The Latest from Iran (12 August): Prisoners, Confessions, and the "War Diversion"

1745 GMT: Bazaar Battle Continues. Ahmad Karimi Esfahani, the Secretary General of Islamic Bazaar Association has complained about the announcement of the Consumer Protection Organization that guilds have debts of $24 million, asking why government debts are not published.

Esfahani claimed the announcement Is meant to incite people against the Bazaar and said the vendors won't accept this slander --- guilds are not responsible for high prices, instead it is due to the mismanagement of government, which then tries to pass the blame.

1730 GMT: The Battle Within. Another challenge to the President, this time from the Ansar Hizbullah daily Yalthareth....

The newspaper notes that Ahmadinejad protested against a seven-month prison sentence for former IRIB chief Mohammad Jafar Behdad for slander against the Larijani brothers and Hashemi Rafsanjani and asks, "Would he do the same for a normal journalist if he had insulted the President? Would he defend a nobody?"

The newspaper continues, "For some justice has no meaning and they allow themselves to mock and humiliate judiciary, because they disagree with a court ruling."

Behdad is a member of the President's Council for Policy-making and Propagation.

1545 GMT: All the President's Men (cont.). The "conservative" Jomhooriye Eslami daily has attacked Presidential Chief of Staff Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai, declaring that his number of offices is unprecedented in the past 30 years and asserting that he has made stupid statements on every matter from heaven to earth, inciting the anger of the people and political figures.

The newspaper continued that, instead of Rahim-Mashai being disciplined, his superiors praise him and repeat his words, which makes the situation even worse. Jomhooriye Eslami says that such a person should be reminded once and for all that he should "talk in his own realm" and refrains from inciting protests amongst the people.

MP Gholam-Hossein Masoudi Reyhan has stated that 1st Vice President Mohammad Reza Rahimi's words are "an insult to science and professors", criticising the Vice President's assertion that all Iranian universites are of poor quality.

1540 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Reformist Mohsen Safaei Farahani has declared that he will not withdraw his complaint over unjust and abusive treatment and will return to prison.

Farahani was arrested on June 20, 2009. Sentenced to five years in prison, he is currently on leave

1330 GMT: The Battle Within. A interesting summary, "The Clerics Turn Away; Iran in Fever" by R. Chimelli in Süddeutsche Zeitung last Friday:

The opposition movement has lost the battle on the streets. Organized demonstrations do not come about, because police, militia and thug forces are too powerful, and --– maybe more importantly --– because of the horrible accounts of torture and illegal detention centers, given by those arrested during the protests. Censorship has never been as repressive as today and reaches out to the print media as well as the internet. Iran’s most renowned journalists and its best-known student leader are currently on hunger strike in prison. Hardly noticed abroad, smaller or larger labor disputes are arising everywhere in the country, (but) union leaders like the head of Tehran’s bus driver union, Mansur Osanloo, have been jailed for several years....

However, Ahmadinejad and the spiritual leader Khamenei could not win people’s hearts or minds. There is not a single renowned writer, artist or filmmaker who would take sides with the country’s rulers. The regime is creating a climate of intellectual poverty, and more and more leading clerics are turning their backs to the regime --– sometimes so visibly that they are answered with violent attacks.

Chimelli notes the significant incident --- which we covered closely on EA --- where the Supreme Leader's office approached Grand Ayatollah Makarem-Shirazi for the "I am the Rule of the Prophet" fatwa. (Makarem-Shirazi declined, unless Ayatollah Khamenei put the pronouncement in the form of an answer to a question from a follower.)

1300 GMT: Britain Does Not Recognise Foreign Affairs Greatness of 1st VP Rahimi. This week we have been noting the emergence of 1st Vice President Mohammad Reza Rahimi as a commentator on international relations and events.

Unfortunately, it seems there is one observer who has failed to give due regard to this. The UK Ambassador to Iran, Simon Gass, said comments about the English as “a bunch of thick people” were “illogical and worthless” and showed “a lack of respect for human dignity”.

Mr Rahimi, in a speech on Monday, called Australians “a bunch of cattlemen” and said South Koreans should be “smacked in the face until they become human”. But his finest remarks were reserved for the land of Queen Elizabeth II:

England has nothing. Its inhabitants are not human, its officials are not responsible, and it doesn’t even have any natural resources. [They are] a bunch of thick people ruled by a mafia. They have plundered the world in the last 500 years and the young lad in charge now is even more stupid than his predecessor.

1200 GMT: Karroubi Watch. More from Mehdi Karroubi's e-mail interview with The Guardian of London:

Karroubi said he believed the Green movement had not been defeated: "It's no longer possible for the opposition movement to pour out en masse into the streets ….But we also do not think it's necessary any more to do this....People were out in the streets to inform the world of what is really happening inside Iran, and they succeeded in doing so. Now the world knows what is the problem in Iran."

Karroubi added his conception of the Islamic Republic: "I should make it clear that we are a reformist movement, not a revolutionary one … We are seeking nothing more than a free election."

The cleric, asked about the notion of leadership in the opposition responded, "In my opinion, it's an advantage that no specific person is the leader. I think that the only reason the Green movement has not been stopped yet is because it doesn't have one leader or unified leadership. If it had, then by arresting that leader they could have controlled the whole movement."

1145 GMT: Mystery Solved. Last week non-Iranian heads were scratched over President Ahmadinejad's aphorism, in the middle of a speech to the Iranian diaspora conference, "The bogeyman snatched the boob."

Iranian commentators went as far as to suggest there might be a bit of Viagra in the water of Tehran's politicians, but Golnaz Esfandiari has offered the explanation, "The expression is one used by mothers in Iran when they are weaning their children off breast milk."

Thus, for an Ahmadinejad scoffing at Washington's efforts to punish Iran over its nuclear programme, "the bogeyman snatched the boob" from the Americans.

0930 GMT: All the President's Men (cont.). Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has brought Gholamhossein Elham, who failed to be re-appointed to the Guardian Council, back into government by naming him as his legal advisor.

An EA source says there is a rumour that Elham will soon replace the controversial Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai as Chief of Staff.

0825 GMT: All the President's Men.
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has publicly defended his embattled aide, Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai:

Mashai is the president’s Chief of Staff and I have full trust in him. The atmosphere of criticism is a necessity and nobody should be condemned for voicing his viewpoints and not every difference of opinion should lead to a fight.

And then this interesting twist, given that Iran's head of armed forces, General Hassan Firouzabadi, said on Monday that Mashai’s remarks on Iran and Islam are a “crime against national security": Ahmadinejad claimed that the attacks against Mashaei are the work of “certain political groups" who are trying to undermine the government.

0805 GMT: Parliament v. Government. President Ahmadinejad has refused again to allocate $2 million for the Tehran metro.

The initial authorisation by the Parliament was refused by the Guardian Council. The Majlis passed the bill to the Expediency Council, which confirmed it, only to meet Ahmadinejad's refusal.

The President has now announced that he has reported "all critical issues" to the Supreme Leader, who has handed the matter back to the Guardian Council, which in turn has established a special group to solve the problems.

EA correspondent Ms Zahra analyses: "This is a bad situation for all. The Supreme Leader has proven that extant institutions are worth nothing and has put himself in opposition to the Majlis. The Majlis will be a joke if the Guardian Council refuses again. The position of Hashemi Rafsanjani, as head of the Expediency Council, is weakened. Ahmadinejad is losing the support of hardline MPs."

0800 GMT: Karroubi's International Comment. Mehdi Karroubi has written, in an e-mail interview with The Guardian of London: "On the one hand, the government's mishandling of the economy has resulted in deep recession and increasing inflation inside the country... On the other hand, we have sanctions which are just strengthening the illegitimate government."

Karroubi added:

Look at Cuba and North Korea. Have sanctions brought democracy to their people? They have just made them more isolated and given them the opportunity to crack down on their opposition without bothering themselves about the international attention....Because Iran is getting more isolated, more and more they are becoming indifferent to what the world is thinking about them.

0745 GMT: Iran-US. Another signal from Washington that resumed talks with Tehran are being considered....

National Security Advisor James Jones has told CNN that President Obama may meet Mahmoud Ahmadinejad if discussions resume over Iran's nuclear programme: “Ultimately if we find a convergence of paths all things are possible.

Jones indicated that a gesture from Tehran over three Americans, detained for more than a year, would be helpful: “One thing they might do is return our three hikers. That would be an important gesture. It could lead to better relations.”

Barack Obama 'may be prepared to meet Iranian president’:

Barack Obama’s national security adviser, Gen James Jones, has indicated the President may be prepared to meet Mahmoud Ahmadinejad if the regime resumed negotiations over its nuclear programme. ...
However, in an interview with CNN, Gen Jones said “the door’s open” if the Iranians agree to resume talks with the International Atomic Energy Agency. When asked whether Mr Obama may meet the Iranian leader, Gen Jones said: “Ultimately if we find a convergence of paths all things are possible.
“One thing they might do is return our three hikers. That would be an important gesture. It could lead to better relations.” However, the President’s national security adviser said there would be “no point in a theatrical meeting.” It is unlikely that the Iranians will agree to the American’s demands as the regime has repeatedly circumvented previous attempts to rein in its nuclear programme.

0740 GMT: Execution (Ashtiani) Watch. Following Brazil's formal offer of asylum to Sakineh Mohammadi Ashtiani, condemned to death for adultery, Foreign Minister Celso Amorim has told a conference of university students, "Who can say that a humanitarian gesture won't be good for Iran, for its image in the world?"

0715 GMT: The Torture Files. Perisan2English has posted a translation of the report --- noted by EA earlier this week --- in Khodnevis of the files of 22 political prisoners, allegedly abused, delivered to the Supreme Leader.

According to Khodnevis' source, Khamenei rejected the claims in the letters, but after an agreement with Hashemi Rafsanjani, a five-person committee was set up to investigate the cases. Two former Ministers of Intelligence, Younesi and Mohseni-Ejei, and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad are among the members of the committee.

0650 GMT: Anything You Can Threaten, We Can Threaten Better....

Israel might have Jeffrey Goldberg of The Atlantic, but Iran has an array of media outlets for this week's posturing.

The naval commander of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps, Ali Fadavi, said Wednesday, “The IRGC’s navy is been fully positioned in Bandar Abbas (in southern Iran) and has the capability to carry out its assigned functions and can respond to threats of extra-regional enemies....The IRGC’s naval force will respond to naval-based enemy threats with full preparation and absolute force, striking the enemy from all positions and from all sides in case of war.”

Fadavi's declaration followed an announcement on Sunday by the Minister of Defence of the positioning of military equipment, including four submarines capable of launching missiles, at IRGC and army bases in southern Iran.

And he head of Iran's Joint Chief of Staff, Major General Hassan Firouzabadi, responding to remarks by Admiral Mike Mullen, the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: “Our foreign minister told Mr. Mike Mullen that if the US attacked Iran, it would be in worse shape than it is after its attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq. America will be finished if it attacks Iran. America is not in a good situation. It can neither tolerate the heavy costs (of another war) nor tolerate fighting against Iran’s Basiji heroes.”

0640 GMT: Mousavi Watch. Mir Hossein Mousavi has met with youth from Iran's provinces to discuss the social, economic, and political situation, including unemployment and the rise in drug addiction, as well as continued activism despite regime pressure.

Speaking about the recent hunger strike in Evin Prison, Mousavi said, “The meaningful and inspiring strike by prisoners will eventually shows its effective outcomes, and I’d like to congratulate these brave prisoners who ended their strike and witnessed its results.”

Mousavi asserted that the Green Movement had the capacity to resolve the “moral” concerns of the country: “We must remember that the social deviances are the results of the wrongdoings, flawed ways of thinking, and deceptive ways and lies created for the nation by the hardliners, and for this reason I believe that the supreme and honourable goals of the Green Movement can control the deviations [from the right path] in society."

Demanding the rights of assembly and protest, Mousavi said, “Neglecting parts of the Constitution, especially the nation’s rights, renders the rest of its articles as meaningless too. How can those who are not even prepared to mention, for once, the rights of citizens or the right of the people to control their own destiny, make any claim about the covenant between the people and the state? Violating this covenant will lead to the illegitimacy of the state."

0545 GMT: We begin this morning with three features.

EA's Josh Shahryar, writing in The Huffington Post assesses the significance of the recent hunger strike by political prisoners and its impact beyond the jail cells: "The Uprising Continues".

We have highlighted in a separate entry the Iranian regime's response to criticism of the death sentence for adultery imposed upon Sakineh Mohammadi Ashtiani and the harassment of her lawyer Mohammad Mostafaei: putting Ashtiani on a prime-time national TV programme to "confess".

And Scott Lucas --- briefly, because there are more important matters to consider today --- takes apart the "analysis" that may well dominate US-based chatter today: Jeffrey Goldberg's lengthy projection of high-level Israeli opinion on a aerial attack on Iran.

US-Iran: Strikes, Sanctions and Scapegoats (Sick)

Gary Sick, a former official in the Carter and Reagan Administrations and a leading analyst of contemporary US-Iran relations, assesses the current state of play:

For the pundits, there are only two questions about U.S.-Iran relations that are of any importance: (1) Will Israel and/or the United States attack Iran? and (2) will the new sanctions have enough bite to persuade Iran to change its nuclear policy? Despite all the printers ink spilled on these two issues, the answers are an easy no and no.

Neither the United States nor Israel will take the military option off the table, thereby giving the pundits (and the crowd that is dying to repeat Iraq) latitude to keep the distant prospect of military action on the front pages, where it has been for years. As a lede, it sells columns and newspapers, so it will not go away. But as analysis it is either blinded by the momentary hype or else is simple wish fulfillment.

Uber-neocon John Bolton had it right. If any such attack were to occur, it would have been at the end of the Bush administration when there was nothing left to lose. Bolton thought it was so inevitable that he predicted it unequivocally in a Wall Street Journal column in 2008. Dick Cheney apparently agreed, judging from his subsequent statements of regret. So it is fair to say that George W. Bush, after looking the potential consequences, resisted the advice of his neocon advisers, his previously dominant vice president, and the reported direct request from the government of Israel — and rejected a strike. What is the likelihood that Barack Obama, with the same catastrophic scenario before him, will approve? Forget it.

Sanctions do not persuade dictatorial regimes to abandon projects that they think are central to their security and survival or even their self-image. Just look at Saddam Hussein. The international sanctions imposed on Iraq in the 1980s make the current Iran sanctions appear anemic in comparison. Every item that went in and out of Iraq was subject to approval by a UN committee dominated by a vindictive United States. Yet, although Iraq had abandoned its nuclear weapons program years earlier, Saddam could not bring himself to let his own people and his enemies know that. Instead he was prepared to gamble that the United States would not attack him.

One of the reasons for this bad bet was that he and his cronies were doing so well under the sanctions that there was no immediate necessity to come clean. They, after all, controlled the smuggling routes. And their henchmen managed the thriving and enormously lucrative black market. As for concern with their own people, a rotund Tariq Aziz, sitting with a fine Scotch and a Cuban cigar, informed a worried UN representative that it would be good for the Iraqi people to lose some weight. An Iraqi friend of mine told me at the time that the sanctions had made criminals of the entire Iraqi middle class, which had to resort to illegal behavior in order to survive. The biggest – and most successful – of this new criminal class was the privileged group immediately around Saddam Hussein.

Which brings us to Iran. The sanctions are more effective than many anticipated. They have built a web of financial restrictions and limitations around the already weak Iranian economy that is certain to cause significant problems for the leadership. Iran’s critical energy sector is particularly vulnerable. It is in a pincer. Because of cheap energy prices inside the country, artificially propped up by massive subsidies, energy demand is soaring. This siphons off a lot of Iran’s oil production, which would otherwise be sold on the world market for hard currency.

At the same time, because Iran’s oil fields are old and complex, they require modern technology to maintain production. That technology – and the capital investment that can only be provided by the major international oil companies – has been absent for many years. It was driven away partly by the sanctions, ironically assisted by Iran’s own short-sighted negotiating tactics that offered only the most meager profit margins to outside investors. As a result, Iran’s oil production is in decline at the same time that more and more of it is being soaked up by domestic consumption. In a period of relatively low oil prices, this means that Iran’s hard currency earnings are drying up at an alarming rate.

This unenviable economic situation is compounded by what has to be described as perhaps the least competent economic management team of any major country in the world. Ayatollah Khamene`i, the Supreme Leader, seems totally preoccupied with bolstering his own shaky political legitimacy by pandering to the Revolutionary Guards who surround and protect him. The result is corruption on a scale beyond anything the shah’s regime could have imagined.

President Ahmadinejad, also a creature of the Revolutionary Guards, is free to indulge his taste for outlandish and irresponsible rhetoric. His words keep the international and domestic spotlight glued to him; but the effect drives away prospective investors and facilitates the U.S. drive to enlist international support for sanctions against Iran. An American Jewish leader once joked with me that he suspected Ahmadinejad was a Mossad agent: no one, he observed, had been more helpful in promoting donations to Israel and Israeli causes. At the same time, under his leadership Iran has inflation and unemployment that are both in double digits.

But to be fair, Ahmadinejad is the first politician in modern Iranian history willing to address the “third rail” of Iranian politics – the immensely costly subsidies on food and energy. His initial efforts to reduce the amount of subsidized gasoline that Iranians could use met with outbursts of indignation, including torching filling stations. But these rules now seem to be grudgingly accepted and have eased slightly Iran’s energy dilemma. He is now addressing the low tax rates assessed against merchants. This has also resulted in outrage, including closing the bazaars in Iran and other major cities. But his campaign seems to be making progress.

These are needed reforms that would be recommended by any responsible economic overseer, including the International Monetary Fund. Ahmadinejad attempts to balance his daring assaults on the entrenched economic interests by his belligerent rhetoric, always casting himself as the champion of the little guy. In that he resembles his populist predecessors, from Juan Peron to Huey Long to Hugo Chavez. Ahmadinejad takes on America and Israel the way Governor Long took on Standard Oil. But like other populists, Ahmadinejad is the prisoner of his own eccentric view of the world and his loyalty to lieutenants who may or may not be worthy of his faith in them.

The key question about Iran today is not whether it will be attacked or collapse under sanctions. It is whether Iran is capable under its present leadership to take a sober decision about how to deal with the outside world. The Revolutionary Guards have established a dominant position in Iran’s military, its economy, and its politics. Iran increasingly comes to resemble the corporatist states of southern and eastern Europe in the 1920s and ‘30s that we call fascist. Iran is conducting an interior battle with its own demons, from the millenarians on the far right who choose to believe that Khamene`i is the personal representative of God on earth, to the pragmatic conservatives who simply want a more responsible leadership, to the reformists of the Green movement whose objective is to put the “republic” back into the Islamic Republic by giving the people a greater voice.

This is a yeasty and unpredictable mix. No one knows what is going to happen next.

And this is the reality that the Obama administration must deal with. The danger is not that the administration will back the wrong horse in Iran. The real danger is that the Obama administration will be so preoccupied with domestic American politics and its constant demand to look tough when dealing with Iran that it will inadvertently rescue this cruel but hapless regime from its own ineptitude by providing a convenient scapegoat for everything that goes wrong in Iran.

US v. Britain: History, Education, and "Big Ideas" in Politics (Haddigan)

Lee Haddigan writes for EA:

For me, one of the fascinations of US politics is the nation’s continual fight over the same issues using the same arguments. Contemporary disputes are fought on the ground of precedent and tradition, example and intent dating back 50, 100, 150, and, ultimately, the 221 years since the ratification of the Constitution. No other country pays as much attention to the relevance of historical events to current affairs than the United States.

And, contrary to some opinion in Europe, America’s reliance on the past as a guide to the future is not a smokescreen for hiding the country’s overriding preoccupation with material interests. The United States, unlike European nations, still believes that political differences rest on contrasting fundamental assumptions about the philosophical justifications for the ways an individual is governed. Thomas Paine wrote, as America sought independence from Britain, that "government is a necessary evil". That sentiment may have died out in Europe, bit it animates debate in the US.

Take, for instance, the contentious subject of education. In America, discussion nearly always reverts to the principle of who has the right --- the federal government or parents --- to provide for the instruction of the young. An argument is brewing right now over the proposed introduction in each state of a standardised curriculum designed by Washington.

Opponents of the reform question the measure on many fronts, but the foundation of their disquiet with the policy is the claimed opportunity for the federal government to "indoctrinate" pupils against the wishes of local communities. Parents, it is argued, have the right to decide what their children learn in school, with the tradition in the US that schools are paid for by local property taxes and controlled by locally-elected school boards. One of the Tea Party’s policies for returning America to its vision of a limited government is to eliminate the Federal Department of Education, leaving education completely in the hands of local elected officials.

The right of the State Government in deciding how the young receive their instruction underlies all debates on the issue. The recent "Textbook Wars" in Texas, where state administrators acrimoniously debated in an open forum the correct teaching material, was a bewildering spectacle for many in Europe.

In Britain, the choice of what is taught in classrooms is left to an unelected bureaucracy in the Government and, except for a few brave souls, any deviation from that assumption is regarded as heretical delusion. The State takes almost complete control of the curriculum and the standards that assess student achievement. No mainstream party, or political persuasion, opposes on principle the right of the Government to dictate how and what students are taught. This leads in Britain to incredulity that greets the news that Creationism is taught in some classes in America and included in the curriculum because parents want it there.

Last week I discovered that a judge in Virginia is allowing the state’s legal challenge to Obama’s healthcare legislation because it raises constitutional concerns about the legitimate scope of the Commerce Clause (unless you are forced to do so, never --- trust me --- try to understand the Commerce Clause). One newsletter in my in-box proclaimed Virginia as having no case, citing numerous constitutional experts; another argued that the state had an ironclad argument, quoting (you guessed it) several experts on the dreaded Commerce Clause.

I also learned that conservatives are questioning the "equal protection", under the 14th Amendment of the Constitution, of so-called "Anchor Babies". These are children who are granted citizenship in the United States because they are born here, even if the parents are illegal immigrants. Some websites agreed with the contention that not all babies born in the United States are entitled to equal protection of the laws; inevitably, some opposed this view. But both, side justified their opposing opinions with the extensive use of quotations from individuals involved in the decision to ratify the 14th Amendment in 1868.

I found out that some Tea Party organizations are calling for repeal of the 17th Amendment. This change to the Constitution (1913) allowed citizens to directly elect senators to Congress, replacing the tradition of state legislatures deciding who represented voters’ interests in the upper house in Washington. More a philosophical dispute over the power of the majority in a democracy than a strictly constitutional matter, this debate was accompanied by discussion of the intent of the authors of the Federalist Papers, written in the late 18th century, against the "progressive" impulse that led to the passing of the Amendment.

And then I was informed by Newt Gingrich, former Speaker of the House of Representatives, that my help was needed to stop Democrats from using the forthcoming session of Congress to pass controversial liberal legislation. Gingrich did not refer the reader to recent examples; instead, he directed attention to the Federalists passing the Judiciary Act in 1800 to handicap the incoming administration of Thomas Jefferson.

The United States still, and almost unconsciously, centres political debates around ideas, big Ideas about democracy that involve the "rights" of the people and the "responsibility" of the individual and that rely on explanations of the nation’s past to supply their context. I received more political discussion based on historical concerns this morning than I would get from watching the BBC for a year.

When I explain to friends in Britain that I study American history they generally reply along the lines of "Why? They don’t have any history." And when I was studying in the US, the usual response of American friends was, "Why? When you have so much more history to appreciate over there."

In Britain, history is an antiquarian pursuit that does not affect contemporary affairs. We have old buildings, a Queen, some quaint social traditions, a venerable if ineffective State religion, and more old buildings.

Last year, the Conservative member of Parliament David Davies resigned his seat in protest at the Labour Government’s encroachments on Britain’s traditional liberties, including the right of habeas corpus, the cornerstone of legal rights of British (and American) citizens. For his principled and legitimate stand, he became a laughingstock in the British media, criticised for wasting the time and money of his constituents who faced the "ordeal" of having to stage another election for the now vacant seat. (Davies stood for election again on the principles over which he resigned. He won, but with the result raising barely a murmur in news reports.)

The parlous condition of politics as a philosophy in Britain is indicated by the fact that the last two books of worth, "The Case for Conservatism" by Quentin Hogg, and George Orwell’s "1984", were published in 1947 and 1948 respectively. Ironically, 1948 also saw the publication of Richard Weaver’s "Ideas Have Consequences" in the US. It was a book that helped to introduce to intellectuals in America the importance of ideas in political change, at the same time that Britain, unknowingly, ended its proud contribution to the tradition of political theory.

In America, history and political philosophy are still a vibrant part of political discussion vital to how --- for those who are interested --- an individual chooses a position on the validity of universal healthcare, welfare, electoral reform, taxation, and all the issues that appear again and again as the subject of political contention.

Whether that is an admirable trait in America’s enduring attempt to determine how to construct a virtuous society is debatable. Race and religion, for instance, still influence American politics in ways that many find perplexing. And the role of a partisan media in provoking dissension, especially to those who see the "neutral" standards of the BBC as the correct way to present the news, also disturbs many.

But for good or ill, history, or more accurately the individual American’s conceptions of the past, determines the content of contemporary US politics in ways that other countries have discarded. As a result, that American politics possesses a depth of philosophical argument about the role of the government in our lives that Europeans, for all their dismissals of the shallowness of opinion in the US, would do well to learn from.

UPDATED Iran-US Special: The 4-Step Collapse of Obama's "Engagement" Into Confusion

UPDATE 7 August: Stephen Walt jumps in with this analysis....

Right now, Washington simply assumes that Iran won't negotiate unless it is coerced into doing so by outside pressure. At the same time, Tehran has made it clear that it wants to negotiate but refuses to do so under pressure. The predictable result is the current stalemate. You'd think the U.S. government could come up with something creative to try to overcome this impasse, instead of just hoping for a miracle.

UPDATE 0940 GMT: An interesting clue that, amidst the confusion, the discussion of US-Iran talks is very much alive. Alaeddin Boroujerdi, the head of the Iranian Parliament's National Security and Foreign Policy Commission, has said that dialogue with Washington requires the permission of the Supreme Leader.

Iran-US Special: Obama Extends His Hand “Engagement, Not Conflict”

This time yesterday I was confidently declaring that President Obama had renewed his approach for engagement with Iran. David Ignatius of The Washington Post was putting out the message, from a specially-arranged briefing of selected journalists: "President Obama put the issue of negotiating with Iran firmly back on the table Wednesday in an unusual White House session with journalists. His message was that even as U.N. sanctions squeeze Tehran, he is leaving open a 'pathway' for a peaceful settlement of the nuclear issue."

Ignatius' narrative fit a pattern which, while interrupted by the breakdown in nuclear discussions last October between Washington, Tehran, and other countries, was far from obsolete. Noting the recent US escalation in Afghanistan and Iran's role in any attempt at a resolution, I assessed, "While the nuclear issue was the first one to be addressed --- given its symbolic position, it had to be resolved before other matters could be tackled --- engagement with Tehran would also pay dividends for US policy in the Middle East, including Iraq, and Afghanistan as well as removing a troublesome issue in relations with Russia and China."

All very logical. Yet, within 24 hours, Obama's initiative has become a tangle of conflicting reports and political counter-attacks, taking us not towards engagement but towards the challenges I identified at the end of yesterday's analysis: "The conflict inside the Administration has taken its toll...The pressure from the US Congress [and opponents outside the Congress] — as well as the war chatter — will not evaporate."

Four Steps to Collapse:

1. THE CONFUSED MESSAGE

If, as Ignatius claims, the President was re-presenting the strategy of negotiating with Iran, others in the room failed to hear this. Marc Ambinder of The Atlantic opens his account: "The session, as envisioned by his aides, was designed to convince his audience that Obama's policy of engagement joined with sanctions is having the desired effect of isolating Iran from the international community even as the country's pursuit of a bomb has not abated."

So pressure, pressure, and only pressure, as Ambinder features Administration optimism that Russia is now on Washington's side. There is not a single word in his report about negotiations.

Robert Kagan recounts, "[Obama] did make clear that the door was, of course, open to the Iranians to change their minds, that sanctions did not preclude diplomacy and engagement, and that if the Iranians ever decide they wanted to 'behave responsibly' by complying with the demands of the international community, then the United States was prepared to welcome them." This, however, is only an annex to the Pressure message: "The 'news' out of this briefing was that the administration wanted everyone to know how tough it was being on Iran."

Peter David of The Economist has perhaps the fullest account of the discussion. Like Ambinder and Kagan, he notes the Administration line that sanctions are pinching Tehran. His presentation on negotiations is not that Obama advocated them but that he pointed to the possibility:

it was important to set out for the Iranians a clear set of steps that America would accept as proof that the regime was not pursuing a bomb: they needed "a pathway". With hard work, America and Iran could thaw a 30-year period of antagonism—provided Iran began to act responsibly.

Mr Obama said that the United States had received no direct contacts from Iran's President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad or its supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, though high-level officials in Iran had investigated the possibility of re-engaging with the P5-plus-one (the permanent members of
the Security Council plus Germany). America would be willing to talk bilaterally to Iran "in the context" of a P5 process that was moving forward. There should meanwhile be a "separate track" on which America could co-operate with Iran on other issues, such as Afghanistan and drugs, for example.

2. THE ANTI-ENGAGEMENT COUNTER-ATTACK

Ambinder and David have not been amongst those beating the drum for confrontation with Tehran and, while Kagan has been a staunch advocate of an aggressive US foreign policy, including the 2003 Iraq war, he has been supportive of Obama's approach on sanctions.

For another journalist at the meeting, however, the agenda was how to stoke the fire of a showdown with Iran. Jeffrey Goldberg of The Atlantic omitted any reference to negotiations, whether Obama advocated them or merely saw the possibility of discussions. Instead, he fit the confusion of journalists' accounts into this pre-determined conclusion:

I am skeptical, though, about the possibilities of a diplomatic breakthrough, for two reasons, one structural, and one related to the state of Iran's opposition: The structural reason is simple; one of the pillars of Islamic Republic theology is anti-Americanism, and it would take an ideological earthquake to upend that pillar. And then there's the problem of the Green Movement. If the Iranian opposition were vibrant and strong, the regime might have good reason to be sensitive to the economic impact of the new sanctions package. But the opposition is weak and divided. The regime has shown itself to be fully capable of suppressing dissent through terror. So I'm not sure how much pressure the regime feels to negotiate with the West.

This is more than enough ammunition for those wanting to shoot down engagement. Max Boot soon wrote for Commentary: "What’s scary is that the illusions about 'outreach' in the upper reaches of this administration have still not been dispelled, despite a year and a half of experience (to say nothing of the previous 30 years of experience), which would suggest that the mullahs aren’t misunderstood moderates who are committed to “peaceful co-existence.”

3. THE FACTIONS INSIDE THE ADMINISTRATION

So what exactly did happen in the Obama briefing to scramble his message? Different journalists, from their own positions or just human nature, will hear --- and even try to produce --- different messages. Kagan, without naming Ignatius, writes:

Some of the journalists present, upon hearing the president's last point about the door still being open to Iran, decided that he was signaling a brand-new diplomatic initiative. They started peppering Obama with questions to ferret out exactly what 'new' diplomatic actions he was talking about.

There's an even more important factor here, however, one that Kagan points to --- but does not fully appreciate, at least in his column --- in his next sentences:

After the president left, they continued probing the senior officials. This put the officials in an awkward position: They didn't want to say flat out that the administration was not pursuing a new diplomatic initiative because this might suggest that the administration was not interested in diplomacy at all. But they made perfectly clear -- in a half-dozen artful formulations -- that, no, there was no new diplomatic initiative in the offing.

As one bemused senior official later remarked to me, if the point of the briefing had been diplomacy, then the administration would have brought its top negotiators to the meeting, instead of all the people in charge of putting the squeeze on Iran.

Kagan's point is incomplete. The Obama Administration has been split, perhaps since it came into office, between a faction who want genuine discussions with Iran and one that only thinks of discussions as the set-up, once there is an Iranian "rejection", for tougher economic and diplomatic measures.

So those who are on the "positive" side for discussions give their perspective to Ignatius --- thus the important reference to the US involvement as Afghanistan (which is not any other account of Obama's remarks) as a factor, if not a necessity, for conversations with Iran --- and those on the "negative" side become the "bemused senior official" in Kagan's article.

Joe Klein of Time, who was also present, captures the confusion: "This was a pretty strange meeting. The President's comments were on the record; his team's comments were on background, meaning that the individuals speaking could only be identified as 'senior Administration officials'."

And that's not all. For the spinning of the story was also going on beyond Obama's briefing. As I noted yesterday in the anlaysis, one or more unnamed officials sought out George Jahn of the Associated Press, leaking two letters (or selected extracts from the letters) from Iran to the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency. The intent --- supported by Jahn's presentation and failure to put quotes into context, let alone present the letters --- was to rule out any possibility of productive dialogue: "Letters by Tehran’s envoys to top international officials and shared with The Associated Press suggest major progress is unlikely, with Tehran combative and unlikely to offer any concessions."

Such manoeuvres  in turn prop up critics of engagement like Ed Morrissey as they put out the gospel: "Time is running out on stopping the mullahs from their doomsday pursuit, and open hands to the regime have hardly been effective over the last several years, including the last eighteen months.  Either we need to get serious about other options or concede that we’re not serious at all."

4. CAN OBAMA RESCUE HIS ENGAGEMENT?

There's even a black-comedy irony in this story. Flynt Leverett, one of the foremost advocates of a US engagement with Iran for a "grand bargain" on bilateral and regional matters, joins others in dismissing the possibility of productive discussions, not because the Administration is too "soft" (as Goldberg and Boot argue) but because of "the Administration’s maladroit handling of its diplomatic exchanges with Tehran, poor grasp of on-the-ground realities in Iran, and mixed messaging....The President feels he must call in Western journalists to signal Tehran is a sad commentary on the Obama Administration’s failure to develop a discreet and reliable channel through which to communicate with Iranian leaders."

I suspect Leverett, because of his entrenched dislike of US foreign policy, goes a bit far with his unsupported assertion of the "failure to develop a discreet and reliable channel". I'm more than a few miles away from Washington, so I can't prove that the channel is operating, but last year's history is instructive. Between July 2009, when the Administration seized on the possibility of a deal in which Iran's uranium would be enriched in a country such as Russia, and October, a channel was established between Washington and Tehran. It was not direct but rather through third parties, including the International Atomic Energy Agency, European parties, and Turkey. And it led to face-to-face talks between US and Iranian representatives at Geneva in the autumn.

Even though that effort at an agreement ran adrift, the channels were not set aside. Ankara and the European Union have been used in recent weeks to pass Washington's thoughts to Tehran (and vice versa). Obama left more than a clue in his briefing: "High-level officials in Iran had investigated the possibility of re-engaging with the P5-plus-one [US, UK, France, Germany, Russia, and China]." Time's Klein offers further support that the process of 2009 --- contact at working levels --- is being repeated, although he fails to recognise it is two-way:

The President confirmed that "high level" Iranians have reached out to the Obama Administration over the past months, hoping to get a dialogue restarted. The President emphasized that neither the Supreme Leader nor Mahmoud Ahmadinejad have attempted to contact us, and his aides later insisted that nothing concrete was in the works.

And in Tehran, once you get past President Ahmadinejad's more outlandish postures in recent weeks, he too has been putting out references to both indirect communication with the US and to direct talks in the near-future.

The problem is not that the channel for engagement does not exist; it is the interference that distorts and even scrambles it. The President and his advisors are putting out signals , not just to Tehran but to the US Congress, to their anti-engagement critics, to Israel, and to other countries. No surprise that those signals often clash, especially when the Obama Administration has the faction within that does not even believe in engagement.

Last November, I fretted, "The US President [may] be back in the cul-de-sac: pressed by some advisors and a lot of Congressmen to pursue sanctions which offer no remedy for — and no exit from — the political dilemma of his failed engagement."

This week, with those sanctions now reality, Obama tried to get out of the cul-de-sac with his high-profile briefing. Initially I thought he had a chance; 24 hours later, I am thinking that his effort --- at least in the context of domestic politics --- never made it around the corner.

Iraq: Obama's Secret Letter to Ayatollah Sistani (Slavin)

Barbara Slavin, writing in Foreign Policy, writes of a US effort to break the political stalemate in Baghdad:

President Obama has sent a letter to Iraq's top Shiite Muslim cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, urging him to prevail upon Iraq's squabbling politicians to finally form a new government, an individual briefed by relatives of the reclusive religious leader said Thursday.

The individual, who asked not to be named because of the sensitivity of the topic, said the information came from members of Sistani's family in the Iranian holy city of Qom, where Sistani maintains a large complex of seminaries, libraries, clinics, and other humanitarian organizations.

Iraq and Iran: Has Ayatollah Sistani Challenged the Supreme Leader’s Authority? (Nafisi)

Iraqi factions have sought in vain since the March 7 parliamentary elections to agree on a government to replace that of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. The impasse is of increasing concern to the United States as it draws down its forces to 50,000 and relinquishes a combat role at the end of this month. There have been a number of violent incidents in Iraq in recent weeks including bombings and shootings that have raised questions about the country's future stability. (Fifteen Iraqis died Thursday; 53 were killed on Wednesday, according to media reports.)

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