Israel: Netanyahu Buys Time with Settlement "Freeze"

On Wednesday, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced that Israel would impose a 10-month freeze on construction in West Bank settlements:

I hope that this decision will help launch meaningful negotiations to reach a historic peace agreement that would finally end the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians.

We have been told by many of our friends that once Israel takes the first meaningful steps toward peace, the Palestinians and Arab states would respond.

However, Netanyahu quickly clarified the nature of this "freeze." It would not include East Jerusalem, the ongoing construction including 3,000 new housing units, and basic requirements of "natural growth" in the West Bank. He explained:

We do not put any restrictions on building in our sovereign capital.

We will not halt existing construction and we will continue to build synagogues, schools, kindergartens and public buildings essential for normal life in the settlements.

Following Israel's announcement, one might argue that Washington's positive response was too quick, if not inappropriate. However, the wider picture remains. The Obama Administration has already declared its commitment to approach the issue through step-by-step negotiations, and that "Washington's position on the settlement issue both in the West Bank and East Jerusalem has not changed."

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said, "Today's announcement by the government of Israel helps move forward toward resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict." US Mideast special envoy George Mitchell added,
"It falls short of a full settlement freeze, but it is more than any Israeli government has done before and can help movement toward agreement between the parties. Nothing like this occurred during the Bush administration." Clinton added the caution, hoewver, that the challenge still remained of meeting "the Palestinian goal of an independent and viable state based on the 1967 lines, with agreed swaps, and the Israeli goal of a Jewish state with secure and recognized borders that reflect subsequent developments and meet Israeli security requirements".

The Palestinian side quickly rejected Netanyahu's "concession". Chief Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat said there was nothing new in Netanyahu's announcement: "This is not a moratorium. Unfortunately, we hoped he would commit to a real settlement freeze so we can resume negotiations and he had a choice between settlements and peace and he chose settlements." And Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad put an end to the discussion, "What has changed to make something that what was not acceptable a week or 10 days ago [acceptable now]? The exclusion of Jerusalem is a very serious problem for us."

The Israeli right was no more happier with the Prime Minister's announcement. Yaakov Katz, member of the Knesset and chairman of the National Union Party, "It can't be possible that Netanyahu is spitting in the faces of those to whom he promised less than a year ago that he would constitute an alternative to Sharon's policy of uprooting."

So Washington may have grasped Netanyahu's announcement as the branch for talks which they have been seeking. Yet how is it going to be possible to urge Palestinians, including Palestinian Authority leader Mahmoud Abbas let alone Hamas, to agree? How sustainable is the prospect of meetings given the mistrust built over the wait, which lasted almost a year, for an Israeli "concession"?

Iran: 3 Problems (for the Greens, for the US, for Ahmadinejad)

0645 GMT: A busy Wednesday, not only in political updates but in conversations with those who have a window into what is happening in Washington and Tehran. The politics and possibilities are so complex that days will be needed to work through the analysis but:

1. The chief problem for the Green movement vis-a-vis the US is not if there is an envoy --- Mohajerani, Makhmalbaf, Sazegara --- but its lack of a clear policy (how would it take power? what would it do if it held power? is there even a single Movement rather than movements?). Then again, does that matter? In other words, if the Green movement focuses on changing the situation inside Iran, giving the US Government (and everyone else) a different political scene to consider, can "Obama: You're with them or you're with us" be treated as a slogan rather than a pressing concern?

2. The chief problem for the Obama Administration is that its nuclear-first policy of engagement is facing the twin difficulty of 1) an Iranian Government that is too fractured and too weak to accept soon a "third-party enrichment" deal taking uranium outside the country and 2) its self-imposed artificial deadline of December to close off the talks and move to tougher sanctions. No doubt, since the talks are still "live" --- International Atomic Energy Agency head Mohmammad El Baradei, Russia, and Turkey are all pushing Tehran to accept a compromise on the Vienna third-party plan --- the US Government will try to push back the cut-off date into the New Year.

It is unlikely, however, that either Congress or the loud sections of the US media and "think tanks" will be willing to accept even a few months of grace. So Obama and advisors  face either the prospect of getting a sudden break-through in Iran's position (how to get to the Supreme Leader so he will endorse this?) or having to accept a "compromise" sanctions regime (probably financial and banking measures outside the United Nations framework).

And that in turn has consequences, because any rupture in the engagement with Iran will affect US strategy in near-by countries. All together now....Afghanistan.

3. And the problem for the Ahmadinejad Government? Take your pick.

The Green movement, whatever the indecisions and vagaries of prominent figures like Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mohammad Khatami and the recent caution of Mehdi Karroubi, won't go away. And the calendar is moving towards 16 Azar (7 December).

Unless the Supreme Leader has an immediate conversion, there will not be a nuclear agreement which both bolsters President Ahmadinejad's legitimacy and gives the impression of Iranian strength.

The "threats within" have resurrected: the Larijanis, Rafsanjani, other Parliamentarians, Ministries who don't like the quest for control of Ahmadinejad (or those allied with him). And they have plenty to work with --- the nuclear dispute, the Government's economic plans, the running sore of the post-election abuses.

The current manoeuvres to ease difficulties are no more than short-term bandages. Allow the most prominent reformists (e.g. Abtahi) to escape their recent sentences and face both the impression of weakness and the risk that those figures will not remain silent. Put them back in prison with "compromise" sentences (2-3 years) and make them martyrs.

And the solutions which sweep away all these little problems? They risk taking down even the symbolic appearance of the Islamic Republic. A Revolutionary Guard public move to assume power, a negotiation to keep rule in the hands of the Supreme Leader (and his family), a new set of the "right" Grand Ayatollahs: any of these bring the pillars of 1979 crashing down.

Problems, problems, problems.....

Afghanistan: Karzai's Victory over the US

Afghanistan Video: Hillary Clinton in Kabul (19 November)
Afghanistan: Obama’s Options (From Cage Fighting to Rugs)
Afghanistan Follow-Up: Civil War in the Obama Administration

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The excellent Rajiv Chandrasekaran has an article in The Washington Post this morning, "A Softer Approach to Karzai". It's an effective review of the US-Karzai relationship from the start of the Obama Administration, leading to a "reset" of Washington's approach: "It's not sustainable to have a 'War of the Roses' relationship here, where...we basically throw things at each other."

Chandrasekaran is too cautious a journalist to bring out the full significance of that "reset". It is an acceptance of the manipulation of the Afghan presidential election. It is the posting of a "longtime field officer close to Karzai to be the new [CIA] station chief in Kabul".



And it is the effective firing of President Obama's envoy on Afghanistan, Richard Holbrooke. After his heated argument with Karzai over the August election, Holbrooke was effectively declared persona non grata by the President and his inner circle. So Holbrooke now will sit in Washington rather than envoy-ing.

So even if US officials tell Chandrasekaran "that Karzai has been an ineffective leader", don't let that obscure the rest of the picture. Karzai, the "tactically shrewd tribal chieftain", out-manoeuvred Obama and his advisors. And now Washington has no choice but to accept the Afghan President.

A Softer Approach to Karzai
Rajiv Chandrasekaran

When a team of senior U.S. officials led by Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton entered the presidential palace in Kabul on Wednesday for a dinner meeting, they had little indication of what Afghan President Hamid Karzai planned to discuss, or whether questions about corruption and governance would pitch their host into a foul mood.

But instead of revisiting old disputes, Karzai brought in several cabinet ministers to talk about development and security. He explained details of a new effort to address graft. And halfway through a meal of lamb stew, chicken and rice, he looked across the table and said he had decided that the United States would be a "critical partner" in his second term, according to a senior U.S. official familiar with the meeting.

The Americans also turned on the charm. Clinton, wearing an embroidered floral coat she had purchased on an earlier trip to Afghanistan, told stories of her time in Arkansas and in the Senate, and listened with interest as the Afghans detailed how they recently exported 12 tons of apples to India by air.

As President Obama nears a decision on how many more troops he will dispatch to Afghanistan, his top diplomats and generals are abandoning for now their get-tough tactics with Karzai and attempting to forge a far warmer relationship. They recognize that their initial strategy may have done more harm than good, fueling stress and anger in a beleaguered, conspiracy-minded leader whom the U.S. government needs as a partner.

"It's not sustainable to have a 'War of the Roses' relationship here, where . . . we basically throw things at each other," said another senior administration official, one of more than a dozen U.S. and Afghan government officials interviewed for this article. They spoke on the condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to discuss internal policy deliberations.

The new approach, which one official described as a "reset" of the relationship, will entail more engagement with members of Karzai's cabinet and provincial governors, officials said, because they have concluded that the Afghan president lacks the political clout in his highly decentralized nation to purge corrupt local warlords and power brokers. The CIA has sent a longtime field officer close to Karzai to be the new station chief in Kabul. And State Department envoy Richard C. Holbrooke, whose aggressive style has infuriated the Afghan leader at times, is devoting more attention to shaping policy in Washington and marshaling international support for reconstruction and development programs.

The tension in the relationship stems from the cumulative impact of several White House decisions that were intended to improve the quality of the Afghan government. When Obama became president, he discontinued his predecessor's practice of holding bimonthly videoconferences with Karzai. Obama granted wide latitude to the hard-charging Holbrooke to pressure Karzai to tackle the corruption and mismanagement that have fueled the Taliban's rise. The administration also indicated that it wanted many candidates to challenge Karzai in the August presidential election.

Although there is broad agreement among Obama's national security team that Karzai has been an ineffective leader, a growing number of top officials have begun to question in recent months whether those actions wound up goading him into doing exactly what the White House did not want: forging alliances with former warlords, letting drug traffickers out of prison and threatening to sack competent ministers. Those U.S. officials now think that Karzai, a tactically shrewd tribal chieftain who is under enormous stress as he seeks to placate and balance rival factions in his government, may operate best when he does not feel besieged.

Criticism of the Obama administration's manner of dealing with Karzai has been most pronounced among senior military officials, who question why the State Department has not dispatched more civilians to help the Afghan leader fix the government or worked more intensively with him to achieve U.S. goals.

"We've been treating Karzai like [Slobodan] Milosevic," a senior Pentagon official said, referring to the former Bosnian Serb leader whom Holbrooke pressured into accepting a peace treaty in the 1990s. "That's not a model that will work in Afghanistan."

Read rest of article....

Iran: Green Message to Obama "Back Us Instead of Dealing With Ahmadinejad"

The Iran Cul-de-Sac: 4 Points on Obama’s Embrace of Ahmadinejad (and Rejection of the Green Movement)
The Latest from Iran (20 November): Manoeuvres in Washington

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UPDATED 1335 GMT: The Washington Times also has a report on the speech. The headline points are the same as those in the Wall Street Journal as is the description of Makhmalbaf, who "has become a spokesman outside Iran for the so-called Green Movement since the country's disputed June 12 presidential
election".

UPDATED 1045 GMT: EA's Mr Smith has done some checking on the important question, raised by our readers, "To what extent does Makhmalbaf represent the Green Movement and Mir Hossein Mousavi?" The response, from those well-connected and well-versed in Iranian politics, is that "Makhmalbaf is not really connected with Mousavi. Nevertheless, Makhmalbaf acts at the least as a roving public ambassador for him."

Earlier this month, we learned of attempts from inside and outside the Green movement to persuade the Obama Administration to back away from an agreement with Tehran on uranium enrichment and the nuclear programme. That effort is in the open this morning.

The Wall Street Journal reveals the Washington mission by Mohsen Makhmalbaf, the filmmaker, "Presidential campaign spokesman for Mir Hossein Mousavi", and "international spokesman for Iran's main opposition movement". Speaking at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, he called for "President Barack Obama to increase his public support for Iranian democrats and significantly intensify financial pressure on Tehran's elite military unit, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps".

As for the nuclear discussions, Makhmalbaf said "that Iranian opposition leaders supported U.S. efforts to use diplomacy to contain the nuclear ambitions of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's government". He warned, however, that the current talks would not produce an agreement and should be suspended:

If they agree not to pursue a nuclear bomb and start negotiations, they will lose their supporters. Definitely dialogue is better than war. ... But can you continue your dialogue without any results?

Makhmalbaf suggested an agenda beyond the talks, with the targeted economic measures against the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps: "We need certain sanctions that put pressure on the government but not the people. But they must be done quickly, or they won't have an impact."

Most importantly, Makhmalbaf tried to replace the current nuclear-first priority of the Obama Administration with a democracy-first approach:

We definitely want Obama to say he supports democracy...If he doesn't say that, he will lose his support in Iran.

Don't only focus on the nuclear issue and allow the Iranian government to crack down on the people. You need to focus on human rights.

And, although it is not noted by the Journal, I suspect Makhmalbaf's visit had another essential aim. With the speech at the high-profile Carnegie Endowment, he is trying to repair the damage caused by last month's talk by Ataollah Mohajerani, a former Khatami Government minister and associate of Mehdi Karroubi, at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Mohajerani's speech, interpreted (wrongly, we think) by some Washington insiders as a Green manifesto, alienated US support because of its "hard-line" statements on nuclear weapons and Iran's position on Israel.

Makhmalbaf avoided those potential pitfalls on Thursday. Doing so, he is reaching out to officials in the State Department, the National Security Council, and Obama's White House (even if the CIA remains hostile to a Green ascendancy). We are not dead. You can work with us.

And now the follow-up: will he get a response?

Iran Nuclear Special: What Tehran's Latest Offer Means (and Why the West Should Consider It)

The Latest in Iran (19 November): It’s the Nukes Today

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Enduring America's Mr Smith carries out a close reading of the latest Iran move in the nuclear negotiations and how to respond to it:

Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki's remarks on Thursday, reviewing the the nuclear dispute between Iran and the West, are a clear departure from the proposal floated in October by the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mohammad El-Baradei. Indeed, that proposal now appears dead in the water. Iran is progressively coming out with a spirited defiance against the idea of having its low-enriched uranium (LEU) processed abroad and returned in the form of 20% enriched nuclear fuel, suitable for its Tehran medical reactor.

The reasons behind this position are not irrational. Russia has once again delayed the operational start of the Bushehr nuclear reactor, cold-shouldering Iran as it has frequently done on the issue in the past decade. Historically, France has manipulated provision of nuclear fuel from the Eurodiff consortium, in which Iran is a dormant stakeholder. So, in the eyes of Tehran, both parties to the El-Baradei deal have a poor track record and therefore cannot be trusted to deliver nuclear fuel on time.

Iran's counter-position is not entirely unreasonable, either. Mottaki's statement was not technical and contained a degree of vagueness, but the offer amounted to a simultaneous exchange of some parts of the Iranian low-enriched uranium stock for the 20% nuclear fuel, which would now be processed abroad and delivered, ready for use, inside Iran. This arrangement would allay Iranian fears that its uranium supply might be held indefinitely by some foreign party, including Russia.

What is uncertain is the fate of Iran's uranium stockpile. Mottaki's statement is not clear this would be stored permanently inside Iran, as most news services reported today or whether it could eventually be transported abroad. It is clear, however, that the Iranian Foreign Minister is talking about an uranium "exchange" to be agreed a new technical meeting in Vienna.

The West has to approach this Iranian counter-proposal carefully, avoiding gut reactions like that of French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner. The end-goal of the West is to ensure that Iran is unable to use its stock for weaponisation, so it has to push for the neutralisation of the low-enriched uranium, a task that can take place even inside Iran if the IAEA is able to coordinate it. It should be noted that Iran is now willing to relinquish total control of its uranium, a concession that was unthinkable a few months ago.

Mottaki's opening is therefore worth consideration by the Obama Administration and the Europeans, even as they face increased pressure from the Israeli Government and US neo-conservatives in Washington that Mottaki's statement is further proof of the military goals of Iran's programme. The ideal course of action is to corner the Iranians into giving up control of their stock, wrestling as many concessions as them as possible to get leeway on the issue of shipping uranium out of Iran.

In the end? It's far better to have as much low-enriched fuel locked up securely inside Iran, rather than slapping on further sanctions while Tehran keeps its hands firmly on its uranium.