The Latest from Iran (21 August): Political Battles

NEW Video: The Sohrab Protests (20 August)
EA Soundcheck: Assessing Afghanistan, Iran, and Iraq
The Latest from Iran (20 August): Grinding to a Halt

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2035 GMT: We had heard rumours all day about this story but, given its explosive nature, had held off posting without confirmation. It has now appeared on a "reformist site", Norooz, and has been recommended by the Facebook page of Zahra Rahnavard, Mir Hossein Mousavi's wife.

A member of staff of a Tehran cemetery told Norooz that on both 12 July and 15 July, the bodies of tens of protestors were brought in without any identification, secretly and under strict security. Staff were forced to issue compulsory burial licences, and the bodies were interred in Section 302 of the cemetery.

2030 GMT: We had reported earlier on protests last night in Tehran (1015 GMT), but it is only after seeing some video that a reader recommended that we realised quite how powerful those demonstrations, both against President Ahmadinejad and in honour of slain protestors such as Sohrab Arabi and Neda Agha Soltan, were. We have posted the video in a separate entry.

2010 GMT: Follow-up on Kayhan. It looks like the "hard-line" newspaper will escape suspension. Tabnak reports that the Tehran Prosecutor's office has denied accounts that the Media Court ordered Kayhan's temporary closure after its editor twice failed to answer court summons. (An English-language summary is on Tehran Bureau.)

1945 GMT: More extracts from the significant event of the day, Friday prayers in Qom (1445 GMT), where Ayatollah Amini criticised the Government:

You are not one another’s enemy. You are all in favor of the establishment, Islam and the rule of the Just Jurisprudent. Why don’t you, instead of talking to the enemy, talk to one another and find a solution to this disunity?

I am not talking about one party or the other… You, as the elite, must sit down and talk. If injustice has really been done to people, deal with it. If an innocent has been incarcerated, release him. And if someone has been shamed [publicly], apologize to him, and properly deal with those who are really guilty.

How must I advise you to set aside disunity for it to register? We are not enemies and our solidarity is possible. Resolve this issue through dialogue and stop giving the enemy something to talk about.

If you want to mend the situation as caring individuals, end the conflict and prevent it from expanding.

1445 GMT: News is emerging that the significant Friday prayers address was not in Tehran but from Ayatollah Ebrahim Amini in Qom. Amini demanded the release of all innocent prisoners and comforted those who had been unfairly victimised by recent events. Reportedly, the sermon has caused supporters of the pro-Government Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi to back away from plans to protest against Ayatollah Yusuf Sane'i and his now-famous video condemnation of the regime.

Amini's address follows his meeting this week, with other clerics, with the Supreme Leader, reportedly to raise criticisms about the role of Khamenei's son Mojtaba in political affairs.

1130 GMT: Officially, Not a Peach. President Ahmadinejad's office has removed his reference to former Minister of Health Kamran Lankarani as "a peach one wants to eat" (see 1000 GMT) from the official transcript of his televised broadcast.

1030 GMT: Iran Republic News Agency does not mention Jannati's challenge to arrest opposition leaders although it says he pointed out "the consequences of slander".

1025 GMT: Jannati Answers. In our first update (0645 GMT), we advised, "Watch...for how far Jannati pushes for punishment of the "ringleaders" of the protest."

Here's the response from Friday prayers in Tehran: "Riots are our main issue today ... Some people were arrested and some were not. Why weren't the leaders behind the riots arrested? ... Their arrest should be the first thing that the judiciary must do."

1015 GMT: A bit more on the broadcast: a reader points us to this from the Green movement's Mowj-e-Sabz, "There were rooftop protests all over the country and especially the Apadana area in Tehran [the neighbourhood of Sohrab Arabi, who was killed on 15 June but whose death was not confirmed for a month]. People gathered ...in streets in protest and were chanting 'Death to Dictator'. This was in solidarity with Sohrab’s family, as it was also the 40th day anniversary of his martyrdom."

1005 GMT: Ahmadinejad - Compromise or Showdown? There is one clue in last night's Presidential broadcast for this question, highlighted in an EA Soundcheck yesterday. Ahmadinejad said that, if the Ministry of Intelligence had done its job properly, there would have been no post-election conflict.

That's a clear slap at former Minister of Intelligence Ejeie and Iran's judiciary, which has just appointed him as Prosecutor General. But it also is a shot in the ongoing battle over who controls the Ministry, amidst the firing of up to 25 key officials. Look for a response from "conservative" and "principlist" opponents of Ahmadinejad.

1000 GMT: It is a relatively slow news day in Iran. We're awaiting the summary of Ayatollah Jannati's Friday prayer address in Tehran, and there has been surprisingly little reaction to President Ahmadinejad's national broadcast promoting his Cabinet choices.

We'll take advantage of the pause to feature the "hot" story on the Internet about the broadcast, noting the President's remarks about his outgoing Minister of Health, Kamran Lankarani: "In his TV appearance last night, Ahmadinejad praised him as one of the most able administrators of his previous cabinet and said: 'I have a special personal interest in him, a pious and faithful young man. Once I said he is like a peach, one wants to eat him!"

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aQUwNDG1Tdc[/youtube]

I leave further interpretation and analysis up to EA readers.

0725 GMT: Picking up on another (largely unreported) story from yesterday. A Parliamentary Commission member has warned that Mir Hossein Mousavi's proposed "Green Path of Hope" political front will not receive a license for public activity.

0700 GMT: Last night's EA Soundcheck podcast includes a lengthy discussion of the pressure on President Ahmadinejad, both from inside the "establishment" and from public protest. General verdict? The President is in a long-term battle. I don't think he'll win, but before that comes the urgent question, will he offer any compromise or press even harder (possibly in co-operation with the Revolutionary Guard) for a showdown?

One clue to an answer: see if next Tuesday's fourth round of trials of political detainees goes ahead and how much publicity it gets in state media.

0645 GMT: With Ramadan starting tomorrow, this could be the last full day for political manoeuvres for the next few weeks. At the same time, nothing can defer the manoeuvres over President Ahmadinejad's submission of his Cabinet choices to the Iran Parliament.

And the challenge may have another dimension. An EA correspondent has reviewed the speech that Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani gave to the Iranian Society of Engineers, mentioned in yesterday's updates. He notes that Larijani offered a response to Mehdi Karroubi's initiative on the abuse of detainees.

On Wednesday, Karroubi sent an official letter to Larijani asking him to arrange a meeting including Ahmadinejad, the head of Iran's judiciary, Mohammad Larijani, the head of the Assembly of Experts and Expediency Council, Hashemi Rafsanjani, and the Prosecutor General, Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejeie, where Karroubi would produce his graphic evidence of the abuses.

Larijani said yesterday that he is willing to participate in such a meeting, "We do not want to preserve any secrecy in this regard and hide any evidence from the public." So will the Speaker not only willingness but press for the gathering, knowing this could be the issue that bends if not breaks the Ahmadinejad Government?

On the public front, Ayatollah Jannati will lead Friday prayers in Tehran today. Expect a hard-line address continuing the recent theme, after last week's replacement of Hashemi Rafsanjani by Ahmad Khatami, supporting the Supreme Leader and Government and deriding the foreign-inspired protest movement. Watch, however, for how far Jannati pushes for punishment of the "ringleaders" of the protest.

Iran: Is Rafsanjani (or Ahmadinejad) A Spent Force? The Sequel

Is Hashemi Rafsanjani A Spent Force?
The Latest from Iran (19 August): Challenges in Parliament and from Prisons

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Yesterday we posted an exchange between two Enduring America correspondents, Mr Smith and Mr Jones, on the current position and future prospects of Hashemi Rafsanjani. Their full and frank discussion soon took in not only Rafsanjani's fortunes but also those of the Supreme Leader and President Ahmadinejad. Our readers then took the analysis further with a set of thoughtful and challenging comments.

Today a third EA correspondent, Mr Johnson, joins the discussion with his views on both Rafsanjani and Ahmadinejad. I believe that his thoughts and a further exchange with Mr Smith take us a stage farther in consideration of the present and future of the post-election crisis.

JOHNSON: I disagree with the statement of Mr. Smith regarding the body language of Rafsanjani, based upon the small clip that can be observed on the EA website. As an Iranian, I did not find any exhibition of subordinate behavior in Rafsanjani's body language. Did Mr. Smith expect arrogant stiffness and coldness? In Persian society, politeness is a deadlier weapon than an arrogant snub. A consummate politician of the old school like Rafsanjani will never ever stoop to a behaviour that will acknowledge that he has been ruffled by a non-entity like Ahmadinejad. I humbly suggest that Mr. Smith read Sir John Chardin's Travels in Persia, which beautifully demonstrates how such deadly politeness worked in the 17th century. The mechanics are still applicable today.The other side of the coin has not been considered at all. Not only has Rafsanjani not caved in, he has snubbed Ahmadinejad. Rafsanjani did not participate in Ahmadinejad's inauguration ceremony, while he did come to the investment of Larijani who is a much lower-ranking official. This shows to everyone in no uncertain terms what Rafsanjani thinks of Ahmadinejad, and of course after planting such a well placed (and well-felt) insult so delicately, Rafsanjani can afford to be graciously polite to such gauche guttersnipe like Ahmadinejad.

In fact it is Ahmadinejad's behavior that supports my interpretation. If this were a ceremony depicting the humilation of Rafsanjani, based upon Ahmadinejad's innate pettiness, I would be sure that he would stay through the whole ceremony savouring the discomfiture of his enemy and his own triumph. The fact that Ahmadinejad came in quickly and left quickly before Rafsanjani's talk points to the fact that he was uncomfortable during the ceremony and that he left before Rafsanjani's speech as a retaliation.

Another issue that must be considered is that Rafsanjani is not looking for reform. Even the freedom of prisoners is not his primary goal. (It can be argued that some of the reformers in prison have been a thorn in his side as much as Ahmadinejad's.) Equating the reform movement with Rafsanjani's politics is a grave mistake; there may be some compatibilities between the two but they are separate issues. Personally, I think that Rafsanjani has been attempting (with some success) to project the image that he is way above the fray and is not getting involved in the political struggle; however, if the establishment is being eroded he will step in, and he will takes pains to couch his disagreements with Ahmadinejad in terms of the survival of the system.

Rafsanjani's reaction to Karroubi's letter again fits this model of an impartial high boss directing the underlings to right a wrong. Possibly his idea is to show to all the powers to be that he is very much the supreme leader. A supreme leader unlike Khamenei who, with his blatant partisanship of Ahmadinejad, has effectively turned the office into a jokeby condoning behavior that absolutely unacceptable.

Mr. Smith also dismisses institutions such as the Assembly of Experts and the opinions of the Grand Ayatollahs. I think that this is a mistake. The opinions of these individuals and others can carry weight in all branches of government, leading to fault-lines and fractures throughout the Iranian political landscape and to a galvanizing of the protest movement. In fact I think that it is these fractures that have prevented the Ahmadinejad and Khamenei factions from having sufficient power to neutralize the opposition. These fractures have become even deeper when one considers the modus operandi of Ahmadinejad: namely, his extreme cronyism in chosing his high level officials (many of whom lack basic credentials for the job), and his extreme reluctance to share power. Both of these issues have led even conservative politicians to worry for their survival: firstly, because they know that, if they do not belong to Ahamdinejad's close circle, they will not be given a political role to play, and secondly, because the inherent incompetence of the Ahmadinejad government is bound to lead the country to ruin. I think that the "carting off of the Assembly of Experts" may lead to even greater fractures that would blow up in the face of any potential "transportation agency".

Mr. Smith also is eloquent about Rafsanjani being lambasted by Ahmadinejad. I think that Mr. Rafsanjani's stock amongst the Iranian public may have increased by these attacks.
Finally, I have an issue with Mr Smith's statement: "However, in terms of real influence in state decision-making, I would say that Ahmadinejad is going quite strong". Ahmadinejad is dealing with a potentially intractable Parliament will make trouble for the confidence votes of his Cabinet, he is dealing with a country that is operating at a much lower level of productivity than last year (e.g. the price of food stuffs have risen 50% in the last month, subsidies in foodstuffs have been cut off, etc.); social unrest has been a cause for so much concern that the idea of closing down schools and universities for the fall semester has been floated; Clinton and other Western leaders have stated that "they have no idea who is in charge in Iran", leaving relations in limbo; the dramatic lowering of Iranian prestige in the Muslim world has been caused by the reaction of the Iranian government towards the persecution of Chinese Muslims and huge coverage by Arab media of the allegations of sexual prison torture that make Abu Ghraib sound like the Holiday Inn; and the list goes on.

Mr. SMITH responds:

With all due respect for Mr Johnson, I really think he is greatly underrating Ahmadinejad and exaggerating the extent of Rafsanjani's actions. He should be guarded in his dismissal of Ahmadinejad as someone who has essentially dug his own grave. "Chronic problems" have been the leitmotif of Ahmadinejad's first four years in office, long before the June elections, yet he still managed, to quote Mr Johnson, to turn the Supreme Leadership into a "joke" and have Khamenei stretch far to support him.

No mention is made of the repeated humiliations Rafsanjani has faced ever since Ahmadinejad brought him up in the TV debate with Mousavi. Quite frankly, it would be an amazing snubbing strategy, by all standards, after the President had leveled his charges of corruption.

Politeness and body language tell it all in Iran, as Mr Johnson rightfully states. For this very reason, Ahmadinejad stepping up on the podium, railing against Rafsanjani and getting off (and away with) it once again --- the ample photo galleries on Iranian news agencies do not show him as "uncomfortable" at all ---- shows the extent of his capacity to overrule etiquette and time-honoured cultural traditions. Once again, that he has done so without facing significant retaliation is telling.

Regarding Rafsanjani's stock within people at large, I hope Mr Johnson's definition of people is not restricted to the Green Wave. My own findings in Tehran before the election pointed to Ahmadinejad actually gaining from his "thief" attacks in the Mousavi TV debate. To really generate support amongst the people, Rafsanjani should have inserted continuity to his post-electoral strategy, in the same way Karroubi and Mousavi have done.

As for the Assembly of Experts, Unless they pull off a major stunt in the next meeting, which no one I know believes they will, they will remain irrelevant in the current power struggle. They have been a spent force in all but one key event, the election of Khamenei. The Grand Ayatollahs carry weight, I don't deny that, but it would have been off topic to discuss them in the contours of my discussion with Mr Smith.

I agree with Mr Johnson's points on the perceptions Rafsanjani has of his own role within the system. The issue is whether he can carry these in practice. I have severe doubts.

Mr. JOHNSON replies:

Mr. Smith's views on the flaws and vulnerabilities of Rafsanjani are well-taken and deserve to be considered thoroughly in any analysis of the current situation and political power struggle in Iran. However, I do believe that his viewpoint colours his analysis and leads to implications with which I disagree.

Mr. Smith says "'chronic problems' have been the leitmotif of Ahmadinejad's four years in office, long before the June elections, yet Mr Johnson still managed, to quote Mr Johnson, to turn the Supreme Leadership into a 'joke' and have Khamenei stretch far to support him". It is Mr. Smith's prerogative to dismiss all problems as merely "leitmotifs" sung by a choir of protest. I am not ashamed to plagiarise a good phrase, so I will take Mr. Smith's colourful Wagnerian analogy further. A high enough cacaphonous frequency of "effective leitmotifs" leads to the composition of "Gotterdammerung", a prospect that I am sure many Iranian politicians across the spectrum are considering very seriously.

I also think that Mr. Smith is placing way too much emphasis upon Ahmadinejad's slights and insults to Mr. Rafsanjani. In experimental science, every instrumental measurement has a signal and a noise. The signal is what is measured when a phenomenon occurs, and noise is the baseline that the instrument measures in the absence of the phenomenon. The issue with quantifying Ahmadinejad's statements is that the language with which he addresses any opponent (real or perceived) involves a heady mixture of snide comments, condescension, arrogance, and maybe an accusation or two thrown in for good measure. This lack of nuance makes it very difficult to assign a value scale to the insults, so it is a challenge to discriminate signal from the noise.

I also think that it should be pointed out that, during the Larijani ceremonies, insults were handed out like candy. If according to Mr. Smith, Ahmadinejad felt that he could insult Rafsanjani with impunity by walking out before his talk, Mr Nateq-Nouri also felt the same way about Ahmadinejad and insulted the President by walking out during his speech. Somehow the frequency of these insults diminishes their effect.

Mr. Smith gently implies that I may be biased by only considering the Green Wave as people. I have tried hard not to do so; however, I thank him for pointing out a potential pitfall. He then demonstrates his point ,using "his findings in Tehran before the election pointing to Ahmadinejad actually gaining from his 'thief' attacks in the Mousavi TV debate." May I return the compliment by humbly suggesting that he should be much more critical about the significance of the results of his findings, avoiding a major error that many journalists make. This last year has been a year of elections and polls, and I took the opportunity to consult with many statisticians and sociologists about polling data. The resounding response from these experts was that the significance of the results of most polls is lost when they are subjected to rigorous statistical analysis.

I most emphatically do not intend to cast any aspersions upon the integrity of the findings of Mr. Smith nor his methodology for data collection. I just want to state that it is highly probable that once his findings are analysed rigorously and correctly via statistical methods, they will lose (just like any other poll) any meaningful significance, making it impossible to generalise these findings to the bulk of the population.

Iran Debate: Is Hashemi Rafsanjani A Spent Force?

Iran: Is Rafsanjani (or Ahmadinejad) A Spent Force? The Sequel
The Latest from Iran (18 August): Which Way for the Government?

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Throughout yesterday, there was a fascinating (and, I think, important) debate between two of Enduring America's specialists on Iran, Mr. Smith and Mr. Jones, about the political fortunes of Hashemi Rafsanjani. The discussion not only considers whether the former President retains a significant influence over the future of the Islamic Republic but also looks at the positions of the Supreme Leader and President Ahmadinejad. Feedback from readers would be welcome, as I believe this may be one of the defining contexts for the outcome of this post-election crisis:

SMITH: I think that Rafsanjani has been giving up his "Godfather" role within the Green movement progressively. If you add up his non-reply to [Mehdi] Karroubi's letter [on abuse of detainees], his embarassing retreat from Friday prayers, and today [appearing with President Ahmadinejad], you get the impression of someone who is deeply distressed but does not feel secure enough to embark on a major confrontation with the state power. It is unnerving in the sense that, as the Mehr photos show [of the Rafsanjani-Ahmadinejad encounter], it is actually Rafsanjani that is adopting a body language geared towards subordination, and not the other way round. The gesture is the single most important "frame" to have come out of elite circles in Iran afte the shoulder kiss of Ahmadinejad to the Supreme Leader during his inauguration.

JONES: But then again, what did Rafsanjani have to gain from replying to Karroubi's letter? That's a hot potato that even [Mir Hossein] Mousavi is wary of handling. I do agree that Rafsanjani is deeply distressed (something his brother made clear), but I'm not sure his "Godfather" role was anything but a superficial and transitory collision of interests. Now Rafsanjani is unsure how his interests are best served and is thus "pausing". This also coincided with the emergence of the Majlis [Parliament]hmin challenging Ahmadinejad, a dynamic in which Rafsanjani was less involved.

I think when he does get around to speaking at Friday Prayers, we will have a much better understanding of his peace of mind and tactical re-appraisal.

SMITH: Rafsanjani's speech on July 17 was quite genuine, as was the distress he vented out through his brother on the Iranian Labor News Agency. But he has realised that Khamenei has gone for brute force and that it's better for himself and his family to back down. So my gut feeling is that there is more than transitory interests here, but he is by now emerging as a spent force. The one and last stand he could/might make is the next Assembly of Experts meeting, whenever that will take place; however, despite all this prodding from former MPs, Grand Ayatollahs, etc. that we have been seeing in the form of all these anonymous letters calling for Khamenei's head, I doubt we shall see Rafsanjani substantiating these.

A passing joke among myself and my Iranian contacts is that the Assembly of Experts communique dismissing Khamenei would not even reach the website of the Assembly before all those septuagenarians are carted away.

JONES: I agree that this pressure will have a lasting legacy. In effect, I think the parameters of Iranian political culture, memory and participation have been extended. In the short term, the regime equates compromise with weakness. In the longer term, such will be the fear of bringing millions of Iranians onto the streets that compromise will be equated with stability (perhaps even survival).

I can think of very few popular movements who have mobilised equivalent support and not gone on to extract or induce significant concessions or changes in the long term.

I guess the extent to which we see Rafsanjani as a spent force depends on our expectations of what he wanted to achieve and how realistic it was he could achieve it. The removal of Ahmadinejad? I don't think was achievable, and Rafsanjani eventually understood this. So, he settled for the effective neutering of Ahmadinejad's 2nd administration, which I think will happen. Khamenei was, in my view, equally never going to be removed. But Rafsanjani ultimately challenged him and is still standing- that's radical in itself. The question is, what has the last 2-3 months cost him? Has it cost Khamenei more or less?

SMITH: I would urge caution on Rafsanjani's capability of neutering Ahmadinejad's administration, but I agree that much has changed in the Iranian political landscape for good in the past two months, regardless of any future progress by the Green movement. However, I am sure that Khamenei has factored in some "cost" or "loss" when agreeing to go by with the hardliners, although I can't say whether he was really ready for this sort of reaction from the people.

As for Rafsanjani, well, he has paid a high price all along. He was lambasted by Ahmadinejad in the debates, has had people extremely close to him such as [Mohammad] Atrianfar, [Mohammad] Qoochani and others thrown into jail and paraded before TV long after his Friday prayer plea for their release, was forced to backtrack when he withdrew from the last Friday prayers [14 August], and today, according to one of the main columnists of Etemade Melli, he "bowed before Ahmadinejad like a servant does in front of his master". So, all in all, I have to stake my claim that he has not emerged in a very good posiition overall, although he has managed to cling on to some of his old powers and be somewhat "radical". But, as Iranian politics have thought us, its better to wait and see, starting from the Assembly of Experts meeting!

JONES: Do you think there was anything Rafsanjani could have done differently? This may be a curious case where none of the current "heavyweights" of the system have come off well, least of all Ahmadinejad (and Khamenei).

Raf's fortunes have ebbed and flowed: he was far more humilated by his loss to Ahmadinejad in 2005 than by the slurs in the 2009 debate. Fact remains, Rafsanjani is still more powerful than Ahmadinejad. The reason being that Ahmadinejad has never challenged the Supreme Leader and was effectively told to shut up and keep out of sight (something Khamenei could not do to Rafsanjani).

I don't think Rafsanjani expected those detained to be released; he wanted it on record that he had called for it. I also think that the mutterings about Rafsanjani are the continuation of old complaints, but the rumblings about Khamenei's suitability as Supreme Leader are something that have never ever come out before, even if they were felt privately by many). As you say, however, we will have to wait and see.

SMITH: I am still unsure of the real extent of Rafsanjani's power. On paper, he is as powerful as it gets, more so given that he survived an attempt to remove him from the leadership of the Assembly of Experts in February, meaning that he could technically count on a majority there.

As for his fortun, you should take the pre-electoral slurs and post-electoral moves as one big package. Not to forget the total sidelining of his concerns, as stated in the letter and three-hour meeting he had with Khamenei right before the elections. A close Rafsanjain associate boasted about the "positive signals" emerging from that meeting to several foreign diplomats, so you can appreciate the sort of "con" Khamenei played on his old associate.

The slurs against Rafsanjani were conducive, according to my own field work and those of others in Tehran before the elections, to a rise of votes for Ahmadinejad, while I will wait for the Assembly of Experts meeting to express my thoughts on his post electoral performance. However, in terms of real influence in state decision-making, I would say that Ahmadinejad is going quite strong. True, he is rebuked from all quarters, including the Supreme Leader, every now and then, but he has been remarkably successful in exerting his own viewpoints on the long-term evolution of many affairs of state, including the nuclear file, relations with the West, and the economy. He has driven the economy to shambles yet nobody has really managed to serious "punish" him for that, which is quite astonishing in its own right.

Iran: Questions for the "Green Path of Hope" and for the Government

The Latest from Iran (17 August): Waiting for the Next Manoeuvre

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After all the manoeuvres and intrigues of the last 48 hours, this morning is wait-and-see.

On the opposition side, this has been illustrated by the confusion over the demonstration, originally scheduled for today, in front of the offices of the Etemade Melli newspaper, associated with Mehdi Karroubi. The gathering had been called by Karroubi's campaign but, after pro-Government forces did not fulfil their threat to demonstrate in front of and possibly attack the offices on Saturday, Karroubi called off today's event.

Late last night, activists around Mir Hossein Mousavi finally withdrew their "official" call to protest, but this morning the Twitter account supporting Mousavi continues to put out the message, "It's hard to undo announcement for protest. If protest goes on, it will be spontaneous and peaceful. You are media!"

The episode, which escalated from a specific situation (the defence of Etemade Melli) into debate over a general protest, is symbolic of the political challenges now facing the opposition. The immediate difficulty posed by the Government is the continuing threat of prosecution and suppression. Had the demonstration gone ahead with official backing, especially given Saturday's non-appearance by the pro-Government supporters, then Karroubi might have been subject to punishment and even detention. Even with the apparent withdrawal of an official gathering, the regime temporarily banned the publication of Etemade Melli.

The wider issue is that opposition now consists of a number of challenges to the regime, all centred around the legal, political, and religious aspects of detention, confession, and abuse. These are all significant: the Karroubi-Rafsanjani initiative for an enquiry into mistreatment of detainees, the possible query of the Supreme Leader's authority under Law 111 of Iran's Constitution, and the call for punishment of those who supervised the detention regime.

They, however, do not constitute a general "political front" or even a coordination of activity. Mir Hossein Mousavi's call on Saturday for a "Green Path of Hope" has been met by a marked silence by other opposition leaders, as they concentrate on the narrower and more immediate criticisms of the regime. While the political response is understandable, it does cause a problem for the public face of the Green movement: where now the symbolic moments for the mass expression of anger and hope that fueled the post-election response to the Government?

Meanwhile, President Ahmadinejad is trying to stop the clock ticking against his stay in office, announcing some of his Cabinet choices on Sunday and promising that all others will be placed before the Parliament on Tuesday. That is a down-to-the-wire strategy, given the deadline of Wednesday. While the conservative and principlist anger with the President has been muted over the weekend, it has not necessarily dissipated.

So, for the moment, as the Green movement considers its next waves, watch for the ripples within the Establishment. Will Parliament strike back at Ahmadinejad? And, given the continuing clerical and political statements and meetings over Law 111 (the latest being Mohammad Khatami's audience with former MPs), how secure is the Supreme Leader?

The Latest from Iran (16 August): New Challenge to Khamenei?

The Latest from Iran (17 August): Waiting for the Next Manoeuvre

NEW Iran: “Beloved and Popular” Mr Ahmadinejad Wants to See You in New York!
Iran: The Battle over the Judiciary and the Republic’s Future
The Latest from Iran (15 August): Battles Within the Establishment

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2200 GMT: Two late-night breaking stories. The first is the temporary ban on Etemade Melli newspaper after its publication of a letter from Mehdi Karroubi.

The second story is potentially bigger. Press TV's website reports that former President Mohammad Khatami met former members of Parliament and said, "We are the real protectors of the Islamic Republic not those who showed in recent months that they are uprooting the republic and Islamic nature of the establishment." Khatami expressed concern about the "illegal" attitude adopted towards the Iranian nation after the election: "Certain ongoing moves run counter to legal principles."

What Press TV fails to note is that those former members of Parliament issued a statement a few days ago raising the issue of the authority of the Supreme Leader. So this meeting may be part of the move to invoke Law 111 over the prudence and justice of Khamenei.

2005 GMT: Agence France Presse reports, "Iran released 24-year-old French academic Clotilde Reiss on bail Sunday six weeks after she was arrested on suspicion of spying, the French presidency said, adding that she is in good health."

2000 GMT: Revolutionary Road has posted a summary in English, including the names of the defendants, in today's third trial of post-election political detainees.

1905 GMT: And it's not just Press TV that is giving airtime to the opposition and "enemies" of the regime. An EA correspondent reports that Iranian state television, including IRIB Channel 1, is also carrying the denial of charges by an attorney for one of the defendants in today's trial in Tehran (see 1625 GMT).

1855 GMT: Press TV's website is now summarising, in fact almost reprinting in full, the latest statement from Mir Hossein Mousavi: “Our election campaign was conducted under the Constitution and the principles which the Iranian nation holds dear. We still remain committed to the same slogans.”

The article prints, without any critical commentary, Mousavi's memories of Election Night:

[At first] we thought that mismanagement was the cause of chaos. I, myself, made contacts with authorities of the country. On the election day, I called the Judiciary Chief [Ayatollah Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi] twice, the Prosecutor General [Qorban-Ali Dorri-Najafabadi] two times, the Majlis Speaker [Ali Larijani] twice, and the Office of the Leader of the Islamic Revolution [Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei] four times to raise issues about the pre-planned scenarios.

Mousavi, the former prime minister who worked under the founder of the Islamic Revolution, added that he had dispatched a team to see Interior Minister Sadeq Mahsouli, “but, surprisingly, he refused to meet” with them.

Mousavi's challenge to the regime is also featured: “We are confident that an atmosphere of mistrust would not have been created in the country if a fair attitude had been adopted [after the election], to the demands of the Iranian people, and if the media had been prevented from attributing the nation's will to foreigners and diverting facts.”


1700 GMT: In Case You Missed It. Yesterday US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton issued a statement calling on "Iranʼs leadership to quickly resolve all outstanding American citizen cases". These include the detentions of Iranian-American academic Kian Tajbakhsh, whose situation we have profiled on Enduring America, and three American hikers, who were seized when they crossed the Iraq-Iran border.

1640 GMT: Mir Hamid Hassanzadeh, who ran Mir Hossein Mousavi's Ghalam News website during the Presidential campaign, has been released on bail after 11 days in detention. Dr Saeed Shirkavand of the Islamic Iran Participation Front has also been freed on bail.

1625 GMT: Tehran Trial Twist. For the first time, an Iranian state media outlet has carried details of a denial of the charges against post-election political detainees. Press TV's website leads with, "The defense attorney of one of the post-vote detainees has described as 'severe' an indictment that charged his defendant with throwing a hand-made grenade."

The article continues with a specific description of the allegation against Meisam Ghorbani and the attorney's rebuttal rather, than as has been typical of state media reporting, focusing on the prosecution's description of foreign intrigue for a "velvet revolution".

1610 GMT: A Moscow Tilt against Ahmadinejad? The Russian company Megafon now denies that it will start a new mobile phone operation in Iran.

1600 GMT: More Cabinet Rumours. Hossein Sobhaninia, the deputy head of the Parliament's National Security and Foreign Affairs Commission, has told Mehr News Agency that Saeed Jalili (currently head of the President's National Security Council) will be next Foreign Minister and that the current Defence and Interior Ministers, Mostafa Mohammad Najjar and Sadeq Mahsouli, will swap positions. He added that he was incensed by Ahmadinejad's failure to consult with the Commission before these cabinet changes.

1150 GMT: Yeah, Yeah, Whatever. Besides announcing some of his Cabinet choices on Iranian television, President Ahmadinejad trotted out the "foreign interference" line, on the same time that 28 more defendants went on trial. Ahmadinejad told the "West", "This time you clearly interfered in Iran's domestic affairs and you thought you would be able to harm the Islamic nation. You should be held accountable for your actions but we know very well the fuss you created in the world is not a sign of your authority but rather it is a sign of your weakness and downfall."

1110 GMT: An EA correspondent writes, "In the end the Intelligence Ministry did not end up in the hands of [Basiji commander] Hossein Taeb, but it appears that the IRGC [Revolutionary Guard] is as present as ever. According to Fars News, [Heydar] Moslehi was Imam Khomeini's representative in the Khatam al-Anbia and Karbala military bases during the Iraq war and, more importantly, the Supreme Leader's "representative with the land forces of the IRGC and deputy of the Islamic Propaganda Organisation". Hence he is a solid Khamenei acolyte with strong ties to the IRGC. He is also currently a deputy to Ahmadinejad for Islamic University Affairs and Khamenei's representative in the lucrative Waqf Foundations Qrganisation.

1100 GMT: Fars News has now published the indictment and photographs from today's Tehran trial.

1050 GMT: The two women announced today by President Ahmadinejad in his Cabinet choice, to lead the Welfare and Health Ministries, are Fatemeh Ajorloo, a conservative MP from Karaj, and Marzieh Dastjerdi, a gynaecologist.

According to Dastjerdi's biography, just published by Mehr News, she is a solid stalwart of Iran's health establishment, having served in the women's section of the Cultural Revolution Council and the top management of the Health Ministry. She is currently on the board of trustees of the Medical Sciences College of Tehran, of which she is also head of international relations.

1030 GMT: An Iranian website is reporting a statement from the "conservative" Society of Teachers and Researchers of Qom, whose members include Mohammad Yazdi and Ahmed Khatami, calling on the Government to ensure detainees' rights and to curb illegal actions committed during arrests and detentions.

1015 GMT: Confusion on the Internet over the demonstration of support for Etemade Melli, originally proposed by Mehdi Karroubi for Monday. As we reported earlier (0720 GMT), Karroubi's office cancelled the demonstration after threatened attacks by Government backers did not materialise on Saturday. A Facebook site run by supporters of Mir Hossein Mousavi, however, continues to maintain the call for protest.

Because the newspaper is closely connected with Karroubi's party, also called Etemade Melli, and because the information on the party's website is co-ordinated with Karroubi, we are treating his office's announcement --- still the lead item on the website --- as the latest information.

1000 GMT: Back to our first story of the day. President Ahmadinejad has just spoken live on Iranian TV. He says the full Cabinet will be named on Tuesday, but some names have been confirmed. Two women, for the Welfare and Health Ministries, will be proposed. Hojatoleslam Moslehi will be nominated as Minister of Intelligence. Ahmadinejad promised at least one more female minister in the full Cabinet.

0940 GMT: A New Challenge to Khamenei? On Friday, we reported and analysed the first wave of a constitutional move against the Supreme Leader's authority, with the statement of former MPs and Ayatollah Dastgheib's move for an emergency meeting of the Assembly of Experts.

This may now be building from "significant" to "important" story with the revelation, in Mowj-e-Sabz, of "a second wave". A number of high-ranking clerics from Qom, Mashad, and Isfahan have sent an open letter to the Assembly of Experts, asking them to re-evaluate the credentials of the Supreme Leader.

Using the words of Law Number 111 of the Constitution, the clerics assert that the necessary conditions of prudence and justice that are essential for any Supreme Leader have not been met. Therefore, according to the principles of Islamic jurisprudence set by Ayatollah Khomeini, Khameini is and must automatically deposed.

Some cautions with the report: Mowj-e-Sabz has a marked political stake in the story, as it is the website of the Green opposition. And the names of the clerics are not known, as they have been withheld out of consideration for their safety. Still, if true, the report indicates the growing pressure against the Supreme Leader.

0755 GMT: Fars News has an initial report on today's trial of 25 detainees for incitement of "velvet revolution". The indictment accuses them generally of "creating chaos and general disarray after the recent elections" and specifically of making bombs and distributing weapons.

0750 GMT: Propaganda of the Day. Keyhan writes, "Girls that have been recently arrested in the latest unrest and their families" want Mehdi Karroubi to be taken to court and be punished. Keyhan claims that these girls and their families believe, "From the time Karroubi published his letter our friends and relatives look down upon us and our reputation has been besmirched....Karroubi is a power-hungry liar and we can only regain our reputation by proving the falsity of his statements in court."

0730 GMT: Further to our first update on 72 hours for the President. Ali-Akbar Javanfekr, Ahmadinejad's press spokesman, says the President will introduce his cabinet to Parliament on Tuesday or Wednesday.

0720 GMT: Mehdi Karroubi has responded to the attacks upon him in Friday prayers in Tehran:

Unfortunately a number of Friday Imams have abused the sacred position of Friday prayers and have used the market of false accusations, lies and infamy to sell their religion and have insulted the holy institute of Friday prayers....I had written a letter because I was concerned [about issues] and felt that it was my duty to respond, some individuals welcomed this letter others criticized it; however, this issue should not become a pretext for destruction, false accusations and insults. I welcome both approbation and criticisms; however, I can not remain indifferent to those who insult and those who have sold their religion for filthy lucre and I will most certainly respond to them in the near future.

Meanwhile, Karroubi's office has called off the demonstration of his followers scheduled for Monday: "Because the demonstration of the critics that was scheduled Saturday did not occur and the operation of Etemade Melli (newspaper) is continuing with no impediments, we are requesting that all supporters to demonstrate their good intentions by refraining from gathering arround the office of Etemade Melli. We would like to take this oppurtunity to thank public support that has been shown towards the personnel, editors and reporters of this newspaper....We would also like to thank the security forces that have maintaned calm and order around the office of the newspaper.

0700 GMT: Amidst a relatively quiet morning, we've concentrated on a special analysis on the fight over Iran's judiciary, marked by the appointment of Mohammad Sadegh Larijani as its head yesterday, and the wider contest between clerics, politicians, and the Revolutionary Guard.

At the same time, we're now starting to watch the clock on the future of the President. Not sure many have noticed, but Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has 72 hours to get approval from Parliament of his choices for Cabinet ministers. Otherwise, under Iranian law, the way is out for dissolution of the Government and new elections.