Iran Discussion: How Would Ahmadinejad Fall? (And What Would Come Next?)

Chris Emery and another top EA correspondent respond to yesterday's "The Plot Against President Ahmadinejad" and readers' question by considering the process for the President's removal and the political questions that would follow:

EMERY: First of all, we should not overlook that there would have to be another election within 50 days in the case of impeachment. The massive question then would be whether (Mir Hossein) Mousavi would be barred from standing. If he was, then the exercise in restoring legitimacy is worthless. If he wasn't, then the regime would be taking a monumental step. Can't see it happening for those reasons alone.

Iran: A Response to “The Plot Against Ahmadinejad”
Iran: The Plot Against President Ahmadinejad
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But if it did....


My understanding is that constitutionally the Majlis Speaker would take a central role in any impeachment. They would also be responsible, along with the Deputy President and head of the Judiciary to arrange for the new President to be elected within 50 days. This may be complicated if (Speaker of Parliament) Ali Larijani is standing.

That would partly explain Rafsanjani's influence in 1981 as head of the Majlis. It might not give him quite as an important role now. On the other hand, in the above scenario, there would be two Larijanis and a weak Deputy (President) at the center of the process.

I also believe that in the case of dismissal of the President, the Deputy would take over until a new election. That would put (Mohammad Reza) Rahimi in temporary power.

However, in the case of "other matters which prevent him to perform his duties", the Leader "shall appoint another person in his place". Even if Rahimi doesn't have the "approval" of the Supreme Leader, Khamenei can appoint another for the interim. So the SL could have his pick for 50, probably quite important, days. But I assume they would not get rid of Rahimi and declare an election quickly.

(Tehran Mayor Mohammad-Baqer) Qalibaf or Larijani or possibly (Secretary of Expediency Council Mohsen) Rezaei most likely to be acceptable to (Revolutionary) Guards and Supreme Leader. The Greens would take Qalibaf, but I suspect the international community would be happy with Larijani.

I said on Enduring America a while back that getting rid of Ahmadinejad and a modest amount of judicial reform or scapegoating would be the best way of splitting the opposition and isolating the fringe who want to dismantle the Islamic Republic. This initiative makes perfect sense but for the problem of an election.

Let me know where I am going wrong.

CORRESPONDENT: Chris, your reading is substantially correct, however the lack of precedent under the present Constitution, i.e. the one in place since 1989, means that it is likely that none of the gritty details contained in it will be respected. My gut feeling is that we won't see new elections in 50 days time, if and when Ahmadinejad is dethroned, but rather a temporary Presidential council taking over, with the usual suspects --- Larijani, Qalibaf, Rezaei, perhaps some Mousavi-leaning people --- part of it.

However, the big, unattended question in my view is --- what happens to Ahmadinejad himself if he is ousted? He certainly won't take the [deposed President in 1981, Abdolhassan] Bani Sadr route and challenge the regime before fleeing abroad, and he won't be chucked into regime retirement homes like the Supreme Leader's office and/or the Expediency Council either. How quite anyone intends to handle an impeached Ahmadinejad is quite a mystery for me, given that the man arguably has more popularity now than what Bani Sadr enjoyed at the moment of his ousting.

EMERY: I agree there is a lack of precedent, but the provisions and mechanisms for impeachment were not altered in 1989.

Would they really make up an entirely extra-Constitutional body? Perhaps they could amend the Constitution, but that was a lengthy undertaking last time and took a public referendum.

Perhaps I'm thinking too orthodox, and they could do this on the fly, but I remain skeptical that this will really happen. Not least because of the problem of what to do with Ahmadinejad. Can't quite see him donning a chador, escaping to France, and joining forces with MEK (Mujahedin e-Khalq, opposed to the Iran regime since 1979)! Of course the sensible thing to do would be to have Ahmadinejadmeet an accident and blame MEK-US-Israel-Mousavi....

CORRESPONDENT: Chris, the impeachment scenario today is very different from 30 years ago. At the time, executive power was in the hands of the Prime Minister, and Bani Sadr was technically impeached because he was relieved of his technically ceremonial office.

This time round the whole executive branch of state enters a state of paralysis, collapse, and uncertainty which cannot be rapidly hushed up like 1981, when prime minister Mohammad Ali Rajai's government, at the time totally estranged from President Bani Sadr, kept on working --- ironically one of the very first decisions after the ouster of Bani Sadr was appointing one Mir-Hossein Mousavi to the vacant Foreign Minister position. Besides, at the time there was Khomeini who could rally everyone around himself. Khamenei will not be able to redeem himself via a simple ouster of Ahmadinejad.

As for extra-constitutional bodies, there is ample precedent. The Assembly of Experts was founded in 1983 or 1984 and included in the Constitution in 1989 --- ditto the Expediency Council, which Khomeini created in January-February 1988 and which was finally incorporated in the Constitution in June 1989. All it needs is essentially a decree by Khamenei.

EMERY: So impeachment would for political reasons have to be accompanied, not by the Consitutional provisions, but by the establishment of a temporary Presidential Council which may or may not receive consitutional legitimacy some years down the line. I still think this would be an extraordinary step. It would presumably have to be rubber-stamped by Parliament.

Also, how temporary would this council be? presumably till the next election cycle?

CORRESPONDENT: I think anything, including Ahmadinejad's resignation would be exceptional and extraordinary right now, and would not solve the political crisis in the long term for sure. I am not even sure his impeachment would ensure a working government, I have reasons to believe that it would unleash anarchy.

Besides, Khamenei has erred on the side of caution throughout the past 20 years. To stick a neck out and implicitly acknowledge that he screwed it up big time on [the Presidential election of] 12-13 June would be a step too far. So I think Khamenei would agree to such a plan only if it were backed up by cast-iron guarantees from everyone involved that he and his cronies (Revolutionary Guards especially) would be left unscathed.

As to how Mousavi and (Mehdi) Karroubi would react to all this, considering that they risk alienating their popular base en masse if they appear to buckle under the terms of a pro-Khamenei agreement --- as a Qalibaf-Larijani-Rezaei one would certainly be portrayed as by the reformist media.... That remains also very much to be seen.

The Latest from Iran (22 January): Breaking News

0030 GMT: Just a quick note to say that we've extended our break. We'll be back first thing Saturday morning with full updates, including the latest on "the plot against Ahmadinejad".

1845 GMT: We're going to catch our breath tonight after the excitement of today. We'll be back later for a wrap-up; in the meantime, keep sending in information and your analyses.

1820 GMT: Larijani's Opening? We'll need to get more on this statement by Ali Larijani, during Friday Prayers in Saveh, southwest of Tehran, but there is a hint in Mehr News that the Speaker of Parliament has extended a hand to different factions when it paraphrases, "Every effort should be made to foster unity in society, and everyone should refrain from divisive actions meant to drive individuals off the political stage."

The Persian-language report, significantly, devotes most of its attention not to the "unity" statement but to Larijani's critique of the Government's economic proposals.

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1735 GMT: Press TV Censors Ahmad Khatami? Surely not, but the website curiously omits any mention of Khatami's warning to Iranian protesters and the call for all to choose the side of the Supreme Leader (see 1250 and 1645 GMT). Instead, the entire report is "Cleric Says Iran Nuclear Case Important 'Test'".

1730 GMT: Journalist Leili Farhadpour has been arrested.

1645 GMT: More on That Friday Prayer (see 1250 GMT). Persian2English translates passages of Ahmad Khatami's statement, which is his usual warning to deviant demonstrators:

To our brothers who call themselves protesters, we ask, how much longer are you going to continue with your protests? Are you still going to use your destructive statements which neglect the law? Are you going to water the roots of those who try to turn any cooperative situation into a conflict? They say it was not them who created the chaos; the question is who initiated this atmosphere? How long are you going to continue your protests and annoy the people?

This passage, however, does give pause for consideration: "The group who considers themselves critics should announce where they stand. Either they are on this side [with the Supreme Leader and velayat-e-faqih] or they are on the other side. There is no third way."

That seems to echo Ayatollah Khamenei's statement earlier this week on "make your decision", but to whom was Khatami pointing the statement? Those deviant demonstrators, or the "critics within" the establishment?

1530 GMT: The German magazine Der Spiegel reports that Abed Tavancheh has been sentenced to one year in an Iranian prison for giving an interview about student protests.

1525 GMT: Hassan Rohani, an ally of Hashemi Rafsanjani, has continued to clash with President Ahmadinejad over the "failed" 4th Development Plan. After the Government ridiculed his data, Rohani has responded in detail in Peyke Iran.

1515 GMT: Earlier today (0845 GMT), we noted the manifesto of 31 Iranian expatriate intellectuals and artists: "The way out of this darkness, and of poverty and oppression caused by it, is that people make clear their relationship with tyranny through free elections, monitored by competent international institutions." This will bring "a system separating government from religion institutions, on behalf of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, separating legislative and executive powers, and [ensuring] judicial independence".

The statement has now been picked up by BBC Persian and by Radio Farda.

1309 GMT: The Purge at Allameh Tabatabei University. We've had reports this week of academic staff being terminated or relieved of duties. Putting them together:

Political philosopher Seyed Morteza Mardiha and women’s rights activist Saba Vasefi have been banned from teaching. According to Tabnak, eight faculty in the Economics Department have been expelled, and all but one stripped of the right to teach. The salaries of two faculty members of the Department of Agriculture have been cut.

The Development Program at Allameh Tabatabei has been completely terminated.

1250 GMT: Your Tehran Friday Prayers Summary. It's Ayatollah Ahmad Khatami setting out all that's significant in religion and politics today. Behold:

When you hold an election, that's the people's opportunity to put forth their views. Then someone wins and you stop for four years. Ahmadinejad won. So, protesters, be quiet.

And the US military is occupying Haiti, which proves they are very bad.

1240 GMT: Where's Mahmoud? President Ahmadinejad has opened a factory at Khorasan Steel and dealt with the current political crisis by calling on all Iranians to have a spiritual focus and obey Allah.

1235 GMT: Human Rights Activists News Agency reports that the files of 18 more Ashura protesters have been sent to the Revolutionary Court.

1015 GMT: We have posted comments from an EA correspondent on our featured analysis, "The Plot Against President Ahmadinejad".

0845 GMT: The Opposition Manifesto. More than 30 expatriate Iranian intellectuals and artists have issued a statement in support of Mir Hossein Mousavi.

0835 GMT: Slamming the  Opposition. Last night's debate on Iranian state media was a non-debate, as MPs Ruhollah Hosseinian and Alaeddin Boroujerdi were generally in agreement. An EA correspondent describes it as a “Love-Making discussion in which both side were praising and appreciating each other".

There was some drama, however. In addition to his claim of "a plot within" to topple the Government, Hosseinian talked of the "Axis of Revolt" of Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi. He offered this advice: the Supreme Leader was too patient with the opposition --- "if we had the authority; we would have sorted it out straightaway".

0820 GMT: An Iranian activist has posted a list, with English translation, of the arrest and current state (if known) of 229 people arrested on 16 Azar (7 December) or in the Tasua-Ashura demonstrations (26-27 December).

0655 GMT: We are putting the last touches to what we believe is a significant story: a high-level plan to move against President Ahmadinejad and possibly remove him from office. As soon as that is completed, we will update on latest news. (We have now posted the story.)

Iran: A Response to "The Plot Against Ahmadinejad"

A valued and well-informed EA correspondent comments on our article on the plan to limit President Ahmadinejad's authority and possibly remove him from power:

The reference to the 1981 scenario is a correct one. It should be reminded that Ayatollah Khomeini's support for the impeachment and removal of [President] Bani Sadr came very late in the day, after the leaders of the Islamic Republican Party succeeded in alienating Khomeini completely from his former lieutenant. Essentially, it didn't happen till pretty much a week or so before the actual impeachment. Guess who was instrumental in the latter happening? One Hashemi Rafsanjani, who was at the time Majlis Speaker. Rafsanjani was also the man behind the ejection of [Grand Ayatollah] Montazeri from the successorship to Khomeini. In short, he's the man with the required CV for the job of removing Ahmadinejad.

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Whether the latter will happen or not, also depends on the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps leadership. One of the big remaining enigmas of the post-election events in Iran is the exact relationship patterns in the IRGC-Ahmadinejad-Supreme Leader triangle. Different scenarios emerge. If the IRGC leadership is, as stated on paper, loyal to the persona of Khamenei and reflexively behind AN because of the former's hitherto unswerving support for the latter, then we could see change happening if and when Khamenei reassures his IRGC flock that they will not be affected by any change in the Presidency. Another way out for Khamenei is to bring back the old IRGC leadership into the fold. [Yahiya] Rahim Safavi has been making interesting noises of late, essentially aligning himself to [Tehran Mayor Mohammad-Baqer] Qalibaf in calling for a "third way" out to get past the "power-hungry" group (Government supporters) and the "destabilising" (opposition) one.

Whatever the outcome of this power tussle, we won't be seeing a Mousavi or Karroubi led administration. The only two people I can see fitting the bill in case of the removal of Ahmadinejad are either [Ali] Larijani or Qalibaf. I think I would gladly accept Qalibaf if I were the Green wave leadership, as they will at least be able to get a semblance of proper political activity (newspapers, party meetings, etc.) going under him.

Palestine: Hamas to Recognize Israel?

The Jerusalem Post reports that, following a meeting in Hebron with British millionaire David Martin Abrahams on Wednesday, Aziz Dwaik, a Hamas senior representative and the elected speaker of the Palestinian Legislative Council in the West Bank, said that Hamas has accepted Israel's right to exist and would be prepared to alter its charter.

Dwaik stated that all Hamas leaders, including Damascus-based leader Khaled Mashaal and Gaza-based leader Ismail Haniyeh, have voiced support for the idea of establishing an independent Palestinian state within the pre-1967 boundaries. He added: "The [Hamas] charter was drafted more than 20 years ago. No one wants to throw anyone into the sea."

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Meanwhile, Abrahams told the newspaper that he would urge British Foreign Minister David Milliband to "consider the implications of Hamas's positive overtures."

Turkey Inside Line: The Evolving Relationship with Russia

EA's Fulya Inci writes:

Last week, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayip Erdogan made a two-day trip to Moscow, with energy, trade and the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute high on the agenda. Erdogan and senior members of his government, in talks with Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and President Dmitri Medvedev, launched the process for an agreement on visa-free travel for the citizens of both countries and took important steps on the use of the Turkish lira, and the Russian ruble in bilateral trade. Most significantly, the two sides signed a declaration of cooperation to construct Turkey’s first nuclear power plant.

The energy issue is the rucial factor in the economic and trading relations of Turkey and Russia. Turkey is highly dependent on Russian gas but now also wants to become a major energy corridor, transporting that gas to the Middle East. This South Stream rivals the U.S. and EU-backed Nabucco pipeline plan, even though Ankara also backs Nabucco  and says the two projects should complement each other.



A Turkish government commission is examining the environmental concerns and high-cost route of South Stream, but it has also allowed Moscow to carry out preliminary work off the Black Sea coast. It also has a commitment from Russia to join a prospective Samsun-Ceyhan oil pipeline via Turkey, as Ankara seeks to develop its geostrategic position and create new cooperation opportunities in the region.

Bilateral trade is also important between the two countries. It reached $33 billion in 2008. There has been an unexpected decrease in 2009 due to the global economic crisis, but both countries’ leaders expressed the desire to triple the figure by 2015.

In contrast to the positive steps in energy and trade, the trip did not seem to reward Turkey’s Nagorno-Karabakh policy. Putin told Erdoğan that “Turkey should not link the Nagorno-Karabakh problem between Armenia and Azerbaijan to the normalization of its bilateral relations with Armenia.”

In October, Turkey and Armenia signed agreements to normalize diplomatic relations, after decades of tension over the mass killing of Turkey's Armenian population in the early 20th century. The two sides also discussed reopening borders that Turkey had closed in 1993 because of Armenia's occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh, a largely Armenian- populated part of Azerbaijan.

As a close ally of Azerbaijan, Turkey “first wants to see progress toward the solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict before opening its border with Armenia”. Putin’s remarks show that Russia does not want Turkey to slow down the normalization process because of Nagorno-Karabakh’s future.

President Medvedev is expected to come to Turkey on May, and the two sides are hopeful for developing cooperation. It is an important negotiation, given that shifting power in regions such as the Middle East is bringing new opportunities and risks for both countries.