Iran's Uranium: Why Can't the US Take Yes for an Answer? (Parsi)

Trita Parsi writes for ABC News:

A noticeable irritation can be sensed in Washington. After months of investing in a new UN Security Council resolution and an escalation of the conflict and apparently winning agreement among the permanent members of the council for such a measure two emerging powers had the audacity to intervene and find a solution. Brazil and Turkey should keep their expectations low, however, because there will not be any thank you party for them in Washington anytime soon.

Iran’s Uranium: Washington “Can’t Afford to Look Ridiculous”, Makes Ridiculous Move (Emery)
Iran’s Uranium: US Shows a Middle Finger to Tehran…and Turkey and Brazil and… (Gary Sick)

Only two days after the announcement of the Brazilian-Turkish brokered deal with Iran that would see 1,200 kg of Iran's low enriched uranium shipped out of the country, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton told a Senate panel that the United States and its partners seeking new sanctions against Iran have come up with a draft proposal for a new round of penalties. UN Ambassador Susan Rice held a press conference at the UN today unveiling the new resolution.



A day earlier, State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley spoke dismissively about the Brazilian-Turkish deal. "The United States continues to have concerns about the arrangement. The joint declaration does not address core concerns of the international community," Crowley said, "Iran remains in defiance of five U.N. Security Council resolutions, including its unwillingness to suspend enrichment operations." Crowley then went on to link the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) deal with the Security Council demand for a suspension of Iran's enrichment activities. "Public statements today suggest that the TRR deal is unrelated to its ongoing enrichment activity. In fact they are integrally linked," he said.

These developments have taken many observers by surprise. Linking the TRR deal to suspension of enrichment is a new component it was the White House itself that decided last year to go forward with a deal to swap Iran's LEU for fuel rods without a suspension in order to throw back Iran's break out capability.

Furthermore, the earlier justification for the sanctions push was a reaction to Iran's failure to accept the swap proposal presented to it in October 2009. Administration officials stated on numerous occasions that sanctions would only be pursued if the diplomatic track failed to produce results. Sanctions would be needed to get Iran back to the table and to convince them to accept the deal.

Analysis: Washington Had Sudden Change of Heart

The sudden change of heart in Washington is particularly surprising mindful of the fact that the three objections Iran lodged against the 2009 TRR deal that the LEU needed to be shipped out in one shipment, that the swap would take place outside of Iran, and that the fuel rods would be delivered to Iran nine to twelve months have now all been withdrawn. Iran has agreed to the terms the US insisted on.

This may explain the comments of  Namik Tan, the Turkish Ambassador to the US, to the Associated Press, "We have delivered what they were asking for&If we fail to get a positive reaction it would be a real frustration."

But there are several factors that can shed light on Washington's apparent reluctance to take yes for an answer.

First, the Senate and the House are in the final phase of sending a broad sanctions bill to the President. The bill has several problems from the White House's perspective, including its limitations of Presidential waivers as well as the impact it will have on US allies who will be subjected to these sanctions.

Progress on the UN Security Council track has in the past few months been an important instrument to hold back Congress's own sanctions push. With Congress eager to sanction Iran, particularly now when the Brazilian-Turkish deal conceivably could derail or delay the UN sanctions track, the Obama administration feels the need to pacify the Congressional sanctions track by accelerating the UN sanctions track.

Second, the Brazilian-Turkish deal explicitly recognizes Iran's right to enrichment and would, as a result, eliminate the option of pursuing the zero-enrichment objective. While most analysts agree that the zero-enrichment objective simply isn't feasible, the White House has kept its options open on this issue. It has neither publicly confirmed it as a goal, nor rejected it. This, it has been argued, would provide the US with leverage. Even if it no longer is America's red line, it can still be America's opening position in a negotiation, the argument reads.

Does Washington's Reservations Hurt Obama's Attempt to Assert DC Diplomacy?

Third, there is a sense in the Obama administration that after the events of last year, a nuclear deal with Iran could only be sold domestically if Iran is first punished through a new round of sanctions. Only after a new round of sanctions would there be receptivity in Washington for a nuclear agreement with Iran. Hence, any nuclear deal that comes before a new round of sanctions would complicate the Obama administration's domestic challenges. A deal without punishment even a good deal simply wouldn't be enough.

Understandably, Washington's reaction to the Brazilian-Turkish deal has created some apprehension in the international community. The Obama administration has worked diligently to overcome the credibility gap America developed with the international community under President George W. Bush. One element of this effort was to utilize diplomacy as a premier tool of US foreign policy.

Punitive measures such as war or sanctions would no longer be the instruments of first resort. But the reaction to the Brazilian-Turkish deal may undo some of the progress the Obama administration has achieved with the international community. Washington's lack of appreciation for the breakthrough may fuel suspicions of whether sanctions are pursued to achieve success in diplomacy, or whether diplomacy was pursued to pave the way for sanctions and beyond.

Iran's Uranium: Washington "Can't Afford to Look Ridiculous", Makes Ridiculous Move (Emery)

EA's Chris Emery analyses:

The US response reminds me of the scene in The Godfather where the Don’s advisor asks the studio boss to drop his objection to using Jonny Fontaine in his next film. The studio boss admits that, although Jonny would be perfect for the role, he is committed to ruining Fontaine's career. Fontaine had made him look ridiculous, and the studio boss explains, "A man in my position can’t afford to look ridiculous."

NEW Iran’s Uranium: Why Can’t the US Take Yes for an Answer? (Parsi)
Iran’s Uranium: US Shows a Middle Finger to Tehran…and Turkey and Brazil and… (Gary Sick)

The Iran-Brazil-Turkey agreement was a good deal, but the US perceived that it would make them look ridiculous. Not just because it undercuts American diplomacy with China and Russia but because the deal resonates of a change in the international system ---- a change that is also a challenge. The US saw the IBT  deal not just as one unlikely to work; they saw it as a threat.


Technically, the deal does not address some concerns stated by the US: it does not include cessation of enrichment and leaves about 600-700 kilogrammes of low-enriched uranium inside Iran. Symbolically, however, this was Tehran saying that it wants a way out. At some point down the line, Iran could have found some handy technical reason for temporarily ending enrichment and decided that it was "cost-effective" to send most of its LEU abroad or to buy in medical isotopes.

But now, through its response, the US has reinforced the cyclical politics of confrontation and capitulation that have driven the crisis in US-Iranian relations for 30 years. Washington needs to recognise that breaking this dynamic is the only starting point for the eventual satisfaction of all its technical and geo-political security concerns.

The sanctions route through the United Nations is actually the worst-case scenario because, although there was not enough in the IBT agreement to get the Chinese and Russians off the hook, there is enough for them to substantially water down sanctions. The outcome will achieve nothing except to anger China, Russia, and all the non-permanent members of the Security Council while bolstering President Ahmadinejad at home and to some extent abroad.

Iran's Uranium: US Shows a Middle Finger to Tehran...and Turkey and Brazil and... (Gary Sick)

Gary Sick assesses Washington's response to the Iran-Brazil-Turkey agreement:

Well, that didn’t take long.

Yesterday I wondered if we were smart enough to declare victory and take yes as an answer from Tehran. Today, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, announced that a new package of sanctions against Iran had been approved by the major powers and would be sent to the UN Security Council later in the day.

Iran’s Uranium: Why Can’t the US Take Yes for an Answer? (Parsi)
Iran’s Uranium: Washington “Can’t Afford to Look Ridiculous”, Makes Ridiculous Move (Emery)

In case anyone overlooked the significance of this action, which followed by one day the announcement by Brazil and Turkey of the successful conclusion of their negotiations with Iran, she added: “I think this announcement is as convincing an answer to the efforts undertaken in Tehran over the last few days as any we could provide.”


Take that, Tehran! But it turns out that this lifted middle finger was not limited to Iran. Only hours before Clinton’s announcement, the foreign minister of Turkey held his own press conference. Obviously unaware of what was about to happen, he described in some detail not only the tortuous negotiation process with Iran, but his perception that he was acting directly on behalf of the United States.

According to Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, he had been in “constant contact” with Clinton herself and with national security adviser James Jones, while his prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, had face-to-face encouragement from President Obama in December and April.

The objective of Turkey and Brazil was to persuade Iran to accept the terms of an agreement the United States had itself promoted only six months ago as a confidence-building measure and the precursor to more substantive talks. There were twelve visits back and forth between the Turk and his Iranian counterpart, some 40 phone conversations, and eighteen grueling hours of personal negotiations leading up to the presentation of the signed agreement on Monday.

“What they wanted us to do was give the confidence to Iran to do the swap We have done our duty,” said Davutoglu, calling the deal an important step for regional and global peace. “We were told that if Iran gives 1,200 kg without conditions, then the required atmosphere of trust would be created [to avoid sanctions]. So if we do all these things, and they still talk about sanctions … [it] will damage the psychological trust that has been created.”

The Turks and Brazilians, who felt they had “delivered” Iran on the terms demanded by the United States, were surprised and disappointed at the negative reactions from Washington. Little did they know that their success in Tehran, which had been given a 0-30 percent chance just days earlier, came just as the Americans were putting the final touches on a package of sanctions to be presented to the UN Security Council. The Tehran agreement was as welcome as a pothole in the fast lane, and the Americans were not reluctant to let their displeasure be known.

The five major powers had made up their minds (without consulting other members of the Security Council that currently includes both Turkey and Brazil), and these two mid-level powers were told in so many words to get out of the way.

The gratuitous insult aside, which approach do you believe would most likely result in real progress in slowing or halting Iran’s nuclear program? We have been imposing ever-greater sanctions on Iran for more than fifteen years. When we started they had zero centrifuges; today they have in excess of 9,000. To those who believe that one more package of sanctions will do what no other sanctions have done so far, I can only say I admire your unquenchable optimism.

More likely the Turkish ambassador to the UN had it about right when he said quite plainly about sanctions, “They don’t work.”

Would a negotiating track do better, perhaps mediated by two middle-level powers who have built up some credibility with Iran, like Algeria when it finally engineered the end to the US-Iran hostage crisis in 1980-81?  We’ll never know. Tonight the hardliners in Iran (and their American counterparts) are celebrating.

The Iranian hardliners had already begun asking questions about the deal, fearful that Iran had given away too much. Now they don’t have to worry since everyone knows that Iran will never be willing or able to negotiate under the threat of sanctions.

For the Revolutionary Guards it is a huge bonus. As foreign companies are driven away, the Guards progressively take over more and more of the economy. And as restrictions on trade grow, so do their opportunities to manage the immensely profitable smuggling routes. Like their American counterparts, but for different reasons, they thrive on an environment of threat and isolation.

The presidents of Turkey and Brazil have been humiliated. But the Great Powers are confident that their lesser cousins know their place and will show deference when the chips are down. They’ll do what they have to do. They always do.

Don’t they… ?

Middle East Inside line: Israel's Nuclear Problem; Syrian Tensions with US & Israel

Israel's Nuclear Trouble: On Wednesday, at the United Nations conference on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the ~US, Russia, Britain, France, and China voiced support for making the Middle East a zone free of nuclear arms. There are two messages: one for Iran's nuclear programme and one for Israel's secret nuclear agenda.

"We are committed to a full implementation of the 1995 NPT resolution on the Middle East and we support all ongoing efforts to this end," the five permanent members of the UN Security Council members said in a statement. International Atomic Energy Agency chief Yukia Amano, in a letter, asked foreign ministers of the IAEA's 151 member states to share views on how to implement a resolution demanding that Israel accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and throw its nuclear facilities open to IAEA oversight.

Israel-Palestine: The Proximity Talks Starts Silently (Yenidunya)
Syria: A National Unity Government for More Democracy? (al-Assad)
Israel-Palestine Opinion: Discrimination in East Jerusalem (Eldar)
Israel-Palestine: Proximity Talks to Begin on Wednesday? (Yenidunya)

Syria-U.S. Relations at Odds?: On Monday, the U.S. renewed the six-year-old economic and diplomatic sanctions on Syria. In response Damascus criticized Washington harshly and said that the penalties reinforce hostilities in the region.



Deputy Foreign Minister Faysal Mekdad said the sanctions decision shows Washington has lost its credibility and failed to live up to its promises to Syria. "Obama is not serious about changing the relationship between the U.S. and Arab and Islamic states in the Middle East," Syrian officials said.

Hezbollah-Syria-Israel Triangle: On Tuesday, although there is still no evidence that Scud missiles were transferred to Hezbollah, the Israeli army's head of intelligence research, Brigadier General Yossi Baidatz, told the Knesset that the Scud transfer was the "tip of the iceberg", .
"Even today Hezbollah has missiles of all ranges types, including solid-fueled rockets that have a longer range are extremely accurate."

Baidatz then drew the picture of a multiple threat:

Hezbollah's long-range rockets allow them to position launchers deep within Lebanese territory and cover ranges far greater than we aware of in the past.

Hezbollah in 2010 is very different to Hezbollah in 2006 in terms of military capability, which has advanced a great deal. Hezbollah is now regarded by the Syrians as a component of their defense establishment.

Lastly and paradoxically,Baidatz stated that a political settlement with Israel is still a priority for Damascus:

A political settlement with Israel is high on Syria's list of priorities and intelligence shows a will to reach an agreement – but on their terms, meaning a return of the Golan Heights and American involvement.

Military intelligence believes Syria could radically alter its role – but Assad feels that political progress with the current Israel government is impossible and has therefore avoided confidence-building measures.

Middle East Analysis: Washington's Latest Stick for an Israel-Palestine Solution

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said on Friday she expects indirect talks between Israel and the Palestinians to begin next week. However, this is not the end of the story.

Here is the Obama Administration’s most recent and biggest stick: an international summit run by the Quartet of Middle East peacemakers --- the United States, European Union, United Nations, and Russia --- to establish a Palestinian state if Israeli-Palestinian talks remain stalemated into September or October.

Israel-Palestine: The Golden Key to Proximity Talks? East Jerusalem (Yenidunya)

Why in September or October? First of all, Arab League foreign ministers are expected to demand that the negotiations show progress within four months. Secondly, the UN General Assembly will reconvene in late September. Thirdly, September is the first anniversary of Obama’s trilateral summit with the Palestinian Authority leader Mahmoud Abbas and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Lastly, 26 September marks the end of the 10-month Israeli freeze on construction in West Bank settlements.


So what does this mean for Israel? Simply put, Washington says that West Jerusalem might find itself facing an internationalization of the conflict, moving hand-in-hand with insistence on a solution based international law and UN Resolutions 242 and 338. This means a shift away from the basis of provisions for Israeli self-defense to the  consolidation of socio-political institutions seeing the Israeli occupation as the heart of problems in the region.

Meanwhile, Washington is increasing its pressure on Israel. On Friday, a Palestinian source told The Guardian that the Obama administration would consider allowing the UN Security Council to censure Israel over its activity in West Bank settlements, encouraging the Palestinians to participate in peace talks. This would mean a US abstention on any resolution. The same source also reported that David Hale, the deputy to US special envoy George Mitchell, told Abbas that the Obama administration views Israeli construction in East Jerusalem as "provocative."

Will the Obama Administration be able to convince other countries to support these measures, despite Israel’s “sensitive” bilateral relations with Russia and France? Washington may find ground if it presents this as an approach to not only the Israeli-Palestinian conflict but also other regional problems, such as Iran’s nuclear programme, Hamas-Fatah reconciliation talks, and Israel’s relations with Lebanon and Syria.

If the Obama Administration is really serious in its warning, this is more than welcome for the Palestinian Authority as it will decrease pressure on the PA in the Weskt Bank.  However, Palestinians are unlikely to welcome an international conference if they cannot get more than “gestures” from the Netanyahu Government.

Arab countries will take a similar position. The London-based Al-Quds Al-Arabi has already reported that Syria is opposed to the Palestinians returning to the negotiating table because "Israel has not made enough gestures of good faith, and in light of the fact that senior officials in Israel have been sounding threats against Damascus and Beirut".