Iran's Nukes: Can Tehran and the US Make A Deal?

Julien Mercille, writing in Asia Times Online, assessed whether a Washington-Tehran settlement on enriched uranium for Iran's medical research reactor could defuse tensions over the nuclear issue:

The latest chapter in the Iranian nuclear crisis revolves around a possible "nuclear fuel swap" through which Iran would send most of its low-enriched uranium stocks (LEU at 3.5%) abroad, possibly to Russia and France, which would further enrich it (making it LEU at 19.5%) and then turn it into fuel rods. The fuel rods would be sent to Iran, which could use them in the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) to produce much needed medical isotopes. The problem for Iran at the moment is that the TRR was last refueled in 1993 by Argentina, but it will soon run out of fuel (perhaps in a few months).

The Latest from Iran (14 April): Ahmadinejad’s Struggle

The swap deal could be a win-win for both Iran and the West. The West should be pleased by the removal of a good portion of enriched uranium from Iranian soil since this will reduce the possibility that Tehran could decide to use it to make nuclear weapons (nuclear weapons require highly enriched uranium, HEU at 90%). For Iran, fuel for its TRR would allow it to keep producing important isotopes used in the medical field and on which hundreds of thousands of Iranian cancer patients rely.



However, there has been some confusion among experts on whether Iran is currently producing its own medical isotopes, or is it only importing them from other countries? It is important to clarify this issue since the ways in which the latest crisis can be resolved depend in part on what exactly Iran is doing.

Flynt and Hillary Leverett, well known analysts of Iran, wrote recently that Iran was not producing any medical isotopes domestically and that it imported all of its requirements. So did Geoffrey Forden writing at Jeffrey Lewis' blog. But others say that Iran is now producing isotopes, although they don't give many details.

When asked about the issue an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) representative said the agency is not commenting ''at this time".

So what's the situation?

Ali Asghar Soltanieh, Iran's ambassador to the IAEA, was asked about Iran's activities in the field of medical isotopes production and his statements cross-checked by reviewing a March 2010 article by Iranian scientists from the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran in the journal Nuclear Technology, published in the United States by the American Nuclear Society [1]. The two accounts appear to match, and are as follows.

Iran now produces two important medical isotopes with the TRR: technetium-99 and iodine-131. Since recent media stories have emphasized production of technetium-99, this is worthy of focus.

Technetium-99 is obtained from molybdenum-99 (Mo-99), perhaps the most important medical isotope in the world. Four countries - Canada, Belgium, South Africa and the Netherlands - meet 95% of the world's Mo-99 demand, using highly enriched uranium (HEU at 90%) to produce it.

Up until 2007, Iran bought its Mo-99 on the world market, but it has now developed a way to produce it domestically, through irradiating Mo-98 in the TRR. This leads to the production of Mo-99, which is then used to produce technetium-99. Apparently Iran does not currently import Mo-99.

As an aside, Iran is also producing other medical isotopes, notably isotopes of thallium and gallium, at its cyclotron facility near Tehran. This production process does not involve uranium, however, so it is not part of the current nuclear "crisis" with the West.

The problem today is that Iran's TRR is running out of fuel (which is made of LEU at 19.5%) and the production of isotopes is therefore at risk. The way to solve this problem is at the origin of the current crisis.

Several solutions are possible for Iran:
1. Buy the fuel for the TRR on the world market.
2. Receive fuel in exchange for most of its LEU stocks (this is the swap deal).
3. Enrich its own LEU to 19.5% (currently it is only enriching at 3.5%) and produce the TRR fuel domestically.
4. Stop producing its own isotopes and buy them on the world market (it would therefore not need fuel for the TRR to produce isotopes).

Any one of those solutions, if implemented, would provide Iran with medical isotopes and ensure its patients receive appropriate care, and therefore, solve the crisis. But they all have some problems, either real, or related to international politics:

1. Buying fuel on the market: Iran has actually said this would be its preferred solution, since it would allow it to keep its own LEU, rather than exchanging it for the fuel under a swap deal. As a member of the NPT (nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty), Iran does have the right to purchase the fuel on the open market. However, as Scott Ritter has noted, "The United States and Europe have held any such sale hostage to Iran's agreeing to suspend its indigenous uranium enrichment program." Since Iran also has the right to enrich uranium according to the NPT, the obstacle here appears to lie in Western capitals, and this explains why they have preferred a swap deal in which Iran would give up its stocks of LEU.

2. Swap deal: From Iran's perspective, one problem here is that by sending most of its LEU stocks to Russia and France, Tehran runs the risk of never receiving the fuel, or, at least, this would give Russia and the West an important bargaining chip in future negotiations. One can easily conceive how the West, in possession of Iran's stocks, could lay out conditions for Iran to receive the fuel, such as asking for a full suspension of uranium in Iran.

There are historical reasons for Tehran to be worried: in the 1970s, under the US-allied Shah, Iran invested more than $1 billion in Eurodif, a consortium enriching uranium in France. This was supposed to give Iran the right to obtain part of the fuel produced by the consortium. However, the 1979 Iranian Revolution led France to renege, and Paris has since then refused to deliver Iran's share of the fuel or to reimburse it with interest. The fact that nuclear hardliner Nicolas Sarkozy is now in power only adds to Iran's fears that France could break the deal.

Partly because of such concerns, Tehran proposed that the swap should take place on Iranian soil and the LEU would leave Iran only when the fuel was delivered. As Siddharth Varadarajan put it, this would look something like this:

At a certain date, when French fabrication of the TRR fuel starts, the IAEA could take into its custody an equivalent amount of Iranian LEU and hold it, in escrow, inside Iran. When the TRR fuel is ready, the Iranian LEU could be loaded onto a plane, which would take off once the French fuel lands inside Iran. At the end of the day, the outcome for the US from a simultaneous swap would be the same as from a sequential swap: Iranian LEU stocks would have been depleted.

But US President Barack Obama, instead of jumping on the opportunity to close the deal, said he was disappointed with Iran, and called for sanctions - for a change.

3. Iran enriches LEU at 19.5%: In February 2010, Iran announced that it would enrich its own uranium up to 19.5% in order to make the fuel rods itself. One question mark here is whether Iran has the technical expertise for doing so. It could always reconfigure its centrifuges to produce 19.5% instead of 3.5% uranium, but Tehran has never before attempted to produce fuel rods out of enriched uranium.

Another potential problem is that Iran's enrichment process is plagued by the fact that its domestic uranium is contaminated with molybdenum and this makes enrichment more difficult (the molybdenum here is a separate issue from the medical isotopes of molybdenum). Further, the prospect of Iran enriching its uranium to an even higher level does not please the West.

4. Importing isotopes: Iran's announcement that it would attempt to reach the near 20% enrichment level led US officials to accuse Tehran of threatening the lives of its patients, since, if Iran was more reasonable, it would simply buy the isotopes on the world market and that would settle the crisis. For instance, Glyn Davies, the US ambassador to the IAEA, asked: "Why is Tehran gambling with the health and lives of 850,000 Iranian cancer patients in pursuit of ever more dangerous nuclear technology," a move he said was "callous and chilling".

Davies said that "to address the humanitarian needs of Iran's people, we are prepared to facilitate Iran's procurement of medical isotopes from third-country sources", maintaining that the American proposal was a "faster, cheaper, and more responsible alternative than enriching to 20%".

But one problem with importing isotopes is that world supply in the future may not be as reliable as it once was; and even if it remains reliable, Iran could still prefer to be self-sufficient and produce its own isotopes. Is the US right to say that it would be more responsible not to enrich uranium to 20%? One could certainly argue the case - but there is a stronger argument that it would be more responsible for states that have nuclear weapons to eliminate them, their obligation under the NPT, and convince Israel to eliminate its own nukes and join the NPT. That would certainly contribute to defusing the crisis.

The latest chapter in the Iranian nuclear dossier can be solved in more than one way. Although technicalities are important, we should nevertheless not forget that there would be no crisis if Western governments, and primarily the United States, had not created it in the first place.

Note

1. Ghannadi Maragheh et al., "Industrial-scale production of 99mTc generators for clinical use based on zirconium molybdate gel", Nuclear Technology Vol. 169, March 2010. See also Davarpanah et al., "Influence of drying conditions of zirconium molybdate gel on performance of 99mTc gel generator", Applied Radiation and Isotopes Vol. 67, 2009.

The Latest from Iran (5 April): Repression

2230 GMT: To close this evening, a photograph of reformist leader Feizollah Arab Sorkhi, temporarily released from prison today, with his family (inset).

2215 GMT: Mousavi's Statement. Back from an evening break to find a summary of Mir Hossein Mousavi's discussion with reformist members of Parliament. We'll have an analysis in the morning but here is the substance....

Mousavi advised Iranian authorities to return to models set up by Ayatollah Khomeini and base policies on “collective wisdom” to remedy the post-election crisis. Had that wisdom prevailed earlier, “we would not have witnessed such bitter incidents.”

Mousavi, as he has done before, criticised both Iranian state media and foreign media. Iran's national broadcaster was “destroying the doctrines of the Imam (Khomeini)”: “In my opinion Seda va Sima [Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting] and the foreign media have been acting like the two edges of a pair of scissors in distorting the luminous face of the Imam.”

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Mousavi also invoked Khomeini to claim the "ability of the country to pass through the crises of the time” was through direct connection of the people with the regime, the government, and the leadership. In Khomeini's time, decisions were made through “rational discussions” and the Imam “provided a basis for the presence of different factions and opinions without barring anyone’s presence”.


1745 GMT: Spin of the Day. Press TV rewrites the critical letter of Ali Larijani (see 1615 GMT) to the President:

"As the Ahmadinejad government and Parliament move to iron out the details of the subsidy reform bill, Speaker Ali Larijani said Monday lawmakers would do their utmost to cooperate with the president, asking him to do the same."

1740 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Kalemeh reports that the release from detention of senior reformist Feizollah Arab-Sorkhi (see 1340 GMT) is for only five days and comes with a bail of $1 million.

1615 GMT: Larijani Responds to Ahmadinejad. We noted earlier today that the President had made an appeal, in a letter to Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani, for revision of the legislation on subsidy reform and spending.

Larijani has now replied sharply. In his letter, he defends the approach of the Majlis and criticises Ahmadinejad's speeches and request for a public referendum. He accuses the President of intervention and interference in the Majlis' affairs.

Larijani aligns himself with the Supreme Leader's recent advice for more co-operation between the Majlis and the Government. However, he asks Ahmadinejad to answer two questions:

Firstly, what is the Government forecast for the rate of inflation in each of the two scenarios of an extra $20 billion spending (The Parliament-approved bill) and an extra $40 billion"(Ahmadinejad's demand)?

Secondly, what would be the Government's estimate of economic growth in each of the scenarios?

1600 GMT: Nowruz Snub for Ahmadinejad? According to Khabar Online, only one-third of the Majlis' members attended the Norouz meeting held with the President.

Ali Larijani (head of Parliament), Mohammad Hassan Abutorabi Fard (First Deputy Speaker) , Mohammad Reza Bahonar (Second Deputy Speaker), Ahmad Tavakoli (Director of Majlis Research Center), Elyas Naderi, and a number of other well-known MPs are amongst those who did not attend the meeting.

1340 GMT: Arab-Sorkhi Released. EA has learned from a reliable source that Feizollah Arab-Sorkhi, the leading member of the Mojahedin of Islamic Revolution party detained since last summer, has come out of Evin Prison.

1320 GMT: Mahmoud's Nuclear. Oh, good, this should lead to a lot of heated press speculation. The head of Iran's atomic energy programme, Ali Akbar Salehi, has foreshadowed Iran's revelation of a "series of scientific achievements" on National Nuclear Technology Day: "The President [Mahmoud Ahmadinejad] will have good news for the nation on Friday."

1245 GMT: Economy Watch. Kalemeh that 150 workers of a textile factory in Ardebil province in northwestern Iran gathered in front of the governor's office of the governor to protest unpaid wages for the last seven months.

The demonstration is politically significant because the factory was launched as part of the Ahmadinejad economy agenda in his re-election campaign. It is reported that the factory has cut its workforce by 85%.

1240 GMT: So Much for Development. Mizan Khabar reports that the Industrial Development and Renovation Organisation has prohibited the use of laptops, external drives, and other hardware by its managers on their foreign trips.

1235 GMT: Nuke Chatter. The Iranian Foreign Ministry has repeated its current line, without any sign of compromise, "Iran is still ready to negotiate a solution to its nuclear stand-off with the West, but only on the condition that foreign powers agree to a fuel swap on Iranian territory. "

1140 GMT: President's Subsidy Appeal. The Iranian Labor News Agency reports another intervention from President Ahmadinejad on the issue of subsidy reform and spending. He has written Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani to claim problems in the implementation of the Parliament-approved proposal and to call on the Majlis to help the Government.

1130 GMT: The Big Repression Question. An EA correspondent gets to the politics of the recent nes of detentions, in particular the contest with former President Hashemi Rafsanjani:

The next big question is whether all the high-profile political prisoners will go back to Evin, given that they were let out for the Nowrouz holidays and we are way past the end of them. In the case of Marashi, Rafsanjani's close associate, it seems that his period of liberty has come to an end.

Hassan Lahuti, Faezeh Hashemi's son and Rafsanjani's grandson, will have to face court proceedings and will therefore be barred from returning to London. The court proceedings of Rafsanjani's children, Mehdi and Faezeh Hashemi, are also going to happen within the near future, according to Rah-e-Sabz.

1035 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. The authorities have not only put Hossein Marashi, ally of Hashemi Rafsanjani and a former Vice President, in jail; it appears they have also taken his blog off-line. A cached copy of Marashi's last entry, written on Sunday just before he was returned to prison, seems to be available.

(An EA correspondent reports that he can access Marashi's latest post, but I am still having no luck. In it, Marashi confirms his return to jail and says that he does not see the new period as that of a prisoner of the Islamic Republic but rather as a new duty and experience.)

1030 GMT: Economy Watch. The Central Bank of Iran claims that the annual inflation rate has declined sharply to 10.8% for the year ending 20 March 2010. This compares to 25.4% for the previous 12 months.

0900 GMT: One to Watch. Parleman News reports that delegates of the coalition of reformist parties, the Imam Khomeini Line, are in meetings with Mir Hossein Mousavi, Mehdi Karroubi, Hashemi Rafsanjani, and Mohammad Khatami. Details are promised soon.

0830 GMT: Journalist and filmmaker Mohammad Nourizad, the imprisoned journalist and filmmaker, will appear in court today, offering his family the first chance to see him during his 107-day detention. Nourizad was reportedly not allowed to make a phone call for more than three months because of his refusal to accept interrogators’ demands and conditions. In the only call allowed to his famtily, he assured, “I am standing firm with an iron will.”

0545 GMT: One of the striking features of the debate over Iran's legal and political situation on Race for Iran, the blog of Flynt and Hillary Leverett, is the near-total refusal of regime and Ahmadinejad advocates --- including the Leveretts --- to discuss or even acknowledge the Government's detention and treatment of opponents. (That is a major reason why they focus on the question of the vote count in the Presidential election; it allows them to shut away the less savoury developments of the next 9 1/2 months.)

Occasionally, there will be a repetition of the regime line that the abuses at Kahrizak Prison, including the three deaths, were recognised by the Supreme Leader, but this is followed by the implication that this resolved any difficulties.

So this morning we begin with more news of political prisoners. Yesterday, we reported from an absolutely reliable source on the poor health of detained journalist Emad Baghi and the harassment of his family. In a few minutes, we'll post a disturbing message from the wife of imprisoned film director Jafar Panahi on concerns for his well-being.

In an audio interview with the International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran, the son of journalist Isa Saharkhiz says his father’s condition has deteriorated since a hunger strike in March. Mehdi Saharkhiz said that his father has lost 20 kilogrammes (45 pounds) over the past few months and that solitary confinement and the harsh prison environment have threatened his health.

Pedestrian reports on a bit of good news with the release of student Sourena Hashemi after more than three months but adds this context: there is no word of the fate of his friend Alireza Firouzi, who was detained at the same time.

One of the reasons for Hashemi's arrest was his appearance in a campaign video for Mehdi Karroubi. All the students involved were expelled or suspended from their universities.

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8M-Q_gyPkw0&feature=player_embedded[/youtube]

Of course, these are events which are not highlighted by the Iranian state. Yesterday, for example,there was a focus on the declaration of Iran's top nuclear negotiatior, Saeed Jalili, after his trip to Beijing that there were increasingly close relations between Iran and China. (More importantly, no word from Jalili about the substance of the negotiations over Iran's nuclear programme and threatened international sanctions.) Look also for big play of the story that China and India will attend Tehran's conference on nuclear disarmament on 17-18 April.

And many in the Western media can be distracted. A lot of the US press corps is being taken along with the book promotion of a "former Revolutionary Guard turned CIA agent", Reza Kahlili (a pseudonym), a story which could be true but is more than a decade old. Still, that doesn't stand in the way of headlines for Kahlili's headline assertion, "Iran will be a nuclear-armed state in the very near future....The only way to stop that from happening may be to attack Iran now, before it gets a nuclear weapon."

Top prize for scary distraction, however, goes to the  Financial Times which, with almost no support, announces, "US Fears Iran Could Use Powerboat as a Weapon."