Iran Analysis: Washington and the Tehran Nuclear Deal (Parsi)

Trita Parsi, writing for Foreign Policy, evaluates Monday's Iran-Brazil-Turkey agreement on procedure for an uranium enrichment deal and Washington's reaction. His analysis complements that of Gary Sick and EA's Ms Zahra:

The Brazilian-Turkish diplomatic breakthrough with Iran has taken Washington by surprise. Clearly, the geopolitical center of gravity has shifted-five years of EU-led negotiations led nowhere while the new emerging powers Brazil and Turkey only needed a few months to produce a breakthrough. Now, the West needs to pull off some political acrobatics to avoid being on the diplomatic defensive.

Before Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva's trip to Iran this past weekend, few among the permanent members of the UN Security Council were optimistic about his chances of success. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev was charitable when he put Lula's odds at 30 percent. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton reportedly called her Brazilian counterpart to discourage Brazil from undertaking the diplomatic mission. And few in Washington seemed to have been prepared for a diplomatic breakthrough.

Iran Analysis: The Contest at Home Over (and Beyond) the Uranium Agreement (Zahra)
Iran Analysis: Assessing the Tehran Nuclear Deal (Gary Sick)
The Latest from Iran (18 May): Getting Beyond the Uranium Agreement

But against all odds, Turkey and Brazil seem to have succeeded in resolving the most critical obstacle in the Iranian nuclear stand-off: the issue of trust. Both through the modalities of the new deal as well as by virtue of who they are, Turkey and Brazil have succeeded in filling the trust gap.


For the Iranians --- beyond their political paralysis of last year --- the issue of trust was the primary flaw of the October 2009 proposal. As the Iranians saw it, the deal would have required that Iran place disproportionate trust in the Western powers by agreeing to give up its low-enriched uranium stockpile in one shipment, only to receive fuel rods for Iran's research reactor nine to twelve months later. This would have required a significant leap of faith on their behalf.

Iran's relations with most permanent Security Council states (P5) are fraught with tension and mistrust. This includes its relations with Russia. The European power's past support for Saddam Hussein --- including providing him with high-tech weaponry and components for chemical weapons --- has not been forgotten in Tehran, particularly not by those in Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's circles.

Iran's relations with Turkey and Brazil are different, however. Though tensions and rivalry with Turkey have historic roots, relations have improved significantly under the Erdogan government. Though some skepticism remains, Iran has nevertheless noted Turkey's increased independence from --- and at times, defiance of --- the United States. In particular, Turkey's position on the Iraq war as well as its campaign to prevent a new round of UN Security Council sanctions on Iran must have impressed Tehran.

Moreover, unlike with the P5 states, Iran does not only have some trust in Turkey, it also senses that it has some leverage over its Western neighbor. In 2009, Iranian-Turkish trade stood at around $11 billion, with Iran providing a significant portion of Turkey's gas needs. The combination of trust and leverage seems to have been critical in getting the Iranians to agree to put their stockpiles in Turkish territory.

In Brazil, Iran has found an unlikely but much needed ally. Brazil is a rising global power, with a legitimate claim for a permanent seat in the Security Council. It's a state with a long history of sympathizing and identifying with the Iranian position on nuclear matters. If the reprocessing takes place in Brazil, as opposed to Russia, it would be a political victory for Iran to have it occur in an emerging power who for long has endorsed Iran's right to enrichment and who itself achieved recognition of its enrichment right in spite of international pressure.

While Iran has been suspicious of European and American maneuvers and proposals, out of a fear that the ultimate objective of the West is to eliminate Iran's enrichment program, that suspicion is unlikely to arise in a Brazilian-sponsored deal due to Brazil's own nuclear program and self-interest in ensuring that Iran's nuclear rights aren't inhibited and turned into a legally binding precedent.

In fact, the Turkish-Brazilian-Iranian agreement explicitly endorses Iran's right to enrichment, a position the US has refused to officially accept.

Beyond economic interests, international prestige and the opportunity for Brazil and Turkey to become indispensible global actors, it should not be forgotten than both states have viewed war and confrontation as the likely alternative to their diplomacy. In particular, there has been a fear that the current Security Council draft resolution, while not providing an explicit justification for military action, would nevertheless provide regional states outside of the Security Council with a legal basis to take military action against Iran's nuclear facilities.

Washington's reaction has thus far been muted. Though details of the agreement remain unknown, two potential points of objection have emerged.

First, the amount of low-enriched uranium (LEU) that will be shipped to Turkey, 1200 kilograms, constituted approximately 75 percent of Iran's entire stockpile back in October. Though that percentage has shrunk, it will still leave Iran with less LEU than it would need for a bomb. Still, even though Washington insisted that the deal from October remains on the table and that it is non-negotiable, it may be the US itself that ends up seeking to renegotiate the terms. Second, Iran has expanded its enrichment activities and is currently enriching uranium to 19.75 percent. The US insists that this activity must be suspended.

In spite of these potential sticking points, it is important to note that both Brazilian and Turkish decision-makers have intimate knowledge of the American position. America's red lines are crystal clear to both. And even though both have shown significant independence from the US, it is unlikely that they would announce a deal with Iran that wouldn't meet America's requirements.

Rather, the Obama administration's problem with domestic actors may be a greater challenge. Both the House and the Senate have prepared broad sanctions bills, which they intend to send to the President in the next few days. Even if the deal meets American security requirements, Congress may still push forward its extraterritorial sanctions bill, citing other concerns with Iranian behavior.

With the November elections only months away, President Obama may face some stiff opposition from Congress, even over a deal that meets America's red lines on the nuclear issue.

The Latest from Iran (18 May): Getting Beyond the Uranium Agreement

2000 GMT: Bring the Kids Home. More than 200 children of Iranian diplomats have returned home to pursue education at local universities, Ministry of Science official Hassan Moslehi announced on Tuesday.

Moslehi said that all Iranian diplomats should transfer their children's education to Iran once they have fulfilled their mission abroad.

Last week member of Parliament Mohammad Shahryari had complained that around 400 children of senior Iranian officials were studying at universities in Britain.

NEW Iran Analysis: Washington and the Tehran Nuclear Deal (Parsi)
NEW Iran Alert: Filmmaker Firouz Faces Deportation From UK
NEW Iran Analysis: The Contest at Home Over (and Beyond) the Uranium Agreement (Zahra)
NEW Iran Analysis: Assessing the Tehran Nuclear Deal (Gary Sick)
Iran Document: Text of Iran-Brazil-Turkey Agreement on Uranium Enrichment
Iran Document: Mehdi Karroubi “The Islamic Republic Depends Upon the People”
Iran Document: The Prosecutor on the Executions, “Leaders of Sedition” (15 May)
Iran Urgent: The Deal on Uranium Enrichment
The Latest from Iran (17 May): Let’s Make a Deal (But Not with You, Mousavi)

1905 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Amir Khosro Dalirsani of the National Religious Front has been sentenced to four years in prison.


1855 GMT: Hmm, You Might Want to Think About This One. Saber Feizi, the head of the Telecommunications Company of Iran, has said, “The reason for the low internet speed in the country is that users mainly consult websites outside the country for obtaining information."

Launching 115 telecommunications projects in the holy city of Qom on Tuesday, Feizi said that issues with infrastructure were not to blame for slow internet access. He admitted that “lack of content” on Iranian pages pushed users to visit foreign websites.

1845 GMT: A Far-from-Academic Protest. Daneshjoo News claims that students at Khaje Nasir University of Technology in Tehran staged a spontaneous protest against the presence of the commander of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps, General Mohammad Ali Jafari, at the Faculty of Mechanical Engineering.

Green Movement supporters distributed leaflets and reportedly spilled paint over the car of the IRGC commander. The protest occurred despite the presence of armed security and military forces and at least four cameramen from university security.

1335 GMT: Defending His Judiciary. The head of Iran's judiciary, Sadegh Larijani, under pressure on several fronts, has issued a "hold the line" (and don't blame me) statement.

To the 175 members of Parliament who submitted a public letter calling for prosecution of opposition figures like Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, Larijani said the judiciary “is always in step with the greater policies of the Islamic Republic” and has not delayed in its confrontiation of “seditious elements”: “We are very good at our job and are not prone to procrastination as these gentlemen would like to believe. We have no fear of confronting the heads of sedition.”

As for claims that the judiciary has not pursued corruption allegations against public officials, including First Vice President Mohammad Reza Rahimi, Larijani claimed, “The Supreme Leader has repeatedly stressed on direct confrontation of corruption cases provided that they do not weaken the system.”

1145 GMT: We've added another analysis on the Iran-Brazil-Turkey uranium deal: Trita Parsi assesses its signficance and Washington's possible reaction.

1030 GMT: Cracking Down on Mousavi. More on the arrest of Mir Hossein Mousavi's lead bodyguard, Ahmad Yazdanfar (see final updates yesterday)....

There is still no official reason for the detention of Yazdanfar, who has accompanied Mousavi for the past seven years. Following the arrest, Mousavi has asked his office staff not to appear at work until further notice.

0739 GMT: Rights and Repression. Rooz Online features a lengthy interview with Kurdish activist Mahmud Saeedzadeh, "The Judiciary is a Repressive Tool".

0735 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. RAHANA has published a list --- still incomplete --- of 472 political prisoners, their prisons, and their professions in both Persian and English.

0725 GMT: Subsidy Front. Subsidies: Gholamreza Mesbahi Moghaddam, a vocal Parliamentary critic of the Government on economic issues, has charged that the delay in implementation of subsidy cuts to September means the Government is obtaining $20 million of revenue illegally.

0720 GMT: Sacrificing Iran. An interesting statement from Dr Alireza Marandi, former Minister of Health and prominent medical professor: he says that the "development of the country has been sacrificed for politics".

Marandi is the father of the academic Seyed Mohammad Marandi, a high-profile post-election defender of Iran's Government.

0650 GMT: Domestic Politics and the Uranium Agreement. EA's newest correspondent, Ms Zahra, offers a sharp analysis of the internal manoeuvres over yesterday's nuclear news, noting the possibilities and pitfalls for both President Ahmadinejad and the opposition.

What is clear this morning is that Ahmadinejad's "opposition" is not limited to the Green Movement and reformists. The most striking comment in Rah-e-Sabz's overview of the deal and reactions is that of "conservative" member of Parliament Ahmad Tavakoli, who complains that "Iran has lost its most important ace" in high-stakes international card games. Tavakoli added to Fars News that the Tehran agreement is not an "treaty" but an "obligation" upon Iran.

There's more: Tavakoli is a firm ally of Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani. And Khabar Online, also linked to Larijani, features Tavakoli's remarks that "Ahmadinejad must come to the Majlis [Parliament] and explain this strange statement".

Jomhouri Eslami piles on, asserting that the treaty is "a complete drawback".

0600 GMT: Monday's Iran-Brazil-Turkey agreement on procedure over uranium enrichment resonates through politics and the media this morning. Our key question remains unanswered: did the US quietly support the Brazilian-Turkish initiative or was it taken by surprise?

So far Washington has limited itself to a "hold the line" statement, which sets out a further lines for Tehran to cross: let's see the agreement when it has been presented to the International Atomic Energy Agency and let's see Tehran pull back from its unilateral attempt at 20-percent enriched uranium. (The latter, I think, is a red herring; more important will be the response to the former.)

We've posted an analysis by top US-based analyst Gary Sick, and the newest EA correspondent will be offering thoughts later this morning.

As always, however, we will be ensuring that the nuclear news does not wipe Iran's internal situation from sight. An agreement on uranium enrichment does not stop the advance towards 12 June, the anniversary of the election, or the Government's arrests and intimidations. In what may be a most pointed signal, the head of Mir Hossein Mousavi's security detail was arrested yesterday.

And we have a special post this morning on Iranian filmmaker  and LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender) rights activist Kiana Firouz, who faces deportation from Britain.

Iran Analysis: The Contest at Home Over (and Beyond) the Uranium Agreement (Zahra)

Our newest correspondent, Ms Zahra, assesses the impact of yesterday's Iran-Brazil-Turkey uranium agreement on Iran's internal situation:

President Ahmadinejad has already declared himself as victorious, which is true, because he managed to convince his opponents within the Iranian system that an agreement --- even one allowing uranium to leave Tehran for a swap --- should be reached. Surely he will now present himself as the big saviour of Iran from more sanctions.

All of this occurring on a high-profile platform in Tehran is a bonus to mobilise the Ahmadinejad supporters. The photograph says it all:



However, there are also political talking points for the opposition. They can argue that Ahmadinejad has given in to superpowers, especially the US, and has had to accept their conditions, This is not a shining example of national sovereignty. Even worse, the Islamic Republic may become more vulnerable vis-a-vis Israel.

Ahmadinejad's critics can also claim that the agreement could have been signed six months ago. An unnecessary waste of time has led to more sanctions. Far from appearing strong in this crisis, the President has been weak and has failed to withstand foreign pressures.

But here's the internal dimension beyond the nuclear. If this agreement is still valid within a week, it will have far from the domestic impact that Ahmadinejad desires. Iranians are more concerned about high prices, lack of fuel and gas, unemployment, and the overall security atmosphere.

After one or two weeks of big noise --- ta da! --- the situation will be the same or even worse. The subsidy reduction plan is ill-prepared, hundreds of protesters are still imprisoned, investment is at its lowest level in years, shaky oil prices and a squeeze on oil exports may worsen the budget deficit, which will not be covered with revenues of the privatisation of state companies often diverting to the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps and its interests.

As for future developments, there are again two possible scenarios:

The Government will hope that the aversion of crisis and an impression of Iran's strengthened position in international affairs, accompanied by peace and harmony, will bolster public opinion. Human rights? That's just an internal issue.

The opposition will contest that the nuclear deal has only masked the country's real problems. Now that this problem is solved, Western states can put more pressure on Tehran over human rights, possible by setting this as a requirement for extended trade. This time around, big companies will find it difficult to reinvest because of activists accusing them of cooperation with murderers and abusers.

And it will note: if this Government will retreat under pressure in the secondary arena of the international, what might happen if it again faces that pressure on the primary stage of the domestic?

Iran Alert: Filmmaker Firouz Faces Deportation From UK

Reports reached us on Monday of the imminent deportation from Britain of Iranian filmmaker and LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender) rights activist Kiana Firouz. Firouz's request for asylum has been turned down, and she now fears she will be charged with homosexuality if returned to Iran:

Homosexuality in Iran is a sin and offence which is subject to harsh punishment. According to the Islamic law, repetition of this offence will be punished by death. The punishment for lesbianism involving persons who are mature, of sound mind, and consenting, is 100 lashes. If the act is repeated three times and punishment is enforced each time, the death sentence will apply on the fourth occasion (Articles 127, 129, 130 penal code). The ways of proving lesbianism in court are the same as for male homosexuality. (Article 128).

According to Bitch Magazine, Firouz's new film, Cul De Sac, "includes explicit lesbian sex scenes, [and] is based heavily on Firouz's life and struggles as a lesbian in Iran." Coilhouse, which appears to have strongly fact-checked the case, adds, "When clips of her video documentary work featuring the struggle and persecution of gays and lesbians in her country were acquired by Iranian intelligence, agents began to follow Firouz around Tehran, harassing and intimidating her. She fled for England where she could safely continue her work and studies." Her status in the UK is now in doubt.



The person who may hold sway over Firouz's fate is new Home Secretary Theresa May, whose voting record on LGBT rights has been generously described as "mixed". Yesterday, however, she released a statement in support of International Day Against Homophobia and Transphobia, promising the UK government would, "[use] our international influence to put pressure on countries where LGB&T people are persecuted."

Earlier this month, Britain's deportation of Bita Ghaedi was postponed after the European Court of Human Rights ruled it could not be carried out.

Kiana Firouz's full statement, a letter to Theresa May, and a link to a petition can be found at LGBT Asylum News.

[Original link via amealyapple]

Iran Analysis: Assessing the Tehran Nuclear Deal (Gary Sick)

Gary Sick, a former official in the Carter and Reagan Administrations and one of the top US-based analysts on Iran, offers an evaluation of today's agreement between Iran, Brazil, and Turkey on a procedure for the enrichment of Tehran's uranium stock:

What to make of the new nuclear agreement by Turkey and Brazil with Iran?

Perhaps the main point is to be reminded of the moral from the old folk tale: Be careful of what you wish for, since you just might get it. The United States took a rather righteous position that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the West had made Iran a remarkably generous offer, and when it was rejected they had no choice but to go all out for sanctions.

Iran Document: Text of Iran-Brazil-Turkey Agreement on Uranium Enrichment
Iran Urgent: The Deal on Uranium Enrichment

There are those in Washington (but also in Paris and London) who were fully committed to passing a strong sanctions resolution in the United Nations Security Council next month, and this is a blow to them and all the intense diplomatic work they have done in the past five or six months. Clearly, it will be immensely more difficult, if not impossible, to get a sanctions resolution if this deal is on the table.


According to preliminary information, the agreement provides that Iran will, within a month, ship 1240 kg of roughly 5 percent low enriched uranium (LEU) to Turkey where it will be held in escrow for up to a year until Iran is provided with 120 kg of fuel cells (uranium enriched to near 20 percent) to replace the nearly exhausted fuel of the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) that makes medical isotopes. This represents more than half of the 2065 kg of LEU that Iran had produced as of February according to the IAEA, and it greatly reduces Iran’s capability to produce enough fissile material for a bomb.

We should all be reminded of the original purpose of the agreement. It was intended as a confidence-building measure that would open the way to more substantive discussions of other issues. The original offer that Iran provisionally accepted in October tacitly accepted Iran’s right to enrich uranium; in return Iran would give up control over a significant portion of its existing stash of LEU. Even low enriched uranium can be further enriched to create bomb-grade (roughly 90+ percent) highly enriched uranium (HEU) that is required for a bomb. The October agreement would have created an environment conducive to at least minimal mutual trust and the beginning of serious negotiations.

Note to negotiators: In the past six months, Iran has not used its LEU to build a bomb, even without an agreement.

Iran has set up a special line to enrich uranium to the 20 percent required for the TRR, but that line is small, separated from its other enrichment facilities, and under inspection of the IAEA. The move to enrich some uranium to 20 percent was obviously intended as a pressure tactic to drive the West back into negotiations, since Iran does not have the capability to manufacture fuel cells for the TRR.

We should also be reminded that Iran did not reject the original deal: they proposed amending it. Basically, when the Iranian negotiators came home with the proposed deal, they were attacked from all sides –-- including members of the Green Movement –-- for being suckers. Their opponents pointed out that they were going to rely on the word and goodwill of Russia (where the LEU would be enriched to 20 percent) and France (where the fuel cells would be fabricated). Iranians from left to right argued that both of these countries had repeatedly cheated Iran on nuclear issues: Russia by delaying endlessly the completion of the nuclear power plant at Bushehr, and France by refusing to grant Iran rights to the Eurodif enrichment facility partially owned by Iran since the days of the shah. Why, they asked, should we believe that this agreement will be any different?

Instead, they proposed that the swap of LEU for the fuel cells should happen on Iranian soil, probably in stages and within a fixed period of time. That idea was rejected by the United States and its negotiating partners.

The new bargain appears to be a compromise in which the LEU would physically be removed from Iran and held in escrow in Turkey for up to a year, in which time the fuel cells would be manufactured and delivered to Iran. The new bargain also appears to go much further in formally recognizing the legitimacy of Iran’s independent enrichment program. That should not be a surprise given the fact that Brazil, one of the parties to the bargain, has its own enrichment facility similar to Iran’s and in fact concealed its details for some time.

So where does that leave us?

Essentially, it takes us back to last October. The one big difference is that Iran has more LEU now than it did then. But the reality is that Iran will keep producing LEU unless a new agreement is reached to persuade them to stop. If we wait another six months for negotiations, Iran will have still more LEU.

In short, this agreement is largely symbolic and limited in its practical effects. If the West accepts the deal as worked out by Brazil and Turkey, and if a new round of negotiations begins – on both the nuclear and other major issues – then this could be a breakthrough. If the West turns it down, or if the two sides do not use it to negotiate some of the major issues that separate them, then nothing much will have been accomplished.

The next step is up to the United States and its negotiating partners.

Although angst is high among the sanctions-at-all-costs crowd, this path to a nuclear swap deal was fully endorsed by the United States and was the centerpiece of the justification for sanctions. One way to respond at this point may just be to declare that our threat of sanctions worked: Iran has capitulated and we accept yes as an answer.

Hmmm…are we that smart?