Saturday
Sep122009
Iran: Is the Supreme Leader Killing Off the Opposition?
Saturday, September 12, 2009 at 8:17
The Latest from Iran (12 September): Reassessing
Iran: The Complete Translation of the Supreme Leader’s Friday Prayer Address
Iran: Josh Shahryar’s Snap Analysis of the Supreme Leader’s Speech
The Latest from Iran (11 September): Prayers and Politics
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Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis
Last night's report, first appearing on the Iranian website Rah-e-Sabz and then extended in The New York Times, carried a double blow. First, the Supreme Leader had issued an order (reportedly two weeks ago) for the arrest of Mehdi Karroubi. Second, Hashemi Rafsanjani, after a conversation with Ayatollah Khamenei, had told aides that he was retreating from front-line politics because of the current dominance of the military
The news was so dramatic that it still has not been fully taken in. The reaction of many, inevitably, was whether that this was the defining setback for the Green movement and Rafsanjani. Will Karroubi be cowed into submission and seclusion? Is Rafsanjani saying that he will not appear at next Friday's Qods Day ceremonies? Is there no prospect of a mass response around those ceremonies?
To be honest, while those questions are vital, they're the easy ones to handle this morning. For we simply don't know. Even before the breaking news, we were watching for the reactions of the Green opposition and Rafsanjani to the Supreme Leader's address, and we're still on that watch.
If the report is true, the more immediate profitable analysis is on the relations within the Establishment. Take the assertion that the order for Karroubi's arrest was issued two weeks ago. That would put it at the end of August, before Khamenei's statement denying that the post-election conflict was a foreign-led "velvet revolution) which distanced him from the position of the Revolutionary Guard and the President and his limited but still clear criticisms of the post-election detentions.
So, if Supreme Leader issued the order for Karroubi's arrest as part of his political approach, then the questions emerge over his relationship with Ahmadinejad and the IRGC: 1) was Khamenei attempting to take the lead by showing his tough side? 2) was he now just following the hard line set by others? 3) was he doing a balancing act, setting out threats while also displaying the possibility of limited concessions as Ahmadinejad's Cabinet was being presented to Parliament?
All of this in turn presumes that the order was carefully considered before it was issued. There is always the possibility that Khamenei, who like his opponents has been under pressure and strain throughout this crisis, had a "Thomas a Becket" moment, declaring, "Will no one rid me of this turbulent priest?" The best observers yesterday (those who listened or saw Khamenei's speech, rather than those who lifted their accounts from the Reuters summary) indicated that the Supreme Leaders seemed nervous and even a bit fraught, crying at one point in the first part of the sermon.
For now, therefore, considering the report in connection with the Supreme Leader's Friday Prayers address, two thoughts:
1. It appears, in line with our recent analyses, that Khamenei is scrambling for position, not against the opposition but against his President and his military. Add to that the significant factor that the Supreme Leader is taking fire from senior clerics in Qom, which Josh Shahryar noted yesterday. So, while trying to secure his "leadership", he also has to be aware that if he is too ham- and heavy-fisted with the opposition, his religious position will be under further tension.
2. If one has to pick out a symbolic figure for the opposition, it is now Mehdi Karroubi. Rafsanjani's reported withdrawal from an immediate public battle (a development I take more seriously than the claim of the arrest order, as it came --- as fact or public-relations spin --- from a Rafsanjani aide) puts him to the side for the moment. Mir Hossein Mousavi is trying to mark with statements but appears to be able to do little beyond that.
Karroubi is the one opposition leader with a significant communications network --- significant enough that the Government tried to knock it out with their raids this week, significant enough to survive that attack. He is the leader carrying the documents about the most symbolic and "real" political issue within the Establishment, the alleged abuse of detainees. He is still working within the system, with his negotiations with the judiciary, as well as appealing to those outside it.
So the arrest order, if it was issued, was a sword of Damocles suspended over Karroubi's head. Misbehave and we take you out. And even if that order doesn't exist, then the Supreme Leader's closing statement in yesterday's speech does: don't make a fuss at Qods Day.
Yes, yesterday was dramatic. Yes, it was tense. But, no, it is not a resolution.
On to next Friday.
Iran: The Complete Translation of the Supreme Leader’s Friday Prayer Address
Iran: Josh Shahryar’s Snap Analysis of the Supreme Leader’s Speech
The Latest from Iran (11 September): Prayers and Politics
Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis
Last night's report, first appearing on the Iranian website Rah-e-Sabz and then extended in The New York Times, carried a double blow. First, the Supreme Leader had issued an order (reportedly two weeks ago) for the arrest of Mehdi Karroubi. Second, Hashemi Rafsanjani, after a conversation with Ayatollah Khamenei, had told aides that he was retreating from front-line politics because of the current dominance of the military
The news was so dramatic that it still has not been fully taken in. The reaction of many, inevitably, was whether that this was the defining setback for the Green movement and Rafsanjani. Will Karroubi be cowed into submission and seclusion? Is Rafsanjani saying that he will not appear at next Friday's Qods Day ceremonies? Is there no prospect of a mass response around those ceremonies?
To be honest, while those questions are vital, they're the easy ones to handle this morning. For we simply don't know. Even before the breaking news, we were watching for the reactions of the Green opposition and Rafsanjani to the Supreme Leader's address, and we're still on that watch.
If the report is true, the more immediate profitable analysis is on the relations within the Establishment. Take the assertion that the order for Karroubi's arrest was issued two weeks ago. That would put it at the end of August, before Khamenei's statement denying that the post-election conflict was a foreign-led "velvet revolution) which distanced him from the position of the Revolutionary Guard and the President and his limited but still clear criticisms of the post-election detentions.
So, if Supreme Leader issued the order for Karroubi's arrest as part of his political approach, then the questions emerge over his relationship with Ahmadinejad and the IRGC: 1) was Khamenei attempting to take the lead by showing his tough side? 2) was he now just following the hard line set by others? 3) was he doing a balancing act, setting out threats while also displaying the possibility of limited concessions as Ahmadinejad's Cabinet was being presented to Parliament?
All of this in turn presumes that the order was carefully considered before it was issued. There is always the possibility that Khamenei, who like his opponents has been under pressure and strain throughout this crisis, had a "Thomas a Becket" moment, declaring, "Will no one rid me of this turbulent priest?" The best observers yesterday (those who listened or saw Khamenei's speech, rather than those who lifted their accounts from the Reuters summary) indicated that the Supreme Leaders seemed nervous and even a bit fraught, crying at one point in the first part of the sermon.
For now, therefore, considering the report in connection with the Supreme Leader's Friday Prayers address, two thoughts:
1. It appears, in line with our recent analyses, that Khamenei is scrambling for position, not against the opposition but against his President and his military. Add to that the significant factor that the Supreme Leader is taking fire from senior clerics in Qom, which Josh Shahryar noted yesterday. So, while trying to secure his "leadership", he also has to be aware that if he is too ham- and heavy-fisted with the opposition, his religious position will be under further tension.
2. If one has to pick out a symbolic figure for the opposition, it is now Mehdi Karroubi. Rafsanjani's reported withdrawal from an immediate public battle (a development I take more seriously than the claim of the arrest order, as it came --- as fact or public-relations spin --- from a Rafsanjani aide) puts him to the side for the moment. Mir Hossein Mousavi is trying to mark with statements but appears to be able to do little beyond that.
Karroubi is the one opposition leader with a significant communications network --- significant enough that the Government tried to knock it out with their raids this week, significant enough to survive that attack. He is the leader carrying the documents about the most symbolic and "real" political issue within the Establishment, the alleged abuse of detainees. He is still working within the system, with his negotiations with the judiciary, as well as appealing to those outside it.
So the arrest order, if it was issued, was a sword of Damocles suspended over Karroubi's head. Misbehave and we take you out. And even if that order doesn't exist, then the Supreme Leader's closing statement in yesterday's speech does: don't make a fuss at Qods Day.
Yes, yesterday was dramatic. Yes, it was tense. But, no, it is not a resolution.
On to next Friday.