whistleblowers could potentially damage or destroy this center of gravity and deter others considering similar actions from using the Wikileaks.org Web site.”....As an odd justificaton for the plan, the report claims that “several foreign countries including China, Israel, North Korea, Russia, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe have denounced or blocked access to the Wikileaks.org website”.

The opening of the report:

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
(S//NF) Wikileaks.org, a publicly accessible Internet Web site, represents a potential force protection, counterintelligence, operational security (OPSEC), and information security (INFOSEC) threat to the US Army.


The intentional or unintentional leaking and posting of US Army sensitive or classified information to Wikileaks.org could result in increased threats to DoD [Department of Defense] personnel, equipment, facilities, or installations. The leakage of sensitive and classified DoD information also calls attention to the insider threat, when a person or persons motivated by a particular cause or issue wittingly provides information to domestic or foreign personnel or

organizations to be published by the news media or on the Internet. Such information could be of value to foreign intelligence and security services (FISS), foreign military forces, foreign insurgents, and foreign terrorist groups for collecting information or for planning attacks against US forces, both within the United States and abroad.

(S//NF) The possibility that a current employee or mole within DoD or elsewhere in the US government is providing sensitive information or classified information to Wikileaks.org cannot be ruled out. Wikileaks.org claims that the "leakers"or "whistleblowers" of sensitive or classified DoD documents are former US government employees. These claims are highly suspect, however, since Wikileaks.org states that the anonymity and protection of the leakers or whistleblowers is one of its primary goals. Referencing of leakers using codenames and providing incorrect employment information, employment status, and other contradictory information by Wikileaks.org are most likely rudimentary OPSEC [operational security] measures designed to protect the identity of the current or former insiders who leaked the information. On the other hand, one cannot rule out the possibility that some of the contradictions in describing leakers could be inadvertent OPSEC errors by the authors, contributors, or Wikileaks.org staff personnel with limited experience in protecting the identity of their sources.

(U) The stated intent of the Wikileaks.org Web site is to expose unethical practices, illegal behavior, and wrongdoing within corrupt corporations and oppressive regimes in Asia, the former Soviet bloc, Sub-Saharan Africa, and the Middle East. To do so, the developers of the Wikileaks.org Web site want to provide a secure forum to where leakers, contributors, or whistleblowers from any country can anonymously post or send documentation and other

information that exposes corruption or wrongdoing by governments or corporations. The developers believe that the disclosure of sensitive or classified information involving a foreign government or corporation will eventually result in the increased accountability of a democratic, oppressive, or corrupt the government to its citizens.

(S//NF) Anyone can post information to the Wikileaks.org Web site, and there is no editorial review or oversight to verify the accuracy of any information posted to the Web site. Persons accessing the Web site can form their own opinions regarding the accuracy of the information posted, and they are allowed to post comments. This raises the possibility that the Wikileaks.org Web site could be used to post fabricated information; to post misinformation, disinformation, and propaganda; or to conduct perception management and influence operations designed to convey a negative message to those who view or retrieve information from the Web site.

(U) Diverse views exist among private persons, legal experts, advocates for open government and accountability, law enforcement, and government officials in the United States and other countries on the stated goals of Wikileaks.org. Some contend that the leaking and posting of information on Wikileaks.org is constitutionally protected free speech, supports open society and open government initiatives, and serves the greater public good in such a manner that outweighs any illegal acts that arise from the posting of sensitive or classified government or business information. Others believe that the Web site or persons associated with Wikileaks.org will face legal challenges in some countries over privacy issues, revealing sensitive or classified government information, or civil lawsuits for posting information that is wrong, false, slanderous, libelous, or malicious in nature.

For example, the Wikileaks.org Web site in the United States was shutdown on 14 February 2008 for 2 weeks by court order over the publishing of sensitive documents in a case involving charges of money laundering, grand larceny, and tax evasion by the Julius Bare Bank in the Cayman Islands and Switzerland. The court case against Wikileaks.org was dropped by Julius Bare Bank, the US court order was lifted and the Web site was restored in the United States. Efforts by some domestic and foreign personnel and organizations to discredit the Wikileaks.org Web site include allegations that it wittingly allows the posting of uncorroborated information, serves as an instrument of propaganda, and is a front organization of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

(S//NF) The governments of China, Israel, North Korea, Russia, Thailand, Zimbabwe, and several other countries have blocked access to Wikileaks.org-type Web sites, claimed they have the right to investigate and prosecute Wikileaks.org and associated whistleblowers, or insisted they remove false, sensitive, or classified government information, propaganda, or malicious content from the Internet. The governments of China, Israel, and Russia claim the right to remove objectionable content from, block access to, and investigate crimes related to the posting of documents or comments to Web sites such as Wikileaks.org. The governments of these countries most likely have the technical skills to take such action should they choose to do so.

(S//NF) Wikileaks.org uses trust as a center of gravity by assuring insiders, leakers, and whistleblowers who pass information to Wikileaks.org personnel or who post information to the Web site that they will remain anonymous. The identification, exposure, or termination of employment of or legal actions against current or former insiders, leakers, or whistleblowers could damage or destroy this center of gravity and deter others from using Wikileaks.org to make such information public.
Monday
Mar152010

The Latest from Iran (15 March): Breaking Human Rights

2133 GMT: More Death Penalties or Old News? There's chatter tonight about a supposed announcement of "six death sentences" for protesters on Ashura (27 December), featured on The New York Times website.

We're being careful about this. Our perception is that the announcement is merely the restatement of death sentences which have already been announced by the Tehran Prosecutor General's office, rather than --- as the NYT piece indicates --- a new set of capital punishments.

2130 GMT: We've posted a separate entry on the developing story of the ban on the Islamic Iran Participation Front.

1945 GMT: Resisting the Empire of Lies. Responding to the Government's assertion that it has been banned (see 1650 GMT), the reformist party Islamic Iran Participation Front calls on all political and social activists to continue their social struggles and not to “give in to the empire of lies”. The IIPF claimed that the attempted ban reveals the “weakness of the government” and that civil institutions and activists will “grow and expand" their activities.

NEW Iran Breaking: Ban on Reformist Political Party
NEW Your Super-Special Iran Caption Contest
Iran: The Opposition’s Campaign in the US — Sequel With Revelations and A Lesson
Iran: Connecting the Dots — 5 Signs of Regime Trouble
Iran Letter: “I Am Still Alive to Tell the Story” (Shams)
The Latest from Iran (14 March): False Strategies, Real Conflicts


1940 GMT: Power, Money, and Oil. The engineering firm owned by the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps has been awarded an $850 million oil pipeline contract.


1935 GMT: Denying the Propaganda. The Center for Defense of Human Rights, connected with Nobel Prize laureate Shirin Ebadi, has rejected the allegation of Fars that it receives financial aid from the US Government. CDHR announced that it intends to sue the news agency for libel.

1930 GMT: Have a Happy Great Satan, Off-the-Streets Fire Festival. An activist reports that Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting is showing 11 movies on Tuesday, including District 9 andUP on Charshanbeh Suri. I'm sure this has nothing to do with a wish to keep people inside their homes and off the streets during the Fire Festival.


1650 GMT: Barring the Reformists? Deputy Interior Minister Solat Mortazavi says the Islamic Iran Participation Front, Iran's largest reformist party, has been stripped by the judiciary of its authorization to conduct political activity.

The judiciary has not confirmed the ban, and the IIPF said it was only barred from holding its annual meeting, scheduled for 11 March.

1545 GMT: Compromise Resolution? Iran's Parliament, after a skirmish with President Ahmadinejad, has given final approval to a $368 billion budget for the year to March 2011.

The Majlis originally passed a $347 billion plan, but Ahmadinejad wanted an extra $40 billion from anticipated subsidy reductions. The Parliament agreed to grant $20 billion but held out against the President's full request, despite an unusual appearance by Ahmadinejad to deliver a speech during voting.

1430 GMT: You asked for it, you've got it --- our readers have found the perfect photo for an Iran caption contest. Let the fun begin....

1245 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Prominent human rights lawyer Mohammad Oliyaifard has been released from detention.

1240 GMT: Showing Support. Mir Hossein Mousavi has met with members of the reformist Islamic Iran Participation Front.

1145 GMT: Ahmadinejad Embraces Non-Violence? Iran's latest get-tough pose loses something in translation. From Press TV:
Iran's President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has named the country's team tasked with minimizing the effects of damage on the country should it be attacked by foreign forces.

The occupant of the presidential palace in downtown Tehran on Monday appointed Chief-of-Staff of Iran's Joint Armed Forces Major General Hassan Firouzabadi as the head of the Permanent Passive Defense Committee.

A statement from the President's office also identified Davud Ahmadinejad as the President's special representative and the country's ministers of interior, defense and science as members of the committee.

0940 GMT: Gender and the Green Movement. Speaking to BBC Persian, Shadi Sadr has declared that the women's movement has managed to gather forces from different camps, from the religious (Azam Taleghani) to the secular (publisher Shahla Lahiji) to press its demands and influence politics at all levels. She complained that the women's movement has no political representative in the Green Movement. [A reader comments: Could Sadr fill that role?]

0930 GMT: Question of Day. Why was Tehran Prosecutor General Abbas Jafari Doulatabadi meeting marjas (senior clerics) in Qom?

0640 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Iran Gender Equality is maintaining two important lists: one on the status of women political prisoners and one on the status of detained journalists.

0615 GMT: The National Iranian American Council has published its summary of the US-Iran panel at last week's hearings in the US Senate. It's a fair reflection of a "realism" amongst American experts which is focused on nukes, nukes, nukes.

As NIAC notes, that issue was set within a call for a "broader strategic outlook" to deal with US-Iran tensions, bringing in discussion of Afghanistan, Iraq, the Middle East, and Iranian security. Questions of rights and justice in Iran, however, were barely mentioned by the panel, in contrast to the first session at the hearings.

0550 GMT: Ripples from the regime's latest strategy --- we've broken the journalists, now let's get the human rights activists --- continue. Among those named as agents for terrorist/US-backed cyber-war is Hossein Ronaghi Maleki, the man behind the Babak Khoramdin blog, who was arrested two months ago on accusations of spying for the CIA.

The attention to human rights campaigners does not mean that others have escaped attention. Among weekend arrests, that of Emad Bahavar of the Freedom Movement of Iran was notable. He was arrested and released recently but broke the condition of his freedom by continuing to publish incisive articles and protests against intrusions by Iranian security services.

Then there are claims that Basiji militia harassed Mehdi Karroubi's family on Sunday, surrounding and vandalising his house.

Understandably, in the face of the intense regime pressure, overt opposition moves are limited at the moment. Chatter continues about demonstrations tomorrow during the Chahrshanbeh Suri (Fire Festival) celebrations, but no substantial plans are being put forward.