The US, Israel, and Charles Freeman: "A Chilling Effect" on Foreign Policy

One of the sharpest, strongest reactions to the withdrawal of the nomination of Charles Freeman (pictured) as head of the US National Intelligence Council has come from Stephen Walt in his blog on the Foreign Policy website. I generally share his views, but a reader offers further useful critique: "All good points, but a bit polemical. You know how this game works: I don't think Walt does Freeman any favours by framing the appointment as a victory over Zionists or as a balance to [the appointment of the State Department's Dennis] Ross. It would have been better to explain why Freeman was a worthy choice in the first place with his other experience and ability."

On Chas Freeman's withdrawal
STEPHEN WALT

First, for all of you out there who may have questioned whether there was a powerful "Israel lobby," or who admitted that it existed but didn't think it had much influence, or who thought that the real problem was some supposedly all-powerful "Saudi lobby," think again.

Second, this incident does not speak well for Barack Obama's principles, or even his political instincts. It is one thing to pander to various special interest groups while you're running for office -- everyone expects that sort of thing -- but it's another thing to let a group of bullies push you around in the first fifty days of your administration. But as Ben Smith noted in Politico, it's entirely consistent with most of Obama's behavior on this issue.

The decision to toss Freeman over the side tells the lobby (and others) that it doesn't have to worry about Barack getting tough with [past and future Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin] Netanyahu, or even that he’s willing to fight hard for his own people. Although AIPAC [American-Israeli Political Action Committee] has issued a pro forma denial that it had anything to do with it, well-placed friends in Washington have told me that it leaned hard on some key senators behind-the-scenes and is now bragging that Obama is a "pushover." Bottom line: Caving on Freeman was a blunder that could come back to haunt any subsequent effort to address the deteriorating situation in the region.

Third, and related to my second point, this incident reinforces my suspicion that the Democratic Party is in fact a party of wimps. I'm not talking about Congress, which has been in thrall to the lobby for decades, but about the new team in the Executive Branch. Don't they understand that you have to start your term in office by making it clear that people will pay a price if they cross you? Barack Obama won an historic election and has a clear mandate for change -- and that includes rethinking our failed Middle East policy -- and yet he wouldn't defend an appointment that didn't even require Senate confirmation. Why? See point No.1 above.

Of course, it's possible that I'm wrong here, and that Obama's team was actually being clever. Freeman's critics had to expend a lot of ammunition to kill a single appointment to what is ultimately not a direct policy-making position, and they undoubtedly ticked off a lot of people by doing so. When the real policy fights begin -- over the actual content of the NIEs [National Intelligence Estimates], over attacking Iran, and over the peace process itself -- they aren't likely to get much sympathy from [Director of National Intelligence Dennis] Blair and it is least conceivable that Obama will turn to them and say, "look, I gave you one early on, but now I'm going to do what's right for America." I don't really believe that will happen, but I'll be delighted if Obama proves me wrong.

Fourth, the worst aspect of the Freeman affair is the likelihood of a chilling effect on discourse in Washington, at precisely the time when we badly need a more open and wide-ranging discussion of our Middle East policy. As I noted earlier, this was one of the main reasons why the lobby went after Freeman so vehemently; in an era where more and more people are questioning Israel's behavior and questioning the merits of unconditional U.S. support, its hardline defenders felt they simply had to reinforce the de facto ban on honest discourse inside the Beltway. After forty-plus years of occupation, two wars in Lebanon, and the latest pummeling of Gaza, (not to mention [Israeli Prime Minister] Ehud Olmert's own comparison of Israel with South Africa), defenders of the "special relationship" can't win on facts and logic anymore. So they have to rely on raw political muscle and the silencing or marginalization of those with whom they disagree. In the short term, Freeman's fate is intended to send the message that if you want to move up in Washington, you had better make damn sure that nobody even suspects you might be an independent thinker on these issues.

This outcome is bad for everyone, including Israel. It means that policy debates in the United States will continue to be narrower than in other countries (including Israel itself), public discourse will be equally biased, and a lot of self-censorship will go on. America's Middle East policy will remain stuck in the same familiar rut, and even a well-intentioned individual like George Mitchell won't be able to bring the full weight of our influence to bear. At a time when Israel badly needs honest advice, nobody in Washington is going to offer it, lest they face the wrath of the same foolish ideologues who targeted Freeman. The likely result is further erosion in America's position in the Middle East, and more troubles for Israel as well.

Yet to those who defended Freeman’s appointment and challenged the lobby's smear campaign, I offer a fifth observation: do not lose heart. The silver lining in this sorry episode is that it was abundantly clear to everyone what was going on and who was behind it. In the past, the lobby was able to derail appointments quietly -- even pre-emptively -- but this fight took place in broad daylight. And Steve Rosen [of AIPAC], one of Freeman's chief tormentors, once admitted: "a lobby is like a night flower. It thrives in the dark and dies in the sun." Slowly, the light is dawning and the lobby's negative influence is becoming more and more apparent, even if relatively few people have the guts to say so out loud.  But history will not be kind to the likes of [Senator] Charles Schumer, Jonathan Chait [of the New Republic], Steve Rosen et al, whose hidebound views are unintentionally undermining both U.S. and Israeli security.

Last but not least, I cannot help but be struck by how little confidence Freeman's critics seem to have in Israel itself. Apparently they believe that a country that recently celebrated its 60th birthday, whose per capita income ranks 29th in the world, that has several hundred nuclear weapons, and a military that is able to inflict more than 1,300 deaths on helpless Palestinians in a couple of weeks without much effort will nonetheless be at risk if someone who has criticized some Israeli policies (while defending its existence) were to chair the National Intelligence Council. The sad truth is that these individuals are deathly afraid of honest discourse here in the United States because deep down, they believe Israel cannot survive if it isn't umbilically attached to the United States. The irony is that people like me have more confidence in Israel than they do: I think Israel can survive and prosper if it has a normal relationship with the United States instead of "special" one. Indeed, I think a more normal relationship would be better for both countries. It appears they aren't so sure, and that is why they went after Charles Freeman.

Ms Clinton's Wild Ride: A US "Grand Strategy" on Israel-Palestine-Iran?

Related Post: Iran, Missile Defense, and a Clinton Power Play?
Related Post: Ms Clinton’s Wild Ride: Is Dennis Ross in the Saddle on Iran?


"What is the broader strategy for the Obama Administration if it is re-engaging with the Israel-Palestinian process and the region beyond? There are three issues to consider: 1. The pursuit of a "two-state" Israel-Palestine settlement; 2. The contest between Hamas and Fatah for political leadership in Gaza and the West Bank; 3. The US relationship with Iran."

The easy part first: the significant development at the Gaza Donors Conference this week was not the declaration of $5.2 billion in aid for the area. It might have been a feel-good measure and good PR for some of the countries putting up their symbolic numbers, but it means nothing unless 1) Israel relents on its choke-hold on any aid to Gaza; 2) Hamas agrees to let the Palestinian Authority carry the aid and the credit. The first condition is doubtful with the current interregnum in the Israeli Government and the prospect of a Netanyahu Administration; the second is a non-starter.

Nope, if you wanted a meaningful headline, it's this: "US Promises $300 Million to Gaza; $600 Million to Palestinian Authority and West Bank". That's right: at a conference which was supposedly to arrange relief for Gazans suffering from long-term deprivation and the short-term assault by Israeli forces, two-thirds of the American commitment went elsewhere.

Which, of course, is no accident: Washington's clear priority is to prop up the PA and Fatah Party of Mahmoud Abbas as the proper faction to lead the Palestinian cause. But there's more....

Yesterday's New York Times, that US newspaper of record, did not lead with the aid announcement. Instead, it chose another pronouncement by the Secretary of State, this one made "privately" to an Arab foreign minister: "Clinton Pessimistic on Iran Outreach". So, at a conference supposedly devoted to the immediate problems of Gaza, the American delegation --- which immediately fed Clinton's Iran statement to the press --- was not solely concentrated on Israel and Palestine but looking hundreds of miles away to Tehran.

This all begs the question: what is the broader strategy for the Obama Administration if it is re-engaging with the Israel-Palestinian process and the region beyond? There are three issues to consider:

1. The pursuit of a "two-state" Israel-Palestine settlement;
2. The contest between Hamas and Fatah for political leadership in Gaza and the West Bank;
3. The US relationship with Iran.

Let's assume that the first issue is the long-term priority for the Obama Administration. That is the declared purpose of the President's designation of an envoy, George Mitchell, and it was restated in Clinton's speech at the Donors Conference and after her meetings with Israeli leaders yesterday.

That doesn't mean, however, that this is the immediate objective of US officials. Instead, their focus is on getting the right answer on Issue 2 --- that "proper" Palestinian leadership --- before proceeding with the negotiations for the two-state settlement.

And this is where Washington lowered the boom this week. It's not just a question of repeating the preconditions for Hamas to be "acceptable" in the political process: renunciation of violence, recognition of Israel, and adherence to 2005 agreements on border crossings. The US just handed out a $200 million lifeline to the Palestinian Authority so it can pay its employees and promised another $400 for unspecified "projects", but presumably ones where Abbas and Fatah will take credit. And, beyond that, there's the small matter of Washington funding the PA's security forces, as a New York Times puff piece illustrated this week:

One year ago, this 18-acre campus built with $10 million of American taxpayer money was another piece of Jordan Valley desert, and Palestinian guardsmen slept on flea-bitten mattresses and took meals on their laps. Along with a 35-acre, $11 million operations camp a few miles away, also American-financed, it is a real step forward in an otherwise moribund process of Palestinian state-building.

“These guys now feel like they’re on a winning team, that they are building a Palestinian state,” said Lt. Gen. Keith W. Dayton, the American who has been overseeing the training of Palestinian forces, as he watched exercises on Thursday. “And I wouldn’t stay if I didn’t think they were going to do it. I have complete confidence in the Palestinian leadership, and I’m convinced the new administration is serious about this.”

That's the nice spin on the US effort. The not-so-nice possibilities are that these security forces may be more concerned about stopping political dissent in the West Bank than they are about stopping attacks on Israel. And, oh yes, those forces could always be used --- as occurred in 2007 --- in a de facto civil war with Hamas.

This US support of the Palestinian Authority, and its corresponding effort to isolate and undermine Hamas, is far from new. Indeed, it was part of the December war in Gaza. However, when the effort to re-install the PA failed, there was a window of possibility --- through private talks or communications via a third party --- for Washington to "engage" Hamas with a view to bringing it into the peace process.

Clinton and the US money this week signalled that this is no longer on the table. It may be that the possibility never existed. Or it may be that the Obama Administration has calculated that, with visions of Benjamin Netanyahu, promotion of the PA is the only way to get the next Israeli Prime Minister to accept any two-state possibility.

That, however, is only the first part of the story. The second is the apparent decision of Washington to bring the Iran variable back into the Israel-Palestine calculation. Clinton's statement of her pessimism on engagement with Tehran was accompanied by the leak to the New York Times of the US offer to Russia to trade missile defence for Moscow's abandonment of the Iranian nuclear programme.

So, only six weeks after the Obama Inaugural prospect of engagement with an unclenched fist and four after his Vice-President's speech at Munich further pointed to a possible dialogue (as well as meetings behind the scenes), US officials have chosen to highlight their get-tough stance.

One explanation for this shift is the long-awaited entry of Dennis Ross, who has long advocated "Diplomacy Then Pressure", into the State Department. Another is that the Obama Administration is in a muddle, with different folks putting out different positions on the Iran question.

However, the conjunction of the setting of the Donors Conference and Clinton's declaration raises a grander possibility: the US relationship with Tehran is now a bargaining chip in the US manoeuvres on Israel-Palestine. So does Clinton's statement yesterday after talking to the Israelis that Hamas is "a client of Iran".

Put bluntly, the US may anticipate that Netanyahu will be insisting on a withdrawal from engagement with Iran if there is to be an engagement with the Palestinian Authority and the two-state process; indeed, he may have already make that clear to the Americans.

The folly of the Obama Administration sacrificing any thought of an opening with Iran is clear. Even if Israel-Palestine is a "core" issue, it's not the only one in town. Indeed, you could argue that Afghanistan has also become a "core" issue for the future of US foreign policy and Iran, which is as focused on Central Asia as the Middle East, is a key player which could assist the American efforts. By throwing up a wall to Tehran, the US Government protects its position in one vital area only to give it away on another.

Unfortunately, that is an easy sacrifice to make, at least with respect to the US relationship with Israel and American domestic politics. And the long-term costs remain, well, long-term.

So the Obama team will press on, possibly oblivious to other consequences of their shift. Consider, for example, another piece of the puzzle: the US relationship with Syria. In the vision of a two-state Israel-Palestine process in which the Palestinian Authority would be promoted, Damascus can and should be brought in from the cold. No coincidence, then, that Clinton announced that two US envoys, Jeffrey Feltman and Daniel Shapiro, would visit Syria this week --- the highest-level US contacts with Damascus since January 2005.

Of course, that US approach will be seeking a Syrian detachment from Iran and a commitment to let Hamas dangle in the wind. So what happens if the Syrians refuse or simply stall on giving an answer to Washington? Does Washington shake a fist, possibly threatening the consequences of the tribunal on the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri? Or does it accept that other countries may not follow the American script?

I fear we are on the verge of witnessing yet another huge strategic choice --- and error --- to accompany the choice/error that has been in Afghanistan and Pakistan.