Obama's Latest Bow: Not a Secret Muslim, Just a Pigeon in Japan

Enduring America regrets that it has to bring the sad news that the US President has once more bowed down to a foreign, unelected ruler.

Readers may recall that, when Obama lowered himself in a meeting with King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia earlier this year, our favourite on-line encyclopedia of eternal truth (and no liberal lies), Conservapedia, were a bit slow off the mark to portray Obama as a "secret Muslim".

So would they do any better on Saturday when President Barack Obama genuflected before Japan's Emperor Akihito?

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3kyD_e0Y7FQ&feature=related[/youtube]

Yes! Conservapedia made amends for their past delinquency, calling Obama's gesture a "bowfest" and posting a YouTube video showing that he "bobbed his head like a pigeon!":

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5U6fL7Y4BZA[/youtube]

Kudos to the right-wing defenders of all things encyclopedic if sad news, indeed, to see such abasement of the Leader of the Free World.

Still....better a pigeon than a secret Muslim?

The Iran Cul-de-Sac: 4 Points on Obama's Embrace of Ahmadinejad (and Rejection of the Green Movement)

The Bomb, The Bomb: Distorting the Latest Report on Iran’s Nuclear Programme
Iran Document: The International Atomic Energy Agency Report on Nuclear Facilities
The Latest from Iran (16 November): Catching Up

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1. IT'S THE NUKES, STUPID

If anyone in the Iranian Government still believes in the
Washington-directed "velvet revolution", rather than using it as a stick to beat the opposition, he/she can breathe easy. The driving force for the Obama Administration's approach to Iran is the quest for an agreement on uranium enrichment.

That ambition is led by the President, and his determination has brought general consensus in an Administration that was arguing over the value of talks earlier in 2009. Broadly speaking, the White House, the National Security Council, and the State Department are all on the same page now.

Any reference to the internal situation in Iran, as in the Obama recent statement calling for recognition of the rights of protesters, is a gloss. The President and his advisors may have a legal and humanitarian interest in what happens to demonstrators, as well to US citizens detained and sentenced to years in prison in Iran, but it is not their top policy priority.

Indeed, Washington's position is now fixed firmly enough to withstand not only the demands of reformists but figures like Hashemi Rafsanjani to go slow on deal with President Ahmadinejad. I suspect we will find that Obama has personally gone farther --- much farther --- than any President since 1979 to get an accommodation with Tehran.

2. GETTING THE GREEN MOVEMENT WRONG

The quest for a nuclear deal has been accompanied by a disturbing if tangential story of how "intelligence" and "analysis" has undermined the Iranian opposition.

Ever since the June election, some US officials, primarily in the intelligence community, have been putting out the line that the Green Movement is insignificant and/or not to be trusted on issues such as nuclear weapons, Israel, and
"anti-Americanism". (The public face of this line is the commentaries of Flynt Leverett, formerly of the National Security Council, and Hillary Mann Leverett, formerly of the State Department.)

This assessment was reinforced by the appearance in October of former Khatami Government official and "Karroubi advisor" Ataollah Mojaherani at the conference of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. His strident caution to the audience that a "Green Government" was unlikely to give ground on Iran's nuclear programme or on the position towards Israel apparently sent shock waves through the audience, angering other reformists present in the audience who feared Mohajerani had just damaged their cause.

They were right. It is the Mojaherani incident that is behind the clamour of well-placed Washington columnists like Jackson Diehl and David Ignatius to beware the Greens. More importantly, the speech fuelled the "analysis" within the CIA that the politics of Mousavi-Karroubi-Khatami were not to be trusted, a belief that accompanied (and possibly fed by) sources such as those in Borzou Daragahi's pre-13 Aban article assaulting the Green Movement.

What is intriguing is how a Washington distraction became the foundation for some in the CIA to bury or fear the Greens. It is true that Mohajerani was a prominent member of the Karroubi campaign and wore the badge of a glittering if past political career: youngest deputy of the first post-Revolution Parliament, Vice-President in the Rafsanjani Government, Minister of Culture under Mohammad Khatami.

Still, at the time, we gave almost no space to the Mojaherani speech because it was so disconnected from events and political strategy in Iran. Before and after the Washington episode, I have not seen Mojaherani's name rise up in the movements of the Green Wave. In short, he was one of a number of former officials who have or had connections with a complex network of "reformists".

For many in Washington, however, Mojaherani was thought to be no less than the ambassador for the Green Movement, presenting its manifesto. And when the approach of his speech did not match up to the "revolution" --- in presentation and policy, if not Islamic system --- that they wanted, those officials and commentators reacted like a lover spurned.

(There is a wider point here. The Iranian Government has had success in disrupting communications within Iran
but it is also important that it has limited any dialogue between the reformist opposition and the "outside", in this case the
US Government. With no direct line
established as the Green Movement evolved, American officials have
relied upon a variety of people, usually located outside Iran presenting a wide range of often contradictory advice and speculation rather than solid information.

While the situation may have been inevitable, given the detentions of many reformists and de facto house arrest of leaders like Mir Hossein Mousavi, it strikes me that the Obama Administration has not worked around these restrictions to read the lines --- and between the lines --- of statements not only of Mousavi, Karroubi, and Khatami but of other activists like Alireza Beheshti and senior clerics from and beyond Qom.)

3. THE MYTH OF THE PLAN B: SANCTIONS

As a case study in internal politics,
the beauty of the Obama nuclear-first, engagement-first approach has been how it has brought consensus amongst differing groups within the Administration. If the talks brought nuclear agreement, that would be a significant result for the unclenched fist (the line often attributed to some State Department officials and envoys like Richard Holbrooke). If they were finally collapsed by Iranian stalling and intransigence, the platform for aggressive sanctions would be laid (the line often
attributed to Dennis Ross, now at the National Security Council).

The only problem comes if, having grasped the hand of the Iranian Government in talks, the Obama Administration then has to slap Ahmadinejad's face in the absence of an agreement.

Washington's current calculation, supported by its diplomatic strategy, turns the Russian key. Moscow's envoys are working on the Iranian Government to accept the uranium enrichment plan, while Russian President Dmitri Medvedev issues unsubtle hints that he will not stand back if Tehran balks.

That is not the same as a Russian commitment to sanctions. Let's assume, however, that Moscow accepts a US-led multilateral effort inside or outside the United Nations. And let's assume that President Obama, who no doubt has mentioned this in Beijing this week, gets a Chinese promise to stand aside.

What next? If there is no nuclear agreement, it will quite likely be because the Supreme Leader has objected, despite Obama's sustained direct efforts. So how does a stricter round of sanctions change Ayatollah Khamenei's position?

It doesn't. So the Obama Administration is presumably counting on a diplomatic and economic containment, indeed isolation, of Iran.

That, however, does nothing to address the issue of President Ahmadinejad, who remains in office. It does nothing to deal with the increasing role of the Revolutionary Guards in matters beyond the nuclear and even military realm. (Indeed, as some analysts have contended, further sanctions may assist the Guard's economic ventures, although this effect may be mitigated if the restrictions can specifically target Guard "investments".)

Sanctions certainly do nothing with respect to the reformists and the Green movement. Even if Washington recants and tries to bring them back into political consideration, it is unclear --- given the perceived snub by Obama's officials in recent weeks --- if the opposition will offer even a cautious welcome.

4. BACK TO THE CUL-DE-SAC

In the Bush years, the cul-de-sac for American policy was the threat that could not be carried out. Whether the vision was a "turn left from Baghdad" intervention, briefly considered in 2003, the military strikes advocated by Vice President Cheney in 2007, or a sledgehammer set of economic sanctions, the Administration could not deliver the blow. The "best" it could manage was the muddled if funded programme of "soft power" in the 2nd term, which was never defined as either a live-and-let-live civic engagement or the cover for "velvet revolution".

The hope of the Obama approach has been to get out of that dead end, opening up space for other initiatives such as Middle Eastern agreements, through engagement. And, considered narrowly in the context of discussions on nuclear programmes and regional politics, that was solid, realist common sense.

But "narrowly" became very narrow after the elections of 12 June. If Obama wanted to dance, he had to dance with an Iranian President who now lacked legitimacy (despite the efforts of engagement advocates like the Leveretts to explain how Ahmadinejad had really won the election and a clear mandate).

That legitimacy, within weeks of the election, was not just a question of a "reformist" challenge. Ahmadinejad has also been in a tenuous position vis-a-vis political rivals like Hashemi Rafsanjani, the conservatives/principlists in the Iranian Parliament, Ayatollahs (and thus bodies such as the Assembly of Experts), and at times the Supreme Leader. That is why the Iranian President, far from breaking off talks to pursue The Bomb, is hugging the nuclear discussions so close --- with no prospect of salvation through an economic miracle, this is his prescription for political longevity.

Now Obama's engagement gamble, re-shaped in this post-June cauldron, may still succeed if the Supreme Leader gives his backing to an agreement on uranium enrichment. (Which is why, just to repeat, this President is going farther than any predecessor in 30 years) A wider US agenda, which may adapt engagement for exchanges on Iran's political and legal issues as well as geopolitical interests, could then be drafted.

But, if the nuclear deal does not go through, Obama and Ahmadinejad now dance in a downward spiral. The Iranian President will struggle to serve out his disputed second term. And the US President will be back in the cul-de-sac: pressed by some advisors and a lot of Congressmen to pursue sanctions which offer no remedy for --- and no exit from --- the political dilemma of his failed engagement.

Photo Diplomacy: The Meaning Behind the Picture at the Obama-Netanyahu Meeting

Haaretz Correspondent Roey Simioni offers an interesting take on photo diplomacy in Washington.

The only photo released by the White House of the recent meeting between Barack Obama and Benjamin Netanyahu shows both men talking seriously in a friendly and calm dinner setting. One might say that the Obama administration could have leaked a photo in which Obama is pointing his finger toward Netanyahu's face, or another pose which could raise questions regarding the atmosphere of the meeting. However this picture looks like the best of bad lot.

Here is Simioni's opinion:

A painting hangs on the wall beside the two leaders, which if Netanyahu did not see it, or saw it and did not understand its significance, then Obama, who recently won the Nobel Peace Prize, must have taken the trouble to explain to him its historic importance.

Obama's message to Netanyahu, if there really was such a message, is quite clear: If you end the blood feud and make a peace of the brave, you will be remembered in history as a great leader, like Lincoln (the former president most esteemed by Obama).

In the picture, which was painted in 1865 by the artist George Peter Alexander Healy, Abraham Lincoln, the 16th president of the United States, is seen conferring with William Sherman, Ulysses Grant and David Porter, the commanders of the Union army. During conversations the four men held on the River Queen steamboat on March 27 and March 28 of that year, just over a week before the end of the U.S. Civil War, they discussed the conditions of the peace treaty they would offer the defeated Confederate forces. The accord, even if it had many deficiencies, brought about the reunion of the North and South, the economic recovery of the South, the abolition of slavery and the emancipation of African Americans.

Inside Line on Hamas & Hezbollah: Their Thoughts on Obama, Unity Governments, & Oprah

Middle East Inside Line: Hezbollah Leader Blasts Obama

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Sharmine Narwani, writing for The Huffington Post, talks to Hamas and Hezbollah leaders about their countries, US foreign policy, and TV programmes:

In early August and late October, I met with Hamas' Osama Hamdan and Hezbollah's Ammar Mousawi, chiefs of their respective organizations' foreign relations portfolios....So where do things stand on rapprochement? What do they think of Obama? Do they have "hope" that US policy will "change?" What do they think of the peace process? Extremist groups in the Mideast - who are the worst offenders? Do they find inspiration in Americans and who might these figures be? Hamdan and Mousawi had plenty to say.

On Obama...

Ammar Mousawi: There is no doubt that we find certain traits that are distinguished in the character of Obama -- that he is no repetition of former US presidents. When we listen to his speeches, we certainly note something new. However, the political forces that make policy in the US allow any exceptional steps to be only limited. There is no doubt that there is a change in tone, but it is doubtful that there will be a change in policy. If change were to take place, it would not be in Cairo University -- it would have to be in the US Congress.

We know that Obama is experiencing political difficulties from his opponents. He is being besieged in domestic policy challenges and internal issues - healthcare reform, issues of his roots. So when he declared his ambitious approach for his solutions for the Mideast, they sent him the Israel lobby to put him in a corner.

Osama Hamdan: I think there has been no change since Obama became president. In fact, I believe we faced a great failure last month (when the US administration caved on the issue of an Israeli settlement freeze in the West Bank). It was a minor failure, but a failure nonetheless. Brings me as a Palestinian to ask why Palestinians should accept any conditions when Israel doesn't. I liked Obama's Cairo speech, but we have to see what happens on the ground.

The US is putting itself in a corner by thinking it is their responsibility to protect Israel in the region when Israel is doing the attacking. Someone has to be courageous enough - there must be conditions for Israel. If you have a child that doesn't have to follow rules, he will be spoilt. Israel is the US's spoilt child.

The US has to say to the Israeli government "That's it." They can do that. It is not so simple, but it is not too difficult either. Who in the world will support Israel against the US? Fifty percent of Europeans identified Israel as the biggest threat to peace and stability in the world -- not in the Middle East -- but in the world.

I understand that Obama is facing internal and external problems and pressures. But his priorities are not clear to us -- he seems confused. Palestinians will not wait forever.

On Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu:

Osama Hamdan: Netanyahu has always been against a genuine peace process. We had experience with him when he was prime minister from 1996-98 -- he undermined the Oslo Agreements, he divided the issues - there is a very bad experience with him. Adding to this is his foreign minister is Avigdor Lieberman -- the worst political figure in all the world. Add to that Ehud Barak. We are facing a government formed of extremists. Netanyahu, Lieberman and Barak? The worst combination in Israeli history.

Ammar Mousawi: One of the unfortunate aspects of Obama's term as president is that it is coupled with Netanyahu's. Netanyahu is not ready to even have an "apparent" flexibility toward peace.

On being called "terrorists":

Ammar Mousawi: The War on Terror's objective was to corner legitimate resistance and prevent it from achieving its mission. The West still resists differentiating between resistance and terrorism -- and that is done on purpose. Resistance is defined as a legal fight against occupation as opposed to terrorism, which is defined as systematically killing innocent people. We are interested in having a dialog with the West because we would like to make them aware of our point of view. Resistance is part of world history -- it is not an uncommon thing. All these negative positions taken by the West are because of their support for Israel and unwillingness to see that the people of this region have the right to exist in peace. After the failure of all their attempts to destroy these resistance groups through military and political means, they concluded that they must now know more about us, how we operate. And so the dialogue begins.

(Hezbollah has been on the US terrorism list since 1999. Only the US, Israel and Canada recognize Hezbollah as a terrorist organization.)

Osama Hamdan: We were listed on the US terrorism list in 1993 just because Israel asked for it -- before that we had direct contacts with the Americans. We even sent a letter to then Secretary of State Madeleine Albright asking why. They know that they are wrong in this. They know that anyone who supports rights and justice supports the Palestinians. We want them to accept Hamas as the choice of the Palestinian people - they must respect the fact that Palestinians are committed to their rights. They will talk with us eventually. We are not in a hurry for that.

In the West, they try to shape you before dealing with you. This is the Palestinian experience. They've done this with Fatah. Hamas' position is to say what we are, what we stand for - clearly - and we can defend our rights best that way.

On Extremist Islamic Groups:

Osama Hamdan: All Islamists should want the good of their people. The most important point is how they deal with their own communities. In my belief, you have to be a good man to your own people - not push them hard or kill them if they don't accept your point of view. In Rafah, Gaza this August, we had clashes with a minority group which started killing Palestinians just because they had different ideas, by putting bombs in internet cafes, beauty salons and wedding parties.

We are against groups like Al Qa'eda and the Taliban for this reason. We condemned the attacks of 9-11, the explosions in London, the Madrid bombing when it was clear to us that these were not accidents.

Ammar Mousawi: We try to promote a positive image of Islam that is open to dialogue between people and cultures. We are not responsible for the actions of groups that present a different picture of Islam. We do not agree with the behavior of these groups -- they give a negative view of Islam. But the question is who created and supported these extremists?

What gives life to these entities is the policies of the West: unlimited support for Israel will cause this extremism. All the wars in Afghanistan will feed this extremism. We are in a situation where we will have wars with no end. Sovereignty, development, mutual respect, the right to determine your own destiny -- these issues need dialog, not wars.

Hezbollah condemns the deliberate killing of innocent people -- it promotes in us a sense of sadness as happened with 9-11, London, Madrid. And if there are some differences between us and the US, this is not the way to sort out our problems -- these acts are not excusable.

Mr. Mousawi, what is the status of efforts to form a Lebanese unity government -- and what are the chances of such a government being successful in overcoming the deadlocks and disagreements of the past?

We believe there are currently good chances for the formation of a national unity government, having overcome the most serious obstacles. We have finally reached agreement on the inclusion of Jubran Basil as a member of the cabinet, and General Michel Aoun has been granted the Telecommunications Ministry, both issues having been points of contention for the opposition.

As for the issue over various ministries, we are still deliberating the cabinet posts that will go to the opposition, but we are hopeful that things will go smoothly.

Mr. Hamdan, what is the status of efforts to form a Palestinian Unity agreement between Hamas and Fatah? How will this impact the holding of elections in 2010?

I have to say that we are still committed to the Palestinian reconciliation and we are willing to have this reconciliation for the benefit of the Palestinian people and the Palestinian cause. I believe that Mahmoud Abbas' move to hold elections on January 24, 2010 has undermined these efforts, but we are still working with the Egyptians to overcome this problem. However, I believe that no elections will take place without reconciliation between the two parties. On this same issue, a few days ago, Abu Mazen [Abbas] declared a clear failure in the peace process, saying that he will not be a candidate in the upcoming election. I think that was supposed to be a helpful step to go back to the Palestinian dialogue, because when you feel there is a failure in the process, you have to go back to the people. I think Abu Mazen was saying there is a failure in the political track, and he invited all the people to support national unity, to face the Israeli threat. This may help Palestinian unity.

No one can trust that there will be real elections without Palestinian unity and so it will be a waste of time and a new complication in the Palestinian cause if there is an election without this unity.

There must be a change in the Israeli mentality because they must understand that without ending the occupation, there will be no peace.

Outside of your own bloc, name a Middle Eastern leader you admire and tell us why:

Ammar Mousawi: I admire the Emir of Qatar who made something of his country -- it is small, but he has made it into a country of influence. They've helped us in rebuilding what Israel destroyed in its 2006 attack on Lebanon. The Emir was the first and only Arab head of state to come to the suburbs of Beirut to witness the horrifying destruction of the Israeli aggression. And we thank him for this because it motivated our own Prime Minister Fouad Siniora to come himself. Imagine the prime minister of all Lebanon didn't see the urgency to visit this area that had taken heavy bombardment and destruction? We are embarrassed in one sense, and angry on the other hand.

Your thoughts on US Middle East policy?

Ammar Mousawi: America is a great nation -- to get to this place has taken some great people, and a certain individuality that is renowned through history. We have no issues with the American people, we share many concerns with them on their government's policies. We have in the Middle East paid a heavy price for US policy. There are many Americans paying for these failed policies of previous administrations. Bush's ratings in the US dropped into the 20s. Therefore, can anybody be surprised if we say we object to aspects of US foreign policy?

We would like to say to Americans that they are subjecting themselves to a double standard - on one hand talking about values and on the other hand resisting and undermining these very values through their unconditional support of Israel's actions. The way they have received and treated the Goldstone Report has caused an uproar here.

I tell you this - America will not find anyone to assist it to come out of its Mideast crisis other than this bloc of nations that Hezbollah belongs to. If we count today the total US crises - in Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine, even Pakistan, what does the supposed Arab "moderate" bloc have and what does our group have in terms of cards to help the US. The strength is in the hands of our resistance bloc.

Osama Hamdan: The US administration has to realize that Israel is occupying Palestinian lands, not the other way around. But they are sending weapons to be used against Palestinians every day -- at least $2 billion worth is sent to Israel annually. They have to put these basic facts on the table before pointing a finger at Hamas' rockets. We have said before we are ready to engage in a prolonged ceasefire if there is a complete Israeli withdrawal from occupied Palestinian lands -- they did not even try to respond to this offer.

There is a peace process. Hamas opposes that peace process, not because we like to be against it, but because we believe there is no real peace. The Israelis and the sponsors of the process, mainly the US administration, were not creating peace through negotiations, they were dismantling the Palestinian cause. If you go through the Oslo Agreement, you discover that this agreement pushed aside the main issues that created the conflict -the status of Jerusalem, the land, sovereignty of a future Palestinian state, the right of return for refugees, and our natural resources. They said all of these have to be negotiated afterward!

We have an Arab saying that goes: the one who is safe from punishment will act badly. Israel feels it is totally protected, that it can do anything -- it feels it is a country above the law when the US uses its veto to protect Israel at every turn. If the Arabs work to protect their own interests, talk to the Americans about their mutual interests, I think the Americans will see the value of re-balancing their strategic interests in the region.

At the moment, nobody in the region can view the US as an honest broker of peace. That is because of the history of American foreign policy. The US has to make a major change - they have to show that they are balanced on the Palestinian issue and not just following the line of the Israeli lobby in the US.

Mr. Hamdan, are there any US presidents you admire, and why?

George Washington, because he led his people to independence. And John F. Kennedy, because he tried to make a change for the better.

Mr. Mousawi, do you watch any American television shows? Any particular programs you admire?

My wife likes the Oprah show, and I watch it with her sometimes -- Oprah seems to cover some interesting topics of social value.

Afghanistan Special: The Obama Administration Breaks Apart Over Military Escalation

Afghanistan Video: Obama Rejects “All Military Options”?
Afghanistan: The Pentagon (and US Companies) Dig In for “Long War”
Afghanistan: A US-Pakistan Deal? Karzai Stays, Talks with the Taliban
The US in Afghanistan: “The Long War” Still Waits for a Strategy

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And no, that is not too dramatic a headline.

Twenty-four hours ago, everything was A-OK in the Obama Administration: "Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, Admiral Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton [were] coalescing around a proposal to send 30,000 or more additional American troops to Afghanistan." OK, maybe "President Obama remain[ed] unsatisfied with answers he has gotten about how vigorously the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan would help execute a new strategy," but each of the four options on the table provided for some increase in the US military presence. The issues were "how much of Afghanistan the troops would seek to control and different time frames and expectations for the training of Afghan security forces".

And then all that coalescing fell apart.

This morning's New York Times reveals, "The United States ambassador to Afghanistan, who once served as the top American military commander there, has expressed in writing his reservations about deploying additional troops to the country, three senior American officials said Wednesday."

So "the position of the ambassador, Karl W. Eikenberry, a retired lieutenant general, puts him in stark opposition to the current American and NATO commander in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, who has asked for 40,000 more troops". But even that is merely a dramatic support for a bigger indication of the divisions in the Administration?

Who were the "three senior American officials" who leaked Eikenberry's memorandum?

Presumably Gates, Clinton, and Mullen, given their reported acceptance of most of the McChrystal increase, would not be spreading secrets to undermine the proposal. So is Vice President Joe Biden, who has been held up as the chief opponent of an intensive escalation for "counter-insurgency" with his preference a targeted "counter-terrorism" effort, trying to sabotage the four options? What about special envoy Richard Holbrooke, who has no love for Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai and bitterly fell out with him after the August Presidential election, given Eikenberry's reported "strong concerns about...Karzai’s reliability as a partner and corruption in his government"?

The mystery will be pored over, without an answer, in the next days. Even more important, however, is the apparent effect of the Eikenberry objections on the President. The White House spin, after yesterday's eighth review conference on the Afghanistan options, is that no decision has been taken but that the President is making clear that the US commitment to the Karzai Government is not "open-ended". That's far from a ringing endorsement, either for the US ally in Kabul or for McChrystal's plan.

Indeed, if I was putting 2+2 together to make more than 4, I would add a question for detective journalists, "Who is to say that those 'senior officials' who ensured the Eikenberry memo went public this morning are not on Obama's White House staff?"

For months I expected this political kabuki, for all the appearances of Administration tensions, differing proposals, and persistent doubts, to end in the "compromise" of a troop increase that would meet most of McChrystal's demands. After all, that was the script in March when Obama approved the escalation of 30,000 more US soldiers and support units.

Now, however, that expectation is suspended. I would not go as far as the Associated Press report that the President "has rejected all military options" (see video in separate entry); supporters of a troop increase will not go away quietly, so there are further chapters in this political story.

Instead, Obama is buying himself some time with his trip to Asia, declaring that no decision will be taken before his return to Washington next week, even as those pressing for escalation scream, "Ditherer". Yet there is a glimmer --- if only a glimmer --- that the President may draw the line on the upward spiral of US military intervention.