Iran Video & Text: Maziar Bahari on His 118 Days in Detention

The Latest from Iran (22 November): Abtahi Sentenced, Ahmadinejad Scrambles

Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis

Iranian-Canadian journalist Maziar Bahari, who was detained for almost four months soon after the 12 June Presidential election on charges of passing information to foreign organisations, has gone public with his story this weekend. He has been interviewed on CNN and CBS, and he has written an article for Newsweek

Within and beyond Bahari's account, which includes a recollection of his staged "confession" on Iranian television,  is an important political tale. This is testimony to the emergence of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as the force within the Iranian regime, eclipsing other agencies like the Ministry of Intelligence and arguably leaders like President Ahmadinejad. Newsweek frames this as "an ever more fractured regime", but what if --- in the eyes of the IRGC --- the Revolutionary Guard is the "uniting force" before and 12 June?

The Newsweek article follows the CNN interview:

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Oeg8iamawzI[/youtube]

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WONlBpMxMHc&feature=channel[/youtube]

118 Days, 12 Hours, 54 Minutes

Evin Prison, June 21, 2009 (around 10 a.m.)

The interrogator sat me in a wooden chair. It had a writing arm, like the chair I'd had in primary school. He ordered me to look down, even though I was already blindfolded: "Never look up, Mr. Bahari. While you are here—and we don't know how long you're going to be here—never look up." All I could see from under the blindfold was the interrogator's black leather slippers. They worried me. He had settled in for a long session.

"Mr. Bahari, you're an agent of foreign intelligence organizations," he began. I had gotten a look at him when he and his men had dragged me out of bed and arrested me a few hours earlier. He was heavyset—I later learned that the guards called him "the big guy"—taller and wider than me, with a massive head. His skin was dark, like someone from southern Iran. He wore thick glasses. But I would know him now only by his voice, his breath, and the rosewater perfume used by men who piously do their ablutions several times a day before prayers, but rarely shower.

I could see Mr. Rosewater's slippers right in front of my foot. He was towering over me.

"Could you let me know which ones?" I mumbled.

"Speak louder!" he shouted. He bent toward me, his face an inch away from mine. I could feel his breath on my skin. "What did you say?"

"I was wondering if you could be kind enough to let me know which organizations," I repeated.

"CIA, MI6, Mossad, and NEWSWEEK." He listed the names one by one, in a low but assured voice.

I was struck by Mr. Rosewater's confidence. I did not know then exactly which branch of the fractured Iranian government he worked for. When I was arrested, hundreds of thousands of protesters had been filling the streets of Tehran for a week, outraged over the disputed reelection of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. There had been violence. The club-wielding militias known as Basij had inflicted much of it on the marchers, women as well as men. But some of the protesters had fought back too. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran's Supreme Leader, had decreed that the protests stop, but nobody at that point was sure they would. At least, nobody outside Evin Prison was sure. Mr. Rosewater was another matter.

I would later discover that I had been picked up by the intelligence division of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, or IRGC. Before the June election, this unit of the Guards was little known; whenever journalists and intellectuals ran afoul of the authorities they were usually questioned by the official Ministry of Intelligence. But the IRGC, which reports directly to Khamenei, had been growing dramatically more powerful. Many suspect that the Guards rigged the election. Certainly they led the crackdown that followed.

IRGC intel is now responsible for Iran's internal security, which means that its rampaging paranoias have suffused the regime. There remain players within the system who can make rational decisions about Iran's international interests; if there weren't, I would still be in jail. But the Guards are exacerbating the Islamic Republic's worst instincts, its insecurity and deep suspiciousness. As world powers try to engage Tehran to mitigate the threat of its nuclear program, it's critical that they understand this mindset and the role the IRGC now plays within the Iranian system. I learned all too much about both while in the Guards' hands.

Everything was an education inside Evin—from the questions Mr. Rosewater asked, to what answers made him beat me, to physical details.

Read rest of article....

The Iran Cul-de-Sac: 4 Points on Obama's Embrace of Ahmadinejad (and Rejection of the Green Movement)

The Bomb, The Bomb: Distorting the Latest Report on Iran’s Nuclear Programme
Iran Document: The International Atomic Energy Agency Report on Nuclear Facilities
The Latest from Iran (16 November): Catching Up

Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis

1. IT'S THE NUKES, STUPID

If anyone in the Iranian Government still believes in the
Washington-directed "velvet revolution", rather than using it as a stick to beat the opposition, he/she can breathe easy. The driving force for the Obama Administration's approach to Iran is the quest for an agreement on uranium enrichment.

That ambition is led by the President, and his determination has brought general consensus in an Administration that was arguing over the value of talks earlier in 2009. Broadly speaking, the White House, the National Security Council, and the State Department are all on the same page now.

Any reference to the internal situation in Iran, as in the Obama recent statement calling for recognition of the rights of protesters, is a gloss. The President and his advisors may have a legal and humanitarian interest in what happens to demonstrators, as well to US citizens detained and sentenced to years in prison in Iran, but it is not their top policy priority.

Indeed, Washington's position is now fixed firmly enough to withstand not only the demands of reformists but figures like Hashemi Rafsanjani to go slow on deal with President Ahmadinejad. I suspect we will find that Obama has personally gone farther --- much farther --- than any President since 1979 to get an accommodation with Tehran.

2. GETTING THE GREEN MOVEMENT WRONG

The quest for a nuclear deal has been accompanied by a disturbing if tangential story of how "intelligence" and "analysis" has undermined the Iranian opposition.

Ever since the June election, some US officials, primarily in the intelligence community, have been putting out the line that the Green Movement is insignificant and/or not to be trusted on issues such as nuclear weapons, Israel, and
"anti-Americanism". (The public face of this line is the commentaries of Flynt Leverett, formerly of the National Security Council, and Hillary Mann Leverett, formerly of the State Department.)

This assessment was reinforced by the appearance in October of former Khatami Government official and "Karroubi advisor" Ataollah Mojaherani at the conference of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. His strident caution to the audience that a "Green Government" was unlikely to give ground on Iran's nuclear programme or on the position towards Israel apparently sent shock waves through the audience, angering other reformists present in the audience who feared Mohajerani had just damaged their cause.

They were right. It is the Mojaherani incident that is behind the clamour of well-placed Washington columnists like Jackson Diehl and David Ignatius to beware the Greens. More importantly, the speech fuelled the "analysis" within the CIA that the politics of Mousavi-Karroubi-Khatami were not to be trusted, a belief that accompanied (and possibly fed by) sources such as those in Borzou Daragahi's pre-13 Aban article assaulting the Green Movement.

What is intriguing is how a Washington distraction became the foundation for some in the CIA to bury or fear the Greens. It is true that Mohajerani was a prominent member of the Karroubi campaign and wore the badge of a glittering if past political career: youngest deputy of the first post-Revolution Parliament, Vice-President in the Rafsanjani Government, Minister of Culture under Mohammad Khatami.

Still, at the time, we gave almost no space to the Mojaherani speech because it was so disconnected from events and political strategy in Iran. Before and after the Washington episode, I have not seen Mojaherani's name rise up in the movements of the Green Wave. In short, he was one of a number of former officials who have or had connections with a complex network of "reformists".

For many in Washington, however, Mojaherani was thought to be no less than the ambassador for the Green Movement, presenting its manifesto. And when the approach of his speech did not match up to the "revolution" --- in presentation and policy, if not Islamic system --- that they wanted, those officials and commentators reacted like a lover spurned.

(There is a wider point here. The Iranian Government has had success in disrupting communications within Iran
but it is also important that it has limited any dialogue between the reformist opposition and the "outside", in this case the
US Government. With no direct line
established as the Green Movement evolved, American officials have
relied upon a variety of people, usually located outside Iran presenting a wide range of often contradictory advice and speculation rather than solid information.

While the situation may have been inevitable, given the detentions of many reformists and de facto house arrest of leaders like Mir Hossein Mousavi, it strikes me that the Obama Administration has not worked around these restrictions to read the lines --- and between the lines --- of statements not only of Mousavi, Karroubi, and Khatami but of other activists like Alireza Beheshti and senior clerics from and beyond Qom.)

3. THE MYTH OF THE PLAN B: SANCTIONS

As a case study in internal politics,
the beauty of the Obama nuclear-first, engagement-first approach has been how it has brought consensus amongst differing groups within the Administration. If the talks brought nuclear agreement, that would be a significant result for the unclenched fist (the line often attributed to some State Department officials and envoys like Richard Holbrooke). If they were finally collapsed by Iranian stalling and intransigence, the platform for aggressive sanctions would be laid (the line often
attributed to Dennis Ross, now at the National Security Council).

The only problem comes if, having grasped the hand of the Iranian Government in talks, the Obama Administration then has to slap Ahmadinejad's face in the absence of an agreement.

Washington's current calculation, supported by its diplomatic strategy, turns the Russian key. Moscow's envoys are working on the Iranian Government to accept the uranium enrichment plan, while Russian President Dmitri Medvedev issues unsubtle hints that he will not stand back if Tehran balks.

That is not the same as a Russian commitment to sanctions. Let's assume, however, that Moscow accepts a US-led multilateral effort inside or outside the United Nations. And let's assume that President Obama, who no doubt has mentioned this in Beijing this week, gets a Chinese promise to stand aside.

What next? If there is no nuclear agreement, it will quite likely be because the Supreme Leader has objected, despite Obama's sustained direct efforts. So how does a stricter round of sanctions change Ayatollah Khamenei's position?

It doesn't. So the Obama Administration is presumably counting on a diplomatic and economic containment, indeed isolation, of Iran.

That, however, does nothing to address the issue of President Ahmadinejad, who remains in office. It does nothing to deal with the increasing role of the Revolutionary Guards in matters beyond the nuclear and even military realm. (Indeed, as some analysts have contended, further sanctions may assist the Guard's economic ventures, although this effect may be mitigated if the restrictions can specifically target Guard "investments".)

Sanctions certainly do nothing with respect to the reformists and the Green movement. Even if Washington recants and tries to bring them back into political consideration, it is unclear --- given the perceived snub by Obama's officials in recent weeks --- if the opposition will offer even a cautious welcome.

4. BACK TO THE CUL-DE-SAC

In the Bush years, the cul-de-sac for American policy was the threat that could not be carried out. Whether the vision was a "turn left from Baghdad" intervention, briefly considered in 2003, the military strikes advocated by Vice President Cheney in 2007, or a sledgehammer set of economic sanctions, the Administration could not deliver the blow. The "best" it could manage was the muddled if funded programme of "soft power" in the 2nd term, which was never defined as either a live-and-let-live civic engagement or the cover for "velvet revolution".

The hope of the Obama approach has been to get out of that dead end, opening up space for other initiatives such as Middle Eastern agreements, through engagement. And, considered narrowly in the context of discussions on nuclear programmes and regional politics, that was solid, realist common sense.

But "narrowly" became very narrow after the elections of 12 June. If Obama wanted to dance, he had to dance with an Iranian President who now lacked legitimacy (despite the efforts of engagement advocates like the Leveretts to explain how Ahmadinejad had really won the election and a clear mandate).

That legitimacy, within weeks of the election, was not just a question of a "reformist" challenge. Ahmadinejad has also been in a tenuous position vis-a-vis political rivals like Hashemi Rafsanjani, the conservatives/principlists in the Iranian Parliament, Ayatollahs (and thus bodies such as the Assembly of Experts), and at times the Supreme Leader. That is why the Iranian President, far from breaking off talks to pursue The Bomb, is hugging the nuclear discussions so close --- with no prospect of salvation through an economic miracle, this is his prescription for political longevity.

Now Obama's engagement gamble, re-shaped in this post-June cauldron, may still succeed if the Supreme Leader gives his backing to an agreement on uranium enrichment. (Which is why, just to repeat, this President is going farther than any predecessor in 30 years) A wider US agenda, which may adapt engagement for exchanges on Iran's political and legal issues as well as geopolitical interests, could then be drafted.

But, if the nuclear deal does not go through, Obama and Ahmadinejad now dance in a downward spiral. The Iranian President will struggle to serve out his disputed second term. And the US President will be back in the cul-de-sac: pressed by some advisors and a lot of Congressmen to pursue sanctions which offer no remedy for --- and no exit from --- the political dilemma of his failed engagement.

The Latest from Iran (13 November): Accusations

NEW Iran Text: Khatami on Legitimate Protest and Illegitimate Government (13 November)
Iran: Is This an “Unravelling” Protest Beyond Mousavi and Karroubi?
Iran: Why is Washington Belittling the Green Movement?
The Latest from Iran (12 November): Ahmadinejad Moves for Nuclear Deal

Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis

1805 GMT: Another Move for the Nuke Deal. Looks like the Ahmadinejad-military axis has put down another marker with the statement of the head of Iran’s armed forces, Major-General Hassan Firouzabadi, supporting the uranium enrichment agreement: “We will not suffer a loss from the exchange of fuel. Rather, in obtaining fuel enriched to 20 percent as needed by the reactors, nearly one million of our people would take advantage of its medical possibilities annually....The quantity of 3.5 percent enriched uranium [to be shipped out] is not so large as to cause damage to Iran’s supply."

1605 GMT: What's Happening at the Revolutionary Guard? Radio Fardi summarises the changes in higher commander at the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps, including the head of the Tehran command. I'll have to leave it to others to assess whether these are "normal" changes in the organisation or whether there is a political story behind them.

1515 GMT: Confidence or Concern? Reuters has now picked up the statement of Mojtaba Zolnour, a representative of the Supreme Leader in the Revolutionary Guard, that the Assembly of Experts cannot remove him from office.

Zolnour told a gathering of Khamenei's representatives in Iranian universities, "The members of the assembly...do not appoint the Supreme Leader, rather they discover him and it is not that they would be able to remove him any time they wish so."

Now is Zolnour saying this because he is feeling good that the Supreme Leader is secure in his seat of power or is his warning prompted by fears that members of the Assembly, who raised the possibility of removal in August/September, may not be pacified?



1500 GMT: Football Story of Day. Or maybe, thanks to the Green movement, a non-story because there was a non-crowd. Persian2English writes about a disappointing turnout for the Iran v. Iceland match in Azadi stadium on Tuesday, citing state media: “In spite of efforts...to have spectators show up in the stadium, only 100 attended to watch the match between the two countries' national teams." (Goal.com say "only a few hundred" turned up to watch a "low-key friendly".)

1400 GMT: We've posted a long statement, adapted from the website linked to Mir Hossein Mousavi, made by former President Mohammad Khatami to academics. Khatami appears to be going to great lengths to set out "legitimate" protest (as opposed to "radical" activity) criticising the failure of the Government to serve the Iranian people and uphold the Constitution.

1315 GMT: Tehran Prosecutor General Abbas Jafari Doulatabadi has announced that Shapour Kazemi, the brother of Mir Hossein Mousavi's wife Zahra Rahnavard, will be tried in Revolutionary Court.

1200 GMT: Your Tehran Friday Prayer Report.

Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, the former head of the Guardian Council, used his speech to put 13 Aban in the "right" context. The presence of students has demonstrated the Revolution's resolve against the "enemy flag" of the United States. Washington also gave Jannati the opportunity to attack the Iranian opposition --- despite the fact that he did not see them on 13 Aban --- "$55 million" authorised by the US for subversive activities.

1100 GMT: Persian2English reports on the Revolutionary Court's sentencing of Hassan Salamat, a master’s student at Tehran University, to four years in prison. Salamat was arrested in post-election protests on charges of "propagating aganist the regime and conspiracy to disrupt national security". He spent two months in Evin Prison before being released on $200,000 bail.

1010 GMT: An intriguing interview with Tehran Chief Prosecutor Abbas Jafari Doulatabadi on the Islamic Republic News Agency website. It's intriguing in part because Doulatabadi is clearly on the defensive about allegations of abuses by the regime. He admits that the Constitution in principle puts forth open trials but gives a convoluted explanation as to why this is not possible. He also expresses the hope that some trials can be completed in the next month.

Even more interesting, however, is the politics in the interview. Pointing to the regime's ongoing manoeuvres against former President Hashemi Rafsanjani, Doulatabadi says Rafsanjani's son Mehdi Hashemi --- accused in the first Tehran trial of corruption and intrigue in the Preisdential election --- should return from Britain to Iran if he believes the charges are false.

0825 GMT: Just catching up with news this morning.

Both The New York Times and Press TV share an interest in the seizure by US Federal prosecutors of properties, including the land where four mosques sit, of the Alavi Foundation. The prosecutors claim that the Foundation, whose 36-story office tower is also being taken, is illegally providing money and other services to Iran.

The Los Angeles Times goes instead for The Bomb, with a survey considering the reactions of Arab states and people to Iran's nuclear programme.

As for us, we're starting the day with two features outlining our concern over "Western" images of the Green Wave, which may point to a US Government policy shifting against the Iranian opposition: "Why is Washington Belittling the Green Movement?" and "Is This an 'Unravelling' Protest Beyond Mousavi and Karroubi?"

The Latest from Iran (11 November): Revelations & Connections

NEW Iran Video & Text: The Mousavi Interview with Jamaran (9 November)
NEW Iran: The Story of How Mr Ahmadinejad Met US "Spies"
NEW Iran: Shadi Sadr’s Speech Accepting “2009 Human Rights Defenders Tulip”
NEW Iran Video Special: Ahmadinejad & Tehran’s “$18.5 Billion in Turkey”
NEW Iran Video Special: When Khamenei Met the US Hostage (and Why It’s Important Now)
NEW Latest Iran Video: The Revelations of Hashemi Rafsanjani’s Son
The Latest from Iran (10 November): Uncertainty and Propaganda

Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis

2110 GMT: Ezatollah Zarghami has celebrated getting a five-year renewal as head of the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting, by alleging that Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi are trying to get television airtime to incite people into joining street protests. Zarghami said this would be contrary to IRIB's objectives to "establish a stable social atmosphere" and help "society out of its instability".

1820 GMT: The Economic Issue Rumbles On. In addition to other challenges, President Ahmadinejad is still facing resistance from Parliament over his subsidy reduction bill. He returned from Turkey on Tuesday to go into a meeting with lawmakers, declaring that Iran will emerge as a prosperous nation in five years if the bill is implemented in full.

1815 GMT: Post-election detainee Soheil Navidi Yekta has been sentenced to seven years in jail and 74 lashes.

1800 GMT: More Posturing. The Iranian Government has taken another swipe at France, warning Paris to quiet down over the detention of lecturer Clotilde Reiss, who is under house arrest. A Foreign Ministry spokesman declared, 'The charges against Reiss are documented and therefore there can be no acquittal on grounds of political pressure, and nobody is allowed to tell the relevant judge what to do.

1755 GMT: The Mousavi Interview. We now have the video of Mousavi's comments on Monday, the text of which we posted earlier.

1525 GMT: More Business for the Revolutionary Guard. The BBC reports that the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps has won a $2.5 billion contract to build a railway route linking the southeastern port of Chabahar to Iran's rail network.

The Guards' engineering wing, Khatam-ol-Anbia, has been awarded Government contracts worth billions of dollars, including the operation of Tehran's Imam Khomeini international airport, and 50 percent of Iran's national telecommunication company was bought by a consortium partly owned by a Revolutionary Guards affiliate fund.

1510 GMT: Crippling the Opposition. In a sign of the effect of Government detentions and intimidation, the reformist Mojahedin of Islamic Revolution Organisation party has postponed its annual convention because of restrictions on members. The party's senior members Behzad Nabavi, Feizollah Arab-Sorkhi, and Mostafa Tajzadeh have been detained since June. (English summary)

1500 GMT: We've posted an entry on how a comment in a US blog became the story of how "Mahmoud Ahmadinejad met US spies".

1245 GMT: The "Neda Plot". As part of the ongoing campaign to portray the death of Neda Agha Soltan as a "premeditated scenario" to discredit the Iranian regime, Basij members are being summoned to gather in front of the British Embassy in Tehran to call for the extradition of Arash Hejazi, the doctor who tried to assist Neda after she was shot on 30 June. “Female Basij members are scheduled to congregate in front of the British Embassy on Wednesday at 2 p.m. local time,” Fars News reports.

1050 GMT: We awoke to reports of the hanging of Ehsan Fattahian, sentenced to death for "acting against national security with arms"and "war against God", but refrained from posting pending confirmation. That confirmation has now come from Fars News.

0900 GMT: We have posted the speech of activist Shadi Sadr accepting the "Human Rights Defenders Award" in The Netherlands: "Before the eyes of the people who are now fighting for freedom, democracy and human rights in Iran, one cannot sit at a negotiation table with a dictatorial government to speak about nuclear energy or economic contracts and talk about concrete conditions and at the same time, criticise the state of human rights in Iran through political statements which have no actual guarantee to be put into action."

0840 GMT: Not quite sure what to make of this, amidst stories of Iran's reorganisation of control over its security forces. Press TV reports, "The Leader of the Islamic Revolution has appointed Iran's interior minister as deputy commander of the country's Armed Forces in charge of police forces. In a decree issued by Commander-in-Chief of Iran's Armed Forces Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei on Tuesday, Mostafa Mohammad-Najjar was handed the post of deputy commander."

0800 GMT: A slow-ish start to the day, so EA correspondents have taken the opportunity to make some important political connections in a series of videos.

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's put-down of a BBC Persian correspondent, who asked about the rumoured $18.5 billion in gold shifted from Iran to Turkey, may not add much beyond a bit of drama. However, the impassioned speech of former President Hashemi Rafsanjani's son Mohsen at a 17 June meeting offers important insight into the Rafsanjani-Ahmadinejad relationship.

And the footage of the Supreme Leader meeting an American hostage (now the highest-level official ever devoted specifically to Iran affairs in the US State Department) is far more than a nostalgic clip. It may point to the emerging, and special, political "engagement" between Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the Obama Administration.

Of course, none of this should eclipse the significance, on the opposition side, of the discussion of Mir Hossein Mousavi's interview with the Khomeini-owned Jamaran website, covering the failings of the Government and the need to restore unity through a return to the Constitution. More than 36 hours after the interview was posted, we have the English translation.

Iran Video & Text: The Mousavi Interview with Jamaran (9 November)

The Latest from Iran (11 November): Revelations & Connections

Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis

Mir Hossein's interview with Jamaran website, published on Monday:

Part 1 of 3

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nNnkV75Pj2w[/youtube]

Part 2 of 3

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H6rNYSK2wQE&feature=channel[/youtube]

Part 3

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-sJrGpNSU3U&feature=channel[/youtube] of 3

Some have their interests in having a divided society
Taking the fanatic approach will take the country to a dead-end

Currently spreading rumours has become very common. We have some individuals whose case, if they were reviewed by Imam Khomeini’s standards, would be considered very tainted. The regime is accusing the people’s great movement of being linked to traitors. It is in their benefit to increase divisions and cynicism in the society in order to prevent their own cases from being unveiled, while it is in everyone’s best interest to acknowledge people’s rights and create optimism.

I feel that the tendency of power to become totalitarian has led to a structured corruption of power in different branches of the establishment....

Considering Imam Khomeini's viewpoint, unity is not achievable based on political loyalties. The union approved by the Imam is a union that relies on components like national interests and a healthy survival of the Islamic establishment, where your connections to power through family, friendship, and acquaintance do not matter.

One of the issues that was raised during the election was on whatever happened to the $300 billion [of oil revenues]. During the [Iran-Iraq] war, if an issue of financial corruption was raised, it was immediately attended to. The smallest corruptions were magnified to a great degree [due to the ongoing war]. In the past, if there was an issue of a missing $10,000, with no record of its expenditure, this could have caused the fall of the Government. Now, the issue is billions of dollars and nobody seems to care.

If it was the early years of the Revolution, this legislation to provide direction to the subsidies [referring to Ahmadinejad's legislation to remove subsidies from food and energy within 3 years] would not have been raised the way it is now. This legislation is not bad in itself. But [right now] the Government are on the one hand talking about removing all the subsidies, causing gas prices to increase, while on other hand they are refusing a budget to the underground subway system. On one side, people's daily affairs will be interrupted under the pressure of high gas prices, and on the other there is no effort put into public transportation. This would cause serious problems for people.

If it becomes common in a system for people to see that their rights are trampled without any objection, that system will move towards violence and dictatorship.

I sincerely believe that granting multi-billion dollar contract to Sepah [the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps] is neither in the interest of the whole regime nor in the interest of Sepah.

There are individuals who live in this way. I sincerely do not know if they have faith or are religious or not....We have people who have a very corrupt record, if it is viewed with the viewpoint of the Imam. But now the regime says that this great popular movement is all connected to the MKO [Mujahedin-e-Khalq "terrorist" organisation].

The interests of the country is in defining the circle of “insiders” such that there is very little left on the outside [thus allowing almost everyone a voice]. Otherwise, we have to doubt our own behavior. We simply cannot put aside thousands of prominent managers who have served this country.

What is happening these days is that the margins have become bigger than the centre. The centre has become very small....
In these margins, we have many managers and clerics, a few marja’ a [senior clerics], a few ex-presidents, and even an ex-head of Parliament....In a situation like this, those who have remained in the main context have to rely on garrisons because they don’t have the support of such a big margin. And this is what has happened: in order to prevent lapsing into a coma, we became numb and insensitive as if suffering from leprosy.

It is in our country’s interest to agree on a fundamental and important matter: the Constitution. You and I may have differences of opinion but we have to agree on the Constitution to solve our problems. We should put aside our differences and attempt to reform.

The people who participated in the revolution didn’t come to the scene to face so many problems. They came for a better life and for freedom.