Al-Qaeda In Pakistan: Making The Local Global

Today's Comment Is Free has a useful overview piece by Jason Burke which considers the involvement of al-Qaeda in conflict-strewn areas of Pakistan. As always it's a complicated relationship, with al-Qaeda's 'global' jihadis tapping in to local militancy and vice versa. Among Burke's findings (apparently sourced from insiders in the Pakistani intelligence community):

• Al-Qaeda may have operational links with Lashkar-e-Taiba (of the November Mumbai attacks) and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (of the Sri Lanka cricket attack in March).


• Relationships between al-Qaeda and Pakistani Taliban are more personal in nature- fighting in the region is less about al-Qaeda-style global jihad and more about the "disintegration of local tribal social hierarchies and values in recent decades, the radicalising effect of Western operations in Afghanistan, generalised mobilisation in much of the Islamic world, collateral damage resulting from US drone strikes and a very local dynamic pitting one valley and one tribe against another."


• Foreign 'al-Qaeda' militants are becoming involved so they can utilise the chaotic situation to regroup and- at least in theory- work to further their own more global aims.

The whole article is worth a read.

Transcript: Gates-Mullen Briefing on US Command Change in Afghanistan

SEC. GATES: First, I would like to express my horror and deep regret over today's shooting incident at Camp Liberty in Iraq. I offer my sympathy and condolences to the families of those who were killed. We are still in the process of gathering information on exactly what happened, but if the preliminary reports are confirmed, such a tragic loss of life at the hands of our own forces is a cause for great and urgent concern, and I can assure you that it will get this department's highest-priority attention.

As you know, I just returned from a trip to Afghanistan, where I met with our troops and commanders in the field. My purpose in going was to see firsthand the preparations and plans under way to execute the president's strategy for the region, especially as significantly more American troops begin arriving in country. I thought it critically important to get a sense from the ground level what needs -- what the needs are, what the challenges are and what the solutions to some of the problems are.

As I have said many times before, very few of these problems can be solved by military means alone. And yet, from the military perspective, we can and must do better. We have not been able to fully resource our military effort in Afghanistan in recent years, but I believe, resources or no, that our mission there requires new thinking and new approaches from our military leaders. Today we have a new policy set by our new president. We have a new strategy, a new mission and a new ambassador. I believe that new military leadership also is needed.

After consultation with the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the commander of Central Command, and with the approval of the president, I have asked for the resignation of General David McKiernan. He will remain in command of both ISAF and U.S. Forces Afghanistan until such time as a relief can be nominated and confirmed.

I am today recommending to the president that Lieutenant General Stanley McChrystal be nominated to replace General McKiernan as commander U.S. Forces Afghanistan.

I am also recommending that Lieutenant General David Rodriguez be assigned to the new position of deputy commander, U.S. Forces Afghanistan. I have advised the secretary general of NATO and the minister of defense of Afghanistan of these prospective changes.

I made these decisions only after careful consideration of a great number of factors, including the advice of Admiral Mullen and General Petraeus. In the end, I believe my decisions are in the best interests of our national security and the success of our mission in Afghanistan. I urge the Senate to swiftly confirm Generals McChrystal and Rodriguez so they can begin their important work as soon as possible.

Let none of this detract from, nor cause us ever to forget, General McKiernan's long and distinguished career of military service. For decades, in peace and war, Dave McKiernan has led hundreds of thousands of men and women in uniform with conviction, integrity and courage. He has dedicated his life to the preservation of the freedoms we in this nation enjoy. And on behalf of the Department of Defense and the nation, I thank him for his years of selfless service.

Pam.

Q (Off mike.) Are you worried at all that switching horses in midstream has an air of desperation, or that you -- that you -- what you saw on both of your recent trips there was worse than you had expected to see?

SEC. GATES: Well, let me start and then turn to Admiral Mullen.

I think that the -- as the statement suggested, that -- that with agreement on a new strategy and a new mission, and a new national approach and international approach in Afghanistan, that if there were to be a change, this is the right time to make the change, at a time when we are at the beginning of the implementation of a new strategy. And it is in that context that I emphasize that the focus here is simply on getting fresh thinking, fresh eyes on the problem, and in how we implement the strategy and the mission going forward.

ADM. MULLEN: In fact, for me, based on my recent trips, the opposite is true. In the time that I spent in RC East, I was very encouraged by the progress that we'd made and the depth of understanding of what the requirement was from our people on the military side to generate success.

Clearly that is not the case in the south, because we have not had the forces there, and putting them there this year is critically important. And I would only echo what the secretary said, from the standpoint of, with the new strategy, with the new team across the board, I felt it was very important for new leadership, and supported this decision completely.

Q Mr. Secretary?

Q Admiral Mullen? Mr. -- for both of you gentlemen, while you say you felt there needed to be fresh eyes, fresh thinking, General McKiernan, of course, has only been there for a period of months. He's yet to get the resources he asked the Obama administration for. The troops that he has asked for aren't even there yet.

So what specifically was he not doing that he -- you said you wanted fresh thinking, fresh eyes. Did he resist your ideas? Did he resist change? Was he uncooperative with the new thinking, the new way forward? What went wrong here?

SEC. GATES: Well, first of all, General McKiernan has been in Afghanistan, I think, 11 months. And -- first of all, I would say, nothing went wrong, and there was nothing specific.

It is -- it simply was my conviction, based on my consultations with Admiral Mullen and General Petraeus, that a fresh approach, a fresh look in the context of the new strategy, probably was in our best interest.

Q Mr. Secretary?

Q Admiral Mullen?

Q Admiral Mullen -- excuse me. Admiral Mullen, what -- why couldn't, in your mind -- you said you supported the recommendation; in your mind, why could General McKiernan no longer do the job?

ADM. MULLEN: Again, he's been there almost a year. And, in fact, under normal circumstances, he would have rotated somewhere between 18 and 24 months, depending on timing.

I have said that we must focus all of our effort in terms of making Afghanistan better.

There probably is no more critical ingredient than that -- than leadership. And again, along with all the other changes, it's time now. And that's why I made that recommendation.

Q Is it just loss of confidence? I haven't heard anything yet -- I'm so sorry -- about why you both think he couldn't do the job.

ADM. MULLEN: Well, I'm not going to say a whole lot more, other than the -- I thought there was a need for new leadership -- clearly we have in the two that the secretary -- the two officers that the secretary mentioned a rich experience level -- General Rodriguez in particular deep in Afghanistan, having been there before -- and that I think these two officers will bring a -- not just a renewed but a focus, which we really need in 2009, and I just didn't think that we could wait until 2010.

Q Mr. Secretary, having talked to people who are involved in all this, they say McKiernan was maybe too conventional, too "old Army" in his outlook, not nimble enough to deal with the complex counterinsurgency. And as the admiral mentioned, McChrystal has a lot more experience in Afghanistan. Could you just comment on some of that?

SEC GATES: Well, it's -- you know, I won't -- it's hard to say anything more than we've already said. I would -- Admiral Mullen just talked about the experience that -- in counterinsurgency that both General McChrystal and General Rodriguez have.

I would tell you that those who are speculating on the ingredients in this decision, if it's not Admiral Mullen or me or General Petraeus, has (sic) no inside information on our thinking.

Q So McKiernan just lacked a certain counterinsurgency experience or wasn't nimble enough on this?

SEC. GATES: I think what the admiral said is exactly where we are. It's time for new leadership and fresh eyes. Julian?

Q Secretary Gates, for you, talk to me a little bit more about why General McChrystal and his -- whether it's the Special Operations background came into your thinking.

And Admiral Mullen, if you would talk a little bit about the effort that General McChrystal has been doing for you in terms of how to resource the Afghanistan mission, what -- why you assigned him that, what his mission was in that.

SEC. GATES: I would simply say that both General McChrystal and General Rodriguez bring a unique skill set in counterinsurgency to these issues. And I think that they will provide the kind of new leadership and fresh thinking that the admiral and I have been talking about.

ADM. MULLEN: I just -- for both of them, as -- whenever you look for replacements -- I mean, whenever that occurs, you -- I took a broad range of inputs from military officers.

And McChrystal and Rodriguez rank -- outside this discussion, outside this change, McChrystal and Rodriguez have ranked, for the entire time that I've been chairman, at the top of the list. So we couldn't pick two better officers.

And then specifically, Julian, with respect to the -- the discussions and focus on getting the best people to Afghanistan, making sure that we resource that as rapidly and as thoroughly as possible, making sure that leaders who go there that -- have that experience so that our ramp-up time when we turn over is absolutely minimal -- all of that focuses on the importance of Afghanistan, and actually lessons that we learned from Iraq where some of our rotations would -- you know, we were starting over from an experience level. So it's how to do that and keep that focus and move as fast as we can from a resourcing people, training, expertise standpoint in Afghanistan.

Q Is this something you started thinking about some months ago? And could you also tell us what Ambassador Holbrooke's role might have been in this? And also, when -- did you just tell him today?

SEC. GATES: Ambassador Holbrooke?

Q (Off mike.)

SEC. GATES: No. I talked to him when I was in Afghanistan last week. The answer to part of your question is that Ambassador Holbrooke played no role in this.

Q He had no recommendation, had no thoughts about how --

SEC. GATES: I don't know whether he had any thoughts. He played no role in this.

Q You'd know. (Laughs.)

ADM. MULLEN: No, I mean, he had no role to -- in this at all.

Q Well, can you talk a little bit about how and when you started thinking about this? Is this some months ago? Is it --

ADM. MULLEN: General McKiernan was -- originally planned to be there between 18 and 24 months. So as far back as six or seven months ago, I was looking at his relief, potentially his relief, as well as General Odierno, who's due to leave sometime early in 2010. So there had been discussions about this over an extended period time. I think certainly for me it's been in the last several months, as we've focused heavily on Afghanistan and resourcing it and how we were going to move forward, that this issue -- that the specifics of this really came to bear and that -- that I concluded that it was time for a change, and made that recommendation to the secretary.

Q So is it fair to say that in terms of a -- unique skill sets, that General McChrystal -- for those who don't follow his career, he specializes in black -- commando special operations: the capturing of Saddam Hussein, the killing of Abu Zarqawi, the melding of intelligence and special-ops units in the -- during the surge. Is that what you're looking for from him in terms of Afghanistan -- replicating some of those successes in that terrain?

SEC. GATES: Well, let me say something and then invite the admiral. The way I look at this is as -- McChrystal and Rodriguez as a team. They each bring tremendous skills in a variety of areas that are very pertinent to the kind of fight that we have in Afghanistan. And it is their combined skill set that I think gives us some fresh opportunities looking forward.

ADM. MULLEN: And while General McChrystal has that background that you described, Tony, his background is much deeper and much broader than that. And I've been privileged to work with him over the better part of the last year and seen that, you know, the broadness and the depth that go far beyond just high-end special-operations skills. And I'm extremely confident that he will be able to carry out this mission in its fullness to include, obviously, those skills, but others as well.

Q Those kind of missions, though, to make this more a SOF-like fight?

ADM. MULLEN: I wouldn't be specific about what kind -- you know, exactly the kinds of missions we would increase specifically. But certainly his focus and his background, I think, are very relevant to our needs there. And then -- but it really is also the combination of he and Rodriguez which are so important.

Q Mr. Secretary, you've often said that you were worried about establishing too big a military footprint in Afghanistan. Yet General McKiernan, it seemed like every few months, was asking for more and more and higher levels of forces. Is that one of the areas that wasn't new-think, in your mind? And did you and General McKiernan have a difference there?

SEC. GATES: No, that had nothing to do with it, as far as I was concerned.

Q And about keeping the troop levels lower, you were talking, Admiral Mullen, about the lessons learned in Iraq. Wasn't that one of the lessons learned in Iraq, that we didn't have enough troops in Iraq initially?

ADM. MULLEN: Well, as I've looked at the analysis for what we need, certainly, in the immediate future, the troops we have in the east recently are -- have recently put in there, as well as those going in the south, those meet the needs that we see that we have right now. And I'm very comfortable that they will be able to provide the hold after the clear, which is where we've been short, particularly in the south.

Q Mr. Secretary, can you talk a bit -- now that these changes have been made at the very top, what follow-on changes may take place? I mean, for instance, as an organizational issue, will there be an RC South -- American commands in RC South paralleling RC East? And even in general terms, can you talk about on the ground, tactically, what we may see differently going forward in the months ahead that was not the case up until now?

SEC. GATES: Well, I don't know that I can speak very well to the strategy and tactics going forward. I don't expect there to be a change in the command rotation in RC South. The Dutch are in command now. They will be replaced for -- at the end of a year by the British, who will be in command for a year, and then we will take command in 2010.

And some of the additional troop levels that General McKiernan has asked for are, in fact, a two-star headquarters to support when the U.S. takes command of RC South in the fall of 2010, in November, I think. So I don't anticipate any change in that arrangement.

Q Can you talk even in general terms about what might take place differently on the ground, as far as the prosecution of the war?

SEC. GATES: No, I don't know.

ADM. MULLEN: I think -- I mean, in some ways, we're learning as we go here. I mean, we're -- what General McKiernan has recommended, in terms of the troops that are going there now, are the ones that we're resourcing.

But I'd also certainly want to hear from new leadership what their beliefs are once they get there, get on the ground and make some recommendations about how to move forward as rapidly as possible.

So I'm not aware of any changes. And I wouldn't speak to exactly how they're going to -- how they'd fight it, although I've been briefed, for instance, on, you know, how it's going to apply in the south here over the course of this year.
But certainly with new leadership, there will probably be some fresh views, which we will have very, very good discussions about.

Q Admiral, you said, we can and must do better. And so I'm surprised you don't have any more solid idea of how we need to do better.

ADM. MULLEN: I can't think of a more important decision than putting in new leadership, with respect to that, and then having the impact that is so critical.

Q Actually the secretary said, we must and can do better. Any thoughts on how?

SEC. GATES: Well, I think, that's the challenge that we give to the new leadership. How do we -- how do we do better? What new ideas do you have? What fresh thinking do you have? Are there different ways of accomplishing our goals? How can we be more effective? The admiral and I aren't the source of those ideas. General McChrystal and General Rodriguez are. And that's what we expect from them.

Q Let me ask it a different way. One of the criticisms of General McKiernan was that he hadn't implemented a joint campaign plan, essentially an implementation of the way the strategy would be used on the ground. When the new leadership gets there, do you have a sense that then they will provide new feedback that could change the Af-Pak strategy as we know it? And what might it be?

SEC. GATES: Well, I -- first of all, the new strategy is a strategy approved by the president. And it is a whole-of-government strategy. If there are any changes that they would recommend, it would be in the military part of that strategy.

Q Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Recently North Korea said that if South Korea participated in -- (inaudible) -- then North Korea will regard it as an act of war. What is your comment on this?

SEC. GATES: Well, I've been frankly surprised and disturbed by the kind of rhetoric coming out of North Korea in recent weeks. And I think that North Korea has effectively isolated itself internationally, even greater than was the case before, by some of this rhetoric. But that's what I think it is, rhetoric.

Q (Off mike) -- you can give us any more detail of the shooting in Iraq -- what you know about the soldier, whether he'd been on multiple deployments, whether he was seeking help for combat stress? Are there any details you can give us?

ADM. MULLEN: No, I don't -- I don't have a whole lot more than what -- than that which is already out there. Clearly, the tragedy occurred in a -- in a -- in a place where individuals were -- were seeking help. And I'd also like to certainly extend my condolences and thoughts and prayers to the families of those who were killed.

It does speak to me, though, about the need for us to redouble our efforts, the concern in terms of dealing with the stress, dealing with the whole issue of those kinds of things. And it also speaks to the issue of multiple deployments, you know, increasing dwell time, all those things that we're focused on to try to improve to relieve that stress. But I just don't have the specifics of this particular incident.

Q Mr. Secretary, where do we stand now on the bombings in western Afghanistan? A lot of blame was thrown each way -- senior Defense officials blaming the Taliban; Taliban blaming U.S., saying there was the use of white phosphorous. Where does that investigation stand? Is there any light you can shed on that?

SEC. GATES: Well, let me tell you what I think the status is and ask the admiral to correct me if I get it wrong.
My understanding is that General McKiernan has sent a general officer to Farah province to participate with the Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior in an investigation of what happened. I also understand that General Petraeus is either considering or has already decided to send someone to Afghanistan from outside the country to investigate the tragedy.
(To Adm. Mullen.) Is that --

ADM. MULLEN: Yes, sir.

Q Do you have an update on how many civilians may have died?

SEC. GATES: No.

Q And have any payments been made to civilian families, as you suggested they would be done immediately last time you were in Afghanistan?

SEC. GATES: I don't -- I just don't know.

Q Clarification? Mr. Secretary, just a clarification. Does General McKiernan's resignation end his military career?

SEC. GATES: Probably.

Q Sir, can I follow up on that other issue of the bombing? You've expressed concern and frustration the military is unable to counter Taliban or al Qaeda propaganda. In this case, with the bombing in Afghanistan, it seems that they have -- they have a storyline, and the U.S. and McKiernan hinted at another narrative, that the Taliban had killed a bunch of people.
How, going forward, do you hope that that changes? And do you see the new leadership there kind of jumping in on that issue?

SEC. GATES: Well, one of the -- one of the disadvantages we have in these situations is that the Taliban don't tell the truth and they don't care what the truth is. And so when you're making it up, you can respond a lot faster than when you're trying to figure out what actually happened.

And we have -- and that has been a disadvantage for us on an ongoing basis. And we have to figure out how to get inside that strategic communications cycle to get in front of this issue. This is a principal strategic tactic of the Taliban, is the use -- is either provoking or exploiting civilian casualties.

And we have done a lot -- and I must say, General McKiernan has done a lot -- in recent months to try and reduce the level of civilian casualties. The fact of the matter is, civilian casualties since January in Afghanistan are down 40 percent over a year ago during the same period. And U.S., Afghan and ISAF casualties are up 75 percent during the same period.
So there is a tremendous effort going on on our part to try and avoid civilian casualties. But figuring out how to come out better on the strategic communications side of this is an ongoing challenge for us.

Q Is it more of the process, or is it just cultural resistance in the military to just come out and say the truth as soon as you know it?

SEC. GATES: Well, I think -- I'm not sure I would characterize it as a military cultural aspect. I think it's more an American characteristic to try and figure out what happened before you decide --

Q (Off mike) -- President Karzai came out over the weekend. He called upon the U.S. to stop using airstrikes and also to stop nighttime raids. Is that at all practical, do you think?

SEC. GATES: Well, I can't improve on General Jones' statement yesterday, that we can't fight this war with one hand tied behind us. But one of the things that General McKiernan has been working on and that I am confident that Generals McChrystal and Rodriguez will work on is how we can do better in this area.

Q Let me ask you about Swat Valley very quickly. We have seen now perhaps half-a-million Pakistanis displaced in their own country. You've given billions to Pakistan. You've urged them to engage in counterinsurgency. Is this kind of aerial and artillery bombardment the kind of -- with thousands displaced -- the kind of counterinsurgency strategy you wanted them to embark on?

ADM. MULLEN: Actually, I spoke in a continuing dialogue with General Kiyani. I spoke to him earlier today. He called me just to update me specifically. And I won't go into the -- into the details of that, but they actually have made considerable progress in recent weeks and in -- in ways that many of us -- many -- not many of us, but many would have not predicted.
Clearly, there is a concern for the refugees and taking care of that. I know that the prime minister has been out speaking to the need for the Pakistan people to support that. That's also an important strategic both shift and emphasis.
And then I guess I wouldn't get into the details of his planning or his execution, but he's certainly aware of the challenges in particular with respect to the IDPs and the need for his government and other NGOs to address that issue.

Q But are you satisfied with the strategy that you're seeing? Because there are now potentially hundreds of thousands of IDPs? Are you satisfied?

ADM. MULLEN: I think, at least historically in counterinsurgencies, particularly when you're in the -- in the aggressive -- when you -- when you start them, you do -- we do see lots of IDPs and have to address that. And certainly, we're all concerned about that. I know that it's -- that it's -- that concern is being addressed specifically by the Pakistani government as a priority.

SEC. GATES: Thank you all very much.

Transcript: David Petraeus on CNN's "State of the Union"

Related Post: David Petraeus on “Fox News Sunday”

JOHN KING: General Petraeus, welcome back to "State of the Union." I want to start with the offensive under way by the Pakistani military in Pakistan. It took a long time for you to convince Pakistan to get about this. And I'm starting at the map so I can pull out and show our viewers the area we're talking about, the Swat district up here, right in here.

Just a basic question for you, sir. This offensive has been under way for quite a bit of time now. How effective is it?

PETRAEUS: Well, let me say, I'm not sure I accept the characterization that you said. This is Pakistan's offensive, and it was galvanized by Taliban action, certainly not by American rhetoric or encouragement.

What has happened in this case is that the actions of the Taliban in breaking the agreement that was reached for Swat, and then moving into other districts of the Northwest Frontier province, these have served as a catalyst, really, for all of Pakistan. And you now see all of the Pakistani political leaders, including opposition figures, you see the Pakistani people and you see the Pakistani military determined to reverse this trend and to deal with the Taliban threat, ultimately, in Swat Valley.

KING: And how effective do you think it is being -- and let me ask in the context of -- this is a military offensive. They are going in there and bombing and pushing them out and attacking them, but I would not say this is out of the Petraeus counterinsurgency playbook. So do you worry at all that these gains will be short-term, not lasting?

PETRAEUS: Well, the true test in counterinsurgency -- and I can tell you that in our dialogue with Pakistani leaders this past week, there is a clear recognition of the concept of counterinsurgency operations, of employing all the tools of government, a whole of government approach. And over the past year, for example, there have been a number of actions that reflect the kind of, if you will, learning and adapting that our own forces have taken -- gone through in recent years as they have carried out operations in Bajaur and Mohmand and so forth. And this will be the challenge, I think, is to bring all of the assets of the government of Pakistan to bear to help their military as it goes in and conducts operations, which inevitably already have displaced citizens, and certainly will displace more of them over time.

KING: When you were here, sir, with Ambassador Holbrooke a few weeks back, both of you spoke openly about the trust deficit between the United States and the Pakistani government and the Pakistani military that has played out in recent years. After the conversations of the past week, how much of that has been repaired and still how much of it do you have?

PETRAEUS: Well, I think the conversations here were quite productive and positive. In fact, I think most participants assessed after the conduct of the trilateral meetings that not just the rhetoric, but even the substance exceeded expectations. So I think they're very helpful. I think they were truly unprecedented in the way that some of the individuals on either side had never even met each other before, and then we had good bilateral conversations with each of the leaders and their delegations as well.

But this is a process. It continues. The trust deficit, if you will, is something that stems back to us dropping Pakistan in the wake of the expulsion of the Soviets from Afghanistan. It lasted for years, and it will take months and years to reestablish the kind of trust and bonds and partnership that are necessary to move forward.

And of course, it's not just the United States. This is the entire world. And it is with a government that has been in office, the first really truly democratically elected Pakistani government in some time, elected just nine, 10 months ago.

KING: When you were here, you said that the United States would not go into Pakistan unless it saw something compelling. This has been a sensitive issue. As the Pakistani military has put pressure on the Taliban, have there been any occasions in the past few weeks where you have had targets of opportunity that have caused U.S. forces to go across the border?

PETRAEUS: No. And I think we have been unequivocal in saying that this is not about us putting combat boots on the ground. This is about us providing assistance, as we do numerous nations around the world. A bit more robust in this case, certainly, but we provide some training assistance, we provide ammunition, we provide spare parts, help with maintenance systems, processes. But a lot of these very similar to the kinds of security assistance programs that we have around the world, albeit this one more robust, and also in the form of the coalition support funds, significantly additional funding.

KING: As this focus now is on the Taliban, give me your assessment of Al Qaida. It has moved, essentially, its headquarters from Afghanistan into Pakistan. With all the focus on the Taliban right now, is this allowing Al Qaida a chance to regroup? And let me ask it in this context. If Al Qaida in Afghanistan was at a 10 in its operational capability on 9/11, how would you rate Al Qaida on that same scale now, as it is based in Pakistan?

PETRAEUS: I don't want to get into that kind of numerical ranking, but I think it's worth going back and looking at the history, of course. In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, we expelled the Taliban and Al Qaida and the other elements of the so-called syndicate of extremists that had found sanctuaries and safe havens in Afghanistan. They eventually relocated into the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and some of the other areas of the border regions.

But I think it's very important to note that those organizations, Al Qaida in particular, has sustained some very serious losses over the course of the last six to 10 months or so, and there is a considerable concern among those leaders because of the losses that they have sustained.

KING: I want you to listen to something that the Afghanistan president, Hamid Karzai, told our Wolf Blitzer a couple of days ago, when he put the question to him, are there still Al Qaida in your country? Let's listen.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

WOLF BLITZER, CNN ANCHOR: Are you saying there's no Al Qaida in Afghanistan right now?

HAMID KARZAI, PRESIDENT OF AFGHANISTAN: No Al Qaida based in Afghanistan.

BLITZER: So who are you fighting against?

KARZAI: That's the thing, that's why we say that the war on terrorism is not in the Afghan villages. That it's in the sanctuaries, it's in the financial support system to them, it's in the training grounds. And it's beyond Afghan borders. That has now been established by the U.S. administration.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

KING: No Al Qaida at all in Afghanistan. Is that an exaggeration, General Petraeus, or is that true?

PETRAEUS: No, I would agree with that assessment. Certainly, Al Qaida and its affiliates. Again, remember that this is, as I mentioned earlier, a syndicate of extremist organizations, some of which are truly transnational extremists. In other words, don't just conduct attacks in Afghanistan and Pakistan and India, but even throughout the rest of the world, as we saw in the U.K. a couple of years ago. They do come in and out of Afghanistan, but the Al Qaida -- precise Al Qaida, if you will -- is not based, per se, in Afghanistan, although its elements and certainly its affiliates -- Baitullah Mehsud's group, commander Nazir Khaqani (ph) network and others, certainly do have enclaves and sanctuaries in certain parts of eastern Afghanistan. And then the Afghan Taliban, of course, has a number of districts in which it has its fighters and its shadow government, if you will, even.

But I think, no, I think that's an accurate assessment, and that the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan -- that very, very mountainous, rugged terrain just east of the Afghan border and in the western part of Pakistan -- is the locus of the leadership of these organizations, although they do, again, go into Afghanistan, certainly, and conduct operations against our troops, and have tried, certainly, to threaten all the way to Kabul at various times.

KING: President Karzai was quite adamant in that interview with Wolf that he wants the air strikes to stop. He believes the air strikes are not taking out terrorist elements, and instead are killing civilians in his country and fomenting anti-American sentiment. Will the air strikes stop?

PETRAEUS: Well, he and I had a good conversation about this yesterday, actually, John. I thought it was important to discuss this with him. I heard that interview. There is no question, and we have all agreed for some time -- and General McKiernan, in fact, put out tactical guidance to this end, as did the Central Command headquarters -- that we have to be very, very sensitive that our tactical actions, our tactical employment in battles and so forth of close air support and other enablers does not undermine our strategic goals and objectives.

And we reaffirmed that in our conversation yesterday. We'll certainly relook this yet again in the wake of this latest incident, although as the joint press release that was put out by Afghan and U.S. authorities in Afghanistan after the initial investigation of the latest situation in Farah province in western Afghanistan affirmed that Taliban bears enormous blame for this latest incident by apparently forcing civilians to stay in houses from which they were engaging our forces with heavy-fire RPGs, and quite effective fire, as the term is used.

KING: General David Petraeus, thank you for your time this morning, sir, and best of luck to you.

PETRAEUS: Good to be with you, John. Thanks.

Video and Transcript: David Petraeus on "Fox News Sunday"

Related Post: David Petraeus on CNN’s “State of the Union”

The centrepiece of the Obama Administration's Afghanistan-Pakistan sales pitch this weekend is not one but two appearances by General David Petraeus, the head of US Central Command, who showed up on "Fox News Sunday" before moving to CNN for "State of the Union".

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pYnfhaYTFK8[/youtube]

CHRIS WALLACE: Joining us from U.S. Central Command in Florida is General David Petraeus, who oversees American military operations in the Middle East and Central Asia.

And, General, welcome back to “FOX News Sunday.”

PETRAEUS: Good to be with you, Chris. Thanks.

WALLACE: General, let’s start with Pakistan. The military there has launched a new offensive against the Taliban in the Swat Valley. Is there any sign that this is different from earlier Pakistani military campaigns, which have not been effective?

PETRAEUS: There are a number of signs of difference, actually, Chris.

First of all, the actions of the Pakistani Taliban pushing below the Swat Valley into Dir and Buner seem to have galvanized all of Pakistan, not just the president and the prime minister, but also even the opposition leaders, virtually all the elements of the political spectrum and the people, in addition to, of course, the -- the military.

So there is a degree of unanimity that there must be swift and effective action taken against the Taliban in Pakistan.

And this is reflected also, as has been announced by the Pakistani leaders, the shift of forces from the eastern part of their country faced off against India to the North-West Frontier Province areas where the fighting is already ongoing and where more presumably will be conducted.

WALLACE: But the fact is that -- and I know you have been critical of this. A lot of military experts in the past -- the Pakistani army tends to fight the war that they would fight against the Indians, with heavy artillery, with air ships -- you know, with war planes fighting.

Do -- do you have the sense that they have the counterinsurgency strategy that makes you confident that they can beat the Taliban in the Swat Valley?

PETRAEUS: Well, we did have some good conversations this past week in Washington as part of the trilateral process that you’ve reported.

And during that, it was very clear in discussions with everyone, from President Zardari through the other members of the delegation that there’s an understanding that this does have to be a whole-of- government approach -- in other words, not just the military but all the rest of the elements of government supporting the military -- so that they can reestablish basic services, repair the damage that is inevitably done by the bombardment of these areas in which the Taliban are located, and to take care of the internally displaced persons.

And there’s an enormous effort ongoing in that regard, our State Department, other countries, all trying to help the U.N., which is the agency on the front lines there, trying to take care of these refugees that are streaming out of the Swat Valley.

WALLACE: General, you reportedly told top U.S. officials recently that the next two weeks were critical to determine the survival of the Pakistani government.

If we’re talking about something as existential as that, what are the chances that the Islamic radicals could get their hands on Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal?

PETRAEUS: Well, first of all, the reports of what I said were a little bit more than what I actually said behind closed doors several weeks ago, at which time I said that, in fact, the next few weeks would be very important and, to a degree, pivotal in the future for Pakistan.

And I think that that has been proven accurate. Indeed, now the Pakistani government, military, people have all responded, and certainly the next few weeks will be very important in this effort to roll back, if you will, this existential threat, a true threat to Pakistan’s very existence that has been posed by the Pakistani Taliban.

With respect to the -- the nuclear weapons and -- and sites that are controlled by Pakistan, as President Obama mentioned the other day, we have confidence in their security procedures and elements and believe that the security of those sites is adequate.

WALLACE: But -- but to press the point, if I may, because, as you say, you are talking about an existential threat from Islamic radicals, can you assure the American people and the rest of the world that the U.S. will not allow those Pakistani nuclear weapons to get into the hands of Islamic radicals?

PETRAEUS: Well, this is not a U.S. assurance that matters. This is a Pakistani assurance. And also, by the way, I should point out, Chris, this is not a U.S. fight that Pakistan is carrying out at this point in -- in this effort.

This is a Pakistani fight, a Pakistani battle, with elements that, as we’ve mentioned, threaten the very existence of the Pakistani state.

WALLACE: You also said this week that Al Qaida has reemerged in northwestern Pakistan as a centrally organized operation capable of planning attacks in other countries.

Is Al Qaida back in business, sir?

PETRAEUS: Well, Al Qaida has been back in business for years, Chris. There is not an enormous revelation here. What I was merely saying was that the location of Al Qaida’s senior leadership is, indeed, in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of that very rugged border region of western Pakistan just east of Afghanistan.

There’s no question that Al Qaida’s senior leadership has been there and has been in operation for years. We had to contend with its reach as it sought to facilitate the flow of foreign fighters, resources, explosives, leaders and expertise into Iraq, as you’ll recall, through Syria.

We see tentacles of Al Qaida that connect to Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen, the elements Al-Shabab in Somalia, elements in north central Africa, and that strive to reach all the way, of course, into Europe and into the United States.

And of course, there were attacks a couple of years ago in the U.K. that reflected the reach of the transnational extremist elements of Al Qaida and the other movements in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas.

WALLACE: And -- and, General, do you believe that bin Laden and Zawahiri are still in charge of Al Qaida?

PETRAEUS: We do. Again, I don’t think anyone can give you any kind of accurate location for bin Laden or, frankly, for Zawahiri other than a general description of where that might be, but certainly, they surface periodically.

We see communications that they send out. And of course, they periodically send out videos in which they try to exhort people and to inspire individuals to carry out extremist activities.

WALLACE: General, let’s...

PETRAEUS: It’s important to note, by the way, Chris, that -- that these organizations, by the way, in the FATA have sustained some pretty significant losses over the course of the last six, eight, 10 months or so.

And there is a good deal of disruption that has taken place but, of course, that’s transitory in nature, and we’ll have to see how the security operations in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas -- different from, of course, the fight in the -- in the Swat and North- West Frontier Province areas go.

WALLACE: General, let’s turn to Afghanistan. It has been widely reported that as many as 147 civilians, Afghan civilians, were killed after U.S. air strikes in western Afghanistan. I know you’ve been investigating the circumstances and the responsibility for that. At this point, what do you know?

PETRAEUS: Well, in fact, I should note, first of all, that I had a very good conversation with President Karzai about this, about some statements, of course, that he’s made in recent days, and we’re going to have to work our way through this.

I would point everyone to -- and we sent you a copy, of course, of the joint press release -- again, put out by the Afghan and U.S. elements in Kabul yesterday after their initial investigating team came back, which clearly described the sequence of events that took place, with the Taliban moving into these villages, seeking to extort money from them, eventually killing three of the citizens in that area, then engaging the Afghan police who responded, which led to the governor of that province, Farah province, requesting help from the Afghan national army and coalition forces.

It was in that response that, of course, this very significant firefight broke out, battle, that ultimately resulted in the dropping of bombs which clearly killed Taliban and some civilians that it appears the Taliban forced to remain in houses from which the Taliban was engaging our forces.

Now, we are going to do a very thorough investigation of this. I’ve appointed a brigadier general with extensive experience in conventional and special operations who will go out to Afghanistan and look at it more broadly as well, to ensure that our forces are very well acquainted with in -- in carrying out the directives that General McKiernan has put out so that our tactical actions don’t undermine our strategic goals and objectives.

And that’s essentially the conversation that President Karzai and I had yesterday on this particular topic.

WALLACE: General, you also say that the Taliban is mounting a surge of its own to protect its safe havens in eastern Afghanistan. President Obama has announced that he’s going to send another 21,000 troops to the country.

Are you getting all the troops you need? And what kind of assurances are you getting from the president about his willingness to send more troops if necessary, his commitment to win in Afghanistan?

PETRAEUS: Well, I’d just state that every request for forces that -- that I’ve sent to the secretary of defense and that has gone to the president has been approved, and that carries all the requests through the course of this calendar year.

There are requests beyond that for which decisions don’t need to be made for a number of months, and I’m confident those decisions will be made at that point in time.

We have gone so far as to shift some forces that just -- we don’t have enough of in the inventory -- which, by the way, is why Secretary Gates’ budget addresses these kind of so-called enablers, the low- density, high-demand units -- to shift some of these from Iraq to Afghanistan, in fact, to ensure that -- that the infrastructure is established and that the kinds of forces that they need to enable this significant augmentation of our forces is made possible.

WALLACE: There is also growing violence in Iraq, amid signs that the Iraqi government is dropping some of the counterinsurgency tactics that you introduced into Iraq. Jobs programs in Sunni areas are -- are being ended. The Sunni “Awakening” -- these are Sunni forces that are fighting Sunni insurgents -- some of those units have not been paid for most of this year.

Are we giving back -- is the Iraqi government giving back some of the gains that we worked so hard to establish on the ground in Iraq?

PETRAEUS: Well, first of all, I don’t think it’s accurate to say that the “Sons of Iraq,” these Sunni “Awakening” forces, have not been paid this year. There is drama and emotion with every single payday, but the vast majority of these “Sons of Iraq” have been paid during the pay periods.

There’s another one ongoing right now. Inevitably, names are lost, mixed up, or what have you. But over time, we feel quite comfortable with what the Iraqi government has done in taking care of these “Sons of Iraq” and on taking them all now onto their payroll rather than being on ours.

The level of violence, actually, has been roughly about the same for the last five or six months, which is quite significant. It has averaged between 10 and 15 attacks per day for that period, which equates to a level of violence not seen since the late summer of 2003 before the insurgency and well before the militia activities accumulated that led to, at one time, 160 attacks per day in Iraq in June of 2007. What we have seen and what is troubling, certainly, has been the incidence of sensational attacks, if you will, high-casualty-causing attacks. Particularly, we saw these in Baghdad a few weeks ago.

That did prompt a number of attacks with Iraqi conventional and special operations forces, together with our forces, to go after the reemerging networks of Al Qaida.

We should expect that Al Qaida will continue to try to reestablish itself in Iraq, even as the focus of Al Qaida’s senior leadership appears to have shifted away somewhat from support of the activities in Iraq.

WALLACE: I’ve got a couple of...

PETRAEUS: But we will see this periodically. There will be periodic upticks in that regard.

WALLACE: If I may, sir, we’ve got a couple of more questions I want to ask you, and we’re beginning to run out of time.

I want to follow up on this last point, because all U.S. combat troops are supposed to be out of Iraqi cities by the end of June of this year.

But General Odierno, the head of U.S. forces in Iraq, now says that 20 percent of our combat forces are going to stay behind in Baghdad and Mosul past that deadline. Why is that, sir?

PETRAEUS: Well, what we are in the process of doing and have been doing is withdrawing the bases of our combat forces from Iraq cities and large towns. That process has been ongoing. It’s gone smoothly. We still do have some of those bases in Baghdad and Mosul, but we think that they will be out.

What General Odierno was talking about were liaison elements, adviser elements, organizations that partner with Iraqi forces in the support of them, not in the conduct of our combat operations.

So certainly, there will be a presence, but there will not be the combat forces based in those cities as we have had in the past, and that is in accordance with the security agreement.

WALLACE: Finally, General, and we have about a minute left, let’s turn, finally, to Iran.

President Obama has made several efforts to reach out to the Iranian regime. Whether it’s its nuclear program or arming our enemies in Iraq, do you see any signs on the ground that the Iranian regime is moderating its behavior?

PETRAEUS: Well, I think there’s probably been some small reduction in the assistance provided to Shia extremists in Iraq, although that continues, and again, it’s very difficult to measure because sometimes you have to have some event that precipitates something to be able to determine how much is ongoing. Beyond that, we’ll have to see as the weeks and months proceed. My deputy just accompanied Ambassador Ross in a swing through the region. There clearly -- enormous concern out there about Iranian rhetoric and actions, but we need to see how these diplomatic initiatives might be able to moderate and produce some openness and transparency in Iran, particularly with respect, of course, to its nuclear programs.

WALLACE: General Petraeus, we want to thank you for giving us a tour of all your responsibilities in that part of the world. Thank you for joining us, and please come back, sir.

PETRAEUS: Thank you, Chris.

Video and Transcript: Pakistan's Zardari and Afghanistan's Karzai on "Meet the Press" (10 May)

Days after their meetings with US officials, including President Obama, Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari and Afghan President Hamid Karzai went through individual examinations on NBC's Meet the Press, hosted by David Gregory. We'll have analysis on Monday.

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DAVID GREGORY: First, the presidents of Pakistan and Afghanistan.  I sat down with both leaders earlier this week after their White House meetings.  Pakistan's President Zardari, in office for the last eight months, is the widower of slain Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto.  I began by asking about the Taliban and whether he agrees with the Obama administration that the group represents an existential threat to his country.

MR. ASIF ALI ZARDARI:  No, I consider the philosophy of Taliban as threat to the world, not just to Pakistan and your country, but I feel it's a larger threat.

MR. GREGORY:  Existential threat to Pakistan?

MR. ZARDARI:  Pakistan, the whole world.  They start from the Horn of Africa and come down all the way to Pakistan.  They don't evolve from Pakistan and go up, they come down.

MR. GREGORY:  Do you consider the Taliban to be a bigger threat today than India?

MR. ZARDARI:  I consider it a different--they're--India's a country and Pakistan is a, a...(unintelligible)...we're, we're two states which in fact Pakistan stemmed out of the subcontinent out of India.  So it's a different relationship, it's a different context.

MR. GREGORY:  Is there a war with the Taliban inside Pakistan?

MR. ZARDARI:  There is a war, sir.

MR. GREGORY:  And is it America's war or Pakistan's war?

MR. ZARDARI:  It's a war of our existence.  We've been fighting this war much before they attacked 9/11.  They're kind of a cancer created by both of us, Pakistan and America and the world.  We got together, we created this cancer to fight the superpower and then we went away--rather, you went away without finding a cure for it.  And now we've both come together to find a cure for it, and we're looking for one.

MR. GREGORY:  When you speak like that, it doesn't sound as if you consider it Pakistan's war, you consider it America's responsibility.

MR. ZARDARI:  No, I think it's a joint responsibility.  I think it's the joint responsibilities of all the democracies of the world.  That's why we made this Friends of Democratic Pakistan, so we can bring most strength to the situation.  You've got to admit that you all have been trying to battle it for the last eight years.  The--all the...(unintelligible)...world powers have been trying to battle it for the last eight years in Afghanistan and nobody's come out of victorious yet.

MR. GREGORY:  And so you say there is a commitment on the part of Pakistan to fight the Taliban now.  How many troops, how many Pakistani troops do you now have in the western part of your country battling the Taliban?

MR. ZARDARI:  Three times the amount of troops you have battling them in Afghanistan.  That's 125,000 we have on ground.

MR. GREGORY:  And yet the administration--you have a military force of roughly 660--650,000 men.

MR. ZARDARI:  Oh.

MR. GREGORY:  Has the administration said to you there should be more fighting men in the west?

MR. ZARDARI:  There is a point of view that more men might improve the situation, but that's something that's still disputed by our military analysts.  We don't think that more--presence of more troops there--you must remember, 650-personnel strong army doesn't mean they're all infantry.  That's the fighting brigade of the infantry, that's the teeth of the army.  So they're not all infantry.  They're tank drivers, they're truck drivers, they're other--gunners, etc., etc.  So we have an infantry of 250,000, out of which 125,000 happens to be in those mountains.

MR. GREGORY:  So you have a sufficient number of troops fighting the Taliban.

MR. ZARDARI:  We think, we think they're sufficient.

MR. GREGORY:  You appeared on Capitol Hill this week, and the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Representative Howard Berman, said this, speaking of you.  He said, "He did not present a coherent strategy for the defeat of this insurgency.  I had a sense of what they're doing today," he said, "I did not have a sense of what they plan to do tomorrow." What's the strategy?

MR. ZARDARI:  So, well, he didn't even ask me, so that's OK.  But I'll tell you what I've got planned to do.  We, we've been loving...(unintelligible)...in, in America, my wife was loving, and we were of the view and always have been of the view that democracy is the answer to the problem.  Like somebody said, it may be--not be the best form of government, but it's the only form of government.  Now we've got democracy.  Democracy needs help.  It needs a little more help than we've been getting in the past. What the American public and people at large do not understand is for 10 years you have given $10 billion to a dictator, but you've given them for the war in these mountains.  So it's actually reimbursement for the money spent; after all, 125,000 troops moving in logistically, otherwise do cost.  So you've been paying back...(unintelligible)...into Pakistan for the expenses occurred as such.  But we need to support democracy.

MR. GREGORY:  Mm-hmm.

MR. ZARDARI:  We need to support the country, we need support--we need to support the systems.  And we've been involved for the last 30 years.  It's not 10 years.

MR. GREGORY:  But is that a strategy for cracking down on the Taliban insurgency?

MR. ZARDARI:  Sure it is.  Sure it is.  The stronger my institutions are, the more the youth I employ, the less fodder they have.  The more poverty goes down, the less fodder they have to recruit from.  That's the strategy.  What else can--what--there is no scientific theorem to that.  And if there was one, if you had a strategy, you would've done it in a, in 10 years.

MR. GREGORY:  But there's a military question, which is, is Pakistan capable of dealing with an insurgency, capable of mounting an effective counterinsurgency when the orientation of your military's primarily been to fight a big enemy to the east in India, predicated on the idea of some kind of deterrence?  Are you able to mount a counterinsurgency strategy at this point?

MR. ZARDARI:  Sir, we've been in this war for the last seven years.  But if you see the record of the one year that the democratic government of Pakistan, the PPP government and its allies has been there, we've done more to damage the infrastructure of the Talibans or the--or these miscreants, whatever you need to call them, than ever before.

MR. GREGORY:  And yet there are some who say that the strategy has not borne fruit.  You went in--so people understand, you went into an area north of Islamabad, the Swat Valley, and you essentially made a deal with the Taliban, which is they would put down their arms if Islamic law could be applied, could be implemented there.

MR. ZARDARI:  Incorrect.

MR. GREGORY:  Incorrect.  Tell me what's correct.

MR. ZARDARI:  The correct position is that we came up with the formula which was that there would be speedy justice there known as...(foreign language spoken).  Nothing to do with Sharia law.  It's been interpreted by--as Sharia law by them.  And then that didn't work.  But we had to get the population to be with us.  The population was fed up with them and was fed up with the fighting.  Some--the provincial government came up with this idea that let's go for a peace deal and let's get the people involved.  They tried it.  It hasn't worked.

MR. GREGORY:  But when you made this deal, when you actually signed this deal...

MR. ZARDARI:  The parliament signed on this deal.  The parliament recommended me--to me to sign.

MR. GREGORY:  Were you against it?

MR. ZARDARI:  I was--yes, I had a position against it.

MR. GREGORY:  Right.  Why?  Why did you think it was misguided?

MR. ZARDARI:  I thought that it won't work.

MR. GREGORY:  You think it was abdication to the Taliban?

MR. ZARDARI:  No, it's not abdication.  I thought that the Talibans are not rational people.  I don't think there's any good Talibans.  The world does, so that's a defensive opinion.

MR. GREGORY:  But so you think there's no negotiating with them.

MR. ZARDARI:  I don't think there should be a negotiating with them at the moment.  Maybe one day when there is enough, we've done enough.

MR. GREGORY:  Mm-hmm.

MR. ZARDARI:  Then always--there cannot only, only be war.  There has to be a--the parliament has come up with a strategy where there's the three D's: dialogue, deterrence and development.  So we have to go into dialogue by the will of the people, which we did.  It didn't work.  Now we've got to do the, the deterrence phase where we are fighting.  And then once we've calmed the situation down in--then we'll go to the development stage to give them the ownership, give them schools.

MR. GREGORY:  You have the fighting that's going on in Swat.  You have the Taliban insurgency there.  That insurgency has also spread into Punjab, to the state of Punjab.  I don't have to tell you, that's where half of Pakistan's population is.  And it has lead to some dire assessments by analysts who look at your country with a critical eye, including a former adviser to General David Petraeus who helped him with the insurgency in Iraq, and he said this: "We're now reaching the point where within one to six months we could see the collapse of the Pakistani state," because the Taliban insurgency has so destabilized Pakistan.  Does he have that right?

MR. ZARDARI:  I think you--he's had other positions wrong before, so--and having said that, we have a threat, yes.  Is the state of Pakistan going to collapse?  No.  We are 180 million people.  The population is much, much more than the, the insurgents are.  But we do have a problem.  We have a problem because it's been there.  It was like I said, it was a monster created by all, all of us.  We got together and we didn't--we forgot to make a cure for it.

MR. GREGORY:  Can you survive politically?

MR. ZARDARI:  Of course.

MR. GREGORY:  Is it possible to defeat this insurgency without U.S. soldiers fighting by your side or at least training your soldiers in Pakistan?

MR. ZARDARI:  I think we need to find a strategy where the world gets together against this threat, because it's not Pakistan specific, it's not Afghanistan specific.  Like I said, it's all the way from the Horn of Africa. You've had attacks in Spain, you've had attacks in Britain, you've had attacks in America, you've had attacks in Africa, Saudi Arabia.  So I think the world needs to understand that this is the new challenge of the 21st century and this is the new war, and we've all got together.

MR. GREGORY:  The question a lot of people ask is are you--is Pakistan really committed to that war?  In The New York Times Dexter Filkins, who, who's reported from Afghanistan and Pakistan, writes this:  "Whose side is Pakistan really on?  ...  Little in Pakistan is what it appears.  For years, the survival of Pakistan's military and civilian leaders has depended on a double game:  assuring the United States that they were vigorously repressing Islamic militants--and in some cases actually doing so--while simultaneously tolerating and assisting the same militants.  From the anti-Soviet fighters of the 1980s and the Taliban of the 1990s to the homegrown militants of today, Pakistan's leaders have been both public enemies and private friends.  When the game works, it reaps great rewards:  billions in aid to boost the Pakistani economy and military and Islamist proxies to extend the government's reach into Afghanistan and India."

MR. ZARDARI:  I think it's an old concept, an old theory that he's talking about.  And what billions are you talking about?  Like I said, a billion dollar a year?  That's not even--altogether, this aid package is not even one tenth of what you gave AIG.  So let's face it; we need, in fact, much more help.  We are responsible, a responsible state.  We've brought democracy back, it's a young democracy.  Accept it, it was not me who was aiding the dictators of the past.

MR. GREGORY:  Is there a view, however, in Pakistan that the Taliban should be kept around for a rainy day, as it's been said, as a bulwark against Indian influence in neighboring Afghanistan?

MR. ZARDARI:  I don't think so.  I don't think so.

MR. GREGORY:  You don't think that was part of the past at all?

MR. ZARDARI:  I think in--it was part of your past and our past, and the ISI and the CIA created them together.  And I can find you 10 books and 10 philosophers and 10 write-ups on that, of what all you didn't do.

MR. GREGORY:  Fair argument, certainly, a lot of people would agree with you. But did the game change after 9/11 to a point where the U.S. decided to root out this threat and Pakistan was straddling both sides?

MR. ZARDARI:  You tell me.  I was imprisoned by the same dictator you were supporting.  You were supporting a dictator who...

MR. GREGORY:  You're speaking of General Musharraf.

MR. ZARDARI:  I'm speaking of General Musharraf.  In fact, I lost my wife on his watch and I has--I spent five years in his prison.

MR. GREGORY:  But, Mr. President, you know well that there is a widespread belief that your military and your intelligence services still have these same sympathies for the Taliban.

MR. ZARDARI:  I wouldn't agree with you.  I think General Musharraf may have had a mind-set that I--to run with the head and hunt with the hound.  But certainly not on our watch.  We don't have that thought process at all.

MR. GREGORY:  Let me ask you about Pakistan's nuclear arsenal.  There's been a question about the security of that arsenal.  You've assured the world that those nuclear weapons are secure.  But I wonder why you're continuing to add to your stockpile, add to your arsenal at what is described as a pretty fast rate when there's so much instability in the country?

MR. ZARDARI:  That's, that's, that's not a fact.  It's a, it's a position that some people have taken.  We, we're not adding to our stockpile as such. Why do we need more?

MR. GREGORY:  So you're not adding to your nuclear arsenal at all?

MR. ZARDARI:  I don't think so, no.

MR. GREGORY:  You don't--do you know?

MR. ZARDARI:  Even if I did, I wasn't going to tell you.

MR. GREGORY:  There is a view that--in the intelligence community in this country that it does not know where all the nuclear weapons are within Pakistan.  Why not share that information so there could be a joint strategy to keep those weapons secure?

MR. ZARDARI:  Why don't you do the same with other countries yourself?  I think it's a sovereignty issue and we have a right to our own sovereignty. It's a sovereign country.

MR. GREGORY:  Who's in control of Pakistan, you or the military?

MR. ZARDARI:  I think the military is in control of their hemisphere and I'm in control of the whole country.

MR. GREGORY:  Can they overrule you?

MR. ZARDARI:  No.  I can overrule them.

MR. GREGORY:  Haven't they overruled you in the past?

MR. ZARDARI:  No.  We've gone to their position and they've come to our positions.

MR. GREGORY:  But you still have final say?

MR. ZARDARI:  The parliament has final say.  It's the parliament that forms government, and I am a product of the parliament.

MR. GREGORY:  But why is it when you wanted your intelligence chief to go to Mumbai you were overruled by your military?

MR. ZARDARI:  No, it was not overruled by the military.  They thought it was too, too soon.  And eventually we've offered for the intelligence chief to meet.

MR. GREGORY:  There's a lot of discussion about additional aid, as you've been talking about throughout our conversation, for Pakistan, $1.5 billion for five years, a total of $7.5 billion.  But as you know, there's discussion about putting some strings, some limits on that aid based on performance by Pakistan.  Do you disagree with that policy?

MR. ZARDARI:  I think it's doubting an ally before you go into action together.  If we are allies--and we, and we understand, it's an accepted position that you--we cannot work this problem out unless Pakistan, Afghanistan and America are on the same page.  How do you go and take an ally along by saying, "OK, I don't trust you," from the first day?  It's not a, a good position to be in.  So I feel that we shouldn't have any, any kind of conditionalities.  We should have a result, a result-oriented relationship where I should be given a time line and I'll give you all a time line so we can both give each other time lines and meet the time lines on, on the, on, on the positive.

MR. GREGORY:  In terms of U.S.-Pakikstani cooperation, there are drones that fire missiles and target Taliban and other extremists, al-Qaeda figures, within Pakistan.  Do you consider those to be effective?

MR. ZARDARI:  I would consider them to be very effective if they were part of my arsenal.  I've been asking for them, but I haven't got a positive answer as yet.  But I'm not giving up.

MR. GREGORY:  Where is Osama bin Laden?

MR. ZARDARI:  You all have been there for eight years, you tell me.  You lost him in Tora Bora, I didn't.  I was in prison.  In fact, my wife warned America about Osama bin Laden in '89.  She rung up senior Bush and asked, asked of him, "Are you destabilizing my government?" Because he paid the then opposition $10 million to do--overthrow the first woman elected in Islamic country.  So we knew that he was your operator.  And...

MR. GREGORY:  But you're not actively looking for him?

MR. ZARDARI:  I think the world is looking for him, and we are part of the world's lookout brigade.

MR. GREGORY:  Do you think he's alive or dead?

MR. ZARDARI:  I've said before that he--I don't think he's alive.

MR. GREGORY:  And you believe that.

MR. ZARDARI:  I have a strong feeling and I have sole reason to believe that, because I've asked my counterparts in the American intelligence agencies and they haven't heard of him since seven years.

MR. GREGORY:  Mr. President, thank you very much for your views and good luck with your work.

MR. ZARDARI:  Thank you, sir.

MR. GREGORY:  Coming next, seven years after 9/11 and the war rages on with the insurgent Taliban still controlling parts of Afghanistan.  Can the government regain control?  And the tough issue of civilian casualties due to U.S. air strikes.  Some harsh words from President Hamid Karzai.  Our exclusive interview from earlier this week is next.

(Announcements)

MR. GREGORY:  Afghanistan's President Hamid Karzai after this brief commercial break.

(Announcements)

MR. GREGORY:  Mr. President, welcome back to MEET THE PRESS.

MR. HAMID KARZAI:  Happy to be here.

MR. GREGORY:  President Obama talked about the deterioration in Afghanistan during a speech back in March.  This is what he said.

(Videotape, March 27, 2009)

PRES. OBAMA:  The situation is increasingly perilous.  It's been more than seven years since the Taliban was removed from power, yet war rages on. Insurgents control parts of Afghanistan and Pakistan.  Attacks against our troops, our NATO allies and the Afghan government have ridden--risen steadily. And most painfully, 2008 was the deadliest year of the war for American forces.

(End videotape)

MR. GREGORY:  So here we are seven years after the attacks of September 11th, 2001.  Another American president is committing troops to Afghanistan, 21,000 additional troops.  By this summer there'll be 68,000 U.S. troops.  My question:  Is it too little, too late?

MR. KARZAI:  Well, a very important question, indeed.  When we began in 2001 with the arrival of the international community in Afghanistan and the two--the Afghan people and the international community joining hands, we together defeated the Taliban and the terrorists and al-Qaeda in less than a month and a half.  Subsequent to that the Afghan people would, as we established the interim government, would come in large numbers, hundreds of them, to my office and ask for more international forces in the country, in their villages, in their towns, in their districts.  That didn't happen at that time.  So in that sense, the arrival of more forces is late.  It should've happened then, six years ago, and we should've paid attention then, six years ago, to the sanctuaries, to the training grounds, to the--those financing the terrorists.  It's a bit late.  But as we all know, it's never too late for a good thing to do.

MR. GREGORY:  With 21,000 additional troops, there's a question of what can be gained.  But the issue of civilian casualties as a result of U.S. air strikes, how much damage does that do to the U.S. effort?

MR. KARZAI:  A lot of damage.  This is something that I've been engaged with with our allies for at least six years now.

MR. GREGORY:  And you talked to President Obama about it.

MR. KARZAI:  Oh, very, very much.  For as least six years now, in different ways and different forms.  The Afghan people are allies of the United States. The Afghan people want this effort together to succeed.  The Afghan people see that the presence of the international community in Afghanistan brings us plenty of good things.  But Afghan people also want to have their children safe.  The Afghan people say we are fighting together with you, shoulder to shoulder against terrorism, that we are part of the struggle; that we are not--our homes, our villages are not places for terrorism and that they should be safe.  It's an important thing that America recognize that civilian casualties are the biggest concern of Afghanistan and a damage to the effort against terrorists.

MR. GREGORY:  When President Obama addressed the American people and announced more troops going to your country, he raised a very important question, which is what is America's purpose...

MR. KARZAI:  Mm-hmm.

MR. GREGORY:  ...in Afghanistan?  Dexter Filkins, veteran war correspondent, has covered Afghanistan and Pakistan thoroughly for The New York Times, writes in the current edition of The New Republic this, and he starts with a question:  "What can be won in Afghanistan?  Driving around the country, as I did recently, one is constantly overwhelmed by how little has been accomplished there.  In December 2001, the country lay in ruins.  Today, it is still pretty much the same place.  ...  Today, Taliban fighters move freely across the countryside, and in some places they have set up a shadow government.  ...  After eight years of neglect, the Afghanistan state is a weak and pathetic thing." Pretty strong words.  Why is that the case?

MR. KARZAI:  Very wrong words.

MR. GREGORY:  Wrong.  You say it's wrong.

MR. KARZAI:  Very wrong words.  Pretty strong, wrong words.  It isn't like that.  In 2001, Afghanistan did not have a single kilometer of paved road. Today Afghanistan has its ring road completed, nearly 3,000 kilometers and above.  Today we have many of the roads in the cities paved.  Today we have health services, which were only to about 9 percent of the Afghan population in 2002, reaching nearly 85 percent and over of the Afghan population.  The rural developing program of Afghanistan goes to more than half of Afghanistan's 40,000 villages.  In 2002, we had 4,000 students in Afghanistan universities and only three or four universities.  Today we have 75,000 students in Afghan universities, 14 public universities and, and many private universities.  In 2002, the 4,000 students that we had were all boys, men. Today, nearly 40 percent are girls of the 75,000.  Today we have thousands of Afghans studying abroad, at least 1,000 each year in India and hundreds in Europe and America.  We have experts return to Afghanistan.  I met with them three months ago.  The country is a lot better.

MR. GREGORY:  Back in 2003, this is what you said about the Taliban.  They were the ones who provided safe haven to al-Qaeda, these are the people that threatened both Afghanistan and Pakistan.  This is what you said back in June of 2003:  "I am not worried about the resurgence of the Taliban.  The Taliban movement as a movement is finished and is gone." Were you wrong about that?

MR. KARZAI:  I was not wrong about that.

MR. GREGORY:  But they're back.

MR. KARZAI:  I was, I--no.  It's--there's a difference.  The Taliban as a movement is gone from ruling Afghanistan.  They were the government in Afghanistan.  In 2001 they were the government.  Today they are not the government.  In 2002 they were threatening you.  Today they are not, from Afghanistan.  Yes, they are a threat in the form of the terrorism that they bring upon us, in the form of the violence that they bring upon us; not as an organized political force holding the government in Afghanistan.  That's not there.

MR. GREGORY:  Are they an existential threat to your leadership?

MR. KARZAI:  They're not an existential threat to Afghanistan's government. They are a threat to our, to our efforts towards more security, more progress, more reconstruction and a more peaceful life.  That threat they definitely are, and especially in parts of the country.  That's strongly there, yes.

MR. GREGORY:  The new administration has a slightly different strategy for trying to deal with the Taliban, and it has to do with operations on a tactical level, similar to what was done in Iraq, to try to turn some of these what might be called irreconcilables and bring them into the American fold.

MR. KARZAI:  Mm-hmm.

MR. GREGORY:  This is how the president described it back in that March speech.

(Videotape, March 27, 2009)

PRES. OBAMA:  There is an uncompromising core of the Taliban.  They must be met with force and they must be defeated.  But there are also those who've taken up arms because of coercion or simply for a price.  These Afghans must have the option to choose a different course.  And that's why we will work with local leaders, the Afghan government and international partners to have a reconciliation process in every province.

(End videotape)

MR. GREGORY:  Now, you have called that reconciliation process...

MR. KARZAI:  Yes.

MR. GREGORY:  ...unworkable.  Why do you believe that?

MR. KARZAI:  No.  I, I didn't call the reconciliation process unworkable. And by the way, I agree with President Obama's description of the elements of peacemaking with the Taliban.  Those Taliban who have been driven out of the country by fear or coercion or intimidation by our forces or the international forces, or by whatever other circumstances that they've found themselves compelled to leave the country and take guns against us are the ones that we want to reconcile with.  They are the sons of the soil, they must return.  To be very precise, those of the Taliban who are part of al-Qaeda or other terrorist networks, or those who are in the grip of, you know, intelligence services must not and cannot come to Afghanistan because they will continue to bring violence and destruction and, and, and damage to Afghanistan.  But those who have been driven out of fear or the other circumstances that I described earlier are welcome.  They're the sons of our soil, they're from our country and we want to reconcile with them.  And that's what President Obama was referring to.  What I was objecting to was the international forces directly engaging at local level with the Taliban commanders for reconciliation.  That is the job of the Afghan government.

MR. GREGORY:  Speaking about the Taliban and the defeat of the Taliban and al-Qaeda generally, do you have more confidence today in Pakistan's commitment to fighting and defeating the Taliban than you did under General Musharraf?

MR. KARZAI:  Definitely more, yes.  Definitely there is a recognition the Pakistani leadership and the democratically-elected leadership.  They see very much the same way things that, that, that--as we see; therefore, we have a lot more confidence there.  We had a very good meeting in Washington.  I hope that this will be taken into further steps, meaning implementation on the ground. I'm a lot more confident and a lot more hopeful.

MR. GREGORY:  You are running for re-election, and as you campaign you've had some pretty pointed messages.  You're critical of the United States for civilian casualties as a result of U.S. air raids.  You also were at a rally recently during which you were very clear and you said, "Look, I have made certain demands of the Americans, and if they do not provide additional aircraft, for instance, I'll go somewhere else and I'll get it." You appeared to threaten the administration, and I wonder whether your core political message is an anti-American message.

MR. KARZAI:  It is not.  It is very much a pro-American message.  So the Afghans do want this relationship with America to continue, but of course Afghanistan has a character of its own and an interest of its own and a demand upon our allies as well.  We are, we are your front line in the war on terrorism.  The Afghan people have given everything on a daily basis in the war on terrorism.  We have our police dying every day, at least five, six of them.  Our security forces...(unintelligible)...people.  Our villages are not where the terrorists are.  And that's what we kept telling the U.S. administration, that the war on terrorism is not in the Afghan villages, not in the Afghan homes.  Respect that.  Civilian casualties are undermining support in the Afghan people for the war on terrorism and for the, the, the relations with America.  How can you expect a people who keep losing their children to remain friendly?

MR. GREGORY:  And yet...

MR. KARZAI:  And, and, and that's a moral question as well.  We have to be morally on a much higher platform in our force to win the war on terrorism.

MR. GREGORY:  And do you worry, do you worry that the U.S. has not met that standard?

MR. KARZAI:  The U.S. has...

MR. GREGORY:  Have they not met their own moral standard?

MR. KARZAI:  The U.S., the U.S., the U.S. has not met that standard in Afghanistan.  The United States must stand on a much higher moral platform in order for us together to win this war.

MR. GREGORY:  Let me be clear about what you are saying.  Are you suggesting that the United States is waging an immoral war in Afghanistan?

MR. KARZAI:  No.  No.  It's not immoral war, it's the standard of morality that we are seeking which is also one that is being desired and spoken about in America.  In other words, are we the same as the terrorists, are we the same as the bad guys, or are we standing on a much higher moral, moral platform?  Are we better human beings or not?  We must definitely be better human beings in order for us to tell the people that, "Look, those guys are wrong and we are better." And we must show that in our practice, and that practice should be extreme care for civilians and their children and their homes and, and, for the civilians to see us completely distinct and separate from the terrorists.  So we have to be better.  My moral, moral platform has to be a lot higher, a lot more distinct and likeable than the terrorists and the bad guys.  That's what separates us.  Otherwise there'll be no difference, so why should the people care about us or--and not care about them?  Do you get my point?

MR. GREGORY:  And yet Secretary of Defense Gates has made the point that there has to be sustained commitment on the part of the Afghan people and the Afghan government.

MR. KARZAI:  And there is.

MR. GREGORY:  He says this:  "It's absolutely critical that the Afghans believe that this is their war.  it is their war against people who are trying to overthrow their government that they democratically elected." Do you think that's the view of your people?

MR. KARZAI:  That is absolutely the view of our people.  And that's why our people, even when they are bombed, even when they suffer, they still come to us.  They receive me in their midst when I go to, to offer my condolences. They receive the American soldiers, they receive the American officers when a, when an incident like that.  In Farah there was an incident of massive civilian casualties, and the U.S. military officials and the Afghan government went together to the population.  That means the people are still with us.  Had they been against us, they would have not received us, they would have not come to us.  But then, there is a limit to all of that.  Any society will, will, will get fed up with, with, with continued violence and continued casualties.  That is something very, very serious.  And I, and I have conveyed this to my friends in America in all humility and friendship, on behalf of the Afghan people, that Afghans are a straightforward, honest allies, believing in the cause that we have undertaken, and that's why we were able to defeat the Taliban and al-Qaeda in less than a month and a half.  And if you continue to behave the way we are, we will lose that.  And that's, and that's a correct thing to do.

MR. GREGORY:  Before you go, just a couple of other issues.  One of the big issues fueling the insurgency in Afghanistan is the poppy crop, opium.  This is what you said on this program back in 2004.

(Videotape, June 13, 2004)

MR. KARZAI:  This production of, of, of poppies supports terrorism.  It criminalizes the economy.  It undermines institution building in Afghanistan. Afghanistan will have to destroy it for the sake of the Afghan people and also because of...(unintelligible).  We will succeed because we have to succeed.

(End of videotape)

MR. GREGORY:  And yet today 60 percent of Afghanistan's gross domestic product is poppy, it is opium.  It accounts for 93 percent of the world's production of opium.  That's not a very strong record.

MR. KARZAI:  It isn't, it isn't like that today.  When I was speaking, was it 2004, we had only--well, in 2005 we had only three provinces free of poppies in Afghanistan.  Today we have 22 provinces free of poppies in Afghanistan, either completely or mostly, you know, to, to a bigger extent.  Only one province in the country is producing poppies to the quantity that it can make 60 percent of Afghanistan's exports.  So Afghanistan has made progress in, in, in, in reducing poppies in Afghanistan, in eradicating and removing it from, from our, our culture.  But the money that is spent to eradicate poppies and to provide it with alternative livelihoods is something that we have a question about with our allies.

MR. GREGORY:  Finally, this spring you signed a law that makes it legal for Afghan men to rape their wives.  Now, you have said in the past month that you were reviewing that law.  Are you going to repeal it?

MR. KARZAI:  It has been reviewed.  When--there's so much that I can talk about in response to what is there.  It is not exactly as, as is printed in the, in the, in parts of the world media.  But when I heard of this, I called the minister of justice and he told me that there were problems in this law and that it will be--then I instructed the review and amendment of the law.  I called in the clergy in the country, the senior most who, who had a hand in drafting this law, and they'd redo the...(unintelligible)...amend it and redraft it, and even parts of the law removed.  I've already done that.  The minister of justice was with me about 10 days ago to give me the amended law that will be sent to the parliament.  So it's something that we have to do.

MR. GREGORY:  Right.

MR. KARZAI:  And we have to correct it, regardless of whether it's...

MR. GREGORY:  So how--just to be clear then, how are you correcting it?  What is permissible behavior?

MR. KARZAI:  But it's, it's, it's, it's--well, it's, it's, it's the--it's not my choice.  It has to go through a legal process and consultation and back to the parliament.  We are a democratic country.  We have a parliament that, that passes laws like that, that debates them and then sends them back to the concerned lobbies.

MR. GREGORY:  But, but are basic human rights part of your democratic values?

MR. KARZAI:  Absolutely.  Oh, absolutely.  Absolutely.

MR. GREGORY:  So, so raping of women is a crime in Afghanistan and will be a crime?

MR. KARZAI:  Absolutely.  Absolutely.  A crime in Afghanistan, because our religion is extremely, extremely difficult on that.

MR. GREGORY:  So this particular area, the, the ability to rape your wife is something that will be repealed.

MR. KARZAI:  Rape has, rape has...

MR. GREGORY:  Is that--are you saying that unequivocally?

MR. KARZAI:  It is not, it is not in the law.  This--it's not in these very sharp words that are described in the Western media.  Even if it is milder than that, it is wrong and it will be repealed, it will be removed and the amendment will be made in this law.  So the Afghan people don't want that and the Afghan people are sensitive about it.  I assure you that has been done.

MR. GREGORY:  Right.

MR. KARZAI:  It's something that really embarrassed us when it came out.  We are a lot more aware a nation, a lot more culturally good nation than sometimes we are seen in, in, in the rest of the world.

MR. GREGORY:  So in democratic Afghanistan it is illegal for a man to rape his wife?

MR. KARZAI:  Absolutely.  Absolutely.  Like hell.  Sure.

MR. GREGORY:  All right, Mr. President, thank you very much.  Good luck with your important work.

MR. KARZAI:  Thank you.