The Latest from Iran (7 July): Mousavi's Intervention

1900 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Bail for human rights activist Abdolreza Ahmadi, detained in March, has been set at $150,000.

1820 GMT: The Bazaar Strike and Government Climb-Down. The Los Angeles Times has a good overview of yesterday's developments over the stoppage in the Tehran Bazaar and the Government's reversal of a proposed increase in business tax.

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1815 GMT: Mousavi on Sanctions (and the Economy and the Revolutionary Guard). Agence France Presse offers a useful summary of today's statement by Mir Hossein Mousavi (see 1430 GMT).

Mousavi, in a direct manipulation of the President's words, declared, "To say that this resolution is like a 'used hankie' will not ease the hardships arising from demagogic policies, as it is clear to me that this resolution will affect our nation's security and economy."

Mousavi continued by noting the impact of sanctions and hitting at the Government's folly for bringing Iran down on both the international and economic fronts:

This oppressive resolution ... will decrease GDP, increase unemployment, create more hardships for people and widen the gap between us and other developing nations, especially our neighbours.

[The Iranian people] should know the effect of this resolution ... on their livelihood, inflation, the nation's progress and security. If people are asked to resist (sanctions), then their trust should be earned by telling them the truth.

Mousavi then linked economic woes to the intervention of the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps,  "Bringing Sepah [the IRGC] back to its main responsibilities can decrease the greed of enemies ... and decrease the wave of corruption," he said.

1500 GMT: Rumour of Day. Iran Press News is claiming that the Tehran Bazaar, amidst this week's strike by some traders, is under heavy security. It claims there was an attack by men in plainclothes, with one merchant killed.

1430 GMT: A Double Intervention from Mousavi. Mir Hossein Mousavi has followed his Monday meeting with former President Mohammad Khatami with a further comment.

In a note on the recent UN Security Council resolution sanctioning Iran's nuclear programme, Mousavi extends remarks from the Monday meeting that the UN is wrongfully punishing Iran and adds that this is a product of the Ahmadinejad Government's wayward foreign policy.

Mousavi's website Kalemeh publishes a long editorial explaining that Mousavi does not believe church and state should be separates in the development of the Islamic Republic. The editorial is in part a response to an article in the Los Angeles Times that claimed Mousavi, in his recent "Green Charter", had advocated a secular Iranian system. (It is not stated what role, if any, Mousavi played in the writing and publication of the editorial.)

0840 GMT: The Bazaar Strike. Claimed video of yesterday's strike, protesting at a proposed 70% in business taxes, by merchants in the Tehran Bazaar:

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QCSSy4HZP-U[/youtube]

0700 GMT: We have two contrasting features this morning. Mr Verde takes a long look at the significant anti-Ahmadinejad intervention by MP Ahmad Tavakoli and the Islamic Azad University dispute to ponder, "Crisis...What Crisis?".

If you prefer your news tongue-in-cheek, our top EA news spies have uncovered the first violator of Iran's new guidelines for men's haircuts.

0610 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. An appeals court has upheld the six-year prison sentence of reformist activist and journalist Keyvan Samimi Behbahani, who has also been barred from political, social and cultural activities for 15 years.

Samimi Behbahani is the managing director of the banned publication Nameh and is also a member of the committee in charge of investigating the unlawful arrest of individuals.

An appeals court has approved the three-year prison sentence handed down to Arman Rezakhani.

0515 GMT: As the 11th anniversary of the 1999 student protests approaches, there is talk of some public demonstration linking the past to the present challenge to the regime. For the moment, however, this is just a ripple. Monday's Mousavi-Khatami statement, from what we can gather, seems to have brought little reaction: the summary of the meeting is more a declaration of the "Iranian" legitimacy of the opposition's politics --- the most striking passage is the criticism of international sanctions and "Western" support for terrorism --- than a call for public resistance.

Protest, however, is never far from the surface, for Iran is far more than a Green v. Government scenario. International attention is riveted by the growing campaign to halt the stoning of Sakineh Mohammadie Ashtiani for adultery.

Inside Iran, the most striking result on Tuesday was the apparent success of merchants in the Tehran Bazaar. A sudden shut-down by some textile vendors --- there was also news of closures in the jewellry market --- seems to have brought a reversal of plans for a 70% increase in business tax.

On the labour front, the Tehran and Suburbs Bus Drivers Union has again strongly condemned the arrest and intimidation of members Saeed Torabian and Reza Shahabi.

And, far from least, the battle within continues. Later this morning we'll have an analysis of the latest "protest" of Ahmad Tavakoli --- key member of Parliament and ally of Speaker Ali Larijani --- against the Government and President Ahmadinejad.

Afghanistan-Pakistan Complexities: Insurgents, Reconciliation, and "Al Qa'eda" (Rodriguez/King)

An interesting article, at many levels, from Alex Rodriguez and Laura King of the Los Angeles Times. It' s interesting not only for the information but the complexities which the reporters are trying to navigate: the links between Pakistani and Afghan groups, the links within Afghanistan, the clear efforts by officials and analysts to "spin" the story properly, and the never-absent spectre of "Al Qa'eda":

Prospects for an effort by Pakistan to broker a reconciliation between the government of neighboring Afghanistan and a violent wing of the Afghan Taliban depend on overcoming a major obstacle: severing long-standing relations between the militant group and Al Qaeda.

Afghanistan: A Winnable War? (Kagan & Kagan)

U.S. officials acknowledge that Pakistan has begun trying to seed a rapprochement between Afghan President Hamid Karzai and the Haqqani network, a branch of the Afghan Taliban that uses Pakistan to launch attacks on U.S., NATO and Afghan forces.

Driving Pakistan's effort is a desire to increase its influence over the government in Kabul and diminish any future role its archrival to the east, India, may have there once the U.S. begins pulling troops out, a withdrawal scheduled to start next summer.

The U.S. hopes that a combination of military pressure and inducements will entice some rank-and-file Taliban fighters to come over to the government side, but it has been cautious about Karzai's plans to reach out to Taliban commanders. It is likely to resist any deal Pakistan brokers in which the Haqqani network does not break ties with Al Qaeda, which date to the end of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan two decades ago.

In the meantime, the U.S. has targeted the organization's hideouts in the Pakistani tribal region of North Waziristan with drone strikes. Military officials also say they have taken the initiative against Haqqani fighters on the ground in eastern Afghanistan.

Experts say both Pakistan and Afghanistan realize that breaking the Haqqani network's ties with Al Qaeda is a prerequisite to any deal. They question whether it would ever happen.

Amir Rana, one of Pakistan's leading analysts on militant groups, said it's not possible for many militant groups, including the Haqqani network, to completely separate from Al Qaeda.

"What the Haqqani network and the other Taliban groups can offer is a guarantee that they will influence Al Qaeda to not attack U.S. or NATO forces, and a guarantee that their soil would not be used in a terrorist attack against the West," he said. "This is the maximum concession that the Taliban can offer."

Numbering in the thousands of fighters, the Haqqani network has a strong relationship with Pakistan's military and intelligence community that stretches 30 years, back to the time when Pashtun warlord Jalaluddin Haqqani organized mujahedin fighters against Soviet troops in the 1980s. Haqqani has now delegated authority over his network of fighters to his son, Sirajuddin.

The group moves freely between Afghanistan's eastern provinces and its headquarters in North Waziristan, where it has been left untouched by Pakistan's military. Experts believe the Haqqani network continues to provide Al Qaeda leaders and commanders sanctuary there.

U.S. leaders have frequently urged Pakistan to launch an offensive against Haqqani hideouts, recently backing those entreaties with evidence that the network was behind major attacks in Kabul and at Bagram air base, the U.S. facility north of the capital. The government in Islamabad, meanwhile, has brushed aside those demands, arguing that its forces are overstretched by extensive military operations against Taliban strongholds in surrounding tribal areas.

Analysts and former Pakistani military commanders, however, say the real reason that Islamabad has avoided military action against the Haqqani network is that it sees the group and other Afghan Taliban elements as a useful hedge against India's rapidly growing interests in Afghanistan.

Haqqani leaders have yet to signal whether they are interested in starting talks with Karzai's government.

In a report issued Monday, Jeffrey Dressler of the Institute for the Study of War, a Washington research organization, said the Haqqani group's ties to Al Qaeda were much closer than those of many other Taliban groups, and he expressed doubt that they could be broken.

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