Iran: How Far Do The Green Movements Go?

Monday was distinguished by statements from the opposition. Both Mehdi Karroubi and Mohammad Khatami issued analyses and, in the case of Karroubi, a five-point proposal to complement the 1 January declaration of Mir Hossein Mousavi.

As protesters draw breath during a relatively long pause between major demonstrations, the question may not be how the regime reacts to these statements --- my reading, set out yesterday, is that the Iranian Government's immediate concern is challenges within the establishment than with the pressure beyond it --- but how the Green movement(s) respond.

While Karroubi and Khatami were clear in their criticisms of the regime, both also emphasised that their approach rested on non-violence on all sides and that their resolutions were within the system, adhering to the Constitution. What, however, does adherence to the Constitution entail? Would this just be a question of apologies, compensation, and the punishment of some officials? Or would the demands reach to the removal of President Ahmadinejad for his responsibility in the failures and abuses? Do they include a change in the position of the Supreme Leader?

(Our initial evaluation that Karroubi had specifically mentioned Khamenei in his five-point plan has not been followed by other summaries. We are double-checking.)

An analysis from an activist sets out the issue forcefully:

The green movement, at least when it comes to its slogans, has defined some short-term objectives. Slogans which, at an earlier point, consisted of calling Ahmadinejad a liar or questioning his 63% share of the vote have now become more direct and confrontational, addressing the dictator himself and wanting an end to the dictatorship.

Why is it that, when the demand of the main body of the movement has evolved to such an extent, the leaders, namely Mousavi and Karroubi, refuse to announce it openly? Why is there no mention of this demand in the statement issued by Bazargan, Soroush, Kadivar, Ganji, and Mohajerani (the five Iranian expatriate intellectuals who issued their 10 Demands two days after Mousavi's New Year statement)?

The demand for the removal of Khamenei is, in reality, a demand for fundamental change; it is tantamount to the negation of his policies for the last 20 years, but at the same time, it does not equal the overthrow of the regime. This demand does not even mean the negation of the supreme leadership as a principle. Even the most conservatives groups within the green movement can remain loyal to Khomeini’s ideals (that is, loyalty to the supreme leader), while simultaneously agreeing that Khamenei is not competent for the position.

The Latest from Iran (11 January): Reading the Regime

2045 GMT: Sanctions La-Dee-Dah. Associated Press is a-quiver over this statement by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, though I'm not sure why:

It is clear that there is a relatively small group of decision makers inside Iran. They are in both political and commercial relationships, and if we can create a sanctions track that targets those who actually make the decisions, we think that is a smarter way to do sanctions. But all that is yet to be decided upon.

That's not a breakthrough declaration, only a holding one. The White House does not want the sweeping sanctions proposed by Congress and will go for a "targeted" approach. It's just not clear who is being targeted with what.

1945 GMT: Journalist Mohammad Reza Nourbakhsh has been sentenced to three years in jail by an appeals court for participating in rallies on 15 June. Nourbakhsh was originally given a six-year prison term.

1940 GMT: Beaten in Detention. Kalemeh claims Mehdi Mahmoudian, a senior member of the reformist Islamic Iran Participation Front, has been beaten by the authorities in Evin Prison.

NEW Iran Exclusive: The Latest Nuclear Riddle — Renewed Talks with “West”?
NEW Iran Analysis: Beyond the Headlines, The Regime Battles Itself
NEW Iran & Twitter: Myth v. Reality of Security and “Deep Packet Inspection”
NEW Iran & Twitter: Last Words on The Hell of Heaven (Shahryar)
Latest Iran Video: Military Commander Mullen on US Options (10 January)
Iran Special Analysis: A US Move to “Sanctions for Rights”?
Iran: Challenge to The Government in “The Heartlands”?
The Latest from Iran (10 January): “Middle” Ground?

1935 GMT: The Detained. Back from an academic break to find that an Iranian activist has posted the names of 156 people arrested between the religious days of Tasoa and Ashura (26-27 December) and 9 January.

1635 GMT: Spinning Rafsanjani. Hashemi Rafsanjani, speaking as chairman of the Expediency Council, has made another general call for reconcilation.

Press TV portrays this as "the Iranian nation should follow the rule of the law and avoid taking extrajudicial measures as not to obstruct the path of justice". While this could be applied as an injunction to both the opposition and Government forces, the state outlet puts the emphasis is on following the guidance of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic: "If [this is] obeyed, balance will return to the society and there will be no room left for frictions. Foreign enemies have clung to the current state of affairs in the country as it is apparent in their tone."

The website also tries to rebut the claim, made by Rafsanjani's brother this weekend, that the former President has been pressured into silence. Instead, it claimed that "Rafsanjani rejected the notion and said he was always trying to resolve the problems away from media hype".

1615 GMT: Those Wacky Leveretts. They may have had their pro-Government, anti-Green movement opinion, published in The New York Times, shredded by analyst after analyst, but that doesn't stop Flynt and Hillary Mann Leverett from returning to their defence of the regime.

On their website, the Leveretts crudely twist a Wall Street Journal article (which was considered in an EA analysis yesterday on the US policy on sanctions, Iran's nuclear programme, and a "rights-first" approach) into "THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION MOVES TOWARD REGIME CHANGE IN ITS IRAN POLICY". They select and crop quotes, to the point of distortion, but this is their sleight-of-hand claim:

Buying into the proposition that the Islamic Republic is imploding has the effect of driving the policy argument toward support for “regime change” in Tehran.

Umm, no. There is a difference between analysis --- in this case, evaluating the internal difficulties in the Iranian regime --- and advocacy. It's the "is-ought" difference, one which should be picked up by an undergraduate student, let alone a supposed foreign-policy expert: noting that something "is" happening is not the same as declaring it "ought" to happen.

The Leveretts are not undergraduate students, so they know what they are doing. By putting out this claim, "whether President Obama and his advisers want to call their policy “regime change”, that is precisely the direction in which they are moving", they will buttress the propaganda line of the Iranian Government that the opposition can all be attributed to "foreign instigation". (I heard this declaration loud and clear in two presentations, including one by an  academic who works with the Leveretts, at the Beirut conference I attended last week.)

Since the survival of the Iranian regime rests in part on making that allegation stick, and since the Leveretts support the quest for that survival, let's just recognise this piece for what it is: an "ought" piece of advocacy rather than an "is" contribution to analysis.

(P.S. to Flynt and Hillary: Throwing in a picture of Senator Joseph Lieberman, who is calling for a "rights-based" approach to sanctions, with Ahmad Chalabi of Iraq "regime change" infamy, is a really nice touch.)

1505 GMT: Today's Fist-Shaker. It's Iran Prosecutor General Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejeie making an appearance to tell Tehran Prosecutor General Abbas Jafari Doulatabadi that it's time for measures against "elements behind the recent sedition....It is expected that the demands ... that those who were leading the post-election sedition are put on trial, are met."

1500 GMT: The "Reformist" Push. Former President Mohammad Khatami has put out his own statement, following that of Mehdi Karroubi, calling for an end to the "extreme violence" and dialogue over political, social, and economic issues.

1455 GMT: A Day for Analyses. Not sure why, but a lot of information seems to be falling into place today. The latest topic is Iran's nuclear manoeuvres with "the West" --- we've got an exclusive on Tehran's latest attempt to keep the discussions going.

1340 GMT: Waving Sticks. EA readers have offered comments considering the reasons for this weekend's declaration by General David Petraeus, the head of the US military's Central Command, that all military options are open in contingency plans for Iran (see yesterday's updates).

For the Iranian Government, however, there is a simple reading. The Foreign Ministry spokesman declared today, "[Petraeus'] comments are thoughtless and it is better that any statement made in this regard take a constructive approach."

1315 GMT: The Karroubi Statement (see 1150 GMT). Reuters has picked up on Mehdi Karroubi's declaration with takeaway quotes such as....

[I am] prepared for any disaster.....Some are thinking that they can block the reform course by closing down newspapers and putting reformers in jail ... but I remain firm in the path that I have chosen....I announce that such threats will not frighten me and will not weaken me in this path.

Agence France Presse has a shorter but similar article. Inexplicably, both Reuters and AFP miss the even more important part of Karroubi's statement, the 5-point proposal for resolution.

1200 GMT: We've posted a special analysis, based on latest developments and speech, of the battles within the Iranian regime. The conclusion? This will only be resolved "when someone stabs Ahmadinejad in the back".

1150 GMT: Karroubi's "5-Point" Plan. First it was Mir Hossein Mousavi with a 5-point post-Ashura proposal for political resolution; now it's Mehdi Karroubi.

Karroubi has written an open letter proposing 1) admission by Government officials of injustices; 2) adherence to the values of the Islamic Revolution through guarantees such as freedom of the press and legal rights; 3) adherence to non-violence for reform and acceptance of the Supreme Leader; 4) acceptance of criticism and an end to violence against those who dissent; 5) a national debate so Iranian people can make a free and informed decision about the way forward for the country.

1145 GMT: Rah-e-Sabz reports that 56 professors at Elm-o-Sanat University in Tehran have written in support of students, asking that they are able to take examinations without fear of disciplinary action over protests.

The intervention follows an open letter by almost 90 professors at Tehran University to the Supreme Leader, asking for a cessation of violence against demonstrations.

1130 GMT: The "Incomplete" Detainees Report. Parallelling and extending the "reformist" criticism that the Parliament report on detainee abuse is incomplete, Ayande News --- which is far from reformist --- is claiming that Iranian state media have not given a full account of the report and its discussion in the Majlis. Ayande even asks whether those responsible for the abuses at Kahrizak Prison are also responsible for output on Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting.

1110 GMT: Foreign Presence. The Government's overseas push is in Syria, as Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki visits Damascus. No significant news has come out of the talks so far.

0920 GMT: No major news this morning, but a lot of individual developments with deeper meanings this weekend. The Supreme Leader's speech, President Ahmadinejad's appearance in Parliament, the arrest of the Mothers of Mourning and their supporters in Laleh Park, the Parliamentary report on the abuse of detainees: all have gotten headline coverage, but the intra-regime tensions that they reveal have yet to be analysed, if recognised. We'll make a start on that analysis later today.

Meanwhile, Josh Shahryar and Mike Dunn have special analyses trying to put away the recent mis-information on #IranElection, Twitter, and security. Shahryar offers final words of reply to Will Heaven, the blogger for The Daily Telegraph who tried to blame "Twitterati" for endangering the Iranian people, while Dunn separates myth from reality over "Deep Packet Inspection".

Iran: A Gut Reaction to Mousavi's "Martyrdom v. Compromise" Statement

Over the last 24 hours, what has been almost as striking is Mir Hossein Mousavi's post-Ashura statement is the division in responses to it. Some activists and observers have seen the letter, with its references to "martyrdom", as a declaration of Mousavi's defiance and willingness to take that defiance to a final showdown with the Iranian regime; others, looking at the five steps proposed by Mousavi for a resolution of conflict, have seen the statement --- for better or worse --- as a proposal for compromise, accepting and indeed affirming the current Iranian system.

For me, the division arises because Mousavi's letter is actually two statements directed to two different audiences, seeking their recognition and possibly acceptance:

Iran Document: Mousavi’s “5 Stages to Resolution” Statement (1 January)
The Latest from Iran (2 January): The Ripples of the Mousavi Statement

Statement Number 1 is to the activists of the Green movement: "I am with you. I am with you to the end against the injustices and betrayals of this regime."

Statement Number 2 is to the regime: "I do not want to have to go to the end with the opposition. I do not want to do so because this will bring more bloodshed and tear apart the Islamic Republic. So let us move towards an agreement that will restore what is best about our system."

Thus, the first part --- indeed the majority --- of the statement is an eloquent, passionate, at times fiery pronouncement (perhaps significantly, written within a few days of the death of Mousavi's nephew in the Ashura demonstration) that Mousavi stands with the Green movement in its fight. At no point, interestingly, does he claim to lead the movement. Indeed, there is the striking remark that he, as well as Mehdi Karroubi and Mohammad Khatami, refrained from a call for Ashura demonstrations, but still the movement turned out in force last Sunday.

Because Mousavi does not claim to lead the movement, he does not have to deal with the issue of what that movement's demands have moved beyond a "reform" of the Islamic Republic. Instead, he moves to the second part of the statement, a pragmatic, point-by-point description of measures which is cool both in tone and in language --- let us ease the rushing river that both threatens to overwhelm us and stagnates under the burden of conflict.

Those measures are far from new. Indeed, once the conflict moved beyond the question of the results of the Presidential election and to the illegitimate, unjust declarations, threats, and punishment of the Government, they were set out by both Mehdi Karroubi and Mousavi in the autumn. Respect for the Constitution, freeing of political prisoners with compensation for them and their families, acknowledgement of errors, corruptions, and violations by Government officials: these are the steps of restitution and reconciliation within the system.

Well, the tension between the first part and second part seems evident: as an EA reader concisely pointed out this morning, "[The issue is] if these reformist circles still adhere to reforms within the system, or if they have recognized them being impossible in the velayat-e faqih [system of ultimate clerical authority]" of the Islamic Republic."

Put even more bluntly, what happens if Mousavi's 5-point plan is rejected by the Government? The one way out may be the ultimate scapegoating, with the dismissal of President Ahmadinejad both as implicit recognition of the electoral manipulations and explicit condemnation of the corruptions --- political, economic, and ideological; note Mousavi's attention to Iran's economic issues and foriegn policy --- of the Government. Surely, however, that moment passed once the Supreme Leader anointed Ahmadinejad's second term in August.

So what happens when Mousavi is met not by negotiation but by silence or even by more threats? Does he indeed declare that he is with the Green movement to the end --- an end which means not "unity" but more conflict? Does he really declare that not only Ahmadinejad and his inner circle but the Supreme Leader and his have had their last chance?

Does he still stand alongside the factions in the Green movement, not as leader but as "one of them"?

Iran: 2009's Year of Living Dangerously (Part 1)

A special analysis from EA's Mr Smith:

When Iran entered 2009, most observers thought that the year --- which marked the 30th anniversary of the Revolution that swept away the Shah's regime and the 20th anniversary of "post-Khomeini Iran", the unwieldy political arrangement that emerged in the aftermath of the death of the founding father of the Islamic Republic --- would also see a lacklustre confirmation of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad for a second Presidential term.

As Iran exits the year, it is reeling from its worst-ever political crisis, one that has finally undermined the halo of sanctity built over the persona of the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, in the past two decades and has finally witnessed the collapse of the fragile factional equilibrium that held sway for the past decade.

After half a decade of carefully pasteurised electoral lists produced by the Guardian Council, there were serious doubts about the population's appetite for electoral politics. Iranian history, however, always remind us that change is sudden and abrupt rather than gradual and predictable. Conscious of their eroding influence in state affairs and their descent into oblivion in the eyes of public opinion, reformist political leaders were determined to make a last stand, one that had to rely upon the return to the scene of its most prominent figure.

Shortly before the anniversary of the Revolution's triumph, February 11, former President Mohammad Khatami, still loved by the urban middle classes, succumbed to the incessant campaign carried out --- largely through the Internet --- by his youthful supporters. He announced that he would "seriously" enter the Presidential campaign. The declaration seemed to fulfil Khatami's earlier promise that either he or the hitherto obscure Mir-Hossein Mousavi, a darling of Ayatollah Khomeini in the Eighties who had estranged himself from politics ever since the death of his mentor, would join the race.

For reasons unknown, Mousavi did not keep to this informal pact and stand aside for Khatami. Several weeks later, he suddenly announced the end of his political lethargy and his intention to register as a candidate for the 12 June elections. An embarrassed Khatami was forced to withdraw from the race shortly afterwards, with the prospect of three heavyweight reformist candidates --- former Majlis speaker Mehdi Karroubi had long announced his presently in the race --- weakening the reformist chances.

Mousavi's re-entrance into the mainstream was an enigma to many. Notwithstanding his long absence from day-to-day politics, his particularly bad relationship with Ayatollah Khamenei throughout the late 1980, with Mousavi's departure from the scene once he was defeated by the present Supreme Leader in a struggle over the reform of the Constitution, meant that any forced co-habitation with Khamenei would not be a happy one.

After a long Internet-based prologue and the start of campaign meetings in March and April, Iran's presidential race picked up pace about three weeks before June 12. Indeed, it was proving to be different. Suddenly the whole nation's squares were ablaze with incessant debate on the virtues and fallacies of each candidate. Popular participation in hustings and meetings was unprecedented, considerably higher than even Khatami's quasi-mythical victory back in May 1997. When the administration of Tehran's Polytechnic (Amir Kabir University), the nation's most politicised campus, denied Karroubi the use of their premises for a campaign event, the 72 year-old cleric was lifted into the campus for an impromptu sermon within the university mosque. It was there that the slogan "Marg bar Diktator" ("Death to Dictator") re-echoed where it was conceived a generation earlier.

A few days before the elections, another innovation of political campaigning had a lasting effect on the emerging contest. For the first time ever, Iranian television featured US-styled debates between the political candidates. The detached criticism that marked the previous presidential campaigns was replaced by the unearthing of latent tension and hatred.

Anxious to prove his position of defender of the common man against the vicious tentacles of the likes of former President Hashemi Rafsanjani, Ahmadinejad claimed --- in his highly-anticipated debate with Mir-Hossein Mousavi --- that he was the victim of a plot hatched by Rafsanjani and executed by Mousavi and Karroubi. The association of the head of the Assembly of Experts and the two candidates was, however, a clumsy move. Karroubi had fiercely criticised Rafsanjani on many occasions during the past two decades, while Mousavi was anything but an ally of the then-Majlis speaker during the 1980s. It was and still is impossible to gauge the effect of Ahmadinejad's accusation on the population.

The last days before the vote transformed the streets of Tehran and other major cities into a never-ending open-air carnival. At 6 or 7 p.m., acting as though a switch had suddenly turned them on, tens of thousands of people would descend upon the capital's main thoroughfares in cars, on motorcycles, or on foot to campaign for their candidate. The equally-divided crowds of the first few days of campaigning soon developed into large crowds for either Mousavi or Ahmadinejad --- Karroubi and Mohsen Rezaei appeared to be lagging behind in the final stages of the campaigning. Rather than being based on distinct electoral programmes, the campaign took the form of a clash of personalities, with voters left to chose the candidate that best embodied their own social position and aspirations. Mousavi's calls for the removal of limits to the "flow of information", his statement that Iran should stop being an enemy of many foreign powers, and, most importantly, his defiant calls against the "lies" and "unaccountability" of Ahmadinejad were decisive in shoring his support for him amongst a vast segment of the urban population.

On the eve of the vote, virtually all analysts and journalists were placing their guess on a run-off between the two major candidates. The exception was the management of the Karroubi-owned Etemade Melli newspaper, who over the course of the last few days before the vote was repeatedly warning observers in private that "things had been arranged to ensure a first-round Ahmadinejad victory". A similar warning was given, before a single vote had been cast, to one of the major international news agencies in Tehran by another source well-placed inside the regime. Etemade Melli devoted most of the front page on the eve of the vote to an article, "We Shall All Remain Awake on Friday Night". It was an implicit reminder of Karroubi's "nap" at 5 a.m. on the night the votes were counted in the first round of 2005, which allegedly cost the cleric the chance to compete in a run-off with Rafsanjani (a run-off that would have precluded any Ahmadinejad Presidency).

June 12 began as a hot, sticky day in Tehran. At the last minute, Mir-Hossein Mousavi reverse his decision to vote together with Rafsanjani and Khatami at Ayatollah Khomeini's residence in Jamaran, North Tehran, and cast his ballot instead at a mosque in Shahr-e Rey, an old and humble area of South Tehran. His smile ended as soon as he took to the podium to deliver a short post-vote speech. In it he claimed, at 10:30 a.m. on Election day, that irregularities were already taking place across the country.

Ahmadinejad voted in Afsariyeh, West Tehran. For the rest of the day, people turned out in droves to cast their votes in all areas of the capital. Turnout was especially strong in middle-class areas whose desertion from the ballot box had helped Ahmadinejad become Mayor of Tehran in 2003 and President in 2005.

As nightfall descended, the news was not quite what was expected. Reformist supporters had already gathered outside the Interior Ministry, and Mousavi emerged for a press conference, during which he dared to claim that he was the victor of the bitterly-fought contest, and that any other result would be the product of fraud.

As the night wore on, the official returns would not show a Mousavi victory. Indeed, they would not even point to the run-off predicted by almost all observers. Not only would the gap between Mousavi and Ahmadinejad widen, the President would easily hurdle the 50 percent required for a first-round victory. To the shock and dismay of the reformist supporters and voters, Ahmadinejad was declared the winner on 13 June.