On Friday the Associated Press put the news, "April deadliest month for US in Iraq in 7 months", in numbers: 18 American troops died, compared to nine in March; 13 were killed in combat, compared to four the previous month.
Those numbers, however, didn't begin to tell the story. One might note, for example, that it's not just (or even primarily) an American issue: 371 Iraqs and 80 Iranian pilgrims were killed in violence, mainly in bombings, during the month, an increase from 335 Iraqis in March, 288 in February, and 242 in January. (The figures are certainly underestimates, given that other deaths go unreported.)
One could ponder not only the contest to control cities like Kirkuk, where Kurdish and Arab factions are in a political and paramilitary battle, and Mosul, where the US military (misleadingly) reduces the insurgent violence to "Al Qa'eda in Iraq". But you can add a new feature: members of the Awakening Councils, the Sunni militias backed by the US from 2006, are rejoining the insurgency after they were not allowed into Iraqi security forces by the Al-Maliki Government.
And then you might offer a conclusion to unsettle both "common wisdom" and American nerves: in this escalation of tension, the US is increasingly marginal.
That's not just in media coverage, although the treatment of recent deaths is illuminating: when three US troops were killed on Thursday in Anbar province, The Washington Post didn't even bother to print the news. The emerging signs of irrelancy are coming on the political front. As an analysis from Middle East Report Onlineon the Awakening Councils summarises, "The ability of the United States and its military forces to affect the trajectory of political accommodation and reconciliation has diminished."
An article in The New York Times by Sam Dagher on 25 April revealed how Al-Maliki "resists pleas by US to placate Ba'ath Party". Beyond that sensational headline was the most detailed and most serious account of how the Shia-led Iraqi Government was balking at any political reconciliation with military officials from the Saddam Hussein era. It is only a short step, however, from a refusal to accept former Ba'athists to a holdout against any co-operation with local Sunni tribes and leadership.
Meanwhile, the manoeuvres for influence mean that former Shi'a foes of the US have become more than acceptable on the Iraqi and even international stage. Moqtada Sadr, the cleric who Washington tried to arrest and then kill in 2004 after he built up a political party and militia, was in Turkey last week meeting Prime Minister Reccip Tayip Erodgan and President Abdullah Gul as well as other leading Iraqi politicians. Sadr's trip points to his emphasis on political rather than paramilitary moves to power and also the place of other countries in that campaign: he ventured to Ankara after discussions in Tehran.
And back in Baghdad, the al-Maliki Government is not only talking tough against internal rivals but even against its American allies. The Prime Minister's spokesman wrote on Sunday, "The Iraqi government is committed to the agreed-upon withdrawal dates, whether it's the June 30 withdrawal of the U.S. troops from all cities and towns or the complete withdrawal from Iraq by the end of 2011."
Of course, no one in the Obama Administration is going to say that the upsurge in violence and the political discussions point to a Washington which is losing its ability to re-shape a "proper" Iraq. As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates insisted on CNN this week, "Nothing ever gets done without American leadership, at the end of the day."
Indeed, April's instability points to a likely irony. Even though it indicates that the US military are bystanders and even "collateral damage", the surge in violence will probably be used by American commanders to postpone a withdrawal from some Iraqi cities (one which Al-Maliki, as he bolsters his position, will probably accept in Mosul. Administration officials will spin the tale that it's a few recalcitrant outsiders who are hindering progress and peace, as in Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's recent identification of "rejectionists".
No matter. The paradox of importance is that, as the Al-Maliki Government --- distrusted but ultimately supported by Washington --- finally established its strength in spring 2008, it did not need to fall back on US forces. That was confirmed in the Government's ultimately successful campaign to get a US commitment to withdrawal under the Status of Forces Agreement. Even though some military aspects of that pullout may be delayed, it's the political withdrawal of the US that is significant.
So the pendulum swings. The US raises a heavier hand in its attempt to re-shape a Government in Islamabad but has no fist to shake in Baghdad. Instead, Nouri al-Maliki was shaking hands in London this week --- after all, investment in Iraq (an investment which is desperately needed as oil revenues decline) doesn't have to come from Washington.
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates' interview with CNN's Fareed Zakaria, conducted earlier this week, was broadcast today. While the discussion has already been overtaken by events in Pakistan and Iraq, we'll be commenting on important clues to the future course of Obama foreign policy in an analysis tomorrow.
ZAKARIA: Secretary Gates, thank you for doing this.
ROBERT GATES, U.S. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE: My pleasure.
ZAKARIA: President Obama -- you've heard a lot of Republican criticism that he's going around the world apologizing about America. Do you accept that?
GATES: Well, I like to remind people that, when President George W. Bush came into office, he talked about a more humble America. And, you know, you go back to Theodore Roosevelt and his line about speaking softly, but carrying a big stick.
I think that acknowledging that we have made mistakes is not only factually accurate, I think that it is unusual, because so few other governments in the world are willing to admit that, although they make them all the time. And some of them make catastrophic mistakes.
And in speeches myself, I have said that at times we have acted too arrogantly. And I didn't feel that I was being apologetic for America, I just was saying, because the next -- I was just saying that that's the way we are in terms of being willing to recognize our own limitations, and when we make a mistake to correct it.
Because I think the next line that I always use is, no other country in the world is so self-critical, and is so willing to change course when we feel that we've strayed from our values, or when we feel like we've been too arrogant.
So, I think -- I have not seen it as an apology tour at all, but rather a change of tone, a more humble America. But everybody knows we still have the big stick.
ZAKARIA: Let me ask you about perhaps the most pressing crisis on your plate right now, which is Pakistan.
In your view, has the Pakistani military regained the initiative in Buner, and perhaps even in the areas around the Swat Valley, where the Taliban had gained strongholds?
GATES: It is my impression from a great distance that they have begun to regain the initiative.
I think that the failure of the agreement in Swat, and then the movement into Buner, particularly, I think was a real wakeup call for the Pakistani government. We and others have been talking with them about how what is happening there in the western frontier area is truly an existential threat to democratic government in Pakistan. And I think the movement of the Taliban into Buner really got their attention.
I think that the leaders of Pakistan do understand this -- President Zardari, Prime Minister Gilani, General Kayani and others. But I think that there's a need for them to help the rest of Pakistan understand why it's an existential threat.
ZAKARIA: But do you think that the leadership gets it? Because I look at what's happened, Mr. Secretary.
They have these Taliban forces, insurgencies, 60 miles from the capital, 100 miles from the capital. And what they have done so far is move 6,000 troops from the eastern border to the western border, out of an army of about a half-million. This does not strike one as a full-throated response at every level that mobilizes the nation and its defense forces.
Do you think that there is still a way to go for the Pakistani military in terms of focusing on this threat?
GATES: Well, I think what you have to do is look at it in some historical context. For 60 years, Pakistan has regarded India as its existential threat, as the main enemy. And its forces are trained to deal with that threat. That's where it has the bulk of its army and the bulk of its military capability.
And historically, the far western part of Pakistan has generally been ungoverned. And the Pakistani governments going back decades would do deals with the tribes and the Pashtuns, and would play the tribes against one another, and occasionally, when necessary, use the army to put down a serious challenge.
I think that -- and partly it's because the Punjabis so outnumber the Pashtuns, that they've always felt that, if it really got serious, it was a problem they could take care of. I think that -- that's why I think the movement of the Taliban so close to Islamabad was a real wakeup call for them.
I would just remind that, you know, the first al Qaeda attack on the United States was in 1993. We really didn't change much of anything we did until after we were hit on September 11, 2001. So, al Qaeda was at war with us for eight years, at least eight years, before we acknowledged that we were at war with them, as well.
And I think a little bit of the same denial has been going on in Pakistan. But I think that the recent developments have certainly got their attention.
ZAKARIA: Do you think they have the counterinsurgency capacity? Because at some level, armies don't like to fight these kind of wars, as you well know. I mean, what armies like to do is have a big enemy, so they can have a big budget, and never have to fight a war.
And that is, in effect, what has happened with Pakistan with India, which is they have this big enemy. It justifies a very large budget for the Pakistani military. But they don't actually have to fight.
Whereas this one, the insurgency, is one which they have to fight. They could lose. And so, they worry, I think, that they even have the capacity.
Do they have the capacity for real counterinsurgency?
GATES: Well, I think that they are at the beginning of the process of developing that capacity.
But again, to provide some perspective, in 2003, when we went into Iraq, or even in 2001 and '02 when we went into Afghanistan, our Army didn't have that capacity either. We had forgotten everything we learned about counterinsurgency in Vietnam. And it took us several years to change our tactics and to get ourselves into a position where we could effectively fight a counterinsurgency.
So, institutions are slow to change, even in the face of a real threat. And I think that the Pakistanis are beginning to open up to others, to get additional help. I certainly hope that's the case.
But I don't -- it's not something where I would sort of blame the Pakistani Army, because we went through the same process ourselves as we confronted a building insurgency in Iraq. We had to learn all over again how to do this. And we had to acquire the equipment to do it effectively, completely outside the normal Pentagon bureaucracy for the most part.
So, perhaps I have a little more understanding of the challenges that our Pakistani counterparts face than perhaps others.
ZAKARIA: Well, they're blaming us. The Pakistani ambassador wrote an article in the "Wall Street Journal," in which he says, basically, that Washington has been reluctant to share critical technology and training, the modern equipment and training for their military. Basically what they want is helicopters, night vision goggles, that kind of thing.
Is it true that we have been reluctant to give them some of this equipment and training?
GATES: Well, of the kinds of things that you have described, I think that we have been willing to provide the training, all the training and that kind of equipment that we possibly can, as much as they would take. There has been a reluctance on their part up to now. They don't like the idea of a significant American military footprint inside Pakistan. I understand that.
But we are willing to do pretty much whatever we can to help the Pakistanis in this situation. I think that we have been willing to do that for quite some time.
ZAKARIA: Will there be American military advisers in Pakistan now, training the Pakistani military in counterinsurgency?
GATES: Well, I think that remains to be seen. There's a very small number now. But I think it will depend on how the situation develops and the views of the Pakistani government.
I would just say, we are prepared to provide whatever help in developing this counterinsurgency capability to the Pakistanis that we possibly can. But it's their country, and they're sovereign. And we'll let them dictate the rules.
ZAKARIA: Let's move to Afghanistan.
You've said a number of times that no civil war, no conflict, no insurgency is ever really ended without some kind of political reconciliation. And you've talked about the fact that some part of the Taliban -- perhaps even the majority of the people fighting, though not the leadership -- might be reconcilable.
There are reports that there have been efforts made by American military officers -- Dexter Filkins of the "New York Times" followed one such reconciliation effort.
What is your sense about how these efforts are going? How is the effort to in some way draw away parts of the Taliban from the central leadership?
GATES: I think there are several aspects to it.
First of all, based on the information available to us, some considerable proportion of the Taliban essentially do this as a job. They get paid for it. And if alternative means of employment can be found, they probably could be fairly easily drawn away, and there really is no political agenda associated with it at all.
In terms of political reconciliation, first of all, in my view, it has to be on the terms of the Afghan government. They will have the monopoly on the use of armed force inside the country.
But I think, as long as the Taliban think the momentum is with them, that the prospects for political reconciliation are probably not very bright.
If we are successful in restoring significant security, particularly in the south and in the east of the country, I think then, as we are more successful, along with our Afghan partners, in reestablishing security, then I think the opportunity for political reconciliation will probably grow.
ZAKARIA: But right now there are no real prospects on hand?
GATES: I think there may be in some limited areas, but not of consequence as far as I can tell.
ZAKARIA: You've talked about trying to secure the population. There's also the effort now to take on the drug cartel, which is effectively run by the Taliban providing most of the money for their operations. All of this suggests you're taking the battle to the enemy.
Should we expect to see higher numbers of casualties in Afghanistan, American casualties, just the way we did in the early months of the surge, when, for the first time, you took the battle to the enemy?
GATES: I think that's a prospect we have to be willing to face, particularly in Regional Command South, as our forces go into parts of Afghanistan where there have been no government or coalition forces, ISAF forces, really, for the last several years. So, we will be turning over rocks that haven't been turned over in quite some time. And so, that does raise the prospect of greater casualties.
Although, it will be interesting to see whether the Taliban are prepared to stand and fight, or whether, in the face of significant military force, they will just dissipate and then return later.
The key, particularly in the south of Afghanistan, it seems to me, is the ability of the Afghan government, with our help, to hold on to the areas that have been cleared. It's very much the same principle as in Iraq.
The people are going to be ambivalent, as long as they can't tell who's going to win. They're going to try and not take sides, because they're afraid that once we leave, the Taliban will come in and kill them.
And so, we have to work with the Afghans to establish an enduring presence in some of these places -- perhaps with some of our people, but mostly with Afghan soldiers and Afghan police -- to hold these places against the Taliban, so the people will have confidence and then be willing to side with the government in a more enduring way.
That, I think, is the real challenge that we face.
ZAKARIA: That sounds like an Afghan government that is strong, legitimate, has a lot of capacity to do things like securing local areas.
Some people -- as you know, Henry Kissinger argues that this is sort of a bridge too far, that this is probably more than you can achieve in Afghanistan.
GATES: Well, first of all, I think that the priority, at least from the standpoint of the Department of Defense, is the continued growth and increased effectiveness of the Afghan national security forces, both the army and the police. And we are now looking at a significant increase in the size of the Afghan army, and it is probable that there will be a need to increase the size of the national police force, as well.
And I think that those are genuine...
ZAKARIA: Which is riddled with accusations of corruption.
GATES: But I think, under the new minister of interior in Kabul, there have been some real -- there has been some real progress in beginning to clean up the national police and make them more effective.
And we also have a program called Focused District Development, which takes the police out of villages and districts and retrains them, and gives them equipment, and gives them new leadership, and so on, that seems to hold promise. So, it's a work in progress. There's no doubt about that.
But I think that we have to pay more -- we have to continue to try and build the capacity of the Afghan government, work with them in their capabilities. But I think we also have to focus at the provincial and the district level.
This is where I think development programs and assistance are more likely to actually happen and for school rooms to be built, for roads to be built, for wells to be dug, and so on and so forth, where the people can actually see government, Afghan government -- it may not be the national government, but the provincial government or the district government -- actually delivering a service and improving the quality of life.
So, I think part of the reason that the civilian surge is such an important part of the administration's new strategy is that it's this kind of capability at the provincial and the district level, in my view, that really has to be strengthened. We have to make the Provincial Reconstruction Teams much more robust with civilian experts, so we can begin to help the Afghans deliver these kinds of services.
I think, at the end of the day, that, plus the increased effectiveness and strength of the army and the police, are really the pathway forward.
ZAKARIA: You once said that the chief lesson you learned from 40 years in government was the limits of power. So, apply that lesson to Afghanistan today.
What does it -- what do you think of -- what are the limits to what America can do in Afghanistan?
GATES: Well, I have been quoted, accurately, as saying I have real reservations about significant further commitments of American military -- of the American military to Afghanistan, beyond what the president has already approved.
The Soviets were in there with 110,000, 120,000 troops. They didn't care about civilian casualties. And they couldn't win.
If there's ever an example that military power alone cannot be successful in Afghanistan, I think it was the Soviet experience. And I think there's a lot we can learn from that.
And so, I worry -- it is absolutely critical that the Afghans believe that this is their war. It is their war against people who are trying to overthrow their government that they democratically elected. For all of its flaws and shortcomings, it is theirs.
And we must be their partner and their ally. If we get to the point where the Afghan people see us as occupiers, then we will have lost.
So, the way we treat the Afghans, the importance of keeping the Afghans in the lead in many of these activities -- the military as well as the civilian -- I think is absolutely critical, so that they know, so that these villagers know, that its their people who are leading this fight. This isn't some foreign army coming in there, like all the previous foreign armies, to just occupy them.
ZAKARIA: But that means that a year from now, six months from now, you are unlikely to approve a request for additional troops in Afghanistan. GATES: I would be -- I would be a hard sell. There's no question about it. And I have not made a secret of that, either publicly or in government meetings.
I think we will have -- between the American military commitment and our coalition partners, the ISAF partners --we will have about 100,000 troops in Afghanistan. That's only about 10,000 shy of what the Russians had. And I think we need to think about that.
My view is, it would be a far better investment to focus on building the strength of the Afghan army and the Afghan police, making sure that, of the numbers of people we have there, there are adequate trainers, so that we can accelerate the growth of those forces. It's that combination of a certain level of international support for the Afghan military effort and the growing of the Afghan security forces themselves, it's that partnership that I think eventually will be successful in Afghanistan.
As long as -- if we try to do it all ourselves, I think it won't work.
ZAKARIA: And we are back with Robert Gates, the secretary of defense.
I'm going to take you west to Iraq.
There has been some renewed violence in Iraq. And some of it does seem to be related to the Sunni community that feels still dispossessed. There is some controversy about exactly who is spearheading it.
You and Secretary Clinton have talked about al Qaeda remnants. But Prime Minister Maliki has pointed the finger at "former Baathists," as he puts it, and used it as a way of explaining why he's not going to make more concessions to Sunni demands.
Is this core problem, the Shia and Sunni political disagreement, going to produce more and more violence as U.S. troops draw down?
GATES: I actually think that that kind of sectarian violence -- I guess I would say, I hope not. And I actually think it probably will not grow.
I think that they do understand that this is al Qaeda. This is certainly the view of our commanders, that most of this, most of these high-profile bombings, are part of a campaign that was started a few weeks ago by al Qaeda, as we begin to draw down our forces, to both demonstrate -- to try and make the point to the Iraqi people that it was this kind of terrorist acts that led us to draw down, rather than our success, but also to try -- for al Qaeda to try and provoke the kind of sectarian violence that you're talking about. This is al Qaeda trying to set Shia against Sunni.
Now, regardless of what he says, Prime Minister Maliki also is reaching out to elements of the Sunni community as potential political allies.
And so, the key for us is the Iraqis themselves working these differences out, and their problems, in a political way. And so far, the record of the past year, year-and-a-half, has been pretty encouraging in terms of the progress that they've made.
There's no question that the roots of democracy are still very shallow in Iraq. But there's been a lot of progress. And I don't think there are very many Iraqis who want to return to the kind of violence that they saw in 2006.
So, I think this is mainly al Qaida. I think we do have to watch very carefully, perhaps more importantly, the situation between the Arabs and the Kurds to make sure that that relationship, that they continue to solve their problems, work through their problems politically.
So, you know, they have a lot of challenges. There's no question about it.
But I'm really -- I'm reasonably optimistic that the gains in terms of solving problems between the sectarian elements will continue to be done politically rather than violently -- despite all of al Qaeda's best efforts.
ZAKARIA: But you don't have an oil revenue-sharing law. You don't have much resolution over Mosul. You don't have much resolution over Kirkuk.
And when I talk to members of the Sunni leadership in Iraq, they tell me that they feel completely excluded from government jobs, from patronage, from all the kind of power-sharing that they were promised.
GATES: Well, I think that the election of the new speaker, of the council representatives, is an important step forward. As the provincial, the newly elected provincial councils begin to allocate positions, and so on, we see alliances being made. So, I think that there has been progress in that way. The Sunnis have taken charge of several of the provinces where they won the elections this time, where they could have won them before, had they not boycotted. So, I think that -- I think they continue to show progress.
On the oil law, the new speaker of the Council of Representatives has said that's one of the highest priorities that he has.
I think that Kirkuk, from an Arab-Kurd point of view, Kirkuk is a bigger problem by far than Mosul. Mosul is really still a security problem from the standpoint of al Qaeda still using it as kind of their last redoubt, if you will. But, you know, they continue to work these things through.
ZAKARIA: President Obama has laid out a vision for a nuclear- free world, for a world free of nuclear weapons.
Now, since 1945, there has been no war between a major power, and many people attribute that to nuclear deterrence. So, would a world free of nuclear weapons be more stable without nuclear deterrence?
GATES: Well, I don't know. And I don't think anybody does.
I think that it's -- you know, we have had a number of countries forego nuclear weapons, countries that had nuclear weapons programs, who really voluntarily walked away from them -- South Africa, Libya, Taiwan, South Korea, Argentina, Brazil. So, total pessimism with respect to nonproliferation, I think, is unwarranted.
I think that -- I have worked -- President Obama is the fourth president that I have worked for, who has said that he would like to -- has said publicly -- that he would like to see an end to nuclear weapons and having a nuclear weapons-free world.
I think that's a laudable objective. I think it's clear to everyone it's an approach -- it's a goal that you have to move towards step-by-step.
I think that continued nonproliferation efforts -- the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, another post-START agreement with the Russians in terms of further reducing our stockpile -- I think these are all important steps in that direction. But my guess is it's a long march.
ZAKARIA: But if we went to zero, and the Chinese went to zero, would the relationship be more stable? I mean, certainly, the U.S.- Soviet case, it seemed as though the fact that we both had nuclear weapons kept the peace.
GATES: Well, you're asking about a hypothetical world. And I think that's -- we don't know the answer to that question.
The question is, how do you deal with the technology? I mean, when you get down to very low numbers of nuclear weapons, and you contemplate going to zero, how do you deal with the reality of that technology being available to almost any country that seeks to pursue it? And what conditions do you put in place? What U.N. verification measures, or IAEA verification measures, do you put in place to prevent others from getting that?
So, I think this is an important goal for everyone to have in the world. But I think that it's a long road to get there.
ZAKARIA: Your defense budget has gathered a huge number of opponents. There's the contractors, people in Congress, parts of the services.
Are you going to get through the budget you want? Or do you think some significant compromise is inevitable?
GATES: Well, I think that, since the budget isn't even on the Hill yet, I'm not prepared to talk about compromises.
But, you know, I think there -- I will tell you, I have actually been surprised by how limited the criticism has been. And where I have heard criticism, it has come from predictable places.
And I think that there also have been some voices raised -- some important voices -- in support, including Senator McCain on the Armed Services Committee, and others, as well, on both sides of the aisle.
So, I'm relatively optimistic, actually. I think we've presented a very -- as one news magazine referred to it -- "radically sane" set of proposals. They don't represent a cut. And where we have eliminated one program, we have added to others.
So, it's a question of how do we balance our preparations for some future conflict with the capabilities necessary to be successful in the conflicts that we're engaged in today? And so, it's that rebalancing that I'm trying to do.
But at the end of the day, 50 percent of our procurement budget is still for these high-tech, modern, modernization programs; about 40 percent for dual-purpose capabilities, such as C-17 cargo planes; and about 10 percent for irregular conflict. So the notion that I've sort of abandoned looking at future threats is contrary to reality, and I look forward to the opportunity to go to the Hill and make that case.
(END VIDEO)
ZAKARIA: Gates was relatively calm about Iraq. He sees more political progress there than I do.
Now, these sectarian tensions don't have to erupt into violence, but this was always the incomplete aspect of the surge. Its military success -- and success has been undeniable -- put a lid on all that sectarian strife. But unless there is a political resolution of the problem, as American forces draw down, the pot could well start to bubble up again.
Up next, a final question for Robert Gates on the question of empire.
(COMMERCIAL BREAK)
(BEGIN VIDEO)
ZAKARIA: And we are back with Robert Gates, the secretary of defense.
A final question, Mr. Secretary. Do you worry -- you're a student of history -- do you worry that we are falling into a kind of imperial trap?
We have the largest defense budget in the world. We spend more, basically, than the rest of the world put together. Meanwhile, the Chinese are building this great industrial machine. We're in Iraq, in Afghanistan. We have to deal with Somali pirates.
It does begin to have this image of the British Empire, putting out the fires all over the world in somewhat peripheral areas, while the great industrial and economic challenges are coming up. And we're sort of -- we're caught by the reach of our own power.
GATES: Well, if we are an imperial power, we are a unique one in history, in that we are the only one in history that is always looking for an exit strategy.
The reality is, the United States has global interests. Our defense budget is about the same as the defense budgets or military budgets of every other country in the world put together.
But, as I say, we have global interests. And that defense budget is still less than 4 percent of our gross domestic product. During the Korean War it was as high as 9 percent -- much higher, obviously, during World War II. And it was 7 or 8 percent during Vietnam.
So, I think, first of all, that the size of military we have is not a burden on our economy compared historically to where we've been.
I think that -- I think a former secretary of state put it in a different way than an imperial power. She said, we are an indispensable power.
Because the reality is, if you look around the world and the variety of problems that exist, nothing ever gets done without American leadership, at the end of the day.
And I think that's going to continue. We're going through our economic troubles today.
I think it ties back to the first question you asked me about, you know, is the president on an apology tour. And absolutely not. This is about how the United States exercises global leadership. And being willing to listen, as well as to talk, is important in that regard.
ZAKARIA: And we thank you for having talked to us, Robert Gates, secretary of defense.
Enduring America, 18 March: "Having failed to get “stability” with Musharraf, having failed with Zardari, it is not hope that moves Washington but this question: Who or what can come next?
Soon after the Obama Administration took office, we concluded that its Pakistan policy was going around President Asif Ali Zardari, rather than working with him. Two weeks ago, we wrote that the US was behind a de facto military leadership of Pakistani policy, especially in the fight against insurgents in the northwest of the country.
Now Washington's idea of a political alternative is emerging. The New York Times revealed on Saturday that the US is trying to bring Zardari's long-time rival, former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif (pictured), into the Pakistani Government. Administration officials told the newspaper, "Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and Richard C. Holbrooke, the special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, have both urged Mr. Zardari and Mr. Sharif to look for ways to work together."
That in itself is not news. The Long March demonstrations in March exposed Zardari's political weakness and, conversely, elevated Sharif as leader of democratic opposition. During the protests, Clinton and Holbrooke talked to both men to avoid a violent showdown.
What is significant in the latest report is the open backing of Obama officials of Sharif, formerly seen as too close to "Islamist" (the shorthand for conservative religious groups, backed by Saudi Arabia) elements in Palistan. The simple reason? In the aftermath of the Long March, Sharif is seen as generally popular in contrast to widespread dislike for Zardari. An Obama official said bluntly, "The idea here is to tie Sharif’s popularity to things we think need to be done, like dealing with the militancy."
Washington's readiness to ditch Zardari, or at least push him to the side, was evident last week in statements by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, and President Obama; however, it reached a new level in leaks from General David Petraeus, the head of the US Central Command. After Petraeus spoke with US Congressmen, Fox News claimed that the General asserted “the Pakistanis have run out of excuses” for their failure to confront the insurgency.Petraeus reportedly gave the Pakistani Government two weeks to take "concrete action to destroy the Taliban".
Zardari's allies have tried to push back, rather lamely, with claims that the President is already talking to Sharif about their co-operation in Government. As the Pakistani military reclaimed the town of Buner, 60 miles north of Islamabad, back from insurgents, the Pakistani Ambassador to the US, Husain Haqqani, used The Wall Street Journal --- the preferred outlet of Zardari's public-relations machine --- to counter-attack:
President Asif Zardari has repeatedly declared the war against them a war for Pakistan's soul.....Meanwhile, the change of administration in the U.S. has slowed the flow of assistance to Pakistan. Unfortunately, ordinary Pakistanis have begun to wonder if our alliance with the West is bringing any benefits at all.
It appears, however, that all this is too late to persuade Washington that Zardari is reliable. On Saturday, Petraeus was in all-day meetings with senior Administration officials on Afghanistan and Pakistan. It may be too early to decode the latest American moves --- Secretary of Defense Gates' interview with CNN, airing today, was recorded earlier in the week --- but here's a safe bet:
If Washington has its way, President Zardari will be pushing his chair to the back of the room.
Quick question: which of these three --- President of Pakistan Asif Ali Zardari, President of Afghanistan Hamid Karzai (pictured), or former President of the West Bank Mahmoud Abbas --- should be feeling most secure this morning about support from Washington?
If you went for one of the two who are legally in office at the moment, you need to do some homework, maybe watching the entire 140 minutes of the Senate Appropriations Committee hearing with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. On the other hand, if you voted for Abbas (something will not be occurring in Palestinian elections in the near-future), take a bow and join the Clinton/Gates team.
The clear backing of Abbas and the Palestinian Authority, unnoticed by the media this morning, came in Clinton's opening statement:
At Sharm el-Sheikh last month, on behalf of the President, I announced a pledge of $900 million for humanitarian, economic, and security assistance for the Palestinian Authority and the Palestinian people.
Notice, not to Gaza, which suffered the damage from the recent war --- as we have pointed out repeatedly, 2/3 of this aid is earmarked for the West Bank. And most definitely no assistance which benefits or has any connection with the Gaza Government of Hamas: "[There are] stringent requirements to prevent aid from being diverted into the wrong hands."
Put bluntly, this aid is not primarily, as Clinton claimed, for "humanitarian" purposes; the objective is political and the primary beneficiary is Mahmoud Abbas.
As we wrote yesterday, President Zardari in Pakistan might want to watch his back, but he did get off lightly yesterday. Clinton and Gates played nice with him in their statements. Their primary purpose was to get Congressional support for the initial tranche of $500 million in military and economic assistance, so they did not raise doubts that America's partner in Islamabad might not be reliable. Instead, they stuck with general references for "diplomacy and development, to work with the Pakistani Government, Pakistani civil society, to try to provide more economic stability and diminish the conditions that feed extremism".
The recent Pakistani military operations to push back Taliban operations in Buner province seems to have given Zardari a bit of breathing space, even if he's not the prime mover behind that offensive. Clinton said:
The Government of Pakistan, both civilian and military leadership, is demonstrating much greater concern about the Taliban encroachment. We're getting a much more thoughtful response and actions. It was heartening to see the military sent into Buner province this weekend.
Afghanistan President Karzai was not so lucky. Consider this from Clinton's opening statement:
Bringing stability to [Afghanistan] is not only a military mission; it requires more than a military response. So we have requested $980 million in assistance to focus on rebuilding the agricultural sector, having more political progress, helping the local and provincial leadership deliver services for their people.
Hmmm, which level of government is not mentioned in that passage? I'm thinking "national".
And, if you believe that was just an oversight, Clinton made her distrust of Karzai more than clear in response to a question from Senator Barbara Mikulski about "cronyism and corruption", narcotics, and "the status and security of women" 50 minutes into the hearing. Clinton responded:
With respect to the Government, its capacity, its problems providing services, its perception of being less than transparent, straightforward, honest: it's a problem, I'm not going to tell you it's not.
Clinton immediately mentioned "significant pockets of progress we want to build on", such as the building up of the Afghan Army, but then returned to putting Karzai on notice: "We have made it very clear that we expect changes. We expect accountability, and we're going to demand it."
This, however, was not the stinger in Clinton's response. That came instead in this phrase, "Several members of the Cabinet are doing an excellent job.". It's notable and far-from-subtle that Karzai, facing re-election in August, was not named amongst those members.
Of course Clinton was shrewd enough not to name any of the "excellent" members. Open American endorsement of any Cabinet Minister who challenges Karzai would be the kiss of electoral death, and Clinton made clear, "We are not taking a position in this Presidential election. We are neither for nor against
However, when Mikulsi asked if Karzai would co-operate with the US in its effects against the Taliban and narcotics, Clinton was not so cautious: "That is what we are demanding of him."
So, in Ramallah in the West Bank, an ex-President can breathe easily this morning. A current President in Kabul, however, best be sleeping with one eye open tonight
One of the headlines from the joint appearance of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates before a Senate committee came not from the opening statements but from an exchange much later in the hearing.
Asked about a military option to curb or destroy Iran's nuclear programme, Gates firmly rejected airstrikes in favour of diplomacy to deter Tehran from an arms race: ""Their security interests are actually badly served by trying to have nuclear weapons. They will start a nuclear arms race in the Middle East and they will be less secure at the end than they are now."
Gates' statement is a clear indication that, for the foreseeable future, the Obama Administration is committed to an "engagement" to get a resolution: Iran renounces any intention of pursuing nuclear weapons, the US eases economic sanctions, and the two countries co-operate in some areas and reduce their conflict in others.
I suspect that Gates and other officials are now building policy on a "Libya precedent". In 2003, after talks pursued by European countries, Tripoli gave up its long-time pursuit of a nuclear device in exchange for the dropping of US sanctions and closer economic links and opportunities.
Clinton did make a reference to the possibility that talks with Tehran will only lead, after they stall, to an American pursuit of tougher sanctions: ""We do have intensive consultation efforts going on with our friends and like-minded nations, not only in the region but elsewhere in the world, concerning the threats that Iran poses." However, unlike her signals last month, the Secretary of State offered this as a sop to tough-minded Senators rather than as a likely development.
Monday, May 4, 2009 at 8:12 
On Friday the Associated Press put the news, "April deadliest month for US in Iraq in 7 months", in numbers: 18 American troops died, compared to nine in March; 13 were killed in combat, compared to four the previous month.
Soon after the Obama Administration took office, we concluded that its Pakistan policy was going around President Asif Ali Zardari, rather than working with him. Two weeks ago, we wrote that 
Quick question: which of these three --- President of Pakistan Asif Ali Zardari, President of Afghanistan Hamid Karzai (pictured), or former President of the West Bank Mahmoud Abbas --- should be feeling most secure this morning about support from Washington?