Israel: A Loose Cannon for a Middle East Conflict?

Sharmine Narwani writes in The Huffington Post:

Another war is looming in the Middle East, say the pundits. It is hard to ignore the whispers -- now louder -- when they are regularly punctuated by hostile statements from various officials in the region, leading further credence to a possible conflagration.

The likely site of the newest regional battle is the Levant. Funnily enough, nobody can pinpoint exactly where, although it is clear that Israel will be involved. Which should tell us something right there.

Middle East Inside Line: Hamas in Russia, Iran FM on “Crazy Israel”, Palestine Talks
Israel, Hamas, and Russia: Who is in Bed with the Bear?

Since the Jewish state's military attack on Lebanon in 2006, it has been itching for a "do-over." Why? Because for the first time in its history, Israel did not win a war. The month-long bombardment of Lebanon resulted in a stalemate -- an intolerable outcome by the standards of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF).

To add to the indignity, it was a mere few thousand men -- not even a national army -- that took the IDF by surprise.

The cornerstone of Israel's military strategy is deterrence -- whether though brandishing a nuclear arsenal to warn off threatening nation-states, or by Gaza-style intensive attacks that send a strong message to a weaker party. This is a highly militarized state that has lived under the legacy of conflict its entire existence. Loss -- or even perceived loss -- is not an option.


So instead of self-examination, Israel's conflicted, and increasingly right-wing political body unleashed a belligerent tone -- angry, defiant, threatening, unfocused like a petulant and wounded child. Diversionary tactics came into play to focus domestic and international attention elsewhere and fill the frustrating void -- Hamas in Gaza, the potential nuclear aspirations of Iran, Palestinian intransigence on peace talks, Hezbollah's weapons, Syria, Turkey, anti-Semitism, the Goldstone Report.

In recent weeks, Israeli officials have made inflammatory statements about conflicts on half a dozen fronts.

SYRIA:

"When there is another war, you will not just lose it, but you and your family will lose power," right-wing Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman challenged Syrian President Bashar al-Assad last Thursday, after Assad claimed that Israel is "driving the region towards war, not peace."

Lieberman went further and hit at the heart of any future Israeli-Syrian rapprochement: "We must bring Syria to realize that...it will have to give up on its ultimate demand for the Golan Heights." Israeli leaders have in the past accepted in principle that the Syrian Golan Heights, captured and occupied by Israel in 1967, would necessarily be part of any bilateral peace deal.

GAZA:

In January -- one year after Israel's Operation Cast Lead in Gaza that lead to the deaths of 1,400 Palestinians -- Major General Yom Tov Samia, former head of the IDF's Southern Command, told the Jerusalem Post: "We are before another round in Gaza... another war with Hamas is inevitable." And Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak warned Gaza's leaders to "watch their step, and not to cry crocodile tears if they force [us] to take action."

The hue and cry about Hamas' rockets hitting Israeli towns was Tel Aviv and Washington's driving narrative in defense of Israel's military actions in Gaza. Still is. But just this week, the Jewish State announced that a new $200 million rocket defense system called the "Iron Dome" will not be deployed against Gaza as promised. Too expensive for Gaza, says the military, explaining that it will be deployed elsewhere where there is more of an "imminent" threat.

And this comes after months of Israeli insistence that Hamas has significantly boosted its military capabilities and has obtained long-range rockets, mostly from Iran. So which is it -- either they do or don't have weapons, either they do or don't pose a threat?

LEBANON:

No two other parties have been more relentlessly subjected to Israeli threats than Iran and Hezbollah. Last summer, after it was clear that the Lebanese resistance group Hezbollah would likely participate at the cabinet level in any unity government formed following Lebanon's June elections, Israeli leaders fell over themselves in their rush to issue warnings. Netanyahu, Barak and Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon all threatened that any border attacks would be blamed on the Lebanese central government -- with repercussions.

Just last month, Israeli Minister Yossi Peled opined, "Without a doubt we are heading for another round (of battle) in the North. No one knows when, but it's clear that it will happen."

And so both Hezbollah and Israel have moved weapons systems closer to their mutual borders.

IRAN:

Iran, in turn, has been the recipient of non-stop bombing threats from Israel over its civilian nuclear program, which the Jewish State claims is really a clandestine plan to build nuclear weapons and delivery systems. Never mind that some two dozen International Atomic Energy Agency reports over six years show no diversion of materials to weaponization. Or that Israeli military intelligence has been extending the date for a finished Iranian nuclear warhead since the 1990s. Last June, Mossad Chief Meir Dagan declared the new date for the first Iranian nuke would be in 2014. But Israel's war drums have kept beating as though these weapons were already sitting on launch pads, ready to go.

TURKEY:

Relatively new on the scene in the game of belligerent words is Turkey. A rare Israeli ally in the Middle East both in political and military terms, Turkey has drawn away from the alliance since Israel's widely-criticized Gaza attacks last year, when Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan lashed out at the particularly brutal IDF campaign.

Things have gone from bad to worse since, culminating a month ago in the now-infamous Ayalon row when the Israeli deputy foreign minister publicly and deliberately humiliated Turkey's ambassador in front of cameras. Israel has called Turkey anti-Semitic and very recently slammed the Turkish prime minister again when he drew attention to the continuing Israeli blockade of Gaza and its daily violations of Lebanese airspace.

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Some Israeli critics suggest that the destabilizing escalation in rhetoric may not just be as a result of Israel's psychological loss in 2006, but more recently, because of an increased paranoia about international isolation -- the result of war crimes allegations documented against Israel in the UN's Goldstone Report about the Gaza war, and the country's ongoing occupation of Palestinian lands.

In a stunning attack on his government two weeks ago, Israeli writer Gideon Levy wrote a commentary piece in Haaretz in which he takes to task their "cynical" use of Holocaust Remembrance Day to propagandize toward political ends:

"An Israeli public relations drive like this hasn't been seen for ages. The timing of the unusual effort - never have so many ministers deployed across the globe - is not coincidental: When the world is talking Goldstone, we talk Holocaust, as if out to blur the impression. When the world talks occupation, we'll talk Iran as if we wanted them to forget."

But the escalation of rhetoric from Israel's right-wing government is not being viewed as simple political posturing -- more, like a promise of battle. As concerned as the Jewish State may be about conflict on its borders, its neighbors -- having been on the receiving end of superior Israeli weapons, and having suffered far larger numbers of civilian casualties -- are taking these words very seriously.

Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Muallem, at a joint press conference with Spain's Foreign Minister Miguel Angel Moratinos on Thursday pointed to this verbal escalation of hostilities by calling on Israel to "desist from making threats against Gaza, southern Lebanon, Iran and now Syria."

Because rhetoric after all creates a perception. And perception is 100% of politics -- not to be played with when standing on a tinderbox. The Levant has always been rife with small-scale border skirmishes -- that is the way of an area re-mapped by foreigners, with unnatural, artificial borders. But it is only Israel that has, since 1973, launched full-on military battles from these skirmishes. And without a doubt it is gearing up for a fight. Where, is anyone's guess.

Iran Analysis: How Turkey Can Break the Nuclear Stalemate

Colette Mazzucelli and Sebnem Udum write for Politics3.com:

The proliferation of nuclear weapons among failing states and fundamentalist non-state actors is the immediate challenge of the decade in national and international security. In Iran, however, the elections of June 12, 2009 illustrate to the world the increasing futility of a narrow focus on proliferation at the expense of the larger picture—the evolution of what Ali Ansari identifies as “a particular idea of power” in the regime.

The threats to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) are much broader than Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Those who argue that Iranian goals are limited to a civilian nuclear program designed to address urgent domestic needs must increasingly confront Iran’s complicated internal power struggle, which is more fragmented each day. Indeed, domestic cleavages and elite factionalization have characterized Iranian politics since the 1979 Revolution. What has emerged more recently, however, as the contestation since the summer makes clearer, is that divisions within the Revolutionary Guards—the element of Iran’s military established after the Revolution of 1979—complicate internal policy making.

This development is particularly dangerous on the nuclear issue and further delimits the ability of other states, even those with strong regional and Muslim ties like Turkey, to mediate on a range of policies. And mediation is essential if Iran is to play a constructive role commensurate with its growing influence in the Middle East.


Domestic Cleavages and a Fragmental Elite

Ansari explains how the changes internal to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps made their co-optation by conservative elements within the Iranian government possible given the rise of the second generation Right in the 1990s. Over time, these changes strengthened the hand of a conservative leadership threatened by the reformers led by Khatami, who was elected president in 1997. Both the Revolutionary Guard and the Basij, a volunteer militia founded by the order of the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979, gradually became, in [Ali] Ansari’s words, “guardians, not so much of the revolution, but of a particularly hard-line interpretation of that revolution personified by the supreme leader.”

Of significance for those who must deal with elite leadership in Iran is the way in which the Guards were increasingly dominated by men loyal, above all, to the doctrine of velayat-e faqih. In the Shia Muslim religion Iranians practice, this doctrine asserts the population’s submission in all matters to the authority of one man, the Supreme Jurist, Ayatollah Khamenei. Velayat-e faqih, or the guardianship of the jurist, is the legal foundation of the Constitution of 1979, and the source of the supreme leader’s authority. İt is this foundation that places the current supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, in a relatively strong institutional position, despite his open, and contested, support of Ahmadinejad as president.

Iran’s domestic crisis is so intricate as to defy scholars’ ability to explain recent events. We may well ask if this is a crisis of an elite increasingly fractured, as Ansari explains, by its blatant pursuit of materialism. The tipping point is that the wealth acquired by the few can only be gained at the expense of the many, who suffer daily the loss of security, the loss of ideals for which the 1979 Revolution was fought and the loss of a future for the country’s youth. Machiavelli’s realism, which the scholar Michael Doyle explains as integral to fundamentalism, is only a starting point for interpreting the complex nature of individual and fragmented elite leadership within the Guards, its pervasive ambitions within the structure of government and society, and the many ways its influence is felt in an oppressive and dangerous regime decades after a revolution that, in Ansari’s reading, is open to “mercantilization".

Ahmadinejad’s election victory in 2005 may be situated in the context of various segments of the Iranian society, particularly among those Hamid Dabashi identifies in his volume, Iran A People Interrupted, as “the most disappointed, the most disenfranchised and the most impoverished” whose hopes were invested in the Revolution of 1979. His opponent, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, was one of the founders of the Islamic Republican Party, which was established to advocate an unrestricted theocracy. Rafsanjani, like numerous contemporary leaders within the protest movement, supports the regime created by the Revolution, starting with the doctrine of velayat-e faqih.

Further, the protest movement continues to illustrate Iran’s evolving demographics in which those under thirty years of age constitute almost 70 percent of the population. It is from that segment of educated and technologically savvy youth, and the experiences of the current protests, that new leadership is likely to emerge. Indeed, leaders are made from the crises of their time. And while the brutality of a narrow elite may succeed in suppressing most of the leadership that could emerge in the present context, it will not stop generational change, which includes the most disenfranchised in the Iranian society. This generation has the authority, borne of its own disillusionment with the failed promises of revolution, to create an obstacle from within, thereby countering the popular dictatorship, which President Ahmadinejad and the genuine power behind his incumbent position—the Ayatollah—increasingly embody for a growing number of protesters.

Nevertheless, attempts from outside Iran to alter the pace or course of change are likely to fail, given the dated narratives that have already created too much history, particularly between Iran and the United States—more specifically during the overthrow of Mossadeq in 1953 and the taking of hostages at the American Embassy in Iran during the 1979 Revolution. Along those lines, Ansari reveals that the Guards are “empowered by a war mythology, reinforced by a largely constructed fear of foreign subversion and given free reign by the Ahmadinejad administration” to indulge in an “extensive extortion racket,” which he defines as one of the realities of the “mafia state” Iran has become.

So what do these developments portend for a people who must develop in their own time and space within an increasingly complex regional and global environment? For now, only time will tell whether a national collective will remains united behind Ahmadinejad’s nuclear rhetoric and more specifically, a regime that persists in shifting the blame for economic stagnation and human rights abuses to those who foment a “velvet revolution” from beyond its borders.

In this context, direct engagement by the United States, Turkey or the P5 + 1 is difficult at best. If the deepening crisis of the regime perpetuates elite paranoia as economic stagnation worsens, the government’s traditional recourse to foreign policy and a nationalist rallying point, such as a nuclear crisis, is destined to confront an Iranian society less inclined to listen to the elite message. It is the timing of engagement by the Obama administration that is critical. Even though the road to sanctions complicates the broader U.S.-Iran relationship, we must consider the current government’s ability and inclination to deliver credibly on an international nuclear agreement. The brutality of the regime against its own, and the uncertainty about Iran’s capacity at present to negotiate in good faith, suggests a waiting game. So while the Obama administration has shown its willingness to engage, the ball is in Iran’s court.

Moreover, to be successful, sanctions must directly target the vast financial assets of the Revolutionary Guards and require the continual assent of China and Russia. Sanctions must also be perceived by the Iranian protesters as denying the Guards the resources to stifle all opposition to the regime in education and media, as well as politics.

Admittedly, however, it is unclear if sanctions that persistently target the Revolutionary Guards’ material wealth may buy time, as the nuclear clock keeps ticking, given the Guards’ dominance in nuclear thinking, the more blatant factional struggles on questions of nuclear policy and the problems Iranians are encountering to accomplish a “covert breakout” option. On the other hand, military strikes are less credible, particularly for Israel, given Iran’s vast network of tunnels which hide the various uranium enrichment facilities around the country.

What is emerging as a more plausible scenario is that Ahmadinejad will not be able consistently to play a card on the international stage, which he can no longer sell to a domestic audience. Popular contestation is a response in part to the leadership divisions within the Guards, whose older generation does not sanction force against the people.¹⁴ This divisiveness has led to a broadening of those segments in Iranian society, which focus more since June 12 on abuses of state and society in their struggle for voice.

Turkey’s Unique Role

Given the growing complexity of Iran’s nuclear ambitions, American engagement in the P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States), as well as the active involvement of Turkey, is the option more likely over the long term to counter proliferation from the inside out. The more immediate action, sanctions against the vested interests of the Guards, would also hurt the Iranian people although this is increasingly a matter of degree. The internal repression of the Guards is worse than the hardship of international sanctions.

Richard Haass argues in Newsweek that working-level negotiations on the nuclear question should continue. In this context, Turkey has genuine interests to play a mediatory role even in the face of resistance from the Republican Guards, as evidenced in the intervention to derail the construction of an international airport in Tehran. Ansari highlights that the airport project, which was being constructed with the involvement of Turkish partners, initially excluded the Guards who promptly acted out of material (not national security) interests and delayed its opening to travellers for months.

In addition, Turkey has other unique characteristics which may provide a lucrative starting point in furthering nuclear negotiations with Iran. First, Turkey pursued a policy of indifference towards the Middle East during the Cold War, and enjoyed stability in its Iranian border since the seventeenth century. Additionally, the rough military and strategic balance between Turkey and Iran has successfully prevented a hot war between the two countries.

Since 2002, when the concerns increased about Iran’s nuclear program and various options were put on the table to deal with it, Turkey has walked a tightrope. Its strategic relations with the United States and the course they went through in the pre-Iraq War period taught Ankara that it would not be alone in responding to security issues in its region. And while Turkey is concerned about the possibility of a nuclear Iran, it also wants to avoid being the target of retaliation should it cooperate with the United States, particularly for military measures against Iran.

In this context, Ankara favors diplomacy over other options. Indeed, Turkey’s geographical and political position between the East and the West is promising for a facilitating role in the negotiation process with Iran. That said, Ankara could play a meaningful role in breaking off the negative perceptions that hinder progress, and in building new ones that would make maintaining the non-nuclear-weapon status the “rational choice.”

Turkey views nuclear proliferation as a consequence rather than a cause of insecurity. It acknowledges the threats and risks of further proliferation in its region and beyond, and has been a committed member of international regimes on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.¹⁷ Ankara has plans to harness nuclear technology for electricity generation, and would be adversely affected by proliferation trends in the region. Additionally, its ties with the Middle East (historical and cultural) and the West, particularly its strategic relations with the United States and the accession process to the European Union, grant Turkey with the ability to “speak both languages.” More importantly, it is one of the countries that would incur the negative impact should negotiations with Iran fail and proliferation trends rise in the region. In sum, Turkey is fit to play an active role in negotiations and it is willing to do so.

The Trust Issue

While there have been several proposals to keep Tehran’s capabilities under control, the main issue that prevents effective cooperation is the lack of trust between the international community and Iran, a reality that reveals itself in the demands for more transparency¹⁸ and “equality” respectively. The international community, most notably the United States, is concerned about the possibility of a nuclear Iran, and believes that unless its nuclear program is completely transparent, (i.e. when Tehran ratifies the Additional Protocol) Iran could divert its enrichment capability to produce a sufficient amount of highly enriched uranium (HEU), which could be used to manufacture an atomic bomb. Tehran’s advances in ballistic missile capability only increase these concerns.

Hence, ratification of the Additional Protocol also has a symbolic meaning that denotes commitment to non-proliferation norms, and Iran’s reluctance to do so emboldens mistrust regarding its nuclear program. More importantly, the possibility of a nuclear Iran could stimulate proliferation in the region, hence instability. Such a trend would challenge the nuclear non-proliferation regime as other non-nuclear-weapon states would start questioning the effectiveness of the regime and the meaning of their status as a security asset.

Finally, as discussed, Iran does not trust extra-regional powers, particularly the United States. The experiences of 1953 and 1979 taught Iran that sovereignty is non-negotiable, and self-sufficiency is the primary asset for security. Therefore, it argues that it cannot be denied its “indisputable and legitimate right” to have and operate complete nuclear fuel-cycle, and believes that doing so would diminish its power both materially and ideationally.

In this context, mutual understanding of key concepts is integral throughout the negotiation process, because they have the power to mitigate the inherent lack of trust from all sides. Some of these concepts are cooperation, transparency, sovereignty and non-proliferation. Along those lines, Iran perceives that if it allows enhanced verification inspections of the IAEA, and halts its uranium enrichment program, it would mean unequal treatment and loss of power because this would compromise self-sufficiency and sovereignty. Iran also argues that the lack of focus on other nuclear states in the region is a double-standard if the real goal is non-proliferation.

The international community, on the other hand, interprets Iran’s reluctance to take steps as a tactic to buy time, and the more they diverge from cooperation, the more Iran becomes a threat to international security. To alleviate these discrepancies, a viable channel must be designed to communicate all of these concepts to both sides, and to overcome the cultural bulwarks that have been underestimated in the negotiation process. Ankara has the potential for such communication, particularly with its new foreign policy perspective that is based on cooperative security.

The Latest From Iran (3 February): Picking Up the Pace

2150 GMT: Pep Talks. It is not just Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi talking up 22 Bahman. Ayatollah Bayat-Zanjani has issued his second declaration in days, reiterating that "mohareb" (enemies of God) are those beating and injuring people bloodily, not peaceful protesters, and asserting that the military should not interfere in politics.

And Nasrullah Torabi, the prominent reformist member of Parliament, has reassured that 22 Bahman is a national holiday and people do not fear the warnings of hardliners.

2140 GMT: Rafsanjani's Children and the Regime. Rah-e-Sabz has an article considering the political and psychological battle around the threat of criminal charges against the children of Hashemi Rafsanjani.

2130 GMT: The Relay of Opposition. Radio Zamaneh has added details of Mehdi Karroubi's denunciation of the Government and call to march on 22 Bahman (see 1100 GMT). Karroubi has called on fellow clerics to “come to the aid of the people...reach[ing out to the people before all these atrocities [of the Government] are attributed to Islam, Shiites and the clergy" and declared that Iranians on 11 February will try to “stop their promising achievements and goals from falling into oblivion, and demand them with fortitude and an aversion of physical and verbal violence”.

Karroubi asserted, "From one side petty flatterers and from another side worthless extremists have closed the arena onto our scholars, thinkers and learned.” In contrast, the common ground for groups in the Green Movement is their demand for “open elections, freedom of the press, unconditional release of all political prisoners, reform of governance and the judiciary as well as respecting citizens’ rights.”

Significantly, given that the "Western" media was distracted earlier today by the Iran rocket launch (see 1325 GMT), CNN's website is now featuring the Karroubi statement.

2125 GMT: Blowing Smoke or Playing for Time? Tehran Prosecutor General Abbas Jafari Doulatabadi has said that death sentences for nine political prisoners have not been "finalised". Doulatabadi's statement adds to the confusion surrounding conflicting statements between the head of Iran's judiciary, Sadegh Larijani, who said he would not be pushed into speeding up executions, and his deputy, Ebrahim Raeesi, who gave assurances that the nine would be killed.

2035 GMT: And Another "Monarchist" Death Sentence. Mehdi Eslamian has been condemned to execution on charges of involvement in a bombing in Shiraz and ties to a monarchist group.

NEW Iran Special: Full Text of Mousavi Answers for 22 Bahman (2 February)
NEW Iran Snap Analysis: “Game-Changers” from Mousavi and Ahmadinejad
Iran Document: The Rallying Call of Mousavi’s 14 Points (2 February)
Iran Letter: Journalist Emadeddin Baghi in Prison
Iran Document: Khatami Statement on Rights and Protests (1 February)
The Latest from Iran (2 February): A Quiet Start to An Unquiet Day

2025 GMT: Another Arrest. Kaveh Ghasemi Kermanshahi, a leading human rights activist, member of the Central Council of the Human Rights Organization of Kurdistan, and journalist, has been detained.

2015 GMT: Let Me Tell You About Human Rights. Back from a break to find that the head of Iran's judiciary, Sadegh Larijani, is setting the world straight about violations of human rights (when they do it, it's a transgression against humanity; when we do it, it's the rule of law):

Larijani on Wednesday criticized advocates of human rights for mixing up the boundaries of law and order with human rights....

Prisons such as Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib along with invasion of Gaza are good examples of human rights violations, he said adding that all should do their best to reveal the anti-human rights nature of such brutal measures.

“We should spare no effort to present theoretical concepts of the Islamic human rights consistent with religious teachings,” he said.

1735 GMT: Well, That's a Relief. General David Petraeus, the head of US Central Command, has apparently declared that the US will not support a military operation against Iran with this "You Think?" assessment:

It's possible (a military strike) could be used to play to nationalist tendencies. There is certainly a history, in other countries, of fairly autocratic regimes almost creating incidents that inflame nationalist sentiment. So that could be among the many different, second, third, or even fourth order effects (of a strike).

1715 GMT: Teaser of the Day. So Ayande News, the website close to Hashemi Rafsanjani --- the same Rafsanjani whose family has been threatened with trials and jail sentences by Government officials --- runs a story based on a source who says that some want to blame the Revolutionary Guard for arrests. However, the source continues, the Guard aren't behind arrests, "certain Government officials" are.

So at whom is Ayande pointing? President Ahmadinejad? Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi? Mojtaba Khamenei, the son of the Supreme Leader?

Just asking....

1700 GMT: Law and Order Moment of the Day. Peyke Iran reports that amongst the charges against the two women in court today is this threat to national security: wearing "I am Neda" wristbands.

1415 GMT: The Ashura Trial. The Human Rights Activists News Agency has published an account in Persian of today's hearing of 16 defendants.

1400 GMT: Ahmadinejad Takes the Lead? A positive reaction from Iranian state media --- Press TV --- to the President's initiative in reviving "third-party enrichment" outside the country for Iran's uranium:

Russia and Britain said Wednesday that they would welcome Iran's readiness to accept a proposal aimed at ending the standoff over its nuclear program as a "positive sign."

"If Iran is ready to come back to the original agreement we can only welcome it," Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov told reporters at a Wednesday news conference.

The UK's Foreign Office said in a statement that "if Iran is willing to take up the IAEA's proposed offer, it would be a positive sign of their willingness to engage with the international community on nuclear issues."

1325 GMT: Mediawatch --- Rockets and Trials. As expected, the "Western" media has rushed after the Iranian "rocket launch", dropping entirely the Mousavi story and so far not even noticing the regime's PR effort with the Ashura trial.

There is one notable exception on the trial front: Reuters publishes information from the Fars News account. That leads to a bit of interesting interpretation ("Student Denies Charges", referring to one of the five accused as "enemy of God"/"mohareb") and information (one defendant is from Manchester in the UK and has British nationality).

1300 GMT: Ahmadinejad's Nuke Move. A short but important update from Associated Press:

Iran's foreign minister says Tehran's plan to send its uranium abroad for further enrichment as requested by the U.N. is aimed at building confidence in the country's nuclear program.

Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki says swapping low-enriched uranium with uranium enriched by 20 percent is "a formula which could build confidence." He spoke Wednesday in Ankara.

Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu says there is room for a diplomatic solution over neighboring Iran's nuclear program.

Mottaki says, "Any threat to the security of Iran amounts to a threat to the security of Turkey."

1. This is the "external" complement to the "internal" (though unacknowledged) reasons for President Ahmadinejad's declaration last night.

2. To follow the nuclear story, keep an eye on Turkey. Ankara is pursuing its regional "strategy in depth", as put forward as Davutoglu, and the moves with Tehran bring not only bilateral advantages but also an enhanced presence in the Middle East and, as a bonus, brownie points with Washington.

3. Now, watch for the reaction within Iran's regime. Will the conservative critics accept the Turkey-Iran manoeuvre or will it be condemned as a giveaway to "the West"?

1210 GMT: Headline of Day. The Independent of London summarises the media's current focus on Tehran: "Iran Fires Mouse,Turtle and Worms into Space".

1110 GMT: On the Economic Front. The Institute for War and Peace Reporting has posted a useful overview by "Mitra Farnik" (the pseudonym of an Iranian writer) of President Ahmadinejad's economic difficulties.

1100 GMT: The Next Leg of the Race. This is almost becoming an opposition relay: Mehdi Karroubi last week, Mohammad Khatami on Monday, Mir Hossein Mousavi yesterday, and now Mehdi Karroubi today. The Facebook page supporting Mousavi has the full text and summarises:

Mehdi Karroubi,...issuing a statement for the 31st anniversary of the Islamic Revolution, invited everyone to participate in the Feb 11th (22 Bahman) rallies peacefully and strongly and emphasised, "The constitution is an order that people give to the rulers, and if a ruler does not obey that, then he/she is oppressor and should be removed from power."

1050 GMT: Swallowing Nuclear Poison? An interesting analysis by Jahanshah Javid in Iranian.com of the motives and likely political repercussions of the Ahmadinejad statement on Iran's nuclear negotiations:

Now the Islamic Republic has again swallowed poison (a reference to the famous 1988 quote of Ayatollah Khomeini when he accepted a cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq War) in the face of enormous international pressure and domestic upheaval. Suddenly it is bowing to the U.N. after years of insisting that it would never ever ever compromise over its enrichment program.

1040 GMT: On the Economic Front. The head of Bank Melli, Mahmoud Reza Khavari, declares that it is not bankrupt.

1030 GMT: Ahmadinejad, His Allies, and Government Money. Radio Farda reports that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's draft budget increases funds for insitutes close to the President by 143 percent.

One beneficiary is the Ayandeh Rooshan Organization, led by Ahmadinejad's brother-in-law, chief of staff, and close ally Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai. It will receive about $120 million if the budget is passed.

Increased funding will also go to the Imam Khomeini think tank, run by Ahmadinejad's "spiritual advisor" Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi.

1020 GMT: The Fight Within the Establishment. While the Mousavi statement holds the political spotlight, the "conservative" challenge to President Ahmadinejad continues.

A latest attack comes from Deputy Speaker of Parliament, Mohammad Reza Bahonar, in the pro-Larijani Khabar Online. While firmly defending the Supreme Leader, calling on opposition leaders to be accountable, and blaming the US for stirring unrest, Bahonar criticised the Government's response to protests:

Some forces fulfilled their responsibility on time, but some took hasty measures and others delayed. The sedition imposed heavy expenses on us which will be simply realized in future.

Many officials have neglected daily responsibilities and are engaged in a game designed by the enemy. If we are to put out the fire of sedition in the country, we should not add fuel to it.

Bahonar also attacked on the economic front, "We in the Parliament are still discussing the issue of budget bill. Perhaps the plans for the next year are not that much significant but outside the country the analyses are made that due to the chaos within the country, the government is so troubled that it cannot even complete a bill."

(It should also noted that Khabar Online has just featured a Monday speech by Davoud Ahmadinejad, brother of the President, attacking Presidential Chief of Staff Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai.)

0915 GMT: And For Our Next Showpiece. Today's latest hearing in the trial of 16 Ashura detainees is also being pushed by Iranian state media. The Islamic Republic News Agency is declaring the repentance of one of the defendants, who was misled by Hashemi Rafsanjani's Friday Prayer address in July (Regime to Hashemi: Take note and stay in your box) and by those seeking trouble on Ashura (27 December).

0850 GMT: Quick, Look Over There!

Can you pronounce "diversion"? This morning Iranian state media have been splashing rivers of ink over the launch of a satellite-boosting rocket, the Kavoshgar-3, and President Ahmadinejad is now speaking about it on national television.

No difficulty reading this move: this is the bid for legitimacy at home, trying to draw attention away from conflict and protest just over a week before 22 Bahman. Any power-posturing in the ongoing manoeuvres with the "West" over the nuclear programme and regional influence is secondary to this.

0845 GMT: We have just posted the English translation of Mir Hossein Mousavi's declaration, in an interview with Kalemeh, yesterday.

Forgive me for dropping journalistic objectivity. Wow. "Game-changer" indeed.

Any media outlet that gets diverted today, by Iran's posturing with the launch of a satellite-boosting rocket or even by President Ahmadinejad's statement on a nuclear deal, and misses the significance of Mousavi's statement needs to get its credentials checked.

0735 GMT: The Call to March. More than 80 Iranian civil rights activists have issued a statement denouncing the "naked violence" of the regime and calling for mass demonstrations on 22 Bahman:

We, the signatories to this statement, invite the wise and courageous people of Iran to demonstrate to the world their demands for justice and liberty with their peaceful and calm presence on the anniversary of the 1979 revolution, once again showing to the dictators that the right-seeking movement of enlightened Iranians will never be decapitated with the blade of violence and terror, and the execution of innocent Iranian youth and the injustice and violence of the coup agents will not leave the slightest impact on the national determination of Iranians to realize the dreams of democracy, human rights, and respect for the human dignity of all Iranian citizens, regardless of their gender, ideology and ethnicity.

0730 GMT: So much for a quiet day yesterday. Mir Hossein Mousavi's statement on Kalemeh emerged as a big boost for the opposition just over a week before 22 Bahman and the marches on the anniversary of the 1979 Revolution, and President Ahmadinejad had his own surprise last night with an apparent shift in Iran's position on its nuclear programme. We've got a special snap analysis.

Those important events, however, should not overshadow the steady patter of news as the regime sends out conflicting signals over its tough stance on protest. On the one hand, detainees are now being released each night to the crowd waiting and demonstrating in front of Evin Prison. On the other, there have been more arrests of activists, journalists, and key advisors. Norooz reported last night that Mohammad Davari, the editor-in-chief of Mehdi Karroubi's website Saham News, is still jailed after five months, ostensibly because he cannot post bail.

This morning, another act unfolds as the trial of 16 Ashura detainees, five of whom are charged with mohareb (war against God), resumes.

Best read? The Government is now caught up in some confusion over its approach to detentions, trials, and even executions --- witness the contradictory statements within 48 hours of Saeed Larijani, the head of Iran's judiciary, and his deputy, Ebrahim Raeesi --- which means that the harsh fist of We Will Arrest, We May Kill You is matched by the open hand of Maybe We Will Let You Have Bail. Overall, if there is a strategy before 22 Bahman, it appears to be letting "smaller fish" go while ensuring that those whom the regime sees as key organisers/mobilisers in the opposition are kept well out of sight.

Yemen: A Beginner's Guide to (The Perils Of) Intervention

Yemen, the state on the Arabian Peninsula which has recently exploded into the headlines as a country of concern, is little-known to most Americans. It does have a track record, however, of embroiling outside powers who decided to intervene. Sean Foley, a professor at Middle Tennessee State University  and author of the forthcoming The Arab Gulf States Beyond Oil and Islam, writes for EA:

In October 1927 Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founder of the Turkish Republic, delivered an historic speech in which he explained why Turks had to abandon the Ottoman Empire and embrace his new state. Ataturk in particular focused on Yemen and the fact that the Empire’s leaders had sent millions of Turks to die in South Arabia in the name of a universal Muslim state: “Do you know,” he asked, “how many sons of Anatolia have perished in the scorching sands of Yemen?”  In the future, Ataturk promised, Turks would not die in wars in Yemen—a state that had become synonymous with the plight of the Ottoman soldier in Turkish folklore.

Saturday Special: Helping Yemen?

Forty years later, Yemen made a similar entrance into Egyptian national consciousness. When Israel defeated Egypt in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, much of Egypt’s army was fighting a protracted and bloody guerilla war in Yemen.

The experience of Turkey and Egypt should give U.S. officials pause, as they contemplate intervening in Yemen and along its 1,800-kilometer border with Saudi Arabia.


That border is one of the most disputed regions in the Middle East.  Its deserts and vast open spaces assist smugglers transporting various consumer goods, weapons, illicit drugs, and illegal immigrants. Al-Qaeda has reportedly brought weapons and explosives into Saudi Arabia from Yemen and trained operatives in the country, such as Umar Farouk Abdul Mutallab, the Nigerian man who sought to destroy a U.S. airliner on Christmas Day 2009.

Although Yemen and Saudi Arabia both wish to eradicate al-Qaeda, their efforts to control the border are hampered by years of mutual mistrust. The two countries fought wars over the border region as recently as 1934, and Yemenis have claimed that Red Sea Saudi islands and the southern Saudi regions of ‘Asir, Najran, Tihamah, and Jizan should be part of Yemen. Saudi Arabia has tried to build a fence along the border, which was only officially demarcated in the year 2000.

Further complicating matters is the nature of the border communities. Not only are there Sunni Muslims, but there are also Ismailis and Zaydi Shi‘a Muslims. Zaydis are more than 40 percent of Yemen’s population and have a tangible presence in Saudi Arabia. (Jews even lived in Najran until the 1950s.)  Riyadh’s relations with border peoples are often problematic, while the Huthis, a Zaydi rebel group, have attacked Yemeni and Saudi military forces.  The Huthis have also received moral and potentially military support from Iran.  In 2009, Saudi Arabia sought to destroy the Huthis by launching the Kingdom’s biggest military operation since 1991.  As of February 2010, the Huthis continue to fight on both sides of the border, and the Saudi offensive has become a contentious issue between Riyadh and Tehran.

In the long run, the best U.S. approach in South Arabia is to continue to support Yemen and Saudi Arabia, since both have the incentive and the means to attack American enemies there. Any other approach risks starting Americans down the road to a military quagmire. Indeed, no American need die in the sands of Yemen for Washington’s policies to succeed in the Middle East.