Iran Video Interview: Mahmoud Ahmadinejad with France 24

President Ahmadinejad's interview with France 24 on Wednesday, covering topics such as Iran's nuclear programme and the violence in Syria:

Iran Special: Tehran's View of Nuclear Talks --- Insight, Propaganda, or Self-Deception?

The Iranian belief --- if it is is genuine --- that it still has some leverage because of European weakness and fear is significant. It indicates that Tehran will persist with a defiant approach in Moscow. If it even chooses to address the nuclear issue as central, it will restate its demand not only for some enrichment of uranium on its soil, but for enrichment to 20% --- the level beyond bounds for the 5+1 Powers. It will refuse any reduction of activity at the Fordoo enrichment activity, let alone the closure demanded by the US and the Europeans. It will offer no concession, ahead of an easing of sanctions, over inspections and safeguards by the IAEA.

The Islamic Republic will offer none of this because it believes that it can win the game of diplomatic "chicken". The Moscow talks will break up with no advance.

Two weeks later, it will be 1 July and the imposition of the European Union's cut-off of Iranian oil. Then we will see if propaganda and mis-perception gives way to cold economic reality.

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Iran Feature: Tehran Sees US Nuke Proposal as "Good Start"? (Mostaghim)

On Friday, we noted a report in the Los Angeles Times, fed by unnamed US officials, which pointed to an American offer on Iran's uranium enrichment. We asked, "Will Iran, with its new-found capability to enrich to 20%, be willing to pull back to 5%? And if so, what will it seek in return from the US and European powers?"

Now an answer: "Iranian officials expressed skepticism Saturday about possible Obama administration support for allowing the country to continue enriching some uranium but said it could be a good start for further negotiations on its disputed nuclear program."

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Iran Snap Analysis: A Nuclear Breakthrough? "US Could Allow Limited Enrichment"

If this leak is supported by senior figures in Washington, this is a significant move from the US Government in the nuclear negotiations:

In a major concession, Obama administration officials say they could support allowing Iran to continue a crucial element of its disputed nuclear program if the government in Tehran took other major steps to curb its ability to develop a nuclear bomb.

The officials told the Los Angeles Times they might agree to let Tehran continue enriching uranium up to concentrations of 5% if the Iranian government agreed to unrestricted inspections, and strict oversight and safeguards that the United Nations long has demanded.

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Iran Analysis: A 4-Point Beginner's Guide to the Nuclear Talks

After days of last-minute fencing --- reflecting both the tensions of diplomacy and the tensions within the Iranian political system --- Tehran finally agreed on Monday to the start of nuclear discussions in Istanbul. Iran's representatives will sit down with those of the 5+1 Powers (US, UK, France, Russia, China, and Germany) on Saturday to consider the future of Tehran's uranium enrichment.

The theatrical dispute over location, which started when Iran pulled back last week from Turkey as the host of the talks, ended with the declaration that Istanbul's opening meeting would be followed by another round of discussions in Baghdad.

At one level, that's a face-saving arrangement. The Islamic Republic had boxed itself in with its posture that Turkey --- which has been a diplomatic partner of Tehran, which had been vital in working with Iran for a possible agreement in 2010, but which had angered some in the regime with its position on the Syrian crisis --- was no longer acceptable as the venue. The Iranians (and by this, I primarily mean the Supreme Leader) either had to take this pose all the way to the collapse of discussions even before they started, or accept that it was the Istanbul way or no way for the negotiations.

At another level, however, the Baghdad add-on is a tip-off from the Islamic Republic to the US and European powers not to expect an immediate meeting of minds in Turkey. If there is to be an agreement, it will have to come through lengthy talks producing compromise, rather than an Iranian concession to sanctions and other pressure, and an arrangement not only respecting but highlighting the Islamic Republic's sovereignty. A meeting in Iraq is symbolic of that desire --- the Iranians know that Washington is suspicious of Baghdad's political leanings towards Tehran, so the US would have to make a concession in entering that diplomatic territory.

At the same time, the setting-out of not just one but two sets of talks --- albeit with those in Baghdad on an unspecified date, only to be confirmed at the end of Istanbul --- raises the question as to whether either side will put a substantial offer on the table this week or whether each will fence for position, trying to get the other to tip off their negotiating hand and even give way on it.

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Iran Propaganda Special: US Officials Spin Away from War

On Friday, Reuters published a significant article by Tabassum Zakaria and Mark Hosenball, "Intel Shows Iran Nuclear Threat Not Imminent".

The significance, however, is not in the "Intel": the information in the article is far from new. What is significant is that, in the battle amongst US officials to set the agenda over Iran, that information has not only resurfaced but has gained the upper hand.

The media spin has shifted. Iran is no longer an imminent threat. Although it should still be watched, Tehran is not approaching the Obama "red line" --- the pursuit of the Bomb --- which would bring Washington's endorsement of a strike on Iranian facilities.

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Special Report: Intel Shows Iran Nuclear Threat Not Imminent
Tabassum Zakaria and Mark Hosenball

The United States, European allies and even Israel generally agree on three things about Iran's nuclear program: Tehran does not have a bomb, has not decided to build one, and is probably years away from having a deliverable nuclear warhead.

For months, the analysis that "Tehran does not have a bomb, has not decided to build one, and is probably years away from having a deliverable nuclear warhead", put forward in the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate, had been pushed aside. Instead --- partly because of pressure from Congress, partly because of its own drive for tough sanctions --- the Administration had used compliant reporters to put out the spectre of an imminent Iranian threat.

This was just a spectre: there has little if any information since 2007 pointing to a resumption of a militarised Iranian programme. However, politics ruled the day in the presentation of the nuclear issue.

And that is still the case. What changed, with respect to Zakaria and Hosenball, was not some breakthrough of investigative journalism. Rather, key members in the Obama Adminisration, including the President, began to worry that an Israeli attack might become a reality rather than a perpetual warning. And some officials are also seeking a deal with Tehran over the nuclear issue, or at least accepting the resumption of talks.

So the media spin has shifted. Iran is no longer an imminent threat. Although it should still be watched, Tehran is not approaching the Obama "red line" --- the pursuit of the Bomb --- which would bring Washington's endorsement of a strike on Iranian facilities.

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Iran Document & Snap Analysis: The IAEA Report on Tehran's Nuclear Programme

I suspect there will be a lot of fuss this weekend about today's quarterly report from the International Agency Energy Agency, much of it made without actually reading the document. Many in the mainstream media are already primed to see a likely if not inevitable military showdown, and they will be fed soundbites that prove Iran's confrontational approach.

In fact, the major shift is not in substance --- "the Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material" is the same clause in its conclusions of the last two years --- but in tone.

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Iran Special Analysis (Part 1): The Nuclear Report --- "May" Is Not "Definitely"

Let's start with the "smoking gun" statement from the IAEA that does not exactly smoke: 

Prior to the end of 2003....activities [which may be related to a militarised nuclear effort] took place under a structured programme. There are also indications that some activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device continued after 2003, and that some may still be ongoing. 

"May" is not definitely. In the analogy of the BBC's Paul Danahar, drawing from the language of a Reuters report, "If the answer to the question 'Do you think she likes me?' was 'strong indications that she might possibly", I would not be off to buy a ring."

But let's examine "may" in the context of the IAEA's 15-page annex, which in the spin of unnamed officials to media this week, became "definitely".

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Iran Interview: Ahmadinejad to Washington Post "If US Gives Us Uranium, We Will Stop Production"

"If [the US] gives us uranium grade 20 percent, we would stop production. Those negotiations took place in Vienna. Apparently they know everything. I repeat: If you give us uranium grade 20 percent now, we will stop production."

This, in effect, is a return to Ahmadinejad's hopes for a deal in the autumn 2009 talks, where his effort to get an agreement was undermined by domestic opposition (as Weymouth astutely notes). Far from giving up the effort, this statement indicates he is determined to try once more.

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The Latest from Iran (12 September): The Nuclear Front

2105 GMT: The Battle Within. Yasaman Baji offers an overview of the political tensions as conservative and principlist factions vie for position:

Intense competition among different wings of forces claiming absolute loyalty to the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei, has created a muddled political environment, making it difficult to speculate about the direction of the country after the term of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad expires in 2013.

The March elections to the Majlis could be a bellwether. In the past, parliamentary elections held right before the president's second term is over have been significant in hinting the future direction the country under the next president.

Today, increasingly acrimonious competition among devoted supporters of the Islamic Republic, known as Principlists, has the country wondering about whether there are plans to continue the country's hard-line direction without Ahmadinejad or whether instead the more- moderate conservative elements within the Principlist camp will take the reins and steer the country in a more centrist direction.

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