Obama and Enemy Combatants: "A War on Terror By Any Other Name Smells...."

UPDATE: Noah Feldman has written in The New York Times echoing the concerns set out by Andy Worthington below: "The Obama lawyers have not abandoned the argument for broad presidential power, just implied that such authority is unnecessary to get them what they want."

Last week there was a bit of fanfare to the Obama Administration's dropping of the term "enemy combatant" with reference to facilities such as Guantanamo Bay.

I was a bit unsettled by the implication that this was a fundamental change in the US approach to detainees, given the Justice Department's maintenance of the Bush Administration line in other cases in the War on Terror. The change in term so that "individuals who supported al Qaeda or the Taliban are detainable only if the support was substantial" appeared to be more of a shift in legal approach rather than a fundamental review of detention policy. It's not a scrapping of the Bush system but a more palatable face for it.

That concern has been reinforced by a detailed analysis from Andy Worthington at the Future of Freedom Foundation:

The Nobodies Known as Former Enemy Combatants

Changing the names of things was a ploy that was used by the Bush administration in an attempt to justify some of its least palatable activities. In response to the 9/11 attacks, for instance, the nation was not involved in a limited pursuit of a group of criminals responsible for the attacks, but instead embarked on an open-ended “war on terror.”

In keeping with this “new paradigm,” prisoners seized in this “war” were referred to as “detainees” and held neither as criminal suspects nor as prisoners of war, protected by the Geneva Conventions, but as illegal “enemy combatants,” without any rights whatsoever. Later, when the administration sought new ways in which to interrogate some of these men, the techniques it endorsed were not referred to as torture — even though many of them clearly were — but were instead described as “enhanced interrogation techniques.”

The Obama administration has clearly learned a trick or two from its predecessors. In its response to a court request for clarification of the meaning of the term “enemy combatant,” for use in the Guantánamo prisoners’ habeas corpus reviews (which were triggered by a momentous Supreme Court decision last June), the new government has responded to the challenge with a cunning sleight of hand. In a press release, the Department of Justice announced that it had dropped the use of the term “enemy combatant” and that it had adjusted its definition of those who can be detained so that, instead of holding people who were “part of, or supporting, Taliban or al-Qaeda forces or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners,” individuals who supported al-Qaeda or the Taliban “are detainable only if the support was substantial.”

As benign-sounding propaganda, in contrast to the Bush administration’s arrogant version, which almost always manifested a tangible disdain for Congress and the judiciary, this announcement has the alluring veneer of the “change” that Barack Obama promised throughout his election campaign, but in practical terms nothing has actually changed. The prisoners are now nobodies, with no label whatsoever to define their peculiar extra-legal existence, and the entire rationale for holding them without charge or trial — and the egregious errors made along the way — remain unaddressed.

In its filing with the District Court (PDF), delivered in response to a deadline of March 13, the government made clear that it was largely business as usual. In its opening salvo, the Justice Department claimed that the laws of war, which “include a series of prohibitions and obligations … developed over time” and which “have periodically been codified in treaties such as the Geneva Conventions,” or have otherwise “become customary international law,” are nonetheless “less well-codified with respect to our current, novel type of armed conflict against armed groups such as al-Qaeda and the Taliban.”

With this “current, novel type of armed conflict” standing in as a more palatable version of the Bush administration’s “war on terror,” the Justice Department proceeded to defend the President’s authority, under the terms of the Authorization for Use of Military Force, which was passed by Congress within days of the attacks, “to detain persons who he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, and persons who harbored those responsible” for the attacks, as well as “persons whose relationship to al-Qaeda or the Taliban would, in appropriately analogous circumstances in a traditional international armed conflict, render them detainable.”

This statement raises a second flag of alarm, as this horrendously open-ended piece of legislation may have been appropriate at the time, but it was used by the Bush administration as the foundation stone on which all its subsequent forays into illegal and unconstitutional actions were based (including, it should be noted, holding these “detained persons” without charge or trial at Guantánamo for seven years), and it is disconcerting to realize that a conversation we should be having — which involves responding to the question, ”Is it justifiable, seven years and seven months after the 9/11 attacks, to claim that we are still involved in an open-ended and ill-defined ‘war’?” — has, instead, been swept aside.

Further disturbing signs that little, if anything has changed can be found in the government’s explanation of who, it asserted, can be held as the “nobodies formerly known as enemy combatants” in the “current, novel type of armed conflict.” In spite of claiming that these men must have “substantially supported” the Taliban, al-Qaeda, or other associated groups, the Justice Department specifically stated that it has the authority to detain not only “those who were part of al-Qaeda and Taliban forces” but also other “members of enemy forces,” even if “they have not actually committed or attempted to commit any act of depredation or entered the theatre or zone of active military operations,” and adds,

Evidence relevant to a determination that an individual joined with or became part of al-Qaeda or Taliban forces might range from formal membership, such as through an oath of loyalty, to more functional evidence, such as training with al-Qaeda (as reflected in some cases by staying at al-Qaeda or Taliban safehouses that are regularly used to house militant recruits) or taking positions with enemy forces.

This, of course, renders the word “substantial” worthless, as it allows the government to detain someone who never even “attempted to commit any act of depredation or entered the theatre or zone of active military operations” and may only have stayed in a house associated with those who did engage in militancy, which, to my mind, is not “substantial” support at all. Furthermore, the government asserts that “it is of no moment that someone who was part of an enemy armed group when war commenced may have tried to flee the battle or conceal himself as a civilian in places like Pakistan,” which effectively condemns anyone who may have traveled to Afghanistan before the 9/11 attacks to take the Taliban’s side against the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan’s long-running inter-Muslim civil war (a conflict which had nothing to do with the United States or its allies) into a terrorist if they happened to be present in Afghanistan when the 9/11 attacks occurred.

In this, the government’s thinking was clearly in line with Judge Richard Leon, the District Court judge whose rulings on the habeas corpus cases of ten Guantánamo prisoners in the last few months resulted in decisions that six of the men (five Algerian-born Bosnians, and Mohammed El-Gharani, a former juvenile) were to be released, but that four could continue to be held. In the case of one of the four, the Yemeni Muaz al-Alawi, Judge Leon ruled that the government had established that he “was part of or supporting Taliban or al-Qaeda forces,” because he “stayed at guest houses associated with the Taliban and al-Qaeda … received military training at two separate camps closely associated with al-Qaeda and the Taliban and supported Taliban fighting forces on two different fronts in the Taliban’s war against the Northern Alliance.”

From the point of view of an impartial observer, of course, the problem with Judge Leon’s ruling was that none of these allegations related to “hostilities against the U.S. or its coalition partners,” but he also endorsed the government’s additional claim that, “rather than leave his Taliban unit in the aftermath of September 11, 2001,” al-Alawi “stayed with it until after the United States initiated Operation Enduring Freedom on October 7, 2001; fleeing to Khowst and then to Pakistan only after his unit was subjected to two-to-three U.S. bombing runs.”

In other words, Judge Leon ruled that Muaz al-Alawi could continue to be held because, despite traveling to Afghanistan to fight other Muslims before September 11, 2001, “contend[ing] that he had no association with al-Qaeda,” and stating that “his support for and association with the Taliban was minimal and not directed at U.S. or coalition forces,” he was still in Afghanistan when that conflict morphed into a different war following the U.S.-led invasion in October 2001. As Leon admitted in his ruling, “Although there is no evidence of petitioner actually using arms against U.S. or coalition forces, the Government does not need to prove such facts in order for petitioner to be classified as an enemy combatant under the definition adopted by the Court.” In the new world of Obama’s Justice Department, all that needs changing are the words “enemy combatants” — to “nobodies formerly known as enemy combatants” — and the conclusion is the same.

Therefore, the Obama administration’s cosmetic tinkering with its predecessor’s supposed justification for holding prisoners at Guantánamo is bitterly disappointing, as it appears, at heart, to endorse the lawless policies introduced by the Bush administration, and also to perpetuate some of its most damaging errors. In spite of claims by the Justice Department that its position “draws on the international laws of war to inform the statutory authority conferred by Congress,” the Obama administration has, in reality, wholeheartedly endorsed the Authorization for Use of Military Force (the founding document of the “war on terror”), has failed to demonstrate that it has any willingness to pour scorn on the Bush administration’s claims that prisoners can be held without being either criminal suspects or prisoners of war, has endorsed its predecessor’s decision to equate the Taliban with al-Qaeda, even though there was never any justification for doing so, has overlooked the fact that the majority of the prisoners were bought for bounties (PDF) and were never screened according to the Geneva Conventions, has ignored the fact that the evidence against them (whether of “substantial” support or not) was often extracted through the use of torture, coercion or bribery, and has also defended the Bush administration’s self-proclaimed right to detain demonstrably peripheral figures in the Afghan conflict as “terror suspects.”

An additional demonstration of the absurdity of the Obama administration’s position involves another case reviewed by Judge Leon, that of Ghaleb Nasser al-Bihani, a Yemeni who had served as a cook for the Taliban and an affiliated group of Arab recruits. In a verdict that also fits with the new administration’s disturbingly loose definition of “substantial support,” Judge Leon ruled that “faithfully serving in an al-Qaeda-affiliated fighting unit that is directly supporting the Taliban by helping prepare the meals of its entire fighting force is more than sufficient to meet this Court’s definition of ‘support,’” and added, “After all, as Napoleon was fond of pointing out, ‘An army marches on its stomach.’”

To gauge how wrong this is, we need only compare al-Bihani’s case to that of another Yemeni prisoner, Salim Hamdan. Last August, Hamdan, a driver for Osama bin Laden, was tried at Guantánamo in the military commissions conceived by Vice President Dick Cheney and his close advisers (including, in particular, his legal counsel David Addington), sentenced and sent home in November to serve the last few weeks of a five-month sentence delivered by a military jury. As I wrote when Judge Leon made his ruling about al-Bihani, “Hamdan is now a free man, whereas al-Bihani, a man who never met Osama bin Laden, let alone driving him around, has just been told, by a judge in a U.S. federal court, that the government is entitled to hold him forever because he cooked dinner for the Taliban.”

I added, “If President Obama is genuinely concerned with justice, he needs to act fast to tackle this squalid state of affairs, which does nothing to undo the previous administration’s disdain for and mockery of the laws on which the United States was founded.” That was just seven weeks ago, but now, despite his fine pronouncements in August 2007, when he declared, “We will again set an example to the world that the law is not subject to the whims of stubborn rulers, and that justice is not arbitrary,” it seems that Barack Obama doesn’t care, and that his sympathies are far more in line with the arbitrary justice instigated by those “stubborn rulers” — George W. Bush, Dick Cheney, David Addington and Donald Rumsfeld — than they are with the military judge and the military jurors involved in Salim Hamdan’s case, who, effectively, set a seven-year limit on the detention of minor players in the “war on terror” by giving Hamdan a short sentence, despite convicting him of “providing material support for terrorism.”

In analyses over the years, intelligence officials have stated that no more than 50 of the prisoners at Guantánamo had any meaningful connection with al-Qaeda, the Taliban or other terrorist groups. By that rationale, the Obama administration should be working flat-out to release the other 190 prisoners as soon as possible. Under its own definition of “significant support” for these organizations, however, the administration has, instead, raised the possibility that, after seven years’ imprisonment in conditions that ought to be a source of shame to any civilized society, a large number of these prisoners — these “nobodies formerly known as enemy combatants” — still have a long way to go before they can hope to see the end of their ordeal.

That Obama "Review/Muddle" on Iran

Related Post: Target Iran? This Week’s US-Israeli Talks

Moments ago, in a post on the US-Israeli talks this week on Iran, we suggested that "review" and "muddle" might mean the same thing in the current policy process of the Obama Adminstration.

The BBC lends weight to this possibility, ironically, in a story headlined, "US policy towards Iran shaping up". The story begins with the revelation, "The Obama administration is finalising its policy for engaging Iran. The approach is likely to involve a combination of small steps to initiate contact between the two countries and may include an overture in the form of a letter to Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, according to Western diplomats and senior US officials."

Read further, however, and this "engagement" is by no means certain. The first difficulty comes in the timing of the initiative:

A senior Western diplomat, speaking on condition of anonymity, told reporters that he expected the letter to be sent to Mr Khamenei before the Iranian elections this summer, although Washington's allies would prefer this step to be taken after the vote, to avoid influencing the election.

More importantly, it is unclear what place a letter --- if it is being considered --- would have in an overall US approach to Tehran and even who is making that determination. The BBC story says, "US officials insist that no final decisions have been made and no announcements are expected for at least another 10 days while Dennis Ross - the top official in charge of reviewing US policy towards Iran - conducts an assessment."
Ross, however, is only one cook stirring the broth. Any assessment has to make its way to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the Pentagon, the National Security Council, and of course the White House.

So there may be the drama of a proposed letter but there is still no clarity on what exactly is happening between Washington and the fist, clenched or unclenched, of Tehran.

Target Iran? Israeli Military Chief in Washington For Talks

Here's a story that has set a few tongues wagging and minds racing on the Internet.

The Chief of Staff of the Israeli Military, General Gabi Ashkenazi (pictured), is spending five days in Washington. He's not only seeing the sights but also chatting with National Security Advisor Gen. James L. Jones, special State Department advisor Dennis Ross (still officially concerned with "Southwest Asia and the Gulf"), and military commanders.

Iran's Press TV is a bit over-the-top with its proclamation of "simmering talks of war", but the attention to Tehran, rather than other Middle Eastern issues, is more than justified. While interchanges between Israeli and American military leaders, as part of Tel Aviv's special relationship with the US, are commonplace, the presence of Ross at the discussions is significant. So is the timing.

Israeli diplomats are putting out the story that incoming Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will be putting Iran --- not Palestine, not discussions with Syria, but confrontation with Tehran --- as the first priority before the US. This is not surprising, given Netanyahu's pronouncements over the last decade, let alone during the recent electoral campaign, but the willingness of Israeli officials to state this clearly is striking.

For example, one diplomat has revealed that Netanyahu told US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in Israel earlier this month, "[Iran] was the be all and end all....If [Washington] wants anything to move on the Palestinian front, we need to take head [sic] on the Iranian threat, diplomatically, with sanctions, and beyond that." (emphasis added)

Clinton allegedly replied, "I am aware of that."

Israeli pressure for a specific move won't come until after the Iranian elections in June, and of course Netanyahu still has to put together a workable coalition in Tel Aviv. Instead, the immediate impact of the Israeli moves, symbolised by Ashkenazi's visit to Washington, may be to limit any American "engagement" with Iran.

"There was one positive coming out of her decision to come here," the Israeli diplomat said. "To make sure everyone realizes that a) she is into this topic, b) that the Obama administration will not let it drop in the priorities list."

An Israeli diplomat offered this spin, either as a reflection of Clinton's attitude or as attempt to box her in: "There was one positive coming out of her decision to come here. To make sure everyone realizes that a) she is into this topic, b) that the Obama administration will not let it drop in the priorities list."

The diplomat continued, "As for substance, there is no [American] policy, which is more or less in a mild way, something she admitted....The Obama administration is in an exploration phase....There is nothing new here. The players are the same. The plot is the same. The solutions are the same."

Of course, the Obama Administration is unlikely to be enthusiastic about the "and beyond that" part of Netanyahu's message to Clinton. This isn't 2003 when the US Government, flush from "victory" in Iraq, could envisage regime change in Tehran as a short- to medium-term opportunity. With Iran now in a position to be useful, if not vital, to Washington on the priority issue of Afghanistan, any ratcheting-up of pressure on Tehran could be counter-productive.

Paradoxically, however, that only ensures that the Israeli Government and supporters will press harder --- even in the absence of a Government in Tel Aviv --- for the "right" US line. This, in part, is why the campaign to block Charles Freeman as head of the National Intelligence Council was so vicious and so symbolic. The next target may well be Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair, who is taking the "wrong" line on Tehran with his (accurate) presentation of the US intelligence community's assessment that Iran is not close to The Bomb.

(Robert Dreyfuss draws the far different conclusion: "Here's the reality behind the Freeman debacle: Already worried over Team Obama, suffering the after-effects of the Gaza debacle, and about to be burdened with the Netanyahu-Lieberman problem, the Israel lobby is undoubtedly running scared. They succeeded in knocking off Freeman, but the true test of their strength is yet to come.")

The US, Israel, and Charles Freeman: "A Chilling Effect" on Foreign Policy

One of the sharpest, strongest reactions to the withdrawal of the nomination of Charles Freeman (pictured) as head of the US National Intelligence Council has come from Stephen Walt in his blog on the Foreign Policy website. I generally share his views, but a reader offers further useful critique: "All good points, but a bit polemical. You know how this game works: I don't think Walt does Freeman any favours by framing the appointment as a victory over Zionists or as a balance to [the appointment of the State Department's Dennis] Ross. It would have been better to explain why Freeman was a worthy choice in the first place with his other experience and ability."

On Chas Freeman's withdrawal
STEPHEN WALT

First, for all of you out there who may have questioned whether there was a powerful "Israel lobby," or who admitted that it existed but didn't think it had much influence, or who thought that the real problem was some supposedly all-powerful "Saudi lobby," think again.

Second, this incident does not speak well for Barack Obama's principles, or even his political instincts. It is one thing to pander to various special interest groups while you're running for office -- everyone expects that sort of thing -- but it's another thing to let a group of bullies push you around in the first fifty days of your administration. But as Ben Smith noted in Politico, it's entirely consistent with most of Obama's behavior on this issue.

The decision to toss Freeman over the side tells the lobby (and others) that it doesn't have to worry about Barack getting tough with [past and future Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin] Netanyahu, or even that he’s willing to fight hard for his own people. Although AIPAC [American-Israeli Political Action Committee] has issued a pro forma denial that it had anything to do with it, well-placed friends in Washington have told me that it leaned hard on some key senators behind-the-scenes and is now bragging that Obama is a "pushover." Bottom line: Caving on Freeman was a blunder that could come back to haunt any subsequent effort to address the deteriorating situation in the region.

Third, and related to my second point, this incident reinforces my suspicion that the Democratic Party is in fact a party of wimps. I'm not talking about Congress, which has been in thrall to the lobby for decades, but about the new team in the Executive Branch. Don't they understand that you have to start your term in office by making it clear that people will pay a price if they cross you? Barack Obama won an historic election and has a clear mandate for change -- and that includes rethinking our failed Middle East policy -- and yet he wouldn't defend an appointment that didn't even require Senate confirmation. Why? See point No.1 above.

Of course, it's possible that I'm wrong here, and that Obama's team was actually being clever. Freeman's critics had to expend a lot of ammunition to kill a single appointment to what is ultimately not a direct policy-making position, and they undoubtedly ticked off a lot of people by doing so. When the real policy fights begin -- over the actual content of the NIEs [National Intelligence Estimates], over attacking Iran, and over the peace process itself -- they aren't likely to get much sympathy from [Director of National Intelligence Dennis] Blair and it is least conceivable that Obama will turn to them and say, "look, I gave you one early on, but now I'm going to do what's right for America." I don't really believe that will happen, but I'll be delighted if Obama proves me wrong.

Fourth, the worst aspect of the Freeman affair is the likelihood of a chilling effect on discourse in Washington, at precisely the time when we badly need a more open and wide-ranging discussion of our Middle East policy. As I noted earlier, this was one of the main reasons why the lobby went after Freeman so vehemently; in an era where more and more people are questioning Israel's behavior and questioning the merits of unconditional U.S. support, its hardline defenders felt they simply had to reinforce the de facto ban on honest discourse inside the Beltway. After forty-plus years of occupation, two wars in Lebanon, and the latest pummeling of Gaza, (not to mention [Israeli Prime Minister] Ehud Olmert's own comparison of Israel with South Africa), defenders of the "special relationship" can't win on facts and logic anymore. So they have to rely on raw political muscle and the silencing or marginalization of those with whom they disagree. In the short term, Freeman's fate is intended to send the message that if you want to move up in Washington, you had better make damn sure that nobody even suspects you might be an independent thinker on these issues.

This outcome is bad for everyone, including Israel. It means that policy debates in the United States will continue to be narrower than in other countries (including Israel itself), public discourse will be equally biased, and a lot of self-censorship will go on. America's Middle East policy will remain stuck in the same familiar rut, and even a well-intentioned individual like George Mitchell won't be able to bring the full weight of our influence to bear. At a time when Israel badly needs honest advice, nobody in Washington is going to offer it, lest they face the wrath of the same foolish ideologues who targeted Freeman. The likely result is further erosion in America's position in the Middle East, and more troubles for Israel as well.

Yet to those who defended Freeman’s appointment and challenged the lobby's smear campaign, I offer a fifth observation: do not lose heart. The silver lining in this sorry episode is that it was abundantly clear to everyone what was going on and who was behind it. In the past, the lobby was able to derail appointments quietly -- even pre-emptively -- but this fight took place in broad daylight. And Steve Rosen [of AIPAC], one of Freeman's chief tormentors, once admitted: "a lobby is like a night flower. It thrives in the dark and dies in the sun." Slowly, the light is dawning and the lobby's negative influence is becoming more and more apparent, even if relatively few people have the guts to say so out loud.  But history will not be kind to the likes of [Senator] Charles Schumer, Jonathan Chait [of the New Republic], Steve Rosen et al, whose hidebound views are unintentionally undermining both U.S. and Israeli security.

Last but not least, I cannot help but be struck by how little confidence Freeman's critics seem to have in Israel itself. Apparently they believe that a country that recently celebrated its 60th birthday, whose per capita income ranks 29th in the world, that has several hundred nuclear weapons, and a military that is able to inflict more than 1,300 deaths on helpless Palestinians in a couple of weeks without much effort will nonetheless be at risk if someone who has criticized some Israeli policies (while defending its existence) were to chair the National Intelligence Council. The sad truth is that these individuals are deathly afraid of honest discourse here in the United States because deep down, they believe Israel cannot survive if it isn't umbilically attached to the United States. The irony is that people like me have more confidence in Israel than they do: I think Israel can survive and prosper if it has a normal relationship with the United States instead of "special" one. Indeed, I think a more normal relationship would be better for both countries. It appears they aren't so sure, and that is why they went after Charles Freeman.

How Israel Limits US Foreign Policy: The Not-so-Curious Case of Charles Freeman

Related Post: Charles Freeman’s Letter Withdrawing His Nomination
Related Post: Charles Freeman’s Speech on the Middle East and Israel (October 2006)
Related Post: Coming Next in the Intelligence-Policy Battle - Iran’s Uranium

For many people, this story will never be known. They will not have heard of the American diplomat, Charles Freeman, or the National Intelligence Council, which he was nominated to lead. The withdrawal of that nomination yesterday will not make CNN Headline News or the front pages of US newspapers.

Make no mistake, however. As a story of how US foreign policy is limited and re-structured --- courtesy of Congress, a network of private groups, and American political culture --- it offers an essential lesson. "Israel" continues to set limits on the "acceptable" in US foreign policy.

Charles Freeman has moved between US Government posts, beginning in the State Department, and influential think tanks for more than 40 years. He was posted in China and China, worked as the lead official for African affairs, and was Ambassador to Saudi Arabia from 1989 to 1992. He moved to the Pentagon in 1993, as Assistant Secretary of Defense. He has been involved with Institute for National Strategic Studies and the United States Institute for Peace and served as President of the Middle East Policy Council.

In short, when it comes to the US and global affairs, Freeman is at the forefront of officials with experience and expertise. So, when he was nominated to lead the National Intelligence Council, a body created in DATE to co-ordinate and assess the intelligence gathered by US agencies, it looked like a shrewd choice.

Only one not-so-problem: for many concerned that Washington maintain the "right" position on Israel, Freeman was on the wrong side of the line. His long service in Arab countries and his work with the Middle East Policy Center, which receives money from the Saudi Government, made him a suspect. So did Freeman's diplomatic and analytic approach, to which you can give the general label of "realism", which did not start from the assumption for US foreign policy of a strategic reliance upon, and a cultural alliance with, Israel in the region.

Within days of the nomination, the chatter against Freeman's selection began on the Internet. It was taken up as a cause by magazines such as the Weekly Standard, looking for a bit of payback after its promotion of the overseas disasters of the Bush years, and the staunchly pro-Israel New Republic.

By the start of March, the campaign was given further legitimacy by a featured opinion piece, written by the New Republic's Jon Chait, in the Washington Post: "The contretemps over Freeman's view of Israel misses the broader problem, which is that he's an ideological fanatic....Realists are the mirror image of neoconservatives in that they are completely blind to the moral dimensions of international politics."

The irony at the heart of the campaign, highlighted by Chait, was that it often did not mention Freeman's position on Arab-Israeli issues. Instead, there was a wild, flailing assault upon "realism", which somehow had become the real danger in US foreign policy, and the highlighting of one incident in Freeman's long career. In 1999, he sent an e-mail to a discussion list about the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre:

[T]he truly unforgivable mistake of the Chinese authorities was the failure to intervene on a timely basis to nip the demonstrations in the bud, rather than -- as would have been both wise and efficacious -- to intervene with force when all other measures had failed to restore domestic tranquility to Beijing and other major urban centers in China.

That judgement may appear cold-blooded, but it is a practical assessment: had the Chinese Government acted at the start of the crisis, it might not have had to put down a very heavy fist when the demonstrations threatened its stability. Fewer lives would have been lost, and political reform could have proceeded with the small but gradual measures being taken by the ruling Communisty Party.

Freeman's analysis does raise serious and troubling issues, particularly when he slipped into his own normative judgement --- "I do not believe it is acceptable for any country to allow the heart of its national capital to be occupied by dissidents intent on disrupting the normal functions of government." The narrow but important point, however, is that the serious and troubling dilemma he highlights has to be confronted. The promotion of human rights confronts the reality that ruling authorities, backed by police and military power, will invoke "order".

The wider point is that Freeman was not nominated for the National Intelligence Council to cast moral judgements. The NIC's function is not to make policy prescriptions but to offer a collaborative assessment of intelligence, thus avoiding disasters such as Iraq 2002/2003, for both short-term and long-term issues. Moral judgement is not, and should not be, in the NIC's remit.

The widest point, however, is that the China incident was always a diversion. Instead, it is that Freeman's position at the NIC threatened an assessment of Middle Eastern issues which did not begin from a founding assumption --- often a very "moral" assumption --- of support for Israel. Assessment might throw up complexities, highlight difficulties of an unchanging course on issues from Palestine to Iran to Syria. It might lead to debate amongst policymakers on those complexities.

There will be no debate, at least drawing upon the analysis of a Freeman-led NIC. Seven Republican members of Congressional committees on intelligence, using the China pretext and the "financial irregularities" of Saudi money behind the Middle East Policy Centre, came out yesterday in opposition to Freeman. The Obama Administration didn't fancy a fight, especially as it could complicate any initiatives that it might pursue now or later in the Middle East, so Director of National Dennis Blair withdrew Freeman's name.

Between 2001 and 2003, many of the State Department's Arabists were pushed out the door because their expertise was an unwelcome hindrance to the Bush Administration's plans on Iraq and the Middle East. The intelligence services saw their information and assessments skewed to fit political agendas, with their agencies taking the blame when the Administration's "intelligence" --- for example, on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction --- was proved wrong. The Obama Administration had tried to promote a revived intelligence community, for example, through the highlighting of Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair and indeed Freeman's selection, and the raising of the State Department's profile (and spirits) under Hillary Clinton.

What it has just learned, if it didn't sense this already, is that such ambitions --- and indeed the policies beyond them --- have to accept the limits set by "Israel".