Afghanistan Special: The Obama Administration Breaks Apart Over Military Escalation

Afghanistan Video: Obama Rejects “All Military Options”?
Afghanistan: The Pentagon (and US Companies) Dig In for “Long War”
Afghanistan: A US-Pakistan Deal? Karzai Stays, Talks with the Taliban
The US in Afghanistan: “The Long War” Still Waits for a Strategy

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And no, that is not too dramatic a headline.

Twenty-four hours ago, everything was A-OK in the Obama Administration: "Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, Admiral Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton [were] coalescing around a proposal to send 30,000 or more additional American troops to Afghanistan." OK, maybe "President Obama remain[ed] unsatisfied with answers he has gotten about how vigorously the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan would help execute a new strategy," but each of the four options on the table provided for some increase in the US military presence. The issues were "how much of Afghanistan the troops would seek to control and different time frames and expectations for the training of Afghan security forces".

And then all that coalescing fell apart.

This morning's New York Times reveals, "The United States ambassador to Afghanistan, who once served as the top American military commander there, has expressed in writing his reservations about deploying additional troops to the country, three senior American officials said Wednesday."

So "the position of the ambassador, Karl W. Eikenberry, a retired lieutenant general, puts him in stark opposition to the current American and NATO commander in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, who has asked for 40,000 more troops". But even that is merely a dramatic support for a bigger indication of the divisions in the Administration?

Who were the "three senior American officials" who leaked Eikenberry's memorandum?

Presumably Gates, Clinton, and Mullen, given their reported acceptance of most of the McChrystal increase, would not be spreading secrets to undermine the proposal. So is Vice President Joe Biden, who has been held up as the chief opponent of an intensive escalation for "counter-insurgency" with his preference a targeted "counter-terrorism" effort, trying to sabotage the four options? What about special envoy Richard Holbrooke, who has no love for Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai and bitterly fell out with him after the August Presidential election, given Eikenberry's reported "strong concerns about...Karzai’s reliability as a partner and corruption in his government"?

The mystery will be pored over, without an answer, in the next days. Even more important, however, is the apparent effect of the Eikenberry objections on the President. The White House spin, after yesterday's eighth review conference on the Afghanistan options, is that no decision has been taken but that the President is making clear that the US commitment to the Karzai Government is not "open-ended". That's far from a ringing endorsement, either for the US ally in Kabul or for McChrystal's plan.

Indeed, if I was putting 2+2 together to make more than 4, I would add a question for detective journalists, "Who is to say that those 'senior officials' who ensured the Eikenberry memo went public this morning are not on Obama's White House staff?"

For months I expected this political kabuki, for all the appearances of Administration tensions, differing proposals, and persistent doubts, to end in the "compromise" of a troop increase that would meet most of McChrystal's demands. After all, that was the script in March when Obama approved the escalation of 30,000 more US soldiers and support units.

Now, however, that expectation is suspended. I would not go as far as the Associated Press report that the President "has rejected all military options" (see video in separate entry); supporters of a troop increase will not go away quietly, so there are further chapters in this political story.

Instead, Obama is buying himself some time with his trip to Asia, declaring that no decision will be taken before his return to Washington next week, even as those pressing for escalation scream, "Ditherer". Yet there is a glimmer --- if only a glimmer --- that the President may draw the line on the upward spiral of US military intervention.

Israel: Which is the Problem? Obama's Policies or Netanyahu's Culture of Fear?

Israel Update: Who’s Busted Now? White House Takes on Netanyahu

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Is the strained relationship between Israelis and the Obama Administration the consequence of mistakes made by the Obama Administration, as argued by Haaretz's Bradley Burston, or of a fear culture promoted by the Netanyahu Government, as New York Times's Henry Siegman contends?

Israelis and Obama
Henry Siegman

Polls indicate that President Obama enjoys the support of only 6 to 10 percent of the Israeli public — perhaps his lowest popularity in any country in the world.

According to media reports, the president’s advisers are searching for ways of reassuring Israel’s public of President Obama’s friendship and unqualified commitment to Israel’s security.

That friendship and commitment are real, President Obama’s poll numbers in Israel notwithstanding. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton sought to reinforce that message during her visit to Israel. The presidential envoy George Mitchell has reportedly been asked to make similar efforts during his far more frequent visits to Jerusalem.

The White House is about to set a new record in the number of reassuring messages and video greetings sent by an American president to Israel, as well as to Jewish organizations in the United States, on this subject. Plans for a presidential visit to Jerusalem are under discussion.

Presidential aides worry that the hostility toward President Obama among Israelis can be damaging to his peace efforts. This is undoubtedly true.

But a White House campaign to ingratiate the president with Israel’s public could be far more damaging, because the reason for this unprecedented Israeli hostility toward an American president is a fear that President Obama is serious about ending Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and Gaza.

Israelis do not oppose President Obama’s peace efforts because they dislike him; they dislike him because of his peace efforts. He will regain their affection only when he abandons these efforts.

That is how Israel’s government and people respond to any outside pressure for a peace agreement that demands Israel’s conformity to international law and to U.N. resolutions that call for a return to the 1967 pre-conflict borders and reject unilateral changes in that border.

Like Israel’s government, Israel’s public never tires of proclaiming to pollsters its aspiration for peace and its support of a two-state solution. What the polls do not report is that this support depends on Israel defining the terms of that peace, its territorial dimensions, and the constraints to be placed on the sovereignty of a Palestinian state.

An American president who addresses the Arab world and promises a fair and evenhanded approach to peacemaking is immediately seen by Israelis as anti-Israel. The head of one of America’s leading Jewish organizations objected to the appointment of Senator Mitchell as President Obama’s peace envoy because, he said, his objectivity and evenhandedness disqualified him for this assignment.

The Israeli reaction to serious peacemaking efforts is nothing less than pathological — the consequence of an inability to adjust to the Jewish people’s reentry into history with a state of their own following 2,000 years of powerlessness and victimhood.

Former Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, whose assassination by a Jewish right-wing extremist is being remembered this week in Israel, told Israelis at his inauguration in 1992 that their country is militarily powerful, and neither friendless nor at risk. They should therefore stop thinking and acting like victims.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s message that the whole world is against Israel and that Israelis are at risk of another Holocaust — a fear he invoked repeatedly during his address in September at the United Nations General Assembly in order to discredit Judge Richard Goldstone’s Gaza fact-finding report — is unfortunately still a more comforting message for too many Israelis.

This pathology has been aided and abetted by American Jewish organizations whose agendas conform to the political and ideological views of Israel’s right wing. These organizations do not reflect the views of most American Jews who voted overwhelmingly — nearly 80 percent — for Mr. Obama in the presidential elections.

An Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement has eluded all previous U.S. administrations not because they were unable to devise a proper formula for its achievement; everyone has known for some time now the essential features of that formula, which were proposed by President Clinton in early 2000.

Rather, the conflict continues because U.S. presidents — and to a far greater extent, members of the U.S. Congress, who depend every two years on electoral contributions — have accommodated a pathology that can only be cured by its defiance.

Only a U.S. president with the political courage to risk Israeli displeasure — and criticism from that part of the pro-Israel lobby in America which reflexively supports the policies of the Israeli government of the day, no matter how deeply they offend reason or morality — can cure this pathology.

If President Obama is serious about his promise to finally end Israel’s 40-year occupation, bring about a two-state solution, assure Israel’s long-range survival as a Jewish and democratic state, and protect vital U.S. national interests in the region, he will have to risk that displeasure. If he delivers on his promise, he will earn Israelis’ eternal gratitude.

Why do Israelis dislike Barack Obama?
Bradley Burston

There are many people, gifted with rare intelligence and tolerance for humankind, who, when addressing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, run off the rails.

This week, it was the turn of former American Jewish Congress national director Henry Siegman. Noting opinion polls showing that a bare six to eight percent of the Israeli public supports Barack Obama, Siegman concludes that the dislike for Obama is a reflection not of the president's policies, but of something essential - and fundamentally defective - in the Israeli people itself:

"The Israeli reaction to serious peacemaking efforts is nothing less than pathological," Siegman writes, calling it "the consequence of an inability to adjust to the Jewish people's reentry into history with a state of their own following 2,000 years of powerlessness and victimhood."

He concedes that polls show that a clear majority of Israelis favor a two-state solution, and thus, Palestinian statehood. But he argues that, while they insist that they much prefer peace, if put to the test, Israelis will prove to be liars, and opt for occupation. "Israel's public never tires of proclaiming to pollsters its aspiration for peace and its support of a two-state solution." Nonetheless, "the reason for this unprecedented Israeli hostility toward an American president is a fear that President Obama is serious about ending Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza."

Siegman's thesis makes no room for the possibility that the administration may have made more major mistakes in handling the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, than it has made in any other primary policy sphere

There is no allowance for the sense that when Barack Obama made an early priority of his presidency a high profile visit to Cairo, its centerpiece an extended address to the Muslim world, a subsequent personal appeal to Israelis might have helped him advance his peacemaking goals.

There is no consideration of the possibility that the administration failed in doing requisite preparation with Benjamin Netanyahu and Ehud Barak prior to dropping on Israel the bomb of a blanket settlement freeze demand - which might have been well-received by the Israeli public, had it been accompanied by gestures on the Palestinian or wider Arab side. As it was, rumors of normalization moves were humiliatingly waved away by Saudi Prince Turki al-Faisal, who wrote that a settlement freeze, even if agreed to by Israel, fell far, far short of his key nation's minimum preconditions for any steps toward relations with Israel.

Demanding not a freeze but total removal of all existing settlements as a mere initial precondition, the prince states that any gestures will have to wait until the return to Arab hands of the West Bank, the Golan, and Shabaa Farms in Lebanon. "For Saudis to take steps toward diplomatic normalization before this land is returned to its rightful owners would undermine international law and turn a blind eye to immorality."

But what should any of that matter to Henry Siegman? From the tone of his arguments, he belongs to the school of thought which suggests that hating Israelis is a form of working for peace.

So willing is Siegman to disavow any legitimate feelings on the part of Israelis, that he suggests that that their worst fears - of Iran, of rocket attacks, of world isolation and abandonment - not only are baseless, but are also a source of consolation:

"Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's message that the whole world is against Israel and that Israelis are at risk of another Holocaust - a fear he invoked repeatedly during his address in September at the United Nations General Assembly in order to discredit Judge Richard Goldstone's Gaza fact-finding report is unfortunately still a more comforting message for too many Israelis."

Siegman doesn't merely think that Israelis are mistaken. He loathes them. In his reading, they are venal, deceitful, the source of the conflict and the obstruction to its solution. In Siegman's reading "the conflict continues because U.S. presidents ... have accommodated a pathology that can only be cured by its defiance."

It may be argued that Israel has much more to fear from people who think like Henry Siegman, than from Richard Goldstone. A close reading of the Goldstone report, and an open hearing of his views, as in this interview with Rabbi Michael Lerner of Tikkun, shows that Justice Goldstone cares a great deal about Israelis and the direction in which their country is headed.

Meanwhile, given Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's opaque, work-in-progress assessment of current Israeli policy as an unprecedented restriction on settlement, but far short of what the administration would like, it should surprise no one in Washington if the White House has now managed simultaneously to alienate Israel's left, right, and center.

For Israel's sake, for the Palestinians' sake, and for the good of his presidency, the administration must radically reassess its approach to the Mideast conflict.

The fears of Israelis are real. The grievances of the Palestinians are just. If both peoples have one trait in common, it is that they cannot be bludgeoned, bribed, or sweet-talked into supporting a policy which favors only side.

Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton are nothing if not good students. It is time to go back and hit the books. If they can broker a package deal which addresses the most critical needs of the Palestinians (including fostering Fatah-Hamas reconciliation, furthering PA security and solcial welfare responsibilities, easing the Gaza siege, and curbing settlement) as well as providing something Israelis can reasonably view as an advance over their current situation (such as making good on hopes for Muslim-world normalization measures), they have a chance of success.

If not, it is time to leave the people here who hate one another to themselves. And to Henry Siegman. In a place where dignity is everything, there is a certain honor to be gained in recognizing that you tried your best, but that peace will have to wait for a time when Israelis are less preoccupied with hating one another other, and Palestinians, the same.

Iran's Nuclear Programme: Washington's Unhelpful Misperceptions

The Latest from Iran (9 November): Assessing the Government

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In The New York Times this morning, David Sanger publishes an article, "Iran Is Said to Ignore Effort to Salvage a Nuclear Deal", which gives half the story on the current tangled state of the negotiations over uranium enrichment.

Half the story because Sanger's story is effectively a US Government press release. Here is the narrative of unnamed officials:

The Obama Administration...has told Iran’s leaders in back-channel messages that it is willing to allow the country to send its stockpile of enriched uranium to any of several nations, including Turkey, for temporary safekeeping....But the overtures, made through the International Atomic Energy Agency over the past two weeks, have all been ignored....Instead....the Iranians have revived an old counterproposal: that international arms inspectors take custody of much of Iran’s fuel, but keep it on Kish, a Persian Gulf resort island that is part of Iran....

That proposal had been rejected because leaving the nuclear material on Iranian territory would allow for the possibility that the Iranians could evict the international inspectors at any moment. That happened in North Korea in 2003, and within months the country had converted its fuel into the material for several nuclear weapons.

This version of events intersects not only with developments around El Baradei's latest proposal --- Turkey takes Iran's reprocessed uranium from Russia and reshapes it into metal plates --- but also the reports that Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov was in Tehran pushing a deal. The article is also notable for revealing the Kish proposal, which had not surfaced before.

The downside of the article, however, is that it misses the other half of the narrative. Yesterday Tehran's officials put out a counter-proposal for reprocessing outside Iran, in a two-stage delivery to Russia. Each shipment of uranium would be 400 kilogrammes; the total of 800 kilogrammes is about half of Iran's stock. That proposal, which could be a response to Ryabkov's intervention, may just be a case of the Iranian Government spinning out the discussions, but it is a far cry from an outright rejection.

Indeed, it is troubling that Sanger's article is riddled with distorting exaggerations. His claim that US officials "had now all but lost hope that Iran would follow through with an agreement reached in Geneva on Oct. 1 to send its fuel out of the country temporarily" overstates the situation --- Tehran's officials did not accept a plan but agreed to further technical talks in Vienna. Thus his follow-up, "Iranian officials told the energy agency on Oct. 29 that they could not agree to the deal that their own negotiators had reached", is an unhelpful simplification.

That would not be a major problem if this was just loose reporting. The worry is that this is also the perception of US officials:

“If you listen to what the Iranians have said publicly and privately over the past week,” one senior administration official said Sunday, “it’s evident that they simply cannot bring themselves to do the deal.”

Even the most casual of EA readers would have picked up by now that there is not a single Iranian view on the negotiations. Instead, there is a heated debate within the regime on how to conduct the talks with the US. The Washington narrative in Sanger's article misses this, ignoring for example that President Ahmadinejad is pressing for a continuation of discussions despite hostility from within the Iranian Parliament and possibly from the Supreme Leader's office.

If true, this misperception carries the consequence that it may be the Obama Administration rather than Tehran which breaks off the talks. This does not mean that it is giving up a likely agreement --- again, Ahmadinejad's primary objective may be to stay at the table rather than signing a deal --- but it will lead to Iran blaming Washington for the collapse (and there will be supporters for this view, such as Erdogan in Turkey) and undercut the possibility of China and Russia supporting the harsh sanctions that the US Congress will demand.

Yet even this is secondary to the wider significance of the Administration's fuzzy view. Simply put, if the statements in Sanger's piece are accurate, Obama officials have a poor understanding of the internal dynamics in Iran after 12 June, with little comprehension of the fault-lines within the Establishment. In the end, they fail to understand that the nuclear issue is, first and foremost, a pawn in a much bigger chess match inside Iran.

The Latest from Iran (6 November): The Day After The Day After

NEW Iran’s New 13 Aban: An Eyewitness Account “I Have Never Seen as Much Violence”
NEW Iran: Josh Shahryar on the Significance of 13 Aban
NEW Iran Video: The Tribute to 13 Aban’s Protesters
Iran Document: Ayatollah Montazeri’s Interview on Eve of 13 Aban
Iran’s New 13 Aban: “A Major Blow to Khamenei’s Authority”
Iran’s New 13 Aban: A First-Hand Account from the Streets
Iran’s New 13 Aban: “The Green Wave Has Bounced Back”
NEW Latest Iran Video: The 13 Aban Protests (4 November — 4th Set)
Latest Iran Video: The 13 Aban Protests (4 November — 3rd Set)
Latest Iran Video: The 13 Aban Protests (4 November — 2nd Set)
Latest Iran Video: The 13 Aban Protests (4 November — 1st Set)

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1905 GMT: Tehran's Prosecutor General Abbas Jafari Doulatabadi says two Germans and a Canadian, detained on 13 Aban, have been released. It is unclear if the Canadian is one of the four foreign journalists who were arrested (see 1155 GMT).

1845 GMT: From the Streets. We've posted an eyewitness account by Persian  Umpire, which can be compared with that of our correspondent Mr Azadi, of the 13 Aban demonstrations.

1820 GMT: MediaFail of the Day. Even by the standards set by the Islamic Republic News Agency for "information", this is Gold-Medal journalism. From Mehdi Karroubi's son, Hossein Karroubi:

On Thursday [5 November], IRNA released an interview said to be with me which was completely false and lies. In these comments IRNA claimed that I have said Mr. Mousavi was not brave enough to attend the November 4th protest and that I have accused him of lying.

There is no need to explain that because of Mr. Mousavi’s and Mr. Karoubi’s character and of course their bravery that we know about, they will continue to lead the Green movement of Iran with unity in their actions and they will not give up until we reach the goals of the movement and eliminate the power of liars.These kinds of lies will only make the strong determination of Mr. Mousavi in fight against lies even stronger and will further prove that he has chosen his mission in this fight justly.

1725 GMT: What does "Obama, You're With Them or You're With Us" Mean? Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty has an interesting article, "What Does Iran's Green Movement Want from Obama?".  Assuming those interviewed are representative of the movement, the message is: 1) of course, no US interference but 2) no eagerness for a nuclear deal with the Ahmadinejad Government and 3) condemnation of Iran's human rights abuses with inclusion of the issue in any US talks with Tehran.

1550 GMT: More on Friday Prayers (see 1145 GMT). The Los Angeles Times has a lengthy summary of today's service in Tehran, from which a couple of interesting twists emerge.

The first is an apparent "concession" in the hard line normally set out by Ayatollah Ahmad Khatami. He began with his portrayal of a small, foreign-backed group trying to disrupt the pro-Government rallies on 13 Aban: "Out of the hundreds and thousands of people who take to the streets, only one or two thousand shouted [for the Greens]...."Americans must not be happy, as there is no red carpet waiting for them." And he pressed the evil sponsor theme: "My brothers and sisters who have fallen in the wrong and incorrect track, look who is supporting you, those who were named by the late imam [Ayatollah Khomeini] as 'blasphemous' and [whose] Islam was called 'Americanized Islam'. The miserable monarchists are supporting you."

Yet Khatami then offered a way back to the fold, "What is wrong if you follow the mainstream of the nation? Come back to the embrace of the nation and the nation will accept your repenting and remorse....Of course the criminals’ cases are different and they should be punished."

That apparent sign of reconcilation was not matched by an opening for the US. To the contrary, Khatami was so loud in his denunciation of Washington that it heightens suspicions that Iran --- possibly against the line set out by President Ahmadinejad --- is walking out on the nuclear talks. Khatami declared, "Since the 1953 coup against [Mohammad] Mosaddegh, the U.S. has done nothing except treason against our nation, and since the beginning of our revolution, as [Khomeini] said, we can compile a book about the crimes committed by the US", and he brought the story to the present, with the Obama Administration instigating ethnic groups and releasing $50 million for "toppling our system". Khatami concluded, "As long as the U.S. will not give up its arrogant character, our nation is not going to be engaged in satanic negotiations."

Khatami's line was introduced by Alaedin Boroujerdi, the head of Parliament's National Security and Foreign Affairs Committee, who denounced protesters for following the line of the Voice of America: "The leaders [of the opposition] used to be high-ranking officials. Now, they repeat the same slogans."

So, if Khatami is speaking for others higher up in the regime, is this an attempt to ease the internal conflict by offering an olive branch to the "less serious" offenders? And will this be matched by a linking of the "more serious" offenders --- say, the leaders of the opposition movement --- to the US, even if that means a suspension of engagement with the "West"?

Most importantly, is this shift in strategy a sign of weakness or strength? I'm voting for the former.

1430 GMT: Will The Regime Break The Opposition? Following our previous entry, Mr Smith checks in, "We may have underestimated the police resolve: Iranian human rights groups are now reporting that no less than 400 people have been picked up in the streets on 13 Aban and are now in Evin Prison."

I do not think we missed this. Rather, we may be seeing an important juncture in the post-election crisis. As we have noted over the last 48 hours, the Ahmadinejad Government may be lost for a political strategy, but it can still try to use blunt force to survive by pounding the opposition into submission.

1255 GMT: The Government Acts. Tehran's Prosecutor General Abbas Jafari Doulatabadi has confirmed that reformists Ali Tajernia, Saeed Shariati, and Ebrahim Amini will be tried on Saturday. Ahmad Zeidabadi and Behzad Nabavi will be in court on Sunday, and Mohammad Atrianfar will appear on Monday.

An Iranian activist is offering running updates on the latest developments with detentions and forthcoming court hearings.

1245 GMT: What Has Mohammad Khatami Been Doing? The former President, who has kept a low profile in recent days including 13 Aban, has resurfaced with a visit to Morteza Alviri, the former mayor of Tehran and Mehdi Karoubi’s representative on the committee to investigate detainee abuses, in his home. Alviri was arrested in a raid on Karroubi's offices in September and released on bail last week.

Khatami offered general remarks, praising Alviri's courage and long service to Iran.

1200 GMT: I can't help thinking that the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps has been seriously distracted by last month's bombing in southeastern Iran.

Brigadier General Hussein Salami, the IRGC's Deputy Commander, has given a lengthy interview to Fars News about the threat from Jundallah. He goes on at length about foreign support of the Baluch insurgents but this is the headline claim: Jundallah leader Abdolmalek Rigi was arrested in September but was released after interference from Pakistani intelligence services.

It's not a question of the attention that the Revolutionary Guard is now paying to the southeastern situation rather than to the internal challenge. Allegations like these are bound to complicate the Government's relations with neighbours such as Pakistan.

1155 GMT: Agence France Presse reports that four journalists --- two Canadian, 1 Japanese, and 1 Iranian working for AFP --- were arrested on 13 Aban.

1145 GMT: Your Friday Prayer Summary. Ayatollah Ahmad Khatami, known for his fierce denunciation of post-election opposition, led the prayers in Tehran, and he did not ease up on the evil of a Green movement led by the United States.

1. Observers should not mistake a "small group" of agitators backed by Washington as the message of 13 Aban, given the "flood surge" of people who came out for the Iranian nation, Government, and Supreme Leader.

2. Iran's great success in nuclear energy is being led by Ayatollah Khamenei. The West "says we should build confidence but we do not have confidence in you".

3. Give us the uranium for Iran's medical research reactor. Now.

4. The US is arrogant, but Iran will never negotiate with evil.

1120 GMT: Nuclear Face-Off. With news from inside Iran slow this morning, the Iranian Government has kept attention on the international talks. Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki has maintained on IRIB television, "The Islamic Republic examines all the proposals. We have examined this proposal, we have some technical and economic considerations [which need to be addressed]." Mottaki's remarks were an indirect response to US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's insistence that the draft arrangement on uranium enrichment would not be changed.

Mottaki has also used remarks to the Islamic Republic News Agency to poke at the "superficial" comments of the French Foreign Minister, Bernard Kouchner.

0935 GMT: Really, I'm Going to Speak...but Football First. Fars News Agency reports:

President Ahmadinejad's speech to the nation has been postponed because of Thursday night's World Cup football match between Iran and Uruguay.

The President will speak after 9 p.m. on Saturday on the nuclear issue, the economy, and in particular information technology.

Postponed because of the football? Call me cynical, but postponed because of uncertainty and disarray is a less dramatic explanation. The original story was that the President would appear on Thursday, irrespective of any prospect that he might be overshadowed by a sporting event; the delay points to a Government that is trying to figure out how to respond to the show of opposition on 13 Aban.

0825 GMT: Following the assessments by Mr Smith and by Chris Emery of the outcomes of 13 Aban's marches, EA correspondent Josh Shahryar offers his assessment of the day's events and their political impact.

0735 GMT: Balancing our criticism of the rush by some back to the haven of Iran as Nuclear Threat, other newspapers do keep an eye on the opposition and internal developments. The Huffington Post has a feature on Mahmoud Vahidnia, the mathematics student who challenged the Supreme Leader during a speech last week. And The New York Times publishes a commentary by Nazenin Ansari and Jonathan Paris on "The Message from Tehran".

0700 GMT: An Enduring America reader wrote with concern a few hours ago, "Today was suspiciously quiet. No videos coming out and no statements....I’m not sure what to make of it." Josh Shahryar's excellent analysis, posted in a separate entry, offers an answer. I would add: 1) this lull happened after previous large demonstrations of opposition, as on 30 July and 18 September; 2) a pause was to be expected after the rush of energy and fortitude on 13 Aban; 3) the movement is already gathering itself for the next show of defiance, with planning beginning for Students Day on 16 Azar (7 December).

That's not to say that other folks are already leaving the party. The Washington Post exits with great haste to its priority of the nuclear issue. It features an article claiming, from the ever-present unnamed official, "Iran is demanding full delivery of reactor fuel before it gives up its stash of low-enriched uranium and has balked at further efforts to hold international talks on its nuclear program." That, however, is fair-and-balanced reporting next to the paper's editorial calling for an immediate cutoff of talks and twisting 13 Aban to fit that demand:

On Wednesday, the opposition protesters chanted: "Obama, Obama -- either you're with them, or with us." Sooner rather than later, Mr. Obama ought to respond to those messages.

The rush away from Iran to the nuclear front is likely to be accelerated by an "exclusive" in The Guardian this morning, "Iran tested advanced nuclear warhead design – secret report". Apparently "Iranian scientists have experimented with an advanced nuclear warhead design...known as a 'two-point implosion' device," and "nuclear experts" find this "breathtaking".

Translation: a "Western" official (US, European, or from the International Atomic Energy Agency) decided --- from genuine concern, a desire to wreck the enrichment talks, or both --- to leak another headline from the controversial 2008 IAEA report on Iran's nuclear programme. Without seeing the actual text, it is impossible to know the significance of the alleged warhead design. Indeed, two sentences deep in a side analysis in The Guardian tip off that this is far from an "imminent threat" story:

Most but not all of the material in the dossier relates back to the period before 2004. It does not necessarily conflict with the US National Intelligence Estimate two years ago, that found it likely that Iran suspended weaponisation work in 2003.

That, I suspect, will not deter media from racing to panic stations over the claim.

Iran: Josh Shahryar on Fictions & Realities of "Revolution"

Iran: A Response to “What If the Green Movement Isn’t Ours?” (The Sequel)
Iran: A Response to an American Who Asks, “What if the Green Movement Isn’t ‘Ours’?

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First of all, I must say that I admire and respect Roger Cohen. He has a been a vital asset for the international community in discerning truth from fiction when it came to the ongoing crisis in Iran. However, his recent article in The New York Times angered me not because it is ridiculously flawed – it is not – but because I did not expect Cohen to be so shallow in thought on protest and "revolution".

In his article, Cohen asks a question that confounded me:

In 1989, the revolutionary year, the Tiananmen Square massacre happened in Beijing and, five months later, the division of Europe ended with the fall of the Wall in Berlin. Could it have been otherwise? Might China have opened to greater democracy while European uprisings were shot down?

We cannot know any more than we know what lies on the road not taken or what a pregnant glance exchanged but never explored might have yielded.

Well, I respectfully beg to differ on the comparison between Eastern Europe and China. We do know: the respective outcomes of the movements in 1989 could not have been otherwise. For what Mr. Cohen fails to mention is that the political situations in China and Eastern Europe were worlds apart.

The Eastern Bloc, along with the USSR, was economically feeble, with rampant problems plaguing it for decades. The governments had lost trust to the point where 99% of the people of Poland voted for the anti-communist Solidarity party in the 1989 elections. At the same time, authoritarianism had waned considerably in the region.

Eastern Europe had been steadily opening up its approach to popular dissent among its citizens. Glasnost and perestroika, Gorbachev’s policies that radically opened up Soviet society, had been in effect for years. The USSR had relaxed its intervention in the internal affairs of Eastern European countries, and governments were more ready for peaceful negotiations than for massacres.

This was not the case in the People’s Republic of China in 1989. The country’s political elite had been strengthened by the West so that China could be used as a pawn against the USSR in the Cold War. Domestic policy was pretty much the same as it was under Chairman Mao.

Furthermore, the West was not really that interested in negotiations with the Chinese over human rights issues as they were in the case of Eastern Europe, and China’s government was not being pounded as much as its less fortunate Communist counterparts by internal problems. While the Eastern European economy had gone from relatively good to very bad, the Chinese economy had improved significantly since Mao’s disastrous utopian schemes.

These differences are the key to understanding why the 1989 revolutionary wave failed in China and succeeded in Eastern Europe. Yet, to go further and to arrive at the heart of Cohen's analysis and our discussion, both these revolutionary waves are inapplicable in the current Iranian situation. Unlike Eastern Europe, the Greens do not form an almost uniform majority of the populace, but unlike China, their numbers are much higher and they are distributed across the country more uniformly.

The position of the Iranian Government is neither absolutely safe nor absolutely vulnerable like Eastern Europe 1989. There is growing dissent among former members of the government and the elite's clerics. Finally, the Government’s policies on access to information are neither open like those during the Eastern European uprisings nor utterly closed like those in China. Although pro-Green media have been largely blacked out now, before the protests the anti-establishment faction of the population had relatively good access to news and analysis.

Given these circumstances, the best way to describe the situation in Iran is that of stalemate. The government cannot possibly attempt to repeat the Tiananmen Square suppression of 1989 because it could bring undesired results. It would alienate the already-raging opposition clerics, politicians within the government who are sympathetic to Greens, and supporters of the government within the population. This could prove disastrous.

The Greens, on the other hand, do not have a quick victory in sight. Even if Mir Hossein Mousavi marched his supporters and took over government buildings, the Revolutionary Guard would step in and massacre them. The idea that three million protesters are unstoppable because no one can halt millions is naïve.

There is an old fable in Persian: If 20 sparrows are perched on a tree and you shoot one, how many sparrows remain? The answer is none. You don’t have to kill a million people to scatter two million. You only need to kill a thousand or so, and the government of Iran seems to have the power to do so if it is pushed too far too soon.

So, for now, both sides are reluctant to escalate the situation further because neither is prepared or ready to strike a killer blow. Tomorrow’s 13 Aban protests throughout Iran will be yet another replay of strategies. The protesters will attempt to isolate the government further, and the government will attempt to emerge with minimal casualties inflicted upon the populace and minimal damage to its grip on power. Both sides will likely retire after the showdown to prepare for forthcoming rounds. Unlike China and Eastern Europe in 1989, we are in for a very long haul.