Iran Analysis: The Regime's Pyrrhic Victory

Pyrrhic Victory (noun): A victory won at too great a cost (after Pyrrhus, king of Epirus, who suffered staggering losses in defeating the Romans)



Mr Verde writes a guest analysis for EA:

This year’s 22 Bahman anniversary must have been the most widely discussed since the 1979 Revolution, but with disruption of communications in Iran, the flow of information about the events was always going to be slow. So, reserving comment about the actual events for a later date when more information is available, here's a look at the “big picture” for the Islamic Republic.

The regime has demonstrated that, as with other occasions, it can bus in people, or entice them with free food or fear of their government jobs, for the setpiece event. It has also demonstrated that, again as with previous occasions, its security forces are very capable of beating peaceful protestors and dispersing them.

And here comes the problem: this year’s events were less like celebrating a Revolution that freed the country from tyranny and dictatorship and more like a tyrannical dictatorship celebrating its continued survival.



The more one pays attention to the words and actions of the officials of the Islamic Republic, the more it becomes apparent that there is something wrong. From the start of the post-election protests, the regime has been adamant that the protestors are few in number and do not have a real agenda except causing chaos and mayhem. (There were exception when officials, desperate to explain specific situations, talked about millions being on the streets in June, but these were single officials trying to explain away a difficult fact.) If the protestors are so few in number and so insignificant, there is no reason for such heavy security presence. How to resolve this contradiction? Either the regime knows that opposition is widespread or we are witnessing a totalitarian regime in action.

The protests have been ongoing for eight months. This period from June to February has covered almost all of the Islamic Republic’s official occasions where it has traditionally encouraged the population to take part in public events and used them as proof of its popularity and stability. But since 12 June, during each one of these events the regime has had to resort to naked violence to keep people off the streets. There are only two such days left in this year's Islamic Republic calendar that have not been tarnished yet by clashes on the streets: the anniversaries of Khomeini’s death (4 June) and the 15 Khordaad uprising (5 June).

The Islamic Republic is a regime that is built upon ideological symbols and heavily depends on them. Friday prayers are supposed to be weekly affirmation of the public’s support for the regime (both in a religious and a political context). Qods Day in September is to celebrate Islamic Republic’s support for oppressed Palestinians. 13 Aban (4 November this year) was meant to commemorate the killing of schoolchildren by the Shah’s security forces and, perhaps more importantly, the start of the US Embassy hostage crisis (referred to by Khomeini as the second revolution and the Islamic Republic’s proof that it stood up to superpowers). 16 Azar (7 December) is supposed to be the commemoration of student movements that stood up to the Shah’s regime. Ashura (27 December) is to commemorate the uprising by Imam Hossein (the third Shi'a Imam) against tyranny and his martyrdom. 22 Bahman is to mark the victory of the Revolution that brought about the Islamic Republic.

All of these events are now remembered not for their original symbolic importance, but for the fact that the security forces of the Islamic Republic have on every occasion beaten and at times killed peaceful Iranian demonstrators.

Beyond this public demonstration, the regime has managed to discredit many of its notable officials and personalities. Many of the Islamic Republic’s former leading figures are in prison on charges of sedition or acting against national security. Some very senior politicians and activists are treated as the enemy these days. On the eve of Ashura, government thugs disrupted a speech by former President Mohammad Khatami, in in no less a place than the home of the Islamic Republic’s founder, Ayatollah Khomeini. Mir Hossein Mousavi, Prime Minister during most of the eight-year war with Iraq, and Mehdi Karoubi --- revolutionary cleric during the Shah’s regime, former head of the Martyrs’ Foundation, former Speaker of Parliament --- are insulted by regime officials on a daily basis, prevented from taking part in official commemorations and at times shot at with tear gas and beaten.

The problem is not just that the current leadership of Islamic Republic owes all it has to such people. The real problem is that, only eight months ago, two of them (Mousavi and Karoubi) were both passed through the formidable filter of the Council of Guardians as Presidential candidates. The regime is now calling them leaders of sedition.

The question for the regime is: have these people, who have impeccable revolutionary credentials, always been leading an insurrection? If so, how is it that for 30 years the Islamic Republic’s many intelligence organizations and intelligence officials missed this? Or could it be that the state of affairs of the Islamic Republic is such that even loyal servants are forced to protest? No enemy would have been able to undermine the ideological symbols and tarnish the reputation of the Islamic Republic with such efficiency.

The regime is fast losing any claim of being Islamic, popular, just, or merciful. And its showpiece events have become occasions on which its forces are mobilized to attack its own citizens, even as it pours resources into a show for TV cameras so that it --- and some foreign media with superficial view of the events --- can call it a “victory”.

So a Pyrrhic hypothesis: For any regime, especially one that claims to be a popular republic based on Islam, pointing TV cameras at the right-looking crowd while beating the “wrong crowd” with all its might, especially on the anniversary of its formation, is not a victory.

Iran: The Events of 22 Bahman, Seen from Inside Tehran

EA correspondent Mr Azadi, who was in close contact with sources in Tehran throughout Thursday, writes this summary:

At 10 p.m., Iranian television began its news with part of the Supreme Leader's declaration, "Iran will be safe to the day that we follow Velayat-e-Faqih (ultimate clerical authority)."

This was followed by the images from the Azadi Square rally, as the narrator said that the day was mainly to show "our" support for the Supreme Leader and the defeat of foreign enemies and those who would deceive "us".

It was a symbolic end to 22 Bahman, with all the noise coming from the regime: many Green Movement supporters believed that, even though they were "countless", they still were not able to show their presence.

What Happened:



From the early hours, plainclothes security forces and the Basij militia were stationed around various streets, putting them . under the control and surveillance of undercover and uniformed security forces. All entry and exit routes around Tehran, as well as bus terminals, were controlled as well. Government buses had transferred Basij forces and plainclothes officers from different parts of town to the demonstration routes.

From Imam Hussain Square to Ferdowsi Square, there were fewer forces. But from Ferdowsi Square onwards, anti-riot force bikes and trucks loaded with batons and tear gas were on standby: on Keshavarz Blvd, from Aria Hospital to Palestine Avenue, and especially around Tehran University.

The security forces were preventing the people from reaching Enghelab and 7 Tir Squares, as a large group moved along the streets leading to Enghelab Square. From Enghelab to Azadi Square the number of anti-riot police forces was low; instead, there was an increase in the plainclothes forces, who could be identified easily from their walky-talkies.

As there was high probability for students protesting at (state broadcasting) IRIB, a large number of military and Basij surrounded the broadcasting complex, on Jam-e-Jam Street, around Karegar and North Amirabad streets.

Tehran’s Sadeghieh Square was one of the focal points of protesters. Mehdi Karoubi had announced the place as the starting point of the demonstration, and  thousands of supporters of green movement had gathered here. Large crowds of green-clad protesters moved from Apadana, the home of Sohrab Arabi (a martyred protester) towards Azadi sq. and Mohammad Ali Jenah Street. A large crowd of people were moving from Sadeghieh Sq. towards Azadi Square; even under tight security in the area, the slogans of “Down with the Dictator" could be heard.

In Asharafi Esfehani Street, people were shouting slogans such as "Death to Dictator and were tearing photographs of Khameini. The sound of car could be heard, which led to severe clashes between people and government forces. Tear gas was thrown and gunshots were heard. The first cases of arrest were reported from Azadi and Sadeghieh Squares.

Around 10:30 a.m. Mehdi Karroubi was attacked in Asharafi Esfehani Stree by plain-clothes officers. His bodyguards and others around him were beaten by batons and hit by "paint" bullets, while his car windows were broken. Karroubi left in another person’s car but the windows of this car were shattered as well. Two of Karroubi’s close friends, who also act as his bodyguards, were arrested by intelligence services and were sent to Evin Prison. (The two, Askarian and Anbar Nejad, each lost a limb defending their country during the Iran-Iraq War.)

Around 11 a.m. Mohammad Khatami joined the protesting crowds at the intersection of Zanjan St. and Azadi St., but was immediately forced to leave as a result of an attack on his car by plain-clothes officers. About 12 o’clock Mir Hossein Mousavi and Zahra Rahnavard joined the rally but again they were harshly attacked by plainclothes forces, and they were forced to leave the rally immediately.


In Azadi Square, the people on the East side were shouting “Death to Dictator!” and chanting: “Courageous Iranians: Support! Support!”; however, loudspeakers in the area were extremely loud and appear to have been arranged to overpower anti-government slogans. Government helicopters were spotted in the sky, flying just above the crowd of people. Rumours went around that the helicopters were taking videos of the crowd.

During Ahmadinejad’s speech, at some points, people could be heard shouting, "Liar, liar’, possibly causing him to lose his concentration on a couple of occasions. After the speech, because of security concerns, he left by helicopter.

The official pro-government march of 22 Bahman was finished, yet sporadic clashes continued in different areas of the city. More anti-riot police forces were called in to suppress the protesters, and eyewitnesses reported armed anti-riot police on motorcycles heading toward central Tehran. A large number of military forces were reported to be stationed around the Supreme Leader’s residence, the IRIB building, and North Amirabad Street. Until 11:30 p.m. local time, the sounds of siren and slogans could be heard in Shahrak Gharb and Vanak Square near Tehran University.

Those involved in the day assess that Green Movement was not able to show itself as well as it wished, even though there were many people on the streets:

1. The city was like a military base, and the control of the police was extensive.

2. Opposition leaders were stopped m participating in the rally, to prevent the formation of a Green Wave

3. People carrying Green symbols were arrested quickly.

4. The Green Movement made a mistake with the instruction to hide Green symbols until Azadi Square. This caused confusion amongst Green protesters, as it was hard to identify who was with and against them.

5. It seemed that people were waiting for others to make the first move and then follow them.

In conclusion, all involved declared that, while the Government used the day for their propaganda, 22 Bahman was still an important experience for the Green Movement to continue on its path.

Iran on 22 Bahman: Ahmadinejad "Wins Ugly" (This Time)

I guess it was inevitable that --- to post a dramatic headline or to make artificial sense out of the complex and messy politics of events --- the open-and-shut, Victory-or-Defeat results would already be declared. Britain's Sky TV, known best for its across-the-wall sports coverage, puts the onus of loser on the opposition: "The danger for Iran's anti-Government Green movement is that after yet again failing to mobilise huge numbers on a key day, it will lose momentum....The Government looks to have maintained its firm grip on the country." The Times of London pronounces, "Iran crushes opposition protests with violence". Others leer --- The Herald Sun in Australia, "Iran regime strangles Green Movement on the streets" --- while some don't even see a contest (Time: "Where Was the Opposition?")

The Tehran Bureau ran up the white flag, "A big anticlimax," "defeat," "An overwhelming presence from the other side. People were terrified." Even Juan Cole, normally an expert offering nuanced, in-depth analysis, leaps to "Regime Victory on Revolution Anniversary; Opposition Fails to Mobilize".

OK, if we have to resort to a sporting metaphor to summarise the twists and turns of 22 Bahman, let's use one that offers some insight into what is to come as well as what has happened.

The Regime Won Ugly. And that's not the same as winning.

The Latest from Iran (11 February): Today is 22 Bahman

Let me explain: when a team "wins ugly", it doesn't triumph through overwhelming superiority, a strength that is likely to see it chalk up victory after victory. Instead, it scrapes through --- in a contest in which all sides makes mistakes and miscalculations --- because its faults aren't quite enough to take away its lead, because it hangs on with just enough of a territorial advantage, because it has a bit of luck to offset its weaknesses or enough tenacity to avoid exhaustion.


That's a good starting point for 22 Bahman. If the regime prevailed today, it did so in part because expectations of the opposition had been set so high. The dramatic scenes of protest of Ashura (27 December), fuelled in part by the recent death of Grand Ayatollah Montazeri, the relay of strong statements by Mir Hossein Mousavi, Mehdi Karroubi, and Mohammad Khatami, and the signs of regime fatigue offered the prospect of overcoming the blunt force and propaganda of the Government. And "overcome" was not the triumph of years or months from now but of this moment; 22 Bahman, 31 years after the Islamic Revolution's victory, might prove the triumphal day once more.

That didn't happen, and I guess in that sense, it has to be Government and Supreme Leader 1, Mousavi-Karroubi-Khatami and Greens O. But that winning score is a "negative" margin, rather than a tribute to the "positive" efforts of the regime. There was nothing hopeful in the rows of security forces who, having been prepared after the humiliations of Ashura, were not going to countenance another retreat. There was nothing of glory or Islamic value in the confrontations with Mehdi Karroubi (wounded, his son missing), Zahra Rahnavard (beaten), Mohammad Khatami and Mir Hossein Mousavi (forced into retreat), let alone the thousands of encounters in which chains, batons, and flying-squad detentions trumped hope and determination.

"Negative", not "positive". And no, the regime's rally in Azadi Square does nothing to alter that assessment. President Ahmadinejad's speech was not even subtle enough to offer a pretence of legitimacy through economic progress, social cohesion, or political manifesto for a post-election Iran in which the election is still a matter for dispute. This was a 75-minute diversion puffed up with a "surprise" (the 20% enrichment of uranium) which had been announced four days ago, the ritual denunciations of the "West" and Israel, and a fantastical vision --- awaiting the 12th Imam --- of Iran straddling the globe. Even the snapshots of the rally were beholden to these fancies, all deployed to avoid any reference to internal issues. There was the big rocket of Presidential strength:



And there was the eternal Western evil that would sweep over Iranians if they did not acknowledge Presidential leadership:



Of course, this was converted by State media into the markers, as the numbers in Azadi Square went from hundreds of thousands to a million to 2 million to 5 million, of all of Iran unified. And that unity was sustained by the reduction of any evidence to the contrary to a "couple of hundred" protesters in an outlying square in Tehran, soon to be dispersed by security forces.

But an unity sustained only by the "negative" is destined to melt away almost as quickly as the crowds dissipated from Azadi Square, duty done, needs met, or loyalties rewarded by the time slot allocated for the Ahmadinejad speech. Come tomorrow, or perhaps after the extended holiday that ends Sunday, the 31st anniversary of the Revolution will be just a date in the calendar as economic disputes resume, the qualms over the President resurface, and the detainees languish in Iran's prisons amidst the symbolic, limited but important manipulation of abuse cases such as the Kahrizak scandal.

There are distinctions to be made in this "negative" victory. It is probably more substantial for the Supreme Leader. The window of political opportunity to curb his authority and, in extreme visions, to remove him from office has now closed; those pursuing compromise within the system like Hashemi Rafsanjani have had to do so by pledging fealty to Ayatollah Khamenei, and figures like Mousavi and Karroubi have now defined their resistance as one that accepts the Leader's rule, provided he deals with an unjust and abusive Government. Khamenei is a damaged figure, a damage that is seen not only in the failure to get resolution but in his own bouts of self-doubt, but he will survive.

Not so Ahmadinejad. He lives another day because Iran's security forces held the line, even advanced in the physical battle against the opposition. But there is no political authority accrued from his postures: even Seyed Mohammad Marandi, the staunch defender of the Iranian regime, was at great pains this morning, when he spoke on British radio to say that the Iranian people had come out for the Republic, not the President (no Marandi interview is now complete without ""I Didn't Vote For Ahmadinejad").

If the opposition had truly been "crushed" today, that might have been sufficient to ensure Ahmadinejad's longer-term survival, even in the absence of any positive measures. But the Green movement and figures like Mousavi and Karroubi were not crushed. They were bashed about, dispersed, and, most importantly, exposed as tactically naïve with today's loudly-declared plan to march from Sadeghiyeh Square to the Government's lair in Azadi. Their ranks have been thinned by the detentions, and their communications have to fight new ways to deal with regime restrictions.

But they are not crushed. They also live for other battles. A Mousavi or Karroubi declaration could come tomorrow or Saturday or later in the week. The Green websites, with new ones emerging as others are closed, will be trying to find the front foot in stories of defiance and justice. And the planning will be moving beyond the tactic of trying to "hijack" the regime's highlight days.

That does not mean easy answers for the opposition, let alone those establishment figures who would like to see the back of Ahmadinejad not today but a moment in the near-future. But --- and perhaps this was the hubris that fed into the build-up for 22 Bahman --- nothing was ever going to come easy in this post-election crisis.

"Winning ugly" doesn't mean winning. It means a scrappy, jaded, exhausting victory on this day and this day only. There will be another game soon, and the negative of force and the rhetoric of diversion may not be enough, especially if those who see behind the batons and the speech-screens refine their approaches.

Put this on your scorecards. Without "legitimacy", the President --- if not the regime --- has to "win ugly" every time. The opposition --- from within the system or without --- only have to win once.

Iran: A Beginner's Guide to The Post-Election Conflict

Enduring America has been working with the University of Birmingham to provide a Briefing Note for those who are beginning to notice the developments in Iran. I thought that, for some new readers, this might be of use on a most important day:

Thursday in Iran is 22 Bahman, the anniversary of the 1979 Islamic Revolution. The day is also likely to see the biggest demonstrations, both for and against the Government, since June’s disputed Presidential election. The size of the protests are a matter for expectation: hundreds of thousands will be on the streets in Tehran and in cites across Iran, but one estimate, based on a Government source, is that three million people will be marching in Tehran alone.

The core immediate issue is the “legitimacy” of the Government of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. “Green Movement” protests last summer focused on the election, amidst claims of fraud and ballot-rigging that denied a runoff to challenger Mir Hossein Mousavi.



However, as Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, insisted on inaugurating Ahmadinejad and as Government tried to crack down on dissent, the issue of legitimacy spread far wider. Demonstrations, including not only Mousavi but former President Mohammad Khatami, Presidential candidate Mehdi Karroubi, senior clerics, and reformist politicians, demanded action over detentions, trials, and abuse of prisoners and sought guarantees for justice, freedom of speech, and political activity.

In short, by last autumn, the protest had evolved from a challenge to an election into a civil rights movement, made up of many different groups. The “Green Movement” no longer claimed to be led by a Mousavi but to be a grassroots organisation seeking change from “the bottom up”.

Despite the regime’s attempts to suppress protest through arrests, prison sentences, and even executions, as well as through disruption of communications, the waves of demonstrations have continued, marked by the “hijacking” of Iran’s holidays and celebrations. Key moments have included the “40th Day” memorial for post-election victims including Neda Agha Soltan (30 July), the Qods Day rallies (18 Sept.), the marches of 13 Aban (4 November), and the protests on Students Day (7 December). Most significantly, on one of Iran’s holiest days, Ashura (27 December), demonstrators not only came out in number but pushed back security forces.

The opposition to President Ahmadinejad is no longer confined to an “opposition”. Key politicians such as former President Hashemi Rafsanjani, who should be considered politically a “free agent” moving between factions, and even “conservative” members of Iran’s establishment, such as Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani, are now criticising the President and perhaps plotting for his removal. It is likely that the pressure from many sides will force the Supreme Leader to curb Ahmadinejad’s authority and may even lead to the President’s removal from office.

Will that be enough, however, to restore “legitimacy”? That is an important, unanswered question. Had the Supreme Leader and key groups in the Iranian system recognised the complaints and rights of protesters last summer, then the challenge might have been one of “reform” within the Islamic Republic. However, in a paradox, the attempt to quell dissent may have not only bolstered it but widened its demands: factions of the Green movement are now seeking the modification or even abandonment of velayat-e-faqih, the system of ultimate clerical supremacy.

So 22 Bahman is unlikely to be the end of this post-election drama. Instead, it will be a significant act in the middle of the play: if the opposition can mobilise a mass presence, then it will be confirmed as a long-term force for change in Iran. If, however, the protest can be minimised and dispersed, then --- for now --- the Ahmadinejad Government and military forces such as Iran’s Revolutionary Guard may be able to hang onto a semblance of authority.

UPDATED Iran Analysis: The Rafsanjani "Ultimatum" to the Supreme Leader

UPDATE 2100 GMT: Another possible twist tonight. Rafsanjani’s website has published an interview in which the former President talks about his letter to the Supreme Leader just before the elections, warning of President Ahmadinejad's "lies" and calling for a "fraudless" ballot. (Rafsanjani claims that that Khamenei did not object to the contents of the letter, but would have preferred it to have been published after the elections.) Rafsanjani also speaks at length about how he gathered funds for the clergy before the Revolution and how, together with others (such as Grand Ayatollahs Montazeri or Sane'i but with no reference to Khamenei), he was trusted by Ayatollah Khomeini to manage the revolutionaries’ funds.


The title of the interview: "In 42 some people were asking, 'Who will account for the blood of the 15 Khordad?'” That is a reference to the uprising of 5 June 1963, protesting the arrest of Khomeini; the protest was put down after six days by the Iranian military.

Perhaps Rafsanjani's question is not just historical recollection but an enquiry for today?

UPDATE 10 FEBRUARY, 1500 GMT: EA is now treated this story as confirmed. A reliable source has said that the Rafsanjani-Khamenei meeting was on Monday. Normally, in his official roles, Rafsanjani sees the Supreme Leaders on Tuesday; in this case, the former President asked for a special discussion.

While the immediate cause for Rafsanjani's intervention was the detention of Mousavi advisor Alireza Beheshti and the reported search by Iranian authorities for Beheshti's wife, Rafsanjani did ask the Supreme Leader to act on all cases involving political prisoners. Our source notes perceptively the "7 Tir families", relatives of those killed in a bombing in the early days of the Revolution, had asked Rafsanjani for help with Beheshti and other cases; other families, learning of this appeal, then approached the former President.

The Rafsanjani intervention should also be connected to another important meeting, days earlier, between the Supreme Leader and Grand Ayatollah Mousavi-Ardebili, one of the most important clerics in Iran and Shi'a Islam. Mousavi-Ardebili, in his first meeting in 17 years with Khamenei, declared that he was "disappointed" in the Supreme Leader's actions and urged him to act decisively for justice in the cases of the detained.

An EA correspondent adds:

It is reported that Ardebili had told Khamenei, “I know the leaders of the protests in Qom and Tehran. I testify that they are after reforming the affairs of the state based on the constitution and are not after toppling you. Your concerns over this are misplaced."

By mentioning “Qom”, the seat of clerical learning in Iran, Ardebili is telling Khamenei that there is a substantial movement against the establishment in its heartland. The mention of “not after toppling you”: either means that Khamenei is very worried about his own position now or it is a threat from one of Shi'a Islam’s few Grand Ayatollahs. Ardebili could mean, "They are not after toppling you, but don’t do something that will force us, the marjas (senior clerics), to have to topple you."

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Let’s assume that the Rah-e Sabz news about the Rafsanjani meeting with Supreme Leader, spurred by the attempt to arrest Alireza Beheshi’s wife, is accurate.

We could say that trying to arrest the daughter-in-law of Shahid Beheshti and traumatizing his grandchildren is just too much for Rafsanjani and he has finally snapped. In this case this could be the first “public” crack in the Rafsanjani-Khamenei relationship. This could create opportunities both for Ahmadinejad & Co. and for the Greens.

On the coup side, they could use this to isolate Khamenei even more and get him to agree to their strategy of further suppression and crackdown. On the Green side, they could use this to draw Rafsanjani (and those within the Iranian establishment who look up to him) away from Khamenei and Ahmadinejad. This would further undermine the legitimacy of Khamenei and the whole Islamic Republic as it stands.

There may be another explanation too....

As you recall just before 16 Azar (the protests of 7 December), Rafsanjani went to Mashhad and said that if the people do not want us, we will leave. At the time that was seen as distancing himself from Supreme Leader, and it may have encouraged more students (especially in smaller towns) to come out. One could argue that he was blowing onto the fire from a distance.

A few days ago, Ayatollah Mousavi-Ardebili went to Tehran to meet Khamenei. This was their first meeting in 17 years. Leaked details of the discussion suggest that Ardebili criticized Khamenei’s handling of the state affairs and asked for Alireza Beheshti to be freed. It is reported that the Supreme Leader dismissed the criticism and refused to help with Beheshti. This information was most probably leaked by someone close to Ardebili (as Khamenei would not want it to be known that he was criticized and is behind Beheshti’s detention).

Now a few days after that meeting and a day after the leaking of the details of the meeting, it is reported that Rafsanjani has criticized the state of affairs and the treatment of Beheshti. And again the news is leaked.

This comes soon after Mir Hossein Mousavi stated that the Revolution has failed to get rid of the roots of tyranny and dictatorship and that he is seeing signs of both in Iran today. Mehdi Karroubi has said that he does not believe in this kind of Islamic Republic. And Mohammad Khatami has indirectly accused Khamenei of being a partial arbiter. (Others like Ayatollah Dashgheib have also criticised the SL). All of these could lead to one logical conclusion: that Khamenei is not fit to lead the Islamic Republic.

Now it may be that Rafsanjani is also putting Khamenei under pressure, not just by his strong protest and “ultimatum” but by allowing the news to be leaked. If this is the case, Rafsanjani would have skilfully used the attempt to arrest Beheshti’s wife to his advantage. In this case, Khamenei should be very mad at the people behind the arrest.

This leaked news may also be an attempt by Rafsanjani to say to the protestors: go out on 22 Bahman, and we (Rafsanjani and his people) will ensure that the regime does not crack down too hard.

If so, this could be a tactic which Iranian insiders call “feshar az paeen, chaneh-zani az bala”: pressure from below, negotiations at the top. Khatami tried this during his Presidency, with limited success. At that time one could argue that there was not much pressure from below, but now it seems the pressure from below is quite strong. It remains to be seen how skilful the negotiators are.