Iran Special Announcement: Supreme Leader Looking for (Facebook) Friends

The Latest from Iran (16 August): New Challenge to Khamenei?

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UPDATE 16 August, 2035 GMT: Supreme Leader wants 2 click "Get New Nokia N97" ad on his page but worries he will put himself under surveillance.

Ayatollah Khamenei still has 39 friends.


UPDATE 15 August, 2040 GMT: Someone sends Supreme Leader "A Monty Python Gift": "The Spanish Inquisition!". Ayatollah Khamenei unsure whether this is for humour or guidance.

The Supreme Leader now has 39 friends.

UPDATE 13 August, 2110 GMT: Supreme Leader reportedly considers "Ultimate Rock Bands" and gives surprising answer, "REO Speedwagon". Meanwhile, he issues Facebook fatwas against Al Green, Green Day, and Green from Scritti Politti.


UPDATE, 13 August, 0745 GMT: So far the Supreme Leader has devoted himself to posting links to his past speeches. Is there a clue, however, in this Google translation of one of the entries (and, yes, this is true): "Validation ceremony...Mr. Hashemi Rafsanjani's death 72 years".

UPDATE 12 August, 2115 GMT: Rumour that Ayatollah Khamenei worried about potential rival after discovering "Nibbles for Supreme Leader" group. Iranian forces being mobilised to stop perpetrators of this "velvet revolution".


UPDATE 12 August, 1040 GMT: Supreme Leader considering whether to click on ad on his Facebook page "Want Six Pack Abs? Feel the burn, shed unwanted pounds, and get ripped." Not sure whether "get ripped" is good or bad thing in current political climate.

UPDATE 12 August, 0745 GMT: Dramatic News! Ayatollah Khamenei has accepted our humble request, and one of our Enduring America staff is now among his (34!) friends.


UPDATE 12 August, 0645 GMT: Ayatollah Khamenei reported to be disappointed with score of 105 in SCRABBLE. He can't believe "KHAR" is not allowed in English version.

The Supreme Leader still has 20 friends.


UPDATE 1945 GMT: Ayatollah Khamenei allegedly takes test, "What Sex and the City Character Are You?". Finds out he is "Charlotte". Disappointed as he wanted to be "Mr Big".


UPDATE 1810 GMT: Ayatollah Khamenei reportedly displeased that he shares his Facebook page with ads for "Prostate Treatment" and "Betfair Arcade".


UPDATE 1735 GMT: Mir Hossein Mousavi is not yet a friend of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Are you?

Well, I guess the Iranian regime won't be blocking Facebook again in the near-future. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei apparently has signed up for his own page, complete with appropriately artistic photograph. Don't know if he has poked anyone yet or posted a status update, such as "Wishing Mahmoud Would Get His Cabinet in Order", but he does have 20 friends.

Iran: The Battle over the Judiciary and the Republic's Future

Iran Special: Mohammad Sadegh Larijani and a “Militarised” Judiciary
The Latest from Iran (16 August): New Challenge to Khamenei?

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The announcement on Facebook, which came just after 1000 GMT yesterday, was short but to the point: "Ayatollah Sadeg Amoli Larijani has been nominated [by] Iran revolution supreme leader to post of administration in department of justice". A few minutes later, a photo of the Supreme Leader and the new head of Iran's judiciary, Mohammad Sadegh Larijani, was posted.

Below the surface of that sentence, and a longer mention on Khamenei's website, is a struggle for power which illuminates how complex and diffuse the contest has become.

As we noted yesterday in a teaser, Khamenei's announcement had to negotiate his relationship with Iran's senior clerics. Larijani does not have the religious standing of "Ayatollah" but is just a "Hojatoleslam"; his title of Ayatollah is a political one, from his appointments to the Guardian Council and Assembly of Experts. After his initial reference to "Ayatollah" Larijani, the Supreme Leader reverted to "Hojatoleslam" Larijani. Questions will still remain amongst some, however, over the new head of judiciary's relative lack of religious qualifications to deliver justice as well as his relatively young age for a senior post.

That, however, is only the beginning of the political manoeuvres. The Supreme Leader's declaration yesterday was no less than an attempt to seize victory in the battle between conservatives in the Iranian establishment. It was clear last week that Larijani's proposed appointment was backed by figures such as his brother Ali, the Speaker of Parliament, and Mayor of Tehran Mohammad-Baqer Qalibaf, as well as a lrage number of MPs, but bitterly opposed by supporters of President Ahmadinejad.

Ahmadinejad's camp won a preliminary victory when the formal ceremony for Larijani's accession was postponed but then Khamenei played his card. He would name Larijani anyway, albeit through a brief decree. This lacked high profile but was still a powerful marker of authority: go on, Mahmoud, challenge this at your peril.

This is the easy part for the Supreme Leader, though. For behind (and, for some, alongside and even ahead of) Ahmadinejad are the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. And they may have more reason than the President to oppose Larijani's appointment.

Bring in the issues that are now symbolically defining the fight for the Islamic Republic: detentions, abuses, confessions, trials. Throughout last week, the story emerged that Larijani wanted to bring an end to the prosecution/persecution of political detainees. As this story appeared in pro-Ahmadinejad outlets, it may have been psychological warfare to taint Larijani as too soft for head of judiciary, but it may also have been based, at least in part, on Larijani's sentiments.

Whatever the case, it immediately brings to the fore the question: does the new head of the judiciary step in to limit the crackdown on the opposition? And today, less than 24 hours after he had his nice picture with Khamenei, Larijani gets his first test. Trials for another 25 detainees open in Tehran, bringing the total appearing in court so far to more than 125.

It appears, however, that a number of these trials have not been arisen from the judiciary. They have not stemmed from arrests by the police or cases built by prosecutors. Instead, these defendants are the property of the IRGC: picked up early in the post-election crisis, sometimes held under IRGC control, and now brought into public as agents of the "velvet revolution".

And the IRGC has not been shy about hiding its intent. To the content, as the debate over Larijani circulated last week, Guard commanders were continuing their drumbeat --- supported in some quarters, such as the Friday prayer of Ahmad Khatami --- for the arrest of opposition leaders such as Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi.

So, if he is serious about limiting the cases against the detainees, Larijani knows who his main opposition is. It is not in Parliament or in the streets but in the corridors of the Revolutionary Guards.

Now take a step further out. For, of course, Larijani is not the only official (if the reports are true) who has split from the President over the actions against the opposition. The Green movement, conservative and priniciplist politicians inside and outside Parliament, senior clerics, and Hashemi Rafsanjani are each --- often from different viewpoints and motives, but converging with the same demands --- insisting that something must be done about the abuses of power and legal process since 12 June. Even the Supreme Leader, with declarations such as the closure of Kahrizak prison, has joined in.

These forces do not and cannot constitute a "bloc" against the IRGC. "Conservatives" and "reformists", even in agreement on specific measures, each cannot afford to be seen as having allied with the other. There is no prospect that the Supreme Leader will suddenly give a warm embrace to Mehdi Karroubi.

At the same time, the temperature over the detentions is steadily rising. And, far from reducing that temperature, someone in the Iranian system --- and I am increasingly thinking that someone means "IRGC" --- is paradoxically raising it by insisting on the trials and the public display of confessions.

So, to return to Ayatollah/Hojatoleslam Larijani, does he have enough support from other concerned factions within the Iranian system to stand up to the Revolutionary Guard? Or does he become another bystander, or casualty, in this crisis?

The Latest from Iran (15 August): Battles Within the Establishment

NEW Latest Iran Video: The Story of Esha Momeni (15 August)
NEW Iran: The Inside Line on Hashemi Rafsanjani (from His Brother)
NEW Iran Special: Mohammad Sadegh Larijani and a "Militarised" Judiciary
The Latest from Iran (14 August): Just Another Prayer Day?
Two Months On: All Our Videos From Iran’s Post-Election Conflict

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2025 GMT: Green movement youth branch members Saeed Noormohammadi and Zoya Hasani have been released from detention.

2015 GMT: A Nice Message to Close the Day. The commander of the Basiji militia, Hossein Taeb, has declared that if Mehdi Karroubi's allegations of sexual abuse of detainees are proven to be a lie, Karroubi is "debauched" and "sinful" and should receive 80 lashes.

1810 GMT: Maryam, from the excellent blog Keeping the Change notifies us that she has translated into English a graphic, moving account by the Iranian journalist Babak Dad, "The Rapes Inside Iran's Prisons: The Story of One Anonymous Victim and a Call to the People of Iran". She introduces it, "It is, in short, a beautifully written and lyrical piece, providing the personal, yet socially critical, perspective on the rape allegations that we did not know we were missing until Mr. Dad brought it to our attention."

Dad has also been interviewed by the Voice of America about the account.

1720 GMT: In the morning, we're going to offer a detailed analysis --- after today's appointment of Mohammad Sadeq Larijani as the head of Iran's judiciary --- on the battle over the judiciary, and its wider implication for the political manoeuvres between the Supreme Leader, the President, Hashemi Rafsanjani, the Green opposition, and even (perhaps especially) the Revolutionary Guards.

For now, here's a teaser from the announcement on Ayatollah Khamenei's website that points to the tightrope walked by the Supreme Leader:

His Eminence Ayatollah Khamenei, Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution, has appointed Ayatollah Agha Hajj Shaykh Sadegh Larijani to the head of the judicial system. The text of the decree of the Supreme Leader of the Revolution follows:

In the name of God,

The Gracious Hojatoleslam Agha Shaykh Sadegh Amoli Larijani, esteemed scholar ... given that the extended period of leadership of Ayatollah Hashemi Shahroudi within the judiciary has come to an end....

Note the titles we've put in boldface. "Ayatollah" is a higher clerical rank than "Hojatoleslam". Larijani can be referred to as "Ayatollah" initially by the Supreme Leader, not by virtue of his religious standing but because of his membership on the Assembly of Experts and the Guardian Council. After that, Khamenei retreats to the title "Hojatoleslam".

An EA correspondent interprets, "Khamenei was trying to keep the Najaf and Qom seminaries from openly criticising him on the choice with the careful use of the titles. Meanwhile, he has nominated a non-specialist to lead the judiciary and kept other conservatives at bay, such as Ali Larijani and [Mayor of Tehran] Qalibaf by giving them a consolation prize."

More --- much more --- tomorrow morning.

1600 GMT: Mir Hossein Mousavi's website, Ghalam News, is still down. It has been out of service for at least 24 hours.

1500 GMT: Barazou Daragahi of the Los Angeles Times reports, from the Iranian Labor News Agency that Mir Hossein Mousavi has announced a "Green Path of Hope" to organise the political movement that arose before and after the Presidential election. Speaking to a group of doctors, Mousavi said, “Numerous volunteer and independent social networks throughout the society form the body of this movement. The Green Path of Hope is in fact aimed at regaining people’s denied rights.”

Building on the theme of recent weeks, Mousavi used the issues of detentions, confessions, and trials as a touchstone for political concerns, “We would not have witnessed so many crises today had [the authorities] adopted fair positions and respected people’s rights, instead of humiliating people on state television. Instead of accusing million-strong demonstrators of connection to foreigners, you have to find those who are waging a poisonous propaganda war on our people."

What is uncertain is how much Mousavi's announcement amounts to a "political front", even though that is label used by Daragahi, with no indication yet by other opposition leaders of their approach to the Green Path of Hope.

1425 GMT: Report from Etemade Melli (political party) website that security forces around Etemade Melli (newspaper) are increasing but situation under control.

1340 GMT: Reuters is reporting, from the Supreme Leader's official site, that Ayatollah Khamenei has appointed Mohammad Sadegh Larijani as head of Iran's judiciary, saying "in a letter to Larijani that he hoped the judiciary would flourish under him".

What Reuters does not ask is why the appointment was made today in a letter rather than in the ceremony scheduled for today. Indeed, the news agency garbles the story, "Some reformist websites had recently reported that Larijani was hesitant to accept the position because of the mass arrests of moderate detainees."

In fact, and in line with the analysis we posted in a separate entry today, Khamenei is pushing through the appointment --- albeit with little fanfare --- against the opposition of supporters of President Ahmadinejad. What is unclear is whether Larijani's reported demand, the cessation of cases against political detainees, will be met.

Instead, as the Iranian Students News Agency reports, trials for another 25 detainees will begin on Sunday. They will join the more than 100 prisoners who have already been in the dock.

1325 GMT: Safety Valve. The Iranian regime, according to Mehr TV, is trying to ease pressure by firing and pressing criminal charges against 12 police officers and a judge associated with the Kahrizak detention facility.

1145 GMT: The Conclusion of a Pre-Election Story. Rather quietly, Iranian-American graduate student Esha Momeni returned to the United States on Tuesday after detention and then a ban on leaving Iran. In April, we profiled the arrest of Momeni, who was working on a thesis on the women's right movement in Iran. She was detained in October 2008 when her research included the filming of a documentary on the activists and charged with “endangering national security” as an “agent of Western powers”.

Momeni has given an extended interview to journalists at her university, California State, Northridge. We've posted the video as a separate entry.

0930 GMT: When the Threat to a Supreme Leader Becomes "Real". This morning's interview with Al Jazeera English went well. AJE is an excellent operation, so we were able to set out the challenge to Ayatollah Khamenei both from former MPs, who are no doubt acting as a vanguard for other groups within the secular establishment, and from some senior clerics.

What struck me after the discussion was how a story becomes "mainstream". Enduring America had this information Thursday night and ran an extended analysis yesterday morning. However, the "threat" only becomes real when the big boys of the media decide to give it that label. So this morning, Al Jazeera English decided to feature the story when the Associated Press put it on their newswires. The Wall Street Journal and the Los Angeles Times also have detailed articles.

So I guess it's time to take the analysis to the next level. In the interview with Al Jazeera English, I suggested that the move against Khamenei should be seen in the context of a rebuttal to the campaign that has been waged against former President Hashemi Rafsanjani. That is especially true in the Assembly of Experts, where some pro-Ahmadinejad members had tried to limit Rafsanjani's influence. So one logical way "forward" is a settlement between Khamenei and Rafsanjani. But, in that case (and remembering the complexity of such a settlement, which would have to consider the Supreme Leader's power and authority), who would be the big loser?

Step up, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

0920 GMT: We have now posted Mehdi Khalaji's provocative analysis of Mohammad Sadegh Larijani and Iran's judiciary, adding our own interpretation.

0755 GMT: More on one of our last stories from yesterday. In response to the leaflets, spread by the Ansar-e Hezbollah groups at Friday prayers, calling for a "gathering" in front of the Etemade Melli newspaper, Karroubi has stated, "We always welcome the opinions and presence of critics and we will hear all of their suggestions and criticisms and we shall reflect these opinions in Etemade Melli." Karroubi also requested that the friends and supporters of Etemade Melli "refrain from gathering in front of the newspaper on Saturday so that our rerporters can interview these critics under calm conditions". Karroubi concluded with a message to his supporters " I will join you in the gathering taking place in front of the offices of Etemade Melli on Monday at 16:00 local time to thank those in charge of the newspaper and to get feedback from you".

The editor-in-chief of Etemade Melli has asked Tehran's prosecutor and head of police to provide security for the newspaper.

0745 GMT: Another Stick for "Conservatives" to Beat Themselves. The proclamation of Ayatollah Mesbah-Yazdi, a staunch supporter of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, that "obedience to the President is like obedience to God" has angered many "conservatives". The newspaper Jomhoori Eslami has pointed out the inherent hypocrisy in Mesbah's proclamation: "If Mr. Mesbah-Yazdi's statement is accepted, he must confess that he himself is a great sinner because, during the eight years that Mr Khatami was President, he encouraged everyone to disobey and confront the President....Even during the last four years, Mr Mesbah has also occasionally sinned against God by expressing his disagreements with Ahmadinejad."

0727 GMT: A slow-ish start to the day, but an unexpectedly busy Friday which exposed the challenges that persist for the regime. The Friday prayer address of Ahmed Khatami, despite his hard-line rhetoric against the "devil's tools and facilities" of the opposition and its leaders, was overshadowed by both secular and clerical challenges to the Government.

Three stories, all of which we noted yesterday and feature today, continue to lead that challenge. The first is the "Karroubi letter" on abuse of detainees, now taken up by Hashemi Rafsanjani in a demand for action. In a separate entry, we highlight an interview with Rafsanjani's brother, Mohammmad Hashemi, which sheds some light on the former President's concerns and motives.

The second story is the unexpected delay in the confirmation of Mohammad Sadegh Larijani as head of Iran's judiciary, which points to fighting between President Ahmadinejad and "conservative" and "principlist" critics of his politics and actions. Although Fars News says that Larijani's ceremony will take place on Monday, the tension is still present. We have a profile of Larijani and an analysis of Iran's judiciary in a separate entry.

The third story is the emerging challenge to the Supreme Leader's position, with both individual Ayatollahs and former MPs calling for a review of his authority. I am interviewing live with Al Jazeera English in 60 seconds on this, so will be back later with details.

Iran Special: Mohammad Sadegh Larijani and a "Militarised" Judiciary

Iran: The Battle over the Judiciary and the Republic’s Future
The Latest from Iran (15 August): Battles Within the Establishment

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In the midst of the ongoing uncertainty over the appointment of Mohammad Sadegh Larijani as head of Iran's judiciary Enduring America correspondents have been paying close attention to this extended analysis by Mehdi Khalaji, of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Khalaji offers both background and critique of Larijani within the context of what he calls the "militarization" of Iran's legal and judicial bodies.

We have read this in the light both of WINEP's political position of long-time hostility to the Iranian regime and of Khalaji's own history as a former cleric. An EA correspondent writes, "Khalaji usually goes down very strong on his former Qom classmates usually. His analysis may turn out to be true, but Sadegh is actually more scholarly than what Khalaji makes him out to be. For example, I have a very erudite rebuttal of Mohammad Khatami's civil society that was written by him 11 years ago in a right-wing weekly called Sobh. However, what Khalaji says about Khamenei's progressive replacement of the elite with a younger generation of his own liking is very similar to other analyses, including those from "reformists". Interesting to see how opinions are converging on this front."

Militarization of the Iranian Judiciary

Widespread reports suggest that Sadeq Larijani, a young and inexperienced cleric with close ties to Iran's military and intelligence agencies, will officially replace Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi as head of the Iranian
judiciary on August 16. [Editor's Note: The installation was originally scheduled for 15 August but has been delayed, reported to the 17th.] This appointment is particularly significant, since the judiciary in Iran wields considerable power --- albeit through the approval of Iran's top leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei --- and has a great deal of latitude to make decisions without reference to law or Islamic concepts, especially when "safeguarding the interests of the regime" is deemed necessary.

Who is Sadeq Larijani?

Born in 1960 in Najaf, Iraq, Sadeq Larijani is the son of Grand Ayatollah Hashem Amoli and the son-in-law of Grand Ayatollah Hossein Vahid Khorasani, currently one of the most widely followed marjas, "sources of
emulation" whose rulings are regarded as binding by devout Shiite believers. Larijani's two older and well-known brothers -- Ali Larijani, speaker of the Majlis (Iranian parliament) and former nuclear negotiator, and Mohammad Javad Larijani, the deputy head of the judiciary, former deputy foreign affairs minister, and mathematics graduate from the University of California, Berkeley -- are also married into respected clerical families: Ali is the son-in-law of the late Morteza Motahhari, an ideologue of the Islamic government, and Mohammad Javad is the son-in-law of Hassan Hassanzadeh, an ayatollah in Qom. Khamenei, at one point the supervisor of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), became
intimate with the Larijani family during Ali's several-year post as deputy commander of the IRGC.

Sadeq justifies his lack of political experience in a short autobiography on his website. Because he "felt that the West's cultural invasion was no less important than a military invasion," he decided to prepare himself
for "confronting the cultural invasion," in part by learning English. He used his new language skills to translate several philosophical works,such as an article by Karl Popper on the philosophy of science and G. J.
Warnock's Contemporary Moral Philosophy, the latter of which he annotated and critiqued from the Islamic point of view. Sadeq first made a name for himself by criticizing religious intellectuals such as Abdulkarim Soroush and eventually became one of the main voices of the Islamic Republic. Larijani taught courses on Islamic ideology, both at the seminary in Qom and at various IRGC bases around the country.

In 2001, Sadeq Larijani was the youngest jurist ever to be appointed to the Guardian Council, the twelve-person body responsible for approving all laws passed by the Majlis and for supervising elections. In the course of his Guardian Council activities, he has tried to remain under the radar by avoiding public appearances and media interviews. He has also made every effort to keep his relationships with Khamenei, the intelligence apparatus, and the IRGC under wraps.

Militarizing Iran's Institutions

In his twenty years in office, particularly in recent years, Khamenei has replaced military, political, economic, cultural, and clerical officials with a new generation of politicians and clerics who owe their political
or religious credentials to him. The IRGC and intelligence apparatuses became the main avenues through which young ambitious men loyal to Khamenei could enter the political scene.

Although most of these new politicians and clerics are close to Khamenei, they are not traditional clerics with independent political and religious credentials, such as those who participated in the 1979 Revolution.

Instead, most of the new generation began their careers in the military, the IRGC, and the intelligence services. Notable examples include Ahmad Khatami (no relation to former president Muhammad Khatami), an influential intelligence agent who is now a member of the Assembly of Experts and the Friday prayer Imam of Tehran; Ahmad Salek, Khamenei's representative in both the Qods Force and IRGC intelligence and a member of the Militant Clerics Society of Tehran; Hossein Taeb, the commander of Basij militia and former head of IRGC intelligence; and Sadeq Larijani.

Khamenei's Judiciary

Khamenei keeps close control of the Iranian judiciary: he not only appoints its head, but also gives unofficial recommendations to other high-ranking judiciary officials. Often a micromanager, Khamenei has been
known to go over the judiciary's head, exemplified by his recent order to close the Kahrizak detention center in Tehran (a move that usually requires a court order). Critics say the closure was meant to prevent a Majlis investigation into abuse of the facility's prisoners -- most of whom were arrested following the postelection demonstrations.

Although the Iranian constitution states that the judiciary supervise all juridical and legal processes, some bodies, such as the Special Court of Clerics, work under Khamenei's direct supervision outside the judiciary's
framework. Moreover, even though the IRGC, Basij, police, Intelligence Ministry, and Special Court of Clerics run many of Iran's detention centers, the judiciary has no jurisdiction over any of them. Further
complicating matters, Khamenei is constitutionally the final arbiter in any dispute between government officials, with the right to overrule Islamic law when necessary to safeguard the interests of the regime. As
such, the judiciary uses Islamic law as the basis for its decisions only when Khamenei sees such use as not in conflict with the regime's interests -- as he defines it.

Not only is the judiciary empowered to ignore Islamic law, it also bypasses the country's criminal law, particularly in politically related cases. This has led to harsh criticism by secular lawyers as well as
clerics in the last two decades. In an open letter to Hashemi Shahroodi, for instance, published in Ettelaat newspaper on August 2, Ayatollah Mustafa Mohaqeq Damad, a prominent scholar of Islamic law, criticized the concept of the "interests of the regime," complaining, "The bitter taste of what happened in the judiciary under you, especially in recent days, would not be forgettable for Iranian people ... Under you, the judiciary,
which is the pivot of society's security, is not only shaken but destroyed."

Conclusion

Iran's judiciary -- under the watchful eye of Iran's top leader -- has a great deal of power to shape the country's legal system and environment. Sadeq Larajani's ties to the IRGC and intelligence agencies provide ample reason to believe that he will use his new powers to crack down even further on human rights and civil liberties than did his predecessors. Moreover, Larijani's appointment signals that the judiciary, the IRGC, and the intelligence agencies will be more closely aligned then ever. Presumably, this state of affairs indicates that traditional ayatollahs deeply trained in Islamic law -- but who are not members of the
intelligence-military-political circles -- will have a lesser role in government in years to come. Given the unstable situation in post-election Iran, such a scenario could be a recipe for continued and ongoing chaos.

Iran: Is the Challenge to the Regime Alive? Pressure on the Supreme Leader

The Latest from Iran (14 August): Just Another Prayer Day?

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The intrigues over the Karroubi-Rafsanjani initiative on detainee, in itself, is an uncertainty to dominate political discussion for days, but attention to it has hidden a second development that may be just as significant. We noted yesterday that an organisation representing hundreds of former members of Parliament had written Rafsanjani calling for ""reviews of the activities and performance of Iranian institutions, security and military forces, and the judicial system in recent events”.

That summary was crucially incomplete. The full translation is "to review of the activities and performance of all Iranian institutions that operate under the direct supervision of the Supreme Leader including security and military forces, and the judicial system during the recent events”.

There you have it. This would not just be an examination of the Iranian system but of Ayatollah Khamenei's actions and role within it. The letter bluntly states:

Contrary to other political systems that absolve their leadership from responsibility, in the Islamic Republic of Iran according to Law Number 107 of the Constitution the Supreme Leader is equal to any other citizen, and according to law the Supreme Leader must assume responsibility for his actions due to his Supreme Leadership.

According to Law Number 57, all three branches of government act under the Supreme Leader, we are therefore asking you as the head of the Assembly of Experts to ensure that the Assembly performs its duty as delineated by Law Number 111 and review of the activities and performance of all Iranian institutions that operate under the direct supervision of the supreme leader including security and military forces, and the judicial system during the recent events.

it is the invocation of "Law Number 111" that raises the red flag to Khamenei. The full text of the clause:

Whenever the Supreme Leader is unable to perform his duties or it is ascertained that he does not currently meet one of the conditions [for Leadership] in laws 5 and 109 (or it is demonstrated that he did not have these
conditions from the beginning) he can be set aside and it is the job of the Assembly of Experts to ascertain this issue.

OK, but these are just former members of Parliament, right? Well, consider a second development --- largely missed by the media --- that we noted last Wednesday and then highlighted in our first update yesterday. Ayatollah Ali Mohammad Dastgheib, a member of the Assembly of Experts, called for an emergency meeting to review the political and legal situation. His statement was a blunt challenge to the performance of Ayatollah Khamenei, the equivalent of asking "Law Number 111" to be implemented.

I concluded yesterday, "Dastgheib’s initiative...is more about keeping up pressure than raising the likelihood of a majority Assembly vote against the Iranian leadership." After the statement of the former MPs, however, an EA colleague asserts, "This is the greatest challenge to Khamenei ever."

I'm not ready to go that far yet. But as this crisis has already shown --- repeatedly --- ripples turn into waves.