Israel-Palestine-US Special: Stakes Raised With Approval of More Settlements

Palestine: Mahmoud Abbas Sticks Around as “President”

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On Tuesday, the Jerusalem Municipal Planning Committee approved the construction plan for an additional 900 new housing units beyond the Green Line in Jerusalem.

Washington responded harshly through Press Secretary Robert Gibbs:

We are dismayed at the Jerusalem Planning Committee’s decision to move forward on the approval process for the expansion of Gilo in Jerusalem. At a time when we are working to re-launch negotiations, these actions make it more difficult for our efforts to succeed. Neither party should engage in efforts or take actions that could unilaterally pre-empt, or appear to pre-empt, negotiations. The U.S. also objects to other Israeli practices in Jerusalem related to housing, including the continuing pattern of evictions and demolitions of Palestinian homes. Our position is clear: the status of Jerusalem is a permanent status issue that must be resolved through negotiations between the parties.

US State Department spokesman Ian Kelly repeated that "they were dismayed". However, even more important --- only weeks after Secretary of State Hillary Clinton had praised Israel's "unprecedented" concessions --- was Washington's warning to the Netanyahu Government to withhold support from the Jerusalem committee's move:

QUESTION: On the peace process, Israel has approved today the construction of 900 new housing units in East Jerusalem. How do you view this approval at this specific time?

MR. KELLY: Well, I think, Michel, you’ve heard us say many times that we believe that neither party should engage in any kind of actions that could unilaterally preempt or appear to preempt negotiations. And I think that we find the Jerusalem Planning Committee’s decision to move forward on the approval of the – approval process for the expansion of Gilo in Jerusalem as dismaying.

This is at a time when we’re working to re-launch negotiations, and we believe that these actions make it more difficult for our efforts to succeed. So we object to this, and we object to other Israeli practices in Jerusalem related to housing, including the continuing pattern of evictions and demolitions of Palestinian homes.

And – just to repeat what we’ve said all along, our position on Jerusalem is clear. We believe that the – that Jerusalem is a permanent status issue that must be resolved through negotiations between the two parties.

QUESTION: Can you tell us, did this come up in Ambassador Mitchell’s meetings in London yesterday? Apparently, we were told that he met an advisor to Netanyahu, asked them to not permit these new buildings, and then that request was flatly turned down.

MR. KELLY: Yeah. Andy, I just don’t want to get into the substance of these negotiations. They’re sensitive. I think you’ve seen the Israeli – some Israeli press reports that did report that this was raised in the meetings. This is – I mean, these kinds of unilateral actions are exactly the kind of actions that we think that both sides should refrain from at a time when we’re trying to start the negotiations again. But I don’t want to get into the substance of the discussions yesterday in London.

QUESTION: Would you steer us away from not believing the Israeli press reports?

MR. KELLY: I just don’t want to get into the substance. I’m not going to steer you one way or the other on it.

QUESTION: Where’s Senator Mitchell today?

QUESTION: How long is the U.S. going to continue to tolerate Israel’s violation of international law? I mean, soon it’s not even going to be possible – there’s not going to be any land left for the Palestinians to establish an independent state.

MR. KELLY: Well, again, this is a – we understand the Israeli point of view about Jerusalem. But we think that all sides right now, at this time when we’re expending such intense efforts to try and get the two sides to sit down, that we should refrain from these actions, like this decision to move forward on an approval process for more housing units in East Jerusalem.

QUESTION: But should U.S. inaction, or in response to Israel’s actions, then be interpreted as some sort of about-face in policy – the President turning his back on the promises he’s made to the Palestinians?

MR. KELLY: You’re – okay, you’re using language that I wouldn’t use. I mean, again, our focus is to get these negotiations started. We’re calling on both parties to refrain from actions, from – and from rhetoric that would impede this process. It’s a challenging time, and we just need to focus on what’s important here, and that’s --

QUESTION: Well, what actions (inaudible) the Palestinians taken recently that would impede progress?

MR. KELLY: Well, as I say, we would discourage all unilateral actions

Reacting to the unilateral action in Jerusalem, Palestinian Authority chief negotiator Saeb Erekat said that there was no point in discussions while Israel expands Jewish neighborhoods in a part of Jerusalem that Palestinians want for their capital.

Iran: Re-Evaluating the Green Movement After 5+ Months

The Latest from Iran (17 November): An Obama-Ahmadinejad Alliance?

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0800 GMT: In recent days there has been an apparent shift in the content of the statements of opposition leaders. Despite Government restrictions, Mir Hossein Mousavi, Mehdi Karroubi, and Mohammad Khatami have continued to get out public declarations, mainly through meetings with reformist groups or appearances such as Karroubi's visit to Ayatollah Bayat-Zanjani in hospital, but their content now seems to be carefully hedged. While the abuses of the Government are still identified, all three have been at great pains to put their calls for changes within the framework of the Constitution and the Iranian system, as well as warning their followers not to resort to extreme action.

In tone, this is not new. The Green movement has always maintained that it is upholding the laws and values of the Islamic Republic and that it is the Government which has dismissed or violated those foundations of 1979. There has been far less in content, however, from Mousavi, Karroubi, and Khatami on political objectives, and even specific issues such as the enquiry into detainee abuses, spurred by Khatami's letter of 29 July to Hashemi Rafsanjani, have not featured so prominently.



One explanation for the shift may be that the Government's 5+ months of restrictions on the communications and movements of the oppositonal leadership, “supported” by detentions and trials, have worn down the scope of the leadership's declarations and ambitions. Another is that figures like Rafsanjani have moved away from open co-operation and that initiatives such as the National Unity Plan appear to have run into the ground. A third is that the leaders have a growing fear of a movement which, angry and frustrated, may strike out violently against the Government.

Whatever the reason for a more cautious approach from the top, this should not be mistaken as the settling of the Green Wave. Dissent bubbles --- yesterday, catching up with news, it was notable that there were not only the statements of Karroubi and Khatami but also the more pointed criticisms of Grand Ayatollahs Sane'i and Montazeri and a show of support for the challenge of Grand Ayatollah Dastgheib. (I also understand, from a private source, that Ayatollah Makarem-Shirazi --- considered a “conservative” in clerical approach --- has launched a scathing attack on the Government in a closed-door session which has not been made public.)

And, of course, there is the simmering at the Universities and other locations of protests, which emerges somewhere as public demonstration on a daily basis. Even if this is not picked up by the media, it should not be missed: note, as EA readers have, the dramatic challenge at the international university at Qazvin to the appearance of regime supporter Hamid Rasaee.

The thoughtful discussion on EA's comments board --- is this now a challenge which is long-term but which will not abate until there are major changes in the Iranian system? --- continues. I don't think there is a definitive answer, but I do think it exposes the fatuousness of mainstream assertions such as that in The New York Times (see yesterday's updates), "[Iran] now looks as if it’s back to business as usual." Indeed, for all the difficulties at the top of the opposition, I was struck recently by the comment of a shrewd but normally cautious Iranian activist, “This is no longer about the election. This is about the concept of velayat-e-faqih [the concept of clerical rule through the Supreme Leader].”

At the same time, that prospect of a demand for action which extends over time but expands in scope raises an equally long-term question. Up to now, I could be secure in the easy fit of a Green leadership, complemented by those like Rafsanjani who also wanted to curb Ahmadinejad's authority, with the mass if somewhat disjointed effort from below. Now I wonder what will be the new dynamic amongst a political leadership, manoeuvring not only against Government forces but against its own concerns and fear, senior clerics who will not go away quietly, and that Green Wave --- sometimes abstract, sometimes below the surface, but also visible in the shows of anger, frustration, and hope --- which ebbs but is never stilled?

Palestine: Mahmoud Abbas Sticks Around as "President"

Israel-Palestine-US Special: Stakes Raised With Approval of More Settlements
Middle East Inside Line: Threats Begin To Fly Between Palestine & Israel

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Officials from the Palestinian Liberation Organization stated on Tuesday that Abbas's term as the Palestinian "President" will be extended when the PLO supreme body meets in December. Abbas's term, depending on the interpretation of Palestine's electoral law, has already expired or officially expires on 25 January.

Azzam al-Ahmad, a senior official in Fatah said: "The Central Council has only one solution and it is to entrust the president, as head of the PLO, with continuing as president of the Palestinian Authority until it is able to hold presidential and legislative elections."

Obama's Latest Bow: Not a Secret Muslim, Just a Pigeon in Japan

Enduring America regrets that it has to bring the sad news that the US President has once more bowed down to a foreign, unelected ruler.

Readers may recall that, when Obama lowered himself in a meeting with King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia earlier this year, our favourite on-line encyclopedia of eternal truth (and no liberal lies), Conservapedia, were a bit slow off the mark to portray Obama as a "secret Muslim".

So would they do any better on Saturday when President Barack Obama genuflected before Japan's Emperor Akihito?

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3kyD_e0Y7FQ&feature=related[/youtube]

Yes! Conservapedia made amends for their past delinquency, calling Obama's gesture a "bowfest" and posting a YouTube video showing that he "bobbed his head like a pigeon!":

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5U6fL7Y4BZA[/youtube]

Kudos to the right-wing defenders of all things encyclopedic if sad news, indeed, to see such abasement of the Leader of the Free World.

Still....better a pigeon than a secret Muslim?

The Iran Cul-de-Sac: 4 Points on Obama's Embrace of Ahmadinejad (and Rejection of the Green Movement)

The Bomb, The Bomb: Distorting the Latest Report on Iran’s Nuclear Programme
Iran Document: The International Atomic Energy Agency Report on Nuclear Facilities
The Latest from Iran (16 November): Catching Up

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1. IT'S THE NUKES, STUPID

If anyone in the Iranian Government still believes in the
Washington-directed "velvet revolution", rather than using it as a stick to beat the opposition, he/she can breathe easy. The driving force for the Obama Administration's approach to Iran is the quest for an agreement on uranium enrichment.

That ambition is led by the President, and his determination has brought general consensus in an Administration that was arguing over the value of talks earlier in 2009. Broadly speaking, the White House, the National Security Council, and the State Department are all on the same page now.

Any reference to the internal situation in Iran, as in the Obama recent statement calling for recognition of the rights of protesters, is a gloss. The President and his advisors may have a legal and humanitarian interest in what happens to demonstrators, as well to US citizens detained and sentenced to years in prison in Iran, but it is not their top policy priority.

Indeed, Washington's position is now fixed firmly enough to withstand not only the demands of reformists but figures like Hashemi Rafsanjani to go slow on deal with President Ahmadinejad. I suspect we will find that Obama has personally gone farther --- much farther --- than any President since 1979 to get an accommodation with Tehran.

2. GETTING THE GREEN MOVEMENT WRONG

The quest for a nuclear deal has been accompanied by a disturbing if tangential story of how "intelligence" and "analysis" has undermined the Iranian opposition.

Ever since the June election, some US officials, primarily in the intelligence community, have been putting out the line that the Green Movement is insignificant and/or not to be trusted on issues such as nuclear weapons, Israel, and
"anti-Americanism". (The public face of this line is the commentaries of Flynt Leverett, formerly of the National Security Council, and Hillary Mann Leverett, formerly of the State Department.)

This assessment was reinforced by the appearance in October of former Khatami Government official and "Karroubi advisor" Ataollah Mojaherani at the conference of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. His strident caution to the audience that a "Green Government" was unlikely to give ground on Iran's nuclear programme or on the position towards Israel apparently sent shock waves through the audience, angering other reformists present in the audience who feared Mohajerani had just damaged their cause.

They were right. It is the Mojaherani incident that is behind the clamour of well-placed Washington columnists like Jackson Diehl and David Ignatius to beware the Greens. More importantly, the speech fuelled the "analysis" within the CIA that the politics of Mousavi-Karroubi-Khatami were not to be trusted, a belief that accompanied (and possibly fed by) sources such as those in Borzou Daragahi's pre-13 Aban article assaulting the Green Movement.

What is intriguing is how a Washington distraction became the foundation for some in the CIA to bury or fear the Greens. It is true that Mohajerani was a prominent member of the Karroubi campaign and wore the badge of a glittering if past political career: youngest deputy of the first post-Revolution Parliament, Vice-President in the Rafsanjani Government, Minister of Culture under Mohammad Khatami.

Still, at the time, we gave almost no space to the Mojaherani speech because it was so disconnected from events and political strategy in Iran. Before and after the Washington episode, I have not seen Mojaherani's name rise up in the movements of the Green Wave. In short, he was one of a number of former officials who have or had connections with a complex network of "reformists".

For many in Washington, however, Mojaherani was thought to be no less than the ambassador for the Green Movement, presenting its manifesto. And when the approach of his speech did not match up to the "revolution" --- in presentation and policy, if not Islamic system --- that they wanted, those officials and commentators reacted like a lover spurned.

(There is a wider point here. The Iranian Government has had success in disrupting communications within Iran
but it is also important that it has limited any dialogue between the reformist opposition and the "outside", in this case the
US Government. With no direct line
established as the Green Movement evolved, American officials have
relied upon a variety of people, usually located outside Iran presenting a wide range of often contradictory advice and speculation rather than solid information.

While the situation may have been inevitable, given the detentions of many reformists and de facto house arrest of leaders like Mir Hossein Mousavi, it strikes me that the Obama Administration has not worked around these restrictions to read the lines --- and between the lines --- of statements not only of Mousavi, Karroubi, and Khatami but of other activists like Alireza Beheshti and senior clerics from and beyond Qom.)

3. THE MYTH OF THE PLAN B: SANCTIONS

As a case study in internal politics,
the beauty of the Obama nuclear-first, engagement-first approach has been how it has brought consensus amongst differing groups within the Administration. If the talks brought nuclear agreement, that would be a significant result for the unclenched fist (the line often attributed to some State Department officials and envoys like Richard Holbrooke). If they were finally collapsed by Iranian stalling and intransigence, the platform for aggressive sanctions would be laid (the line often
attributed to Dennis Ross, now at the National Security Council).

The only problem comes if, having grasped the hand of the Iranian Government in talks, the Obama Administration then has to slap Ahmadinejad's face in the absence of an agreement.

Washington's current calculation, supported by its diplomatic strategy, turns the Russian key. Moscow's envoys are working on the Iranian Government to accept the uranium enrichment plan, while Russian President Dmitri Medvedev issues unsubtle hints that he will not stand back if Tehran balks.

That is not the same as a Russian commitment to sanctions. Let's assume, however, that Moscow accepts a US-led multilateral effort inside or outside the United Nations. And let's assume that President Obama, who no doubt has mentioned this in Beijing this week, gets a Chinese promise to stand aside.

What next? If there is no nuclear agreement, it will quite likely be because the Supreme Leader has objected, despite Obama's sustained direct efforts. So how does a stricter round of sanctions change Ayatollah Khamenei's position?

It doesn't. So the Obama Administration is presumably counting on a diplomatic and economic containment, indeed isolation, of Iran.

That, however, does nothing to address the issue of President Ahmadinejad, who remains in office. It does nothing to deal with the increasing role of the Revolutionary Guards in matters beyond the nuclear and even military realm. (Indeed, as some analysts have contended, further sanctions may assist the Guard's economic ventures, although this effect may be mitigated if the restrictions can specifically target Guard "investments".)

Sanctions certainly do nothing with respect to the reformists and the Green movement. Even if Washington recants and tries to bring them back into political consideration, it is unclear --- given the perceived snub by Obama's officials in recent weeks --- if the opposition will offer even a cautious welcome.

4. BACK TO THE CUL-DE-SAC

In the Bush years, the cul-de-sac for American policy was the threat that could not be carried out. Whether the vision was a "turn left from Baghdad" intervention, briefly considered in 2003, the military strikes advocated by Vice President Cheney in 2007, or a sledgehammer set of economic sanctions, the Administration could not deliver the blow. The "best" it could manage was the muddled if funded programme of "soft power" in the 2nd term, which was never defined as either a live-and-let-live civic engagement or the cover for "velvet revolution".

The hope of the Obama approach has been to get out of that dead end, opening up space for other initiatives such as Middle Eastern agreements, through engagement. And, considered narrowly in the context of discussions on nuclear programmes and regional politics, that was solid, realist common sense.

But "narrowly" became very narrow after the elections of 12 June. If Obama wanted to dance, he had to dance with an Iranian President who now lacked legitimacy (despite the efforts of engagement advocates like the Leveretts to explain how Ahmadinejad had really won the election and a clear mandate).

That legitimacy, within weeks of the election, was not just a question of a "reformist" challenge. Ahmadinejad has also been in a tenuous position vis-a-vis political rivals like Hashemi Rafsanjani, the conservatives/principlists in the Iranian Parliament, Ayatollahs (and thus bodies such as the Assembly of Experts), and at times the Supreme Leader. That is why the Iranian President, far from breaking off talks to pursue The Bomb, is hugging the nuclear discussions so close --- with no prospect of salvation through an economic miracle, this is his prescription for political longevity.

Now Obama's engagement gamble, re-shaped in this post-June cauldron, may still succeed if the Supreme Leader gives his backing to an agreement on uranium enrichment. (Which is why, just to repeat, this President is going farther than any predecessor in 30 years) A wider US agenda, which may adapt engagement for exchanges on Iran's political and legal issues as well as geopolitical interests, could then be drafted.

But, if the nuclear deal does not go through, Obama and Ahmadinejad now dance in a downward spiral. The Iranian President will struggle to serve out his disputed second term. And the US President will be back in the cul-de-sac: pressed by some advisors and a lot of Congressmen to pursue sanctions which offer no remedy for --- and no exit from --- the political dilemma of his failed engagement.