Palestine: Washington Blocks Unilateral Declaration of Statehood

Analysis: The Israeli-Palestinian Diplomacy Game

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On Monday, soon after the Palestinian proposal for an unilateral declaration of statehood via the United Nations Security Council,  State Department spokesman Ian Kelly stated that Washington would not support the plan, as it is seeking a two-state solution through negotiations.

U.S. senators visiting Israel said that Washington would veto a Palestinian declaration . For instance, Democratic Senator Ted Kaufman said, "It would be dead on arrival. It's a waste of time," and Independent Senator Joseph Lieberman added, "An essentially unilateral declaration of statehood is the one thing that will not move the stalled peace process forward."

The Transcript of Ian Kelly's press briefing:

QUESTION: A follow-up on this? The Palestinian Authority has asked the European Union today to back their plan to help the UN Security Council recognize an independent Palestinian state. And Saeb Erekat has said that the Palestinian Authority plan to seek U.S. approval. Will – what’s your position toward this request?

MR. KELLY: Well, I don’t think that – I’m not aware that they have come to us seeking our opinion or our approval. I mean, our position is clear. We support the creation of a Palestinian state that is contiguous and viable. But we think that the best way to achieve that is through negotiations by the two parties. And we understand that people might be frustrated, but we would – we just, as I say, we – it is our very strong belief – we are convinced that this has to be achieved through negotiation between the two parties.

QUESTION: So you will veto any --

MR. KELLY: I’m not going to say we’re going to – I mean, I don’t – I can’t say we’re going to veto something we haven’t seen or hasn’t even been proposed yet.

QUESTION: So you support a Palestinian state, just not yet?

MR. KELLY: We support a Palestinian state that arises as the result of a process between the two parties.

QUESTION: There are a lot of people who think that this kind of a unilateral declaration of statehood by the Palestinians might be the thing that is the jolt that is needed to get the actual negotiation started. You don’t agree with that?

MR. KELLY: I don’t necessarily agree with that, no. I think that the thing we have to do is get the two parties to sit down, and that is what we’re putting all of our efforts behind. That’s what Senator Mitchell is doing in London today, and that’s what we’ve been doing throughout is to try to get them to.

The Bomb, The Bomb: Distorting the Latest Report on Iran's Nuclear Programme

Iran Document: The International Atomic Energy Agency Report on Nuclear Facilities
The Latest from Iran (17 November): An Obama-Ahmadinejad Alliance?

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Unsurprisingly, David Sanger and William Broad in  The New York Times publish an article today which continues the overblown and misleading presentation (see yesterday's updates) of the IAEA report on Iran's nuclear facilities. The IAEA's wrist-slap of Iran--- for not reporting the 2nd uranium enrichment facility at Fordoo near Qom before September 2009 and for claiming that the plant was begin in 2007, not 2006 --- is converted into a "strong suspicion...that the country was concealing other nuclear facilities".

Sanger and Broad invoke The Bomb Next Year spectre and repeat the distortion, fed by leaking sources who oppose talks with Iran, "The site had been built to house about 3,000 centrifuges, enough to produce enough material for one or two nuclear weapons a year. But that is too small to be useful in the production of fuel for civilian nuclear power, which is what Iran insists is the intended purpose of the site." (A decent analysis would note the IAEA's assessment that Fordoo is intended as a back-up to the main enrichment facility at Natanz, given the threat of aerial attack, rather than as a full-scale plant.)

The distortion is extended by converting leaking sources are also converted into official judgements: "Both International Atomic Energy Agency officials and American and European diplomats and nuclear experts have argued that the existence of the hidden facility at Qum would make little sense unless there was a network of related covert facilities to feed it with raw nuclear fuel." Again, nothing in the report supports this speculation.

It is also notable that Sanger and Broad, to prop up their shaky claims, ignore most of the report. For example, it might be considered significant not only that the IAEA found no evidence of illegal enrichment at Fordoo and, indeed, at Natanz. There is also the striking note that less than half of Natanz's centrifuges are operational, which may indicate that Iran is suffering from a shortage of uranium for its programmes (and, thus, may have added incentive to reach an agreement on enrichment).

If we have the time --- and if the controversy continues to be whipped up --- we may draw on contributors and sources to put out a full critique of the report. But I suspect, given that the Obama Administration still wants a bargain with Tehran, that these exaggerations of the IAEA assessment.

Iran Document: The International Atomic Energy Agency Report on Nuclear Facilities

The Latest from Iran (16 November): Catching Up

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From the website of the Institute for Science and International Security

Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security
Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran
Report by the Director General

1. On 28 August 2009, the Director General reported to the Board of Governors on the
implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran) (GOV/2009/35). This report covers relevant developments since that date.

A. Current Enrichment Related Activities

A.1. Natanz: FEP and PFEP

2. On 2 November 2009, Iran was feeding UF6 into the 18 cascades of Unit A24, and 6 cascades of Unit A26, at the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) at Natanz. On that day, the other 12 cascades of Unit A26 were under vacuum. Iran has continued with the installation of cascades at Unit A28; as of 2 November 2009, 17 cascades had been installed and the installation of another cascade was continuing. All machines installed to date are IR-1 centrifuges with 164 machines per cascade. Installation work at Units A25 and A27 is also continuing.

3. Iran has estimated that, between 18 November 2008 and 30 October 2009, 10395 kg of UF6 was fed into the cascades and a total of 924 kg of low enriched UF6 was produced, which would result in a total production of 1763 kg of low enriched UF6 since the start-up of FEP. The nuclear material at FEP (including the feed, product and tails), as well as all installed cascades and the feed and withdrawal stations, are subject to Agency containment and surveillance.

4. The next physical inventory verification (PIV) at FEP is scheduled for 22 to 30 November 2009. As previously indicated to the Board, at that time, the Agency will verify the inventory of nuclear material at the facility and evaluate the nuclear material balance.

5. Between 14 August and 27 October 2009, a total of approximately 53 kg of UF6 was fed into a 10-machine IR-2m cascade and single IR-1, IR-2m and IR-4 centrifuges at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP). The nuclear material at the PFEP, as well as the cascade area and the feed and withdrawal stations, remain subject to Agency containment and surveillance. The Agency is currently evaluating the results of the PIV it conducted at PFEP between 14 and 16 September 2009.

6. The results of the environmental samples taken at FEP and PFEP indicate that the declared maximum enrichment level (i.e. less than 5.0% U-235 enrichment) has not been exceeded at either plant. Since the last report, the Agency has conducted two unannounced inspections at FEP, for a total of 31 since March 2007.

A.2. Qom: Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant

7. In a letter to the Director General dated 21 September 2009, Iran informed the Agency that “Based on [its] sovereign right of safeguarding … sensitive nuclear facilities through various means such as utilization of passive defense systems … [Iran] has decided to construct a new pilot fuel enrichment plant (up to 5% enrichment)”. Iran stated that the required infrastructure for the plant had been established and that the plant was under construction. In a letter dated 25 September 2009, the Agency requested Iran to provide further information on the current status of its construction and Iran’s plans for the introduction of nuclear material into the facility. The Agency also requested that Iran submit a detailed Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ) and provide access to the facility as soon as possible.

8. During a meeting with the Director General in Tehran on 4 October 2009, Iran agreed to provide the Agency with access to the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP). Under cover of a letter to the Agency dated 18 October 2009, Iran also submitted a preliminary DIQ for FFEP.

9. On 26 and 27 October 2009, the Agency carried out design information verification (DIV) at FFEP, which is located about 20 km north of the city of Qom. The Agency also held two meetings in Tehran, on 25 and 28 October 2009, to review the DIQ and to discuss the chronology of the design and construction of FFEP as well as its status and purpose. The Agency verified that FFEP was being built to contain sixteen cascades with a total of approximately 3000 centrifuges. Iran indicated that it currently planned to install only IR-1 centrifuges at FFEP, but that the facility could be reconfigured to
contain centrifuges of more advanced types should Iran take a decision to use such centrifuges in the future. Iran stated that some of the equipment located at FFEP had come from the Natanz site, and that the Natanz site would provide functional support to FFEP, such as centrifuge assembly and decontamination of equipment. Iran also stated that no nuclear material had been introduced into FFEP.

10. The DIV included a detailed visual examination of all areas of the plant, the taking of
photographs of cascade piping and other process equipment, the taking of environmental samples and a detailed assessment of the design, configuration and capacity of the various plant components and systems. Iran provided access to all areas of the facility. The Agency confirmed that the plant corresponded with the design information provided by Iran and that the facility was at an advanced stage of construction, although no centrifuges had been introduced into the facility. Centrifuge mounting pads, header and sub-header pipes, water piping, electrical cables and cabinets had been put in place but were not yet connected; the passivation tanks, chemical traps, cold traps and cool boxes were also in place but had not been connected. In addition, a utilities building containing electricity transformers and water chillers had also been erected.

11. During the meeting in Tehran on 25 October 2009, the Agency provided comments on the preliminary DIQ submitted by Iran, and requested that a revised preliminary DIQ be submitted with additional information, which Iran did in the course of the later meeting on 28 October. Iran informed the Agency that it would provide further information required in the DIQ as the facility is developed.

The Agency informed Iran that, in accordance with its Safeguards Agreement, FFEP will henceforth be subject to regular DIV by the Agency. The next DIV is scheduled for the end of November 2009.

12. Iran explained that the Fordow site had been allocated to the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) in the second half of 2007, and that that was when the construction of FFEP had started. Iran subsequently confirmed that explanation in a letter dated 28 October 2009. In that letter, Iran stated that:

“As a result of the augmentation of the threats of military attacks against Iran,
the Islamic Republic of Iran decided to establish contingency centers for various
organizations and activities …

“The Natanz Enrichment Plant was among the targets threatened with military
attacks. Therefore, the Atomic Energy Organization requested the Passive
Defence Organization to allocate one of those aforementioned centers for the
purpose of [a] contingency enrichment plant, so that the enrichment activities
shall not be suspended in the case of any military attack. In this respect, the
Fordow site, being one of those constructed and prepared centers, [was]
allocated to the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) in the second half
of 2007. The construction of the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant then started.
The construction is still ongoing. Thus the plant is not yet ready for operation
and it is planned to be operational in 2011.”

13. During the meetings, the Agency informed Iran that it had acquired commercially available satellite imagery of the site indicating that there had been construction at the site between 2002 and 2004, and that construction activities were resumed in 2006 and had continued to date. The Agency also referred to the extensive information given to the Agency by a number of Member States detailing the design of the facility, which was consistent with the design as verified by the Agency during the DIV. The Agency also informed Iran that these Member States alleged that design work on the facility had started in 2006.

14. The Agency further indicated that it still had questions about the purpose for which the facility had been intended and how it fit into Iran’s nuclear programme. The Agency also indicated that Iran’s declaration of the new facility reduces the level of confidence in the absence of other nuclear facilities under construction and gives rise to questions about whether there were any other nuclear facilities in Iran which had not been declared to the Agency.

15. In light of the above, the Agency requested access to the FFEP project manager and those responsible for the design of FFEP, along with access to original design documentation, such as engineering drawings, with a view to confirming Iran’s statements regarding the chronology and purpose of the facility.

16. Iran stated that it did not have any other nuclear facilities that were currently under construction or in operation that had not yet been declared to the Agency. Iran also stated that any such future facilities would “be reported to the Agency according to Iran’s obligations to the Agency”. In a letter dated 6 November 2009, the Agency asked Iran to confirm that it had not taken a decision to construct, or to authorize construction of, any other nuclear facility which had not been declared to the Agency.

17. For reasons set out in previous reports to the Board of Governors, Iran remains bound by the revised Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part to which it had agreed in 2003,7 which requires that the Agency be provided with preliminary design information about a new nuclear facility as soon as the decision to construct or to authorize construction of the facility is taken. The revised Code 3.1 also requires that Iran provide the Agency with further design information as the design is developed early in the project definition, preliminary design, construction and commissioning phases.
Even if, as stated by Iran, the decision to construct the new facility at the Fordow site was taken in the second half of 2007, Iran’s failure to notify the Agency of the new facility until September 2009 was inconsistent with its obligations under the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement.

B. Reprocessing Activities

18. The Agency has continued to monitor the use and construction of hot cells at the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) and the Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production (MIX) Facility. The Agency carried out a DIV at TRR on 19 August 2009 and on 9 November 2009 at the MIX Facility. There were no indications of ongoing reprocessing related activities at those facilities.

While Iran has stated that there have been no reprocessing related R&D activities in Iran, the Agency can confirm this only with respect to these two facilities, as the measures of the Additional Protocol are not currently available to it for Iran.

C. Heavy Water Reactor Related Projects

19. The Agency has reviewed the updated DIQ for the Fuel Manufacturing Plant (FMP) at Esfahan provided by Iran on 21 August 2009 (GOV/2009/55, para. 9). Contrary to what was requested in the Agency’s letter of 19 June 2009, the updated DIQ did not contain information on the design features of the IR-40 fuel assembly. The Agency provided comments on the DIQ to Iran on 5 November 2009, reiterating its request that Iran include the fuel assembly information.

20. The Agency has finalized its assessment of the results of the physical inventory verification (PIV) carried out at FMP in August 2009 (GOV/2009/55, para. 10), and has concluded that the inventory of nuclear material at FMP as declared by Iran is consistent with those results, within the measurement uncertainties normally associated with fabrication plants of similar throughput. On 24 October 2009, the Agency carried out a DIV at FMP. It confirmed that the status of the facility had remained unchanged and that no further assemblies, rods or pellets have been produced.

21. On 7 November 2009, the Agency carried out a DIV at the IR-40 reactor at Arak. The Agency verified that the construction of the facility was ongoing. The Agency has continued using satellite imagery to monitor the status of the Heavy Water Production Plant, which seems not to have been operating since the last report.

22. On 25 October 2009, during the DIV at the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) at Esfahan, the Agency observed 600 50-litre drums said by Iran to contain heavy water. In a letter dated 10 November 2009, the Agency asked Iran to confirm the number of drums and their contents, and to provide information on the origin of the heavy water.

D. Other Implementation Issues

D.1. Uranium Conversion

23. In a letter dated 16 October 2009, the Agency requested Iran to provide information regarding the layout, equipment and installation schedule for an analytical laboratory which, in the updated DIQ for UCF submitted in August 2009, Iran had indicated would be installed in an underground location in one of the UCF storage areas.

24. On 25 October 2009, the Agency carried out a DIV at UCF. At that time, the plant was undergoing maintenance. No UF6 has been produced since 10 August 2009. The total amount of uranium in the form of UF6 produced at UCF since March 2004 therefore remains 366 tonnes, some of which was transferred to the FEP and PFEP, and which remains subject to Agency containment and surveillance (GOV/2009/55, para. 12). Between 11 August 2009 and 25 October 2009, 92 samples of ammonium diuranate (ADU) containing about a kilogram of uranium were received at UCF from the Bandar Abbas Uranium Production Plant.

D.2. Design Information

25. Iran has not yet resumed the implementation of the revised Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part on the early provision of design information, and remains the only State with significant nuclear activities which has a comprehensive safeguards agreement in force but is not implementing the provisions of the revised Code

3.1. It is important to note that the absence of such early information reduces the time available for the Agency to plan the necessary safeguards arrangements, especially for new facilities, and reduces the level of confidence in the absence of other
nuclear facilities under construction, as indicated above.

26. In December 2007, the Agency requested preliminary design information for the nuclear power plant to be built in Darkhovin (GOV/2008/38, para. 11). In a letter dated 22 September 2009, Iran provided the Agency with preliminary design information for the plant, citing, as it had in its letter of 21 September 2009 concerning FFEP, its desire to cooperate rather than a legal obligation. In the preliminary design information, the Darkhovin plant is described as a 360 MWe pressurized water reactor, the construction of which is scheduled to start in 2011, with commissioning to take place in 2015. The Agency has examined the design information and has requested Iran to provide additional
clarifications regarding, inter alia, the design of the fuel assemblies and the facility layout.

27. For reasons set out in previous Board reports,9 the Agency is of the view that the revised Code 3.1 remains in force for Iran. Thus, as indicated above concerning the late submission of design information for FFEP, Iran’s failure to submit design information for the Darkhovin facility until September of this year was inconsistent with its obligations under the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement.

D.3. Other Matters

28. A PIV at the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant is planned for 17 November 2009.

29. On 23 September 2009, the Agency performed a DIV at the Uranium Chemical Laboratory at Esfahan, and was able to confirm the decommissioned status of the facility (GOV/2009/55, para. 17).

30. Based on satellite imagery and supporting documentation relevant to the ADU samples received at UCF (see para. 23 above), the Agency assesses that uranium recovery activities are continuing in the area of the Bandar Abbas Uranium Production Plant.

E. Possible Military Dimensions

31. As detailed in the Director General’s previous reports to the Board (most recently in
GOV/2009/55, para. 18), there remain a number of outstanding issues which give rise to concerns, and which need to be clarified to exclude the existence of possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme. As indicated in those reports, for the Agency to be able to address these concerns and make progress in its efforts to provide assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, it is essential that Iran, inter alia, implement the Additional Protocol and provide the information and access necessary to: resolve questions related to the alleged studies; clarify the
circumstances of the acquisition of the uranium metal document; clarify procurement and R&D activities of military related institutes and companies that could be nuclear related; and clarify the production of nuclear related equipment and components by companies belonging to defence industries.

32. The Agency is still awaiting a reply from Iran to its request to meet relevant Iranian authorities in connection with these issues. The Agency is also still awaiting Iran’s response to the Agency’s repeated requests for access to persons, information and locations identified in the alleged studies documents in order to verify Iran’s assertion that these documents are false and fabricated. Further analysis of the information available to the Agency underscores the importance of Iran engaging with the Agency in a substantive and comprehensive manner, and providing the requested access, so that
the remaining outstanding issues may be resolved. In this context, it would be helpful if Member States which have provided documentation to the Agency would agree to share more of that documentation with Iran, as appropriate.

F. Summary

33. The Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran. While Iran recently submitted preliminary design information on the Darkhovin reactor, it continues to assert that it is not bound by the revised Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part to which it agreed in 2003, and which it ceased to implement in March 2007.

34. Iran has informed the Agency about the construction of a new pilot enrichment plant at Qom, FFEP. Iran’s failure to inform the Agency, in accordance with the provisions of the revised Code 3.1, of the decision to construct, or to authorize construction of, a new facility as soon as such a decision is taken, and to submit information as the design is developed, is inconsistent with its obligations under the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement. Moreover, Iran’s delay in submitting such information to the Agency does not contribute to the building of confidence. While the Agency has confirmed that the plant corresponds to the design information provided by Iran, Iran’s explanation about the purpose of the facility and the chronology of its design and construction requires further clarification.

35. Iran has not suspended its enrichment related activities or its work on heavy water related projects as required by the Security Council.

36. Contrary to the request of the Board of Governors and the requirements of the Security Council, Iran has neither implemented the Additional Protocol nor cooperated with the Agency in connection with the remaining issues of concern, which need to be clarified to exclude the possibility of military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme. It is now well over a year since the Agency was last able to engage Iran in discussions about these outstanding issues. Unless Iran implements the Additional Protocol and, through substantive dialogue, clarifies the outstanding issues to the satisfaction of the Agency, the Agency will not be in a position to provide credible assurance about the absence of
undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran.

37. The Director General will continue to report as appropriate.

The Latest from Iran (16 November): Catching Up

NEW Iran Document: The International Atomic Energy Agency Report on Nuclear Facilities
NEW Iran: More on The Political Attack on the National Iranian American Council
The Latest from Iran (14 November): Political Fatigue?

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1740 GMT: Judge for Yourself. We've posted a copy of the IAEA report on Iran's nuclear facilities. In my opinion, it's a slap on the wrist from the Agency for Iran for not declaring the second enrichment facility before September 2009 and for saying it was begun in 2007 (the IAEA goes for 2006). The IAEA also wants an assurance there are no more nuclear surprises out there. But that, in contrast to the overblown press coverage, is about it.

1715 GMT: Iran Human Rights Voices Reports that 48 protesters detained during 13 Aban demonstrations in Shiraz went on trial on 11 November.

1653 GMT: Spin, Spin, Spinning Iran (see 1555 GMT). Some folks somewhere really want to kill off the idea of engagement by putting out the story of an Iran that breaks its agreements in pursuit of The Bomb. They hope to do so by framing the "Iran threat" in the latest International Atomic Energy report on uranium enrichment, before the IAEA discusses it on 26 November.

In The Washington Post: "A senior official said Monday that the U.N nuclear agency believes Iran plans to start enriching uranium at a previously secret facility in 2011. The official said the International Atomic Energy Agency also believes that the site near the holy city of Qom will be able to house 3,000 uranium-enriching centrifuges. The senior international official familiar with a new IAEA report said that number could allow Iran to enrich enough material to be able to arm one nuclear warhead a year. He spoke on condition of anonymity because of the restricted nature of the information."

In Bloomberg News: "The United Nations atomic agency has lost confidence that the Persian Gulf country is telling the whole truth about its nuclear program and isn’t hiding additional secret facilities. Iran’s Qom enrichment facility, revealed in a Sept 21 letter, 'reduces the level of confidence in the absence of other nuclear facilities under construction and gives rise to questions about whether there were any other nuclear facilities in Iran which had not been declared,' the International Atomic Energy Agency said today in a 7-page report obtained by Bloomberg News.

On Al Jazeera: "Iran's belated revelation of a second uranium enrichment site has raised concerns about possible further secret nuclear sites in the country. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) raised its fears in a report obtained by several news agencies on Monday."

1644 GMT: A group of activists have gathered in Shiraz to collect signatures for a statement supporting Grand Ayatollah Ali Mohammad Dastgheib, who has been an outspoken critic of the Iranian Government.

1630 GMT: The Death of the Prison Doctor. Speculation is spreading about Ramin Pourandarjan, the physician on duty at the infamous Kahrizak Prison, who was said last week to have died from a heart attack or stroke.

It is claimed that Iranian security forces did not allow any autopsy and that the funeral of the 26-year-old Pourandarjan took place with security agents present. Pourandarjan had allegedly been detained for leaking patients' files and telling close friends about the abuse of detainees and, after his released, warned against making any further revelations.

1620 GMT: Free the Journalist. More than 50 Iranian writers and journalists have signed an open letter to the head of Iran's judiciary, Sadegh Larijani, urging him to release Javad Mahzadeh. Mahzadeh was detained more than a month ago.

1615 GMT: Fearing a Loss of Control? Speaking to reformist members of Parliament, Mehdi Karroubi has urged young protesters to refrain from "violent behaviour". Following similar statements by former President Mohammad Khatami, Karroubi's advice may be an indication that opposition leaders fear an angry and frustrated movement will go further in their demonstrations of resistance.



1555 GMT: Spinning Iran. The political battle over Iran's nuclear programme --- friend or foe? --- is being played out again in the media with the framing of the latest report from the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The report is the IAEA's summary of its inspection of the second uranium enrichment site near Qom. Although the IAEA itself has said it found nothing out of the ordinary, others, including sceptics within the agency, are hoping to find suspicious evidence. So they have leaked parts of the report to Reuters, who declare that the project began in 2002, paused in 2004, and resumed in 2006.

Much more interesting, however, is Reuters' headline, unsupported in the article, "Iran revelation could mean more secret sites".

1455 GMT: Russia Keeps Up Pressure. Meanwhile, Moscow --- in its role as the broker for an uranium enrichment agreement and following Sunday's warning by Presidents Obama and Medvedev that a deal needed to be completed soon --- may have just given Tehran a warning slap.

The Russians have announced that the opening of the Bushehr nuclear plant, scheduled for the end of 2009, has been delayed yet again. Russian Energy Minister Sergei Shmatko insisted that the postponement was due to technical difficulties, but --- call us cynics --- the timing of the declaration is a bit more than curious.

1450 GMT: Who's Pushing the Nuke Talks? Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

It can't get much clearer than this:

As the West continues to threaten Tehran with fresh sanctions, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad expresses readiness to enhance nuclear cooperation with Western countries.

"The Islamic Republic of Iran is ready to have constructive cooperation with Western countries on nuclear technology," Iranian Student News Agency (ISNA) quoted Ahmadinejad as saying on Monday...."Nuclear rights of the Iranian nation are non-negotiable and our nuclear cooperation and activities will be carried out within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency."

1435 GMT: Who's Pushing the Nuke Talks Inside Iran? Press TV has an intriguing post, "Turkey Still Wants Role in Iran Nuclear Deal".

The website quotes, from Turkish newspapers, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu's statement that Turkey is still happy to serve as the third country in an uranium enrichment deal. Iranian uranium would shipped to Russia for enrichment and then held/reshaped by Turkey as metal plates for uses in Iran's medical research reactor. Davutoglu said, "From our point of view, the door is open. We will store that [uranium] as a kind of a trustee."

That, however, is not the significant part of the story. Rather, it's the fact that it appears at all (and indeed has been at least the second story run by Press TV on these lines in the last few days) despite the rejection by Iranian politicians of the proposal for a Turkey broker, offered by the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mohammad El Baradei, almost two weeks ago.

Indeed, Press TV uses Davutoglu to highlight the tension, "The Iranians trust us... but there is a great opposition within Iran. They say the problem is not Turkey, but the fact that the uranium will be taken abroad."

Which raises the question: if the deal was supposedly blocked by Tehran, why does the Turkish possibility keep re-appearing? Could it be that sources close to President Ahmadinejad are ensuring that Press TV keeps the option alive?

Although Tehran has ruled out the participation of third parties in a nuclear fuel deal with the West, Turkey says it is awaiting Iran's response on an offer to store the country's enriched uranium stockpile.
1420 GMT: We're back from our first break since 13 June in 24/7 blogging on the post-election crisis. Just catching up with the latest news inside and outside Iran: meanwhile, we have a new entry updating on the domestic political squabble in the US over the National Iranian American Committee.

Meanwhile, I have used the last 48 hours to review sources for what I hope will be a major re-evaluation of the Obama Administration's approach to the Iranian Government the nuclear talks, and the Green Movement. The aim is to post this tomorrow but here's a teaser:

1. IT'S THE NUKES, STUPID --- "The driving force for the Obama Administration's approach to Iran is the quest for an agreement on uranium enrichment."

2. GETTING THE GREEN MOVEMENT WRONG --- "What is astounding is how a Washington distraction, an appearance by Ataollah Mohajerani at a conference, became the foundation for some in the CIA to bury and/or fear the Green movement."

3. THE MYTH OF THE PLAN B: SANCTIONS --- "How can a stricter round of sanctions, if nuclear talks break down, change Ayatollah Khamenei's positions?"

Analysis: The Israeli-Palestinian Diplomacy Game

At first, Palestinian chief negotiator Saeb Erekat told Palestinian newspaper Al-Ayyam on Saturday that the Palestinian Authority is considering seeking recognition from the United Nations Security Council of a Palestinian state along 1967 lines, with East Jerusalem as its capital.

On Sunday (which was the anniversary of the symbolic Nov. 15, 1988 declaration of independence by the late Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat), Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad said that the Palestinian Authority is working on a two-year development plan aimed at consolidating the groundwork for independence. It was also stated that these two issues- applying to the United Nations Security Council to have the independence legitimized in the eyes of international law, and the two-year-long economic development plan- were separate issues. Fayyad said:

I know some people are concerned that this is unilateral development plan. But it seems to me that it is unilateral in a healthy sense of self-development.

However these two statements are lacking a strong vision when it comes to the realities of the region. First of all, as I stated yesterday, there is no need to guess at Washington's approach to an appeal for a unilateral demand to be recognized in the UN Security Council. Secondly, the fact that the first plan cannot be achieved overnight breaks apart the claim that they are not inter-related. Fayyad stated that they need two years in which the economic power of the Palestinian Authority can be strengthened - a plan that he hopes will weaken Israel's position and gain US support. Of course, it is not possible and not consistent with the realities Palestinians face today. Can anyone think of an economic development in the West Bank that will strengthen the Palestinian Authority politically yet weaken Tel Aviv, as if the latter has no interest in this land's economic development? Do not forget that it is Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu who has been highlighting "the significance of the economic development of the West Bank"! So, the economic liberalization process of the West Bank is already in Tel Aviv's interest.

The statements from the Palestinian Authority are aimed at consolidating their position and strengthening it legitimacy in the West Bank, and are not rationally-formulated and strongly-believed plans to make progress toward peace. In other words, they have grown out domestic concerns rather than any deep and wise plans to save Palestine from Israeli occupation.

On the other side of this game, Netanyahu warned that Israel would respond to any unilateral Palestinian steps - particularly declarations of statehood - with one-sided steps of its own. He said:

There is no substitute for negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority and any unilateral path will only unravel the framework of agreements between us and will only bring unilateral steps from Israel's side.

At the end of the day, there is still a big question as to whether the statements of the Palestinian Authority will work as they desire them to- are they pushing Netanyahu into the corner or are they merely helping Netanyahu show the Israeli public how "uncompromising" Palestinians are following Netanyahu's continuing rhetoric that "Israel is ready to sit at the negotiating table without any pre-conditions?"

Yes, Washington is stuck in the middle of this game. However, the Obama Administration needs to work harder than ever and show its seriousness with concrete action on both sides.