Iran Analysis: How Turkey Can Break the Nuclear Stalemate

Colette Mazzucelli and Sebnem Udum write for Politics3.com:

The proliferation of nuclear weapons among failing states and fundamentalist non-state actors is the immediate challenge of the decade in national and international security. In Iran, however, the elections of June 12, 2009 illustrate to the world the increasing futility of a narrow focus on proliferation at the expense of the larger picture—the evolution of what Ali Ansari identifies as “a particular idea of power” in the regime.

The threats to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) are much broader than Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Those who argue that Iranian goals are limited to a civilian nuclear program designed to address urgent domestic needs must increasingly confront Iran’s complicated internal power struggle, which is more fragmented each day. Indeed, domestic cleavages and elite factionalization have characterized Iranian politics since the 1979 Revolution. What has emerged more recently, however, as the contestation since the summer makes clearer, is that divisions within the Revolutionary Guards—the element of Iran’s military established after the Revolution of 1979—complicate internal policy making.

This development is particularly dangerous on the nuclear issue and further delimits the ability of other states, even those with strong regional and Muslim ties like Turkey, to mediate on a range of policies. And mediation is essential if Iran is to play a constructive role commensurate with its growing influence in the Middle East.


Domestic Cleavages and a Fragmental Elite

Ansari explains how the changes internal to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps made their co-optation by conservative elements within the Iranian government possible given the rise of the second generation Right in the 1990s. Over time, these changes strengthened the hand of a conservative leadership threatened by the reformers led by Khatami, who was elected president in 1997. Both the Revolutionary Guard and the Basij, a volunteer militia founded by the order of the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979, gradually became, in [Ali] Ansari’s words, “guardians, not so much of the revolution, but of a particularly hard-line interpretation of that revolution personified by the supreme leader.”

Of significance for those who must deal with elite leadership in Iran is the way in which the Guards were increasingly dominated by men loyal, above all, to the doctrine of velayat-e faqih. In the Shia Muslim religion Iranians practice, this doctrine asserts the population’s submission in all matters to the authority of one man, the Supreme Jurist, Ayatollah Khamenei. Velayat-e faqih, or the guardianship of the jurist, is the legal foundation of the Constitution of 1979, and the source of the supreme leader’s authority. İt is this foundation that places the current supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, in a relatively strong institutional position, despite his open, and contested, support of Ahmadinejad as president.

Iran’s domestic crisis is so intricate as to defy scholars’ ability to explain recent events. We may well ask if this is a crisis of an elite increasingly fractured, as Ansari explains, by its blatant pursuit of materialism. The tipping point is that the wealth acquired by the few can only be gained at the expense of the many, who suffer daily the loss of security, the loss of ideals for which the 1979 Revolution was fought and the loss of a future for the country’s youth. Machiavelli’s realism, which the scholar Michael Doyle explains as integral to fundamentalism, is only a starting point for interpreting the complex nature of individual and fragmented elite leadership within the Guards, its pervasive ambitions within the structure of government and society, and the many ways its influence is felt in an oppressive and dangerous regime decades after a revolution that, in Ansari’s reading, is open to “mercantilization".

Ahmadinejad’s election victory in 2005 may be situated in the context of various segments of the Iranian society, particularly among those Hamid Dabashi identifies in his volume, Iran A People Interrupted, as “the most disappointed, the most disenfranchised and the most impoverished” whose hopes were invested in the Revolution of 1979. His opponent, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, was one of the founders of the Islamic Republican Party, which was established to advocate an unrestricted theocracy. Rafsanjani, like numerous contemporary leaders within the protest movement, supports the regime created by the Revolution, starting with the doctrine of velayat-e faqih.

Further, the protest movement continues to illustrate Iran’s evolving demographics in which those under thirty years of age constitute almost 70 percent of the population. It is from that segment of educated and technologically savvy youth, and the experiences of the current protests, that new leadership is likely to emerge. Indeed, leaders are made from the crises of their time. And while the brutality of a narrow elite may succeed in suppressing most of the leadership that could emerge in the present context, it will not stop generational change, which includes the most disenfranchised in the Iranian society. This generation has the authority, borne of its own disillusionment with the failed promises of revolution, to create an obstacle from within, thereby countering the popular dictatorship, which President Ahmadinejad and the genuine power behind his incumbent position—the Ayatollah—increasingly embody for a growing number of protesters.

Nevertheless, attempts from outside Iran to alter the pace or course of change are likely to fail, given the dated narratives that have already created too much history, particularly between Iran and the United States—more specifically during the overthrow of Mossadeq in 1953 and the taking of hostages at the American Embassy in Iran during the 1979 Revolution. Along those lines, Ansari reveals that the Guards are “empowered by a war mythology, reinforced by a largely constructed fear of foreign subversion and given free reign by the Ahmadinejad administration” to indulge in an “extensive extortion racket,” which he defines as one of the realities of the “mafia state” Iran has become.

So what do these developments portend for a people who must develop in their own time and space within an increasingly complex regional and global environment? For now, only time will tell whether a national collective will remains united behind Ahmadinejad’s nuclear rhetoric and more specifically, a regime that persists in shifting the blame for economic stagnation and human rights abuses to those who foment a “velvet revolution” from beyond its borders.

In this context, direct engagement by the United States, Turkey or the P5 + 1 is difficult at best. If the deepening crisis of the regime perpetuates elite paranoia as economic stagnation worsens, the government’s traditional recourse to foreign policy and a nationalist rallying point, such as a nuclear crisis, is destined to confront an Iranian society less inclined to listen to the elite message. It is the timing of engagement by the Obama administration that is critical. Even though the road to sanctions complicates the broader U.S.-Iran relationship, we must consider the current government’s ability and inclination to deliver credibly on an international nuclear agreement. The brutality of the regime against its own, and the uncertainty about Iran’s capacity at present to negotiate in good faith, suggests a waiting game. So while the Obama administration has shown its willingness to engage, the ball is in Iran’s court.

Moreover, to be successful, sanctions must directly target the vast financial assets of the Revolutionary Guards and require the continual assent of China and Russia. Sanctions must also be perceived by the Iranian protesters as denying the Guards the resources to stifle all opposition to the regime in education and media, as well as politics.

Admittedly, however, it is unclear if sanctions that persistently target the Revolutionary Guards’ material wealth may buy time, as the nuclear clock keeps ticking, given the Guards’ dominance in nuclear thinking, the more blatant factional struggles on questions of nuclear policy and the problems Iranians are encountering to accomplish a “covert breakout” option. On the other hand, military strikes are less credible, particularly for Israel, given Iran’s vast network of tunnels which hide the various uranium enrichment facilities around the country.

What is emerging as a more plausible scenario is that Ahmadinejad will not be able consistently to play a card on the international stage, which he can no longer sell to a domestic audience. Popular contestation is a response in part to the leadership divisions within the Guards, whose older generation does not sanction force against the people.¹⁴ This divisiveness has led to a broadening of those segments in Iranian society, which focus more since June 12 on abuses of state and society in their struggle for voice.

Turkey’s Unique Role

Given the growing complexity of Iran’s nuclear ambitions, American engagement in the P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States), as well as the active involvement of Turkey, is the option more likely over the long term to counter proliferation from the inside out. The more immediate action, sanctions against the vested interests of the Guards, would also hurt the Iranian people although this is increasingly a matter of degree. The internal repression of the Guards is worse than the hardship of international sanctions.

Richard Haass argues in Newsweek that working-level negotiations on the nuclear question should continue. In this context, Turkey has genuine interests to play a mediatory role even in the face of resistance from the Republican Guards, as evidenced in the intervention to derail the construction of an international airport in Tehran. Ansari highlights that the airport project, which was being constructed with the involvement of Turkish partners, initially excluded the Guards who promptly acted out of material (not national security) interests and delayed its opening to travellers for months.

In addition, Turkey has other unique characteristics which may provide a lucrative starting point in furthering nuclear negotiations with Iran. First, Turkey pursued a policy of indifference towards the Middle East during the Cold War, and enjoyed stability in its Iranian border since the seventeenth century. Additionally, the rough military and strategic balance between Turkey and Iran has successfully prevented a hot war between the two countries.

Since 2002, when the concerns increased about Iran’s nuclear program and various options were put on the table to deal with it, Turkey has walked a tightrope. Its strategic relations with the United States and the course they went through in the pre-Iraq War period taught Ankara that it would not be alone in responding to security issues in its region. And while Turkey is concerned about the possibility of a nuclear Iran, it also wants to avoid being the target of retaliation should it cooperate with the United States, particularly for military measures against Iran.

In this context, Ankara favors diplomacy over other options. Indeed, Turkey’s geographical and political position between the East and the West is promising for a facilitating role in the negotiation process with Iran. That said, Ankara could play a meaningful role in breaking off the negative perceptions that hinder progress, and in building new ones that would make maintaining the non-nuclear-weapon status the “rational choice.”

Turkey views nuclear proliferation as a consequence rather than a cause of insecurity. It acknowledges the threats and risks of further proliferation in its region and beyond, and has been a committed member of international regimes on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.¹⁷ Ankara has plans to harness nuclear technology for electricity generation, and would be adversely affected by proliferation trends in the region. Additionally, its ties with the Middle East (historical and cultural) and the West, particularly its strategic relations with the United States and the accession process to the European Union, grant Turkey with the ability to “speak both languages.” More importantly, it is one of the countries that would incur the negative impact should negotiations with Iran fail and proliferation trends rise in the region. In sum, Turkey is fit to play an active role in negotiations and it is willing to do so.

The Trust Issue

While there have been several proposals to keep Tehran’s capabilities under control, the main issue that prevents effective cooperation is the lack of trust between the international community and Iran, a reality that reveals itself in the demands for more transparency¹⁸ and “equality” respectively. The international community, most notably the United States, is concerned about the possibility of a nuclear Iran, and believes that unless its nuclear program is completely transparent, (i.e. when Tehran ratifies the Additional Protocol) Iran could divert its enrichment capability to produce a sufficient amount of highly enriched uranium (HEU), which could be used to manufacture an atomic bomb. Tehran’s advances in ballistic missile capability only increase these concerns.

Hence, ratification of the Additional Protocol also has a symbolic meaning that denotes commitment to non-proliferation norms, and Iran’s reluctance to do so emboldens mistrust regarding its nuclear program. More importantly, the possibility of a nuclear Iran could stimulate proliferation in the region, hence instability. Such a trend would challenge the nuclear non-proliferation regime as other non-nuclear-weapon states would start questioning the effectiveness of the regime and the meaning of their status as a security asset.

Finally, as discussed, Iran does not trust extra-regional powers, particularly the United States. The experiences of 1953 and 1979 taught Iran that sovereignty is non-negotiable, and self-sufficiency is the primary asset for security. Therefore, it argues that it cannot be denied its “indisputable and legitimate right” to have and operate complete nuclear fuel-cycle, and believes that doing so would diminish its power both materially and ideationally.

In this context, mutual understanding of key concepts is integral throughout the negotiation process, because they have the power to mitigate the inherent lack of trust from all sides. Some of these concepts are cooperation, transparency, sovereignty and non-proliferation. Along those lines, Iran perceives that if it allows enhanced verification inspections of the IAEA, and halts its uranium enrichment program, it would mean unequal treatment and loss of power because this would compromise self-sufficiency and sovereignty. Iran also argues that the lack of focus on other nuclear states in the region is a double-standard if the real goal is non-proliferation.

The international community, on the other hand, interprets Iran’s reluctance to take steps as a tactic to buy time, and the more they diverge from cooperation, the more Iran becomes a threat to international security. To alleviate these discrepancies, a viable channel must be designed to communicate all of these concepts to both sides, and to overcome the cultural bulwarks that have been underestimated in the negotiation process. Ankara has the potential for such communication, particularly with its new foreign policy perspective that is based on cooperative security.

The Latest from Iran (2 February): A Quiet Start to An Unquiet Day

2150 GMT: A Final Note. We'll know more tomorrow, after Iranian state media kicks into high gear, but the Ahmadinejad statement on the nuclear talks --- which had effectively gone into the freezer --- could be big. All of a sudden, the move of Iran's uranium stock outside the country is A-OK: "If we allow them to take it, there is no problem. We sign a contract to give 3.5 percent enriched uranium and receive 20 percent enriched one after four or five months."

But --- and watch this, because it will probably be missed by Western media more concerned with the West-Iran dynamic --- Ahmadinejad may have re-opened a fight with Iran's "conservatives" over his nuclear strategy. As the Associated Press notes, "He dismissed concerns by what he called 'colleagues' that the West would not return the uranium."

More tomorrow.....

NEW Iran Document: The Rallying Call of Mousavi’s 14 Points (2 February)
NEW Iran Letter: Journalist Emadeddin Baghi in Prison
NEW Iran Document: Khatami Statement on Rights and Protests (1 February)
Latest Iran Video: Sunday Boxing – French Police v. Iranian Ambassador (31 January)
Iran Football Special: Green Movement Shoots! It Scores!
NEW Latest Iran Video: Foreign Minister Mottaki on Elections & Protests (31 January)
The Latest from Iran (1 February): The Anniversary Begins

2135 GMT: Hamlet and 22 Bahman. Let's close tonight on a high literary note.

Rah-e-Sabz, unsurprisingly, is jabbing away at the Government. For example, it is claiming that the Revolutionary Court has stepped back in its latest bulletin by not connecting the two executions last week to the post-election demonstrations. However, its cheekiest story is a summary of Seyed Hassan Khomeini's supposed comments as he cold-shouldered President Ahmadinejad yesterday: "To be or not to be a protester, that is the question."

2130 GMT: Another release. Journalist Mostafa Izadi, arrested on Ashura, has been freed after 34 days in solitary confinement.

2105 GMT: Missing the Point. Almost all Western media have picked up on one of today's big events, the statement of Mir Hossein Mousavi. Unfortunately, not all have realised the significance of Mousavi's resolute call to arms against the Government of "dictatorship and tyranny" for the rallies on 22 Bahman. The Associated Press mis-reads, and The Washington Post prints the mis-reading without question:

Iran's opposition leader appealed to his supporters and other anti-government activists Tuesday not to overstep the law in pressing for political and social changes....His comments also expose the range of separate and sometimes conflicting aims within the opposition camp.

2100 GMT: Protests and Releases. For the fourth night in a row, hundreds have gathered in front of Evin Prison, and for the fourth night, detainees have been freed. About 20 joined the crowd this evening.

2050 GMT: Correction. Big Correction. That's not just an Ahmadinejad posture (2020 GMT) over the nuclear talks. It appears to be a concession: according to Reuters, the President said, "We have no problem sending our enriched uranium abroad."

2040 GMT: More Invites to the Rally. The reformist Association of Combatant Clergy, calling for an acceptance of people's rule, has asked Iranians to take to the streets on 22 Bahman.

2020 GMT: Where's Mahmoud? Well, it appears that, while Iran heats up, President Ahmadinejad is still playing the international field. First, he used a meeting with the Qatari Crown Prince to strike a pose, “The Westerners cannot bear the thought of security and solidarity among regional countries. They have survived largely by sowing discord and inciting instability in the region.”

Then, perhaps more significantly, Ahmadinejad used an interview on national television tonight to keep open the prospect of a deal on Iran's nuclear programme, offering assurances that a "swap" of 20% uranium for Iran's 3.5% stock inside the country "would be properly and fully implemented".

Ahmadinejad also said that there were discussions for a swap of jailed Iranians for three US citizens detained in August after crossing into Iran from northern Iraq.

2010 GMT: Clerical Challenge. Grand Ayatollah Bayat-Zanjani, meeting members of the Islamic Association of Students at Tehran University, has criticised those who “introduce their false interpretation as the religion while seeking a specific political goal”, pointedly turning the regime's charges of "mohareb" against it: “The enemy of God (mohareb) is the one who kills and butchers people, not the protester with empty hands.”

Bayat Zanjani continued, “In the Islamic Republic we say one with a question is free to ask his/her question, he/she should not be called an Enemy of God over a question, criticism, or even protest.” However, “those who use the public podiums for terrorising, threatening, and unfortunately a platform for giving untrue and self-established definitions of the Shia’s teachings, are far from the religion of Mohammad (the Prophet) and Ali (the first Imam of Shi'a) and all they do is to feed their false interpretations to the public.”

1830 GMT: Arrests (cont.). It is reported that Ali Mohammad Eslampour, journalist and chief editor of Navay-e Vaght in Kermanshah, has been arrested.

1720 GMT: Arrests. Rah-e-Sabz reports that four members of Tehran University's Islamic Students Association have been arrested. We published three of the names earlier today (1320 GMT).

1715 GMT: Thanks to an EA correspondent, we're posting the 14 headline points of today's statement by Mir Hossein Mousavi.

1645 GMT: As an EA reader has noted in comments, the website Radio Zameneh is back on-line after a recent cyber-attack.

1637 GMT: You Know the EA All Is Well Trophy Video, Right? Well, today's winner is the Supreme Leader, who tells a group of Tehran University professors: "I'm optimistic. Recent bitter events were the result of ignorance."

1633 GMT: On the Plus Side. We're still waiting for the English translation of the Mousavi statement, but it is now getting attention in newspapers such as The Wall Street Journal and the BBC.

1630 GMT: Journalistic Idiocy Awards (US Section). It is one of the wonders of American political culture that anyone gives a moment of attention to Daniel Pipes. (I could explain why, but this would take me beyond professional decency.)

So here's a moment of attention to Pipes' latest wisdom before running away: "How to Save the Obama Presidency: Bomb Iran".

1620 GMT: Journalistic Idiocy Awards (Iran Section). Javan, the newspaper linked to the Revolutionary Guard, claims that the opposition is paying $100 to people to protest on 11 February.

1340 GMT: Worst Prediction for 22 Bahman. Retired US Navy Captain and "Fox News military analyst" Chuck Nash says, with a straight face, that President Ahmadinejad may test a nuclear device on 11 February.

1335 GMT: Interesting Clues in the "West". Lindsay Hilsum, of Britain's Channel 4, offers some interesting teasers on US and European policy from a gathering at Chatham House in London:

Last night, I went to a discussion on Iran. “Chatham House rules” mean I can’t quote anyone who was there, but the highlights are worth noting.

Someone who is well in with the Obama administration told us that when the president started his “hand outstretched” policy towards Iran it was “100 per cent about the nuclear and external policy and zero per cent about Iran’s internal issues.”

After 12 June, and the turbulent post-election crisis, there’s been some recalibration – he’d now put it at 70/30....

Another [source] (close to a European government) said: “We must ensure we do no harm. This is not our moment, and not our movement. But we must ensure the opposition is not subjugated to the nuclear issue or business interests.”

1330 GMT: Slowing Down the Net. I'll leave others to speculate on significance of this report: Internet traffic for some servers in Iran has ceased; for others it is reduced.

1320 GMT: Arrests and Sentences. Reports --- student activists Vahid Abedini, Navid Abedini, and Esmail Izadi have been detained after their houses were raided. Journalist Niloofar Laripour has been arrested after being summoned to the Ministry of Intelligence.

Journalist Keyvan Samimi has been sentenced to six years in prison, with a lifetime ban on political activity.

1315 GMT: We're Going to Get You, Hashemi. That threat against Hashemi Rafsanjani, sending the files of his children to court (see 0945 GMT)? It came from the same man who declared today We Will Kill the Detainees (1025 GMT), deputy head of Iran's judiciary, Ebrahim Raeesi.

1310 GMT: It is reported that the second court session for the 16 Ashura protesters, whose trial began on Saturday, will be held Wednesday. Five of the defendants, including two women, are charged with "mohareb" (war against God).

1025 GMT: Battling over Executions. Hours after the head of Iran's judiciary, Sadegh Larijani, said he would not be pushed by "hard-liners" into quicker executions and would follow the legal process, his deputy has reportedly assured, We're Going to Kill Them.

Fars quotes Ebrahim Raeesi in a meeting in Qom, "The two people executed (Mohammad Reza Ali Zamani and Arash Rahmanipour) and another nine who will soon be executed were definitely arrested in recent riots and each was linked with counter-revolutionary movements. They had participated in riots with the aim of creating disunity and toppling the system."

1020 GMT: Mohammad Ali Rafi'i, a member of political department of the Islamic Students Organization, has reportedly been abducted when leaving Tehran University. Peyke Iran also claims pressure on detained students to confess on television.

0945 GMT: Pressuring Rafsanjani. It appears the regime just does not trust Hashemi Rafsanjani enough to let him be: files on the investigation of his children, including Mehdi Hashemi, have been presented to a Tehran court.

(There is a hot Internet rumour that at least one of Rafsanjani's children will be marching on 22 Bahman. Rafsanjani's daughter, Faezeh Hashemi, has been involved in demonstrations since June.)

0940 GMT: Kayhan London (not to be confused with the "hard-line" Kayhan in Tehran) has now come out behind the leadership of the Green movement, while stressing it contains other political currents, and defended Mir Hossein Moussavi and Mehdi Karroubi against the attacks of those who condemn them of loyalty to the Islamic Republic.

0935 GMT: Ruining the Revolution. Agence France Presse and Reuters have both picked up on Mir Hossein Mousavi's declaration (see 0710 GMT), and it loses none of its force in translation. Mousavi claims the goals of the 1979 Revolution have not been fulfilled because the "roots of tyranny and dictatorship" still exist; Mousavi no longer believes "that the revolution had removed all those structures which could lead to totalitarianism and dictatorship":

Today, one can identify both elements and foundations which produce dictatorship as well as resistance against returning to this dictatorship Stifling the media, filling the prisons and brutally killing people who peacefully demand their rights in the streets indicate the roots of tyranny and dictatorship remain from the monarchist era... I don't believe that the revolution achieved its goals.

0825 GMT: Yahoo Keeps Mowj-e-Sabz Off-Line? In December, Mowj-e-Sabz, the key Green movement website, was knocked off-line by a cyber-attack. Those behind the site said at the time that they were suspending operations but intended to resume their journalism.

This now in from blogger Ethan Zuckerman:

I’ve been in regular contact with the administrators of Mowjcamp as they’ve tried to regain control of their site. For six weeks, they’ve been getting the runaround from Yahoo! (where they’d originally registered the domain names) and Moniker (where the hackers moved control of the domain name). Yahoo has been informed that the site was illegally moved by hackers who managed to access a Yahoo Mail account and authorize a transfer to Moniker – they’ve told the site administrators that there’s nothing they can do, and the problem’s in Moniker’s hands. Moniker, in turn, tells the administrators that they’ve responded to Yahoo, which will resolve their problem. In the meantime, the site continues to be inaccessible from the URLs by which it is most widely known.

0805 GMT: With the help of EA readers, we have posted an English translation of a letter we have received from Tehran, "Journalist Emadeddin Baghi in Prison".

0745 GMT: "A New Kind of Revolution". Setareh Sabety in Iranian.com:

[This] is the first revolution that does not need leadership nor ideology because it is fueled by a basic, unrelenting need for freedom and justice that is so strong it is self-correcting and self-propelling! This is not just a civil rights movement; this is not merely a reform movement. This is a new kind of Revolution.

0710 GMT: Quiet No Longer. Today's first big move has come from Mir Hossein Mousavi, answering 10 questions on his website Kalemeh. Among his forthright declarations: "We have lost complete hope in the judiciary system"; "Resistance to dictatorship is the precious heritage of the Islamic Revolution"; "People have always wanted justice; the demand for freedom is born of human thought".

0705 GMT: On the Economic Front. Iran's oil and gas revenue fell more than 45 percent in the first half of the current Iranian year (March-September 2009) compared to the same period in 2008.

0700 GMT: Looking for the Positive. About 1000 family members of detainees and supporters gathered again in front of Evin Prison last night. Almost 30 prisoners were reportedly released.

Amongst those freed was Ayatollah Mohammad Taghi Khalaji, released on bail after his detention last month.

0650 GMT: And Those Who Have Been "Disappeared". Photographer Mehraneh Atashi and her husband Madjid Ghaffari were arrested on 12 January and detained, apparently in solitary confinement in ward 209 of Evin Prison. Authorities have released no information about charges against them. They have had no access to a lawyer, no visits from their family, and no contact apart from a brief telephone call to say they had been arrested.

The International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran has raised the situation of Atashi and Ghaffari as a case typical of "hundreds" of Iranians in the post-election conflict.

0640 GMT: The Detentions. Fereshteh Ghazi complements our morning analysis of "threats and arrests" with a summary of the current situation of political prisoners, focusing on the attempt to break advisors to Mir Hossein Mousavi.

0630 GMT: Three prominent Iranian authors have been arrested: Reza Khandan, Omid Montazeri, and Alireza Saqafi.

0620 GMT: So the big news from the 1st day of the commemorations of the 1979 Islamic Revolution? There was no big news.

Perhaps the most notable development was former President Mohammad Khatami joining the calls, albeit implicitly, for people to rally on 22 Bahman on 11 February (see separate entry). On the regime side, however, there were no big declarations, no mass gatherings, merely a rather muted ceremony at Behesht-e-Zahra cemetery and President Ahmadinejad's strained appearance at the Khomeini memorial.

Government actions were more of the "negative" kind, with scattered threats and arrests. The strategy of trying to wipe out public protests continues, but even that appears to be filled with tension as the big day approaches.

22 Bahman is a week on Thursday.