Iran Analysis: Washington and the Tehran Nuclear Deal (Parsi)

Trita Parsi, writing for Foreign Policy, evaluates Monday's Iran-Brazil-Turkey agreement on procedure for an uranium enrichment deal and Washington's reaction. His analysis complements that of Gary Sick and EA's Ms Zahra:

The Brazilian-Turkish diplomatic breakthrough with Iran has taken Washington by surprise. Clearly, the geopolitical center of gravity has shifted-five years of EU-led negotiations led nowhere while the new emerging powers Brazil and Turkey only needed a few months to produce a breakthrough. Now, the West needs to pull off some political acrobatics to avoid being on the diplomatic defensive.

Before Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva's trip to Iran this past weekend, few among the permanent members of the UN Security Council were optimistic about his chances of success. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev was charitable when he put Lula's odds at 30 percent. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton reportedly called her Brazilian counterpart to discourage Brazil from undertaking the diplomatic mission. And few in Washington seemed to have been prepared for a diplomatic breakthrough.

Iran Analysis: The Contest at Home Over (and Beyond) the Uranium Agreement (Zahra)
Iran Analysis: Assessing the Tehran Nuclear Deal (Gary Sick)
The Latest from Iran (18 May): Getting Beyond the Uranium Agreement

But against all odds, Turkey and Brazil seem to have succeeded in resolving the most critical obstacle in the Iranian nuclear stand-off: the issue of trust. Both through the modalities of the new deal as well as by virtue of who they are, Turkey and Brazil have succeeded in filling the trust gap.


For the Iranians --- beyond their political paralysis of last year --- the issue of trust was the primary flaw of the October 2009 proposal. As the Iranians saw it, the deal would have required that Iran place disproportionate trust in the Western powers by agreeing to give up its low-enriched uranium stockpile in one shipment, only to receive fuel rods for Iran's research reactor nine to twelve months later. This would have required a significant leap of faith on their behalf.

Iran's relations with most permanent Security Council states (P5) are fraught with tension and mistrust. This includes its relations with Russia. The European power's past support for Saddam Hussein --- including providing him with high-tech weaponry and components for chemical weapons --- has not been forgotten in Tehran, particularly not by those in Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's circles.

Iran's relations with Turkey and Brazil are different, however. Though tensions and rivalry with Turkey have historic roots, relations have improved significantly under the Erdogan government. Though some skepticism remains, Iran has nevertheless noted Turkey's increased independence from --- and at times, defiance of --- the United States. In particular, Turkey's position on the Iraq war as well as its campaign to prevent a new round of UN Security Council sanctions on Iran must have impressed Tehran.

Moreover, unlike with the P5 states, Iran does not only have some trust in Turkey, it also senses that it has some leverage over its Western neighbor. In 2009, Iranian-Turkish trade stood at around $11 billion, with Iran providing a significant portion of Turkey's gas needs. The combination of trust and leverage seems to have been critical in getting the Iranians to agree to put their stockpiles in Turkish territory.

In Brazil, Iran has found an unlikely but much needed ally. Brazil is a rising global power, with a legitimate claim for a permanent seat in the Security Council. It's a state with a long history of sympathizing and identifying with the Iranian position on nuclear matters. If the reprocessing takes place in Brazil, as opposed to Russia, it would be a political victory for Iran to have it occur in an emerging power who for long has endorsed Iran's right to enrichment and who itself achieved recognition of its enrichment right in spite of international pressure.

While Iran has been suspicious of European and American maneuvers and proposals, out of a fear that the ultimate objective of the West is to eliminate Iran's enrichment program, that suspicion is unlikely to arise in a Brazilian-sponsored deal due to Brazil's own nuclear program and self-interest in ensuring that Iran's nuclear rights aren't inhibited and turned into a legally binding precedent.

In fact, the Turkish-Brazilian-Iranian agreement explicitly endorses Iran's right to enrichment, a position the US has refused to officially accept.

Beyond economic interests, international prestige and the opportunity for Brazil and Turkey to become indispensible global actors, it should not be forgotten than both states have viewed war and confrontation as the likely alternative to their diplomacy. In particular, there has been a fear that the current Security Council draft resolution, while not providing an explicit justification for military action, would nevertheless provide regional states outside of the Security Council with a legal basis to take military action against Iran's nuclear facilities.

Washington's reaction has thus far been muted. Though details of the agreement remain unknown, two potential points of objection have emerged.

First, the amount of low-enriched uranium (LEU) that will be shipped to Turkey, 1200 kilograms, constituted approximately 75 percent of Iran's entire stockpile back in October. Though that percentage has shrunk, it will still leave Iran with less LEU than it would need for a bomb. Still, even though Washington insisted that the deal from October remains on the table and that it is non-negotiable, it may be the US itself that ends up seeking to renegotiate the terms. Second, Iran has expanded its enrichment activities and is currently enriching uranium to 19.75 percent. The US insists that this activity must be suspended.

In spite of these potential sticking points, it is important to note that both Brazilian and Turkish decision-makers have intimate knowledge of the American position. America's red lines are crystal clear to both. And even though both have shown significant independence from the US, it is unlikely that they would announce a deal with Iran that wouldn't meet America's requirements.

Rather, the Obama administration's problem with domestic actors may be a greater challenge. Both the House and the Senate have prepared broad sanctions bills, which they intend to send to the President in the next few days. Even if the deal meets American security requirements, Congress may still push forward its extraterritorial sanctions bill, citing other concerns with Iranian behavior.

With the November elections only months away, President Obama may face some stiff opposition from Congress, even over a deal that meets America's red lines on the nuclear issue.

The Latest from Iran (18 May): Getting Beyond the Uranium Agreement

2000 GMT: Bring the Kids Home. More than 200 children of Iranian diplomats have returned home to pursue education at local universities, Ministry of Science official Hassan Moslehi announced on Tuesday.

Moslehi said that all Iranian diplomats should transfer their children's education to Iran once they have fulfilled their mission abroad.

Last week member of Parliament Mohammad Shahryari had complained that around 400 children of senior Iranian officials were studying at universities in Britain.

NEW Iran Analysis: Washington and the Tehran Nuclear Deal (Parsi)
NEW Iran Alert: Filmmaker Firouz Faces Deportation From UK
NEW Iran Analysis: The Contest at Home Over (and Beyond) the Uranium Agreement (Zahra)
NEW Iran Analysis: Assessing the Tehran Nuclear Deal (Gary Sick)
Iran Document: Text of Iran-Brazil-Turkey Agreement on Uranium Enrichment
Iran Document: Mehdi Karroubi “The Islamic Republic Depends Upon the People”
Iran Document: The Prosecutor on the Executions, “Leaders of Sedition” (15 May)
Iran Urgent: The Deal on Uranium Enrichment
The Latest from Iran (17 May): Let’s Make a Deal (But Not with You, Mousavi)

1905 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Amir Khosro Dalirsani of the National Religious Front has been sentenced to four years in prison.


1855 GMT: Hmm, You Might Want to Think About This One. Saber Feizi, the head of the Telecommunications Company of Iran, has said, “The reason for the low internet speed in the country is that users mainly consult websites outside the country for obtaining information."

Launching 115 telecommunications projects in the holy city of Qom on Tuesday, Feizi said that issues with infrastructure were not to blame for slow internet access. He admitted that “lack of content” on Iranian pages pushed users to visit foreign websites.

1845 GMT: A Far-from-Academic Protest. Daneshjoo News claims that students at Khaje Nasir University of Technology in Tehran staged a spontaneous protest against the presence of the commander of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps, General Mohammad Ali Jafari, at the Faculty of Mechanical Engineering.

Green Movement supporters distributed leaflets and reportedly spilled paint over the car of the IRGC commander. The protest occurred despite the presence of armed security and military forces and at least four cameramen from university security.

1335 GMT: Defending His Judiciary. The head of Iran's judiciary, Sadegh Larijani, under pressure on several fronts, has issued a "hold the line" (and don't blame me) statement.

To the 175 members of Parliament who submitted a public letter calling for prosecution of opposition figures like Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, Larijani said the judiciary “is always in step with the greater policies of the Islamic Republic” and has not delayed in its confrontiation of “seditious elements”: “We are very good at our job and are not prone to procrastination as these gentlemen would like to believe. We have no fear of confronting the heads of sedition.”

As for claims that the judiciary has not pursued corruption allegations against public officials, including First Vice President Mohammad Reza Rahimi, Larijani claimed, “The Supreme Leader has repeatedly stressed on direct confrontation of corruption cases provided that they do not weaken the system.”

1145 GMT: We've added another analysis on the Iran-Brazil-Turkey uranium deal: Trita Parsi assesses its signficance and Washington's possible reaction.

1030 GMT: Cracking Down on Mousavi. More on the arrest of Mir Hossein Mousavi's lead bodyguard, Ahmad Yazdanfar (see final updates yesterday)....

There is still no official reason for the detention of Yazdanfar, who has accompanied Mousavi for the past seven years. Following the arrest, Mousavi has asked his office staff not to appear at work until further notice.

0739 GMT: Rights and Repression. Rooz Online features a lengthy interview with Kurdish activist Mahmud Saeedzadeh, "The Judiciary is a Repressive Tool".

0735 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. RAHANA has published a list --- still incomplete --- of 472 political prisoners, their prisons, and their professions in both Persian and English.

0725 GMT: Subsidy Front. Subsidies: Gholamreza Mesbahi Moghaddam, a vocal Parliamentary critic of the Government on economic issues, has charged that the delay in implementation of subsidy cuts to September means the Government is obtaining $20 million of revenue illegally.

0720 GMT: Sacrificing Iran. An interesting statement from Dr Alireza Marandi, former Minister of Health and prominent medical professor: he says that the "development of the country has been sacrificed for politics".

Marandi is the father of the academic Seyed Mohammad Marandi, a high-profile post-election defender of Iran's Government.

0650 GMT: Domestic Politics and the Uranium Agreement. EA's newest correspondent, Ms Zahra, offers a sharp analysis of the internal manoeuvres over yesterday's nuclear news, noting the possibilities and pitfalls for both President Ahmadinejad and the opposition.

What is clear this morning is that Ahmadinejad's "opposition" is not limited to the Green Movement and reformists. The most striking comment in Rah-e-Sabz's overview of the deal and reactions is that of "conservative" member of Parliament Ahmad Tavakoli, who complains that "Iran has lost its most important ace" in high-stakes international card games. Tavakoli added to Fars News that the Tehran agreement is not an "treaty" but an "obligation" upon Iran.

There's more: Tavakoli is a firm ally of Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani. And Khabar Online, also linked to Larijani, features Tavakoli's remarks that "Ahmadinejad must come to the Majlis [Parliament] and explain this strange statement".

Jomhouri Eslami piles on, asserting that the treaty is "a complete drawback".

0600 GMT: Monday's Iran-Brazil-Turkey agreement on procedure over uranium enrichment resonates through politics and the media this morning. Our key question remains unanswered: did the US quietly support the Brazilian-Turkish initiative or was it taken by surprise?

So far Washington has limited itself to a "hold the line" statement, which sets out a further lines for Tehran to cross: let's see the agreement when it has been presented to the International Atomic Energy Agency and let's see Tehran pull back from its unilateral attempt at 20-percent enriched uranium. (The latter, I think, is a red herring; more important will be the response to the former.)

We've posted an analysis by top US-based analyst Gary Sick, and the newest EA correspondent will be offering thoughts later this morning.

As always, however, we will be ensuring that the nuclear news does not wipe Iran's internal situation from sight. An agreement on uranium enrichment does not stop the advance towards 12 June, the anniversary of the election, or the Government's arrests and intimidations. In what may be a most pointed signal, the head of Mir Hossein Mousavi's security detail was arrested yesterday.

And we have a special post this morning on Iranian filmmaker  and LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender) rights activist Kiana Firouz, who faces deportation from Britain.

Thailand Latest: Protestors Ready for Talks? (Fuller/Mydans)

Thomas Fuller and Seth Mydans provide latest news from Thailand in The New York Times:

Leaders of the antigovernment red-shirt protesters said Tuesday they were prepared to negotiate with the government to halt five days of street fighting that threatened to spiral further out of control.

“We have agreed to a new round of talks proposed by the Senate because if we allow things to go on like this, we don’t know how many more lives will be lost,” said the leader Nattawut Saikua, speaking at a news conference in the heart of a neighborhood that has been occupied by demonstrators for six weeks.

Thailand Latest: Opposition General Dies, Fresh Fighting (BBC)

There was no immediate word on the government’s response to his offer. Fighting has raged in Bangkok since May 13, causing at least 36 deaths and turning an area of the city into a battlefield.



Chaotic gun battles in central Bangkok on Sunday and Monday marked a new phase in the city’s spiraling violence, as residents hoarded food and the government warned die-hard protesters that they should leave their encampment or risk “harmful” consequences.

Protesters roaming the lawless streets of a strategically important neighborhood near the protest zone threatened to set fire to a gasoline truck as bonfires, some from piles of tires, sent large plumes of black, acrid smoke into the sky. Earlier on Monday, a rogue Thai general who was shot in the head last week died.

Security forces armed with assault rifles were deployed in greater numbers across the city after many firefights, including a nighttime grenade attack on the five-star Dusit Thani Bangkok Hotel, a landmark in the city. The attack and a subsequent prolonged gun battle suggested that Thai security forces were up against more than just protesters with slingshots and bamboo staves. The mayhem of the crackdown, which follows two months of demonstrations by protesters who are seeking the resignation of the government, has made it difficult to understand who is battling whom.

The government suggested that Thaksin Shinawatra, the former prime minister who was ousted in a 2006 coup, was behind the shadowy forces battling the army on Bangkok streets.

Satit Wongnongtoei, an official in the prime minister’s office, spoke of a “commander who lives overseas” who is intent on “causing violence and loss of life as much as they can by using weapons of war.” Mr. Thaksin is reported to live mostly in Dubai.

The government on Sunday issued a ban on certain banking transactions linked to companies and accounts held by Mr. Thaksin and his family.

The protest movement defiantly encamped in Bangkok began as a reaction to Mr. Thaksin’s ouster, but it has expanded into a social movement as less affluent segments of Thai society rebel against what they say is an elite group that tries to control Thailand’s democratic institutions.

On Sunday, Mr. Thaksin issued a statement through his lawyer that called on “all sides to step back from this terrible abyss and seek to begin a new, genuine and sincere dialogue between the parties.”

It seems plausible that some of the attacks in recent days have been carried out by disaffected elements of the military or the police. The attack on the Dusit Thani Bangkok Hotel in the early hours of Monday may have been a retaliatory move by a faction loyal to Maj. Gen. Khattiya Sawatdiphol, the renegade officer allied with the protesters who was shot on Thursday and died Monday. Security experts speculate that General Khattiya was shot by a sniper stationed at the hotel, which has in recent weeks served as a base for hundreds of security personnel.

The government has insisted that soldiers fire only in self-defense, but the death toll has been lopsidedly among civilians. Government statistics said that 34 civilians and 2 soldiers — counting the general — had been killed since Thursday, and 256 people had been wounded, almost all of them civilians.

Protesters have attributed some of the deaths to snipers who are stationed in several places around the city on top of tall buildings.

The Foreign Ministry explained in a memo distributed Monday that the sharpshooters had been deployed to “look out for danger and protect others.”

With the apparent involvement of various armed groups, the fighting may have moved beyond the point where any protest leader can declare an effective cease-fire.

The protest site, in the heart of Bangkok’s main commercial district, which at its peak was filled with tens of thousands of demonstrators, had thinned to perhaps 2,000 protesters on Monday afternoon. Where entire families had camped in a festive atmosphere, mostly men remained.

Army aircraft circled above the site, dropping leaflets urging people to leave. Guards in black with red scarves escorted people who chose to leave. A man circulated among the guards handing out small packets of sticky rice along with 100-baht bills, worth about $3.

Protesters filled small energy drink bottles with gasoline and then demonstrated their plan to propel them by swinging a golf club. Small groups of people occasionally pointed at department stores where they said they believed snipers were hidden.

Outside the site of the sit-in, on Rama IV Road, where much of the worst fighting has taken place, trucks loaded with tires raced in, unloaded them as if at a racetrack pit stop, and sped away. Crowds watching from a safe distance applauded. The tires were stacked by the road to replenish a burning barricade.

Tension radiated from the battle zone, and at one point unknown gunmen carried out an attack on a hospital.

Hundreds of businesses and bank branches were closed after the violence caused the government to declare a national holiday and postpone the opening of schools.

The American Embassy in Bangkok canceled a “town hall” meeting about the security situation scheduled for Tuesday because of the risk that those attending would be put in “harm’s way,” a statement from the embassy said Monday. Embassy officials will instead use the Internet to address concerns of Americans living in Bangkok.

Iran Analysis: The Contest at Home Over (and Beyond) the Uranium Agreement (Zahra)

Our newest correspondent, Ms Zahra, assesses the impact of yesterday's Iran-Brazil-Turkey uranium agreement on Iran's internal situation:

President Ahmadinejad has already declared himself as victorious, which is true, because he managed to convince his opponents within the Iranian system that an agreement --- even one allowing uranium to leave Tehran for a swap --- should be reached. Surely he will now present himself as the big saviour of Iran from more sanctions.

All of this occurring on a high-profile platform in Tehran is a bonus to mobilise the Ahmadinejad supporters. The photograph says it all:



However, there are also political talking points for the opposition. They can argue that Ahmadinejad has given in to superpowers, especially the US, and has had to accept their conditions, This is not a shining example of national sovereignty. Even worse, the Islamic Republic may become more vulnerable vis-a-vis Israel.

Ahmadinejad's critics can also claim that the agreement could have been signed six months ago. An unnecessary waste of time has led to more sanctions. Far from appearing strong in this crisis, the President has been weak and has failed to withstand foreign pressures.

But here's the internal dimension beyond the nuclear. If this agreement is still valid within a week, it will have far from the domestic impact that Ahmadinejad desires. Iranians are more concerned about high prices, lack of fuel and gas, unemployment, and the overall security atmosphere.

After one or two weeks of big noise --- ta da! --- the situation will be the same or even worse. The subsidy reduction plan is ill-prepared, hundreds of protesters are still imprisoned, investment is at its lowest level in years, shaky oil prices and a squeeze on oil exports may worsen the budget deficit, which will not be covered with revenues of the privatisation of state companies often diverting to the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps and its interests.

As for future developments, there are again two possible scenarios:

The Government will hope that the aversion of crisis and an impression of Iran's strengthened position in international affairs, accompanied by peace and harmony, will bolster public opinion. Human rights? That's just an internal issue.

The opposition will contest that the nuclear deal has only masked the country's real problems. Now that this problem is solved, Western states can put more pressure on Tehran over human rights, possible by setting this as a requirement for extended trade. This time around, big companies will find it difficult to reinvest because of activists accusing them of cooperation with murderers and abusers.

And it will note: if this Government will retreat under pressure in the secondary arena of the international, what might happen if it again faces that pressure on the primary stage of the domestic?

Middle East Inside Line: IDF Concern over Settlers, Israel's Warning to Europeans, Barak's Tactics, Chomsky on "Stalinist" Israel

Israel Defense Forces Concern over Settlers: The head of Israel Defense Forces' Central Command, General Avi Mizrahi, told the troops of Kfir Infantry Brigade on Monday that the recent spate of settler violence could lead to a Palestinian uprising in the West Bank.

The Kfir Brigade, created in December 2005, consists of six battalions who man 30 percent of the roadblocks in the West Bank and are responsible for 60 percent of arrests. Although the IDF is not aware of any plan, Mizrahi said, the IDF must be ready for any escalation in the territory and for the possibility of fighting the Palestinian forces, trained in Jordan by US General Keith Dayton. Mizrahi continued:

Middle East Inside Line: Proximity Talks Continue; Israel’s Lieberman & Palestine; Chomsky Barred

In most of the settlements, there is no problem,. Most are normative – but another mosque arson, and yet another arson, and it all comes together. But Yitzhar, Gilad's Farm, Maon, they don't believe in us at all as a state. They want only one thing, and when someone loses his boundaries, you don't know where it's going to go.

"Hands off Gaza": The Israeli Foreign Ministry warned Turkey, Greece, Ireland, and Sweden that any of their citizens setting sail for Gaza would be stopped before they could reach the coastal territory.

Earlier Monday, Israeli security forces released and deported a Turkish national arrested this month for allegedly belonging to an outlawed Islamic group.

Israel's Barak Aligning with Obama: Unlike his coalition partners, Ehud Barak prefers playing the "good guy" within the context of a regional peace under Washington's guidance. Possibly because of benefits when compared to partners' "intransigence", the Labor Party declines to hit the media with conservative and provocative statements on Jerusalem.

Barak on Monday urged Israeli lawmakers to refrain from taking any actions or making remarks that might present West Jerusalem's opposition to the Middle East peace process, according to Israel Radio. He also said that Israel must work to increase the mutual trust with its top ally, the United States, and added that the proximity talks must eventually lead to direct talks with the Palestinians.

Chomsky's Response to Israeli Officials: Having been refused entry into Israel on Sunday, Noam Chomsky likened Israel to a  "Stalinist regime". In a telephone conversation with Haaretz, Chomsky said from Jordan:

The official asked me why I was lecturing only at Bir Zeit and not an Israeli university. I told him that I have lectured a great deal in Israel. The official read the following statement: 'Israel does not like what you say.

I find it hard to think of a similar case, in which entry to a person is denied because he is not lecturing in Tel Aviv. Perhaps only in Stalinist regimes.

Israel's Lieberman on North Korea: Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman on Sunday responded to a personal attack from the North Korean Foreign Ministry, which called him "an imbecile". He said, "I see it as a compliment from the North Koreans."