Iran: The Five Lessons of Qods Day

Iran After Qods Day: What Next for the Green Movement (The Sequel)?
The Latest from Iran: Challenge Renewed (19 September)
The Latest from Iran (18 September): Qods Day

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1. THE VICTORY OF THE GREEN WAVE...

Let's start with the basic but important observation. After all the attempts of the regime has tried to crush dissent in the last three-plus months --- the speeches, the threats, the shutdown of communications, the arrests, the raids, the trials --- the protestors came out yesterday. They came out not in scattered groups of hundreds across the capital, not in the "few thousand" of initial estimates on Friday, not in the "several thousand" of our judgement after President Ahmadinejad's speech, not in the "10,000" to which we cautiously moved, but in "tens of thousands".

How many? That is now a statistical game with no resolution. What matters is that, for all the regime's attempts to force a recognition of its legitimacy, it has still not succeeded. By 1000 GMT, even as Ahmad Khatami was delivering the Friday Prayers, the President had been eclipsed by the story of "No Gaza, No Lebanon, My Life for Iran". Despite the regime's portrayal of "Israel/Palestine" as the meaning of the day (a plot which many in the "traditional" media shamefully, if unwittingly, abetted --- see below), despite all the smokescreens and the restrictions, the images and videos came out. Al Jazeera's footage told the story that its reporter could not --- streets were filled not just with pro-Government supporters but with those who wanted to make Qods Day a renewed marker of their anger and their hopes. That footage was already being complemented and even surpassed by the videos that made it out of the regime's grasp. And the stories also came through: via phone calls, via the e-mails that could not be blocked, via blogs, via the curiosity-now-fixture called Twitter.

By 1000 GMT, no one noticed the Friday Prayers being led by Ahmad Khatami. The Ahmadinejad speech was down the list. The demonstrations had become Qods Day.

And that victory was obtained despite, not because of, some conditions that had been thought essential. Mir Hossein Mousavi played at best a marginal and belated role, whether this was because his genuine participation in the rallies had been limited and then twisted by the Government or because he was simply unable to make his presence felt. And former President Rafsanjani --- the chants rang out, "Hashemi, where are you?" --- was nowhere. The opposition's Web outlets were filtered, taken down, curbed.

And still the marchers turned out.

2. ...SETS A NEW TEST FOR ITS LEADERSHIP

This, however, is not a final victory. It's not even a triumph in the sense of making the Government alter its path. That awaits the political manoeuvres and power plays that will once more come to the fore.

Mehdi Karroubi passed his personal test yesterday. Three months, he was "just" a well-liked cleric and politician who --- by regime manipulation or by the limits of his political range --- had received less than two percent of the Presidential vote. Now he is the symbolic figure for many in the Green Wave. He has carried the fight in his letters, statements, and his encounters with Government officials. And today, by virtue of a well-organised office and communciations network, a focus on the injustices and abuses of the regime, and a personal charisma and persistence, he is at the head of the opposition as the next challenges are faced.

Mohammad Khatami is now in an important supporting role. His place yesterday was limited but quite visible, when the news and eventually pictures of his encounter with security forces, forcing him to withdraw from the rally, emerged. Now he returns to discussions with the reformist clerics and political parties who seek to link up with other factions to press their case against the President and, to an extent, the Supreme Leader.

And Mir Hossein Mousavi? The episode of the pictures --- "Was he at the rallies? And, if so, with whom?" --- has deeper roots in both the initial hope for his leadership of the Green movement and the later doubts as his public visibility was replaced by a series of statements. On reflection, I think this is more because of Government success than Mousavi's failure: this is one case where the threats and the sabotage of communications has drawn the net tighter and tighter around a leader. However, the return to basics brings this recognition: on 30 July, Mousavi was turned away from the "40th Day" memorial when Karroubi pressed on, and yesterday, when Karroubi (and Khatami) were able to show persistence and defiance, Mousavi could not.

Yet, as I write, I recognise that this attention to "leaders" might be contributing to the regime effort to limit the movement and its achievements. For, while the MKK trio are significant, opposition to the Government and the system has come in the last month from a wider range of political and clerical voices. In particular, the message out of Qom is that a majority of the Grand Ayatollahs and Ayatollahs want significant change to preserve the Islamic Republic. The paradox is that, as their role has been increasingly constricted by a move by President and his allies away from "Islamic" and "Republic" to "secular" and "authoritarian", space for their views is being opened up by the complementary presence of public opposition. That is why the Government has swung at them with a heavy hand by jailing their relatives, a step which I suspect may produce more problems than solutions for the regime.

3. AHMADINEJAD STUMBLES

We have underestimated the President throughout this crisis and we may do so again, but yesterday --- at least inside Iran --- was a powerful slap in the face to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

It was a slap felt in an episode just after the President's attempt to seize and define the political agenda with his introduction of Friday Prayers. As he spoke to IRIB Channel 2, the chant rose up behind him, "Ahmadi, Ahmadi, Resign, Resign!" All the weeks of promoting himself, standing up to the Supreme Leader, challenging Hashemi Rafsanjani, and smiting his reformist opponents, and a few voices (may they be protected) had whipped off the Emperor's clothes.

There is a powerful paradox here: Ahmadinejad's speech in itself was a politically shrewd one. He avoided any recognition of internal difficulties by playing the Israel/Palestine card (and throwing in Native Americans as well). For those at home, it represented, "I'm in charge here leading Iran, and Iran leads the world." For those abroad, it was, "C'mon. Take me on. Recognise me."

And the second part of that effort worked. Outlet after outlet in the "West" fell for the "Ahmadi Denies Holocaust" line. This was supplemented by the President's interview with NBC television (added to the Iranian declaration that 137 foreign media representatives had been granted permits to cover Qods Day), which has now become, "Ahmadi Won't Give Up His Nukes". It is a repeat of the political cycle of the last four days, only this time it is more for the President's preservation than Iran's grand geopolitical contests.

Where Ahmadinejad failed was at home. He failed not because of the speech but because it followed a stark, heavy-handed effort to wipe out dissent. And all it took was the first signs of the dissent to realise that his contest is not over. Legitimacy may await him in New York this week, but it is not guaranteed at home.

4. THE WANDERINGS OF THE SUPREME LEADER

This is a lesson of absence. I'm not sure that our updates yesterday ever mentioned Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

If this was just a case of Qods Day, would not be that significant. After all, it is Hashemi Rafsanjani who has had the lead role on this occasion over the last 25 years; there is no requirement for the Supreme Leader to come to the fore for the political symbolism of supporting Palestine.

This Qods Day, however, is in a wider political arena, one which the Supreme Leader jumped into hours after the Presidential polls closed. With that decision, he put his own authority on the line, and much of the story of the last three months has been whether he ensured or damaged that authority. So absence yesterday comes not in the midst of certitude of his Supreme Leadership but in the question of whether Khamenei is now scrambling for position vs. his own President.

Nice mirror image: if Mir Hossein Mousavi has to re-establish his political relevance in forthcoming days, so does the cleric who denied him the Presidency in that very political move on the night of 12 June.

5. AND NEXT? THE LONG(ER) MARCH

My colleague Mr Smith projected yesterday that the outcome of the Qods Day protests and manoeuvres would be a continued stalemate, both between forces within the system and between the regime and opposition.

I can see the merit of the assessment but I beg to differ re "stalemate" (Mr Smith uses the word again today, but I think his surprise at the large turnout may have bring a shift in his analysis). Stalemate indicates no movement, and yesterday was a rejection of deadlock, both in the slogans and the politics.

This does not mean, to repeat, "revolution" (even if that was the goal of the protesters, which it most certainly is not). Rather, it is a quest to find spaces and to open up new ones for negotiation. In practical terms, that is likely to return us immediately to the dance over arrests and detentions. But, in addition to the less visible and flammable but equally important dimensions of the economy and governance --- take note that foreign policy and the nuclear programme are not on that list --- those issues carry the wider question of Ahmadinejad's authority.

If this was a President and his allies inclined to compromise, I could see the way out. Stop mentioning the internal enemies, not only in yesterday's speech but in statements to come. Gradually release the detainees and stop the show trials. Do not crush but isolate Karroubi, Khatami, Mousavi, and the dissident clerics, hoping that with time fatigue and resignation will ensure no more large demonstrations.

This is probably the resolution sought by the Supreme Leader, notably in the meetings held by Ali Larijani with Mehdi Karroubi and with senior clerics. Already, however, the question has arisen whether there is any flexibility in the system: the smack-down of Karroubi's claims on detainee abuse by the Judiciary committee indicate either that bureaucracy is not prone to any meaningful talks or that the Presidency, rather than the Supreme Leader, has the upper hand in the system.

For this is not a President inclined to compromise. So he, and probably the Revolutionary Guard behind him, are likely to wield the heavy hand. There would seem to be limits to how far they can go --- dare they risk the arrest of the opposition leadership? --- but I am not sure, in a game of Political Chicken, whether they will let up on the accelerator and avoid a possibly catastrophic showdown with the opposition.

More importantly, and this is where the long(er) march comes, I am not sure whether Ahmadinejad yet realises that he may be aiding the opposition in the Iranian version of "What Does Not Kill You, Makes You Stronger". This President and his allies may have thought they would land a knock-out blow with their swinging of the last week, but when the bell finally rang last night, the opposition was still standing.

Welcome to a contest which just went beyond 15 rounds.

Iran: What's at Stake on Qods Day for Green Movement and Regime?

The Latest from Iran (18 September): Qods Day

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Enduring America's Mr Smith prepares for today:

Qods Day is going to be a significant development in the post-June 12 election drama that has gripped Iran. It will probably be at least equivalent in significance to 17 July, when former president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani delivered a strong sermon stressing the need to respect popular will within the confines of the Islamic Republic's elite.

The reformists are chasing a few important goals in tomorrow's demonstration. First and foremost, it gives an opportunity both for the leadership and the rank and file supporters of the Green Wave to "stand up and be counted". It will be the possible setting for a morale-boosting strong presence. Protestors will be back in the streets of central Tehran, following month of retreat from the waning but ever-lively cycle of martyr commemorations and street demonstrations that proceeded unabated from 13 June to the end of July. It will also be an opportunity to indicate that the most recent tool of repression set loose by the regime, the indiscriminate raping of opposition supporters that joined baton attacks and occasional murder as methods of coercion, did not succeed in dampening the morale of the reformist supporters.


Of the reformist leaders, Mousavi is the one that needs to capitalise most from marching alongside his supporters. The former Prime Minister has largely played second fiddle to the other defeated moderate candidate, Mehdi Karroubi, in the latter part of the three-month post-election saga. He has lost the lead in producing communiques challenging the regime, and he has not produced anything as ground-breaking and earth-shattering as Karroubi's series of strong accusations regarding rape that has cost the former Majlis speaker the ban of his long-running newspaper, Etemade Melli, but has won him tremendous popular support. Likewise, former president Mohammad Khatami has largely lurked in the shadows since initially coming out strongly and challenging the Supreme Leader in very thinly veiled terms for the Kahrizak Prison abuses. Both Mousavi and Khatami will therefore need to augment their stature as reformist leaders, as neither is yet ready to bow to Karroubi. Although the three are adamant opponents of Ahmadinejad, they are also vying at the same time for the leadership of the opposition.

The government forces have several paths to tread with utmost care. Ahmadinejad will be heading to New York within hours of the Friday Qods Day events, and he will most likely want to avoid arriving in the Big Apple to account for yet another high violence toll in what is going to be a long sparring match with the international media. Likewise, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei will want to minimise public violence in the first, major street demonstration to hit Iran during Ramadan for at least 30 years. It is therefore to be expected that the ordinary law enforcement forces will have the order to keep violence at a minimum. The same cannot be applied to the Basiji and other autonomous forces, who are probably going to unleash violence of their own accord. The traditional itinerary of the Qods Day march also poses serious logistical problems for the government, starting as it does in various parts of the city to converge in front of the University, where participants would usually go and attend Friday prayers.

The complex scenario above leads to think that Qods will effectively protract the stalemate between the various contenders in Iran's chess game. The government will not find solace in the fact that Iran's calendar is replete with other religious festivities and anniversaries that the reformist opposition can use at will to return to the streets. In the background, impenetrable as ever, stands Hashemi Rafsanjani, who inched closer to the opposition this week as he was thrusted out of the leadership of the first Qods prayer in almost a quarter century. The million-dollar question was, and remains, does he really have the power to break that stalemate and is he willing to do so?

Latest Iran Video: Ayatollah Dastgheib Condemns Khamenei (31 Aug/5 Sept?)

The Latest from Iran (17 September): Tomorrow

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This video, which was put up on YouTube last week, suddenly caught folks' attention today. Ayatollah Ali Mohammad Dastgheib, condemning post-election repression, also has some choice words like "apostate" for the Supreme Leader. From the date given on YouTube and our updates, it looks like this may have been delivered on 31 August or 5 September:

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=30tQ94dntBA[/youtube]

Iran: So, What Are the Green Movement's Goals Tomorrow?

Qods Day: A Protest For Palestine or Against Iran’s Government?
Iran’s Chess Match: Setting Up the Pieces for Friday
The Latest from Iran (17 September): Tomorrow

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Last night EA's Chris Emery sent me this challenging question:

"What do you think the Green Movement consider to be their achievable aims on Friday and, more generally, beyond that? What would be their ideal result?

"My view is that the Green Movement is unsure what is achievable now and aim simply to demonstrate that they have not gone away (an achievement in itself --- but not necessarily leverage). Sadly, I think the authorities probably have a clearer idea of their aims and consider most of them, but not all, achievable."

This was my immediate reply:

The immediate aim? Stand up to Ahmadinejad.

I appreciate the wider points about aims but just surviving after everything thrown at the movement would be a victory. It maintains some space for all the complex negotiations going on in Tehran and Qom.

For me, if the President succeeds, this is no longer an Islamic Republic. Karroubi and senior clerics are saying this but they need the public display if they're to have any traction against the forces around Ahmadinejad.

Chris' response:

I agree both on the aim and the achievement of still making noise. It would be a victory but how will it limit the President's power? If Ahmadinejad's aim is to establish a military dictatorship and the Supreme Leader's is to preserve the authority of his office, then I think these demonstrations put much more pressure on the Supreme Leader than on Ahmadinejad. The President seems unconcerned by his lack of legitimacy and confident of the loyalty and capability of the security services. Ayatollah Khamenei has placed his lot with a man who literally is not bothered by the protests.

In regard to the complex negotiations in Tehran and Qom, you have to ask why they need more space and how they will use it. Are they hoping that the demos will somehow make a strategy for limiting Ahmadinejad's power clearer? Are they hoping that Ahmadinejad will have his wings clipped by the Supreme Leader? I think that rather than the people providing space for never-ending complex negotiations, which have now been rumbling on for more 3 months, those in the negotiations need to provide the space for the people by showing some real leadership. Open letters to the Supreme Leader backed by real threats, strikes, etc.

But they won't, and I expect that Ahmadinejad will get up on friday and say I won, I am your President, my mandate is to root out those contaminating the revolution or acting as foreign agents. You will not win. In other words, your demonstrations do not scare me.

I think that in the long term, the genie will never go back in the bottle and that is the Green movement's fantastuc legacy. However, in the short term, they need some direction if they are to persuade the Supreme Leader that the situation demands some immediate concessions.

Over the next 24 hours, we'll be debating this question, with other EA staff putting in their views and, of course, welcoming the thoughts of our readers.

Tomorrow is Qods Day.

Iran: The Supreme Leader and the Larijani-Karroubi Meeting

Iran’s Chess Match: Setting Up the Pieces for Friday
The Latest from Iran (16 September): Smoke Before Battle

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Maryam at Keeping the Change has posted an article on Monday's meeting between Speaker of the Parliament Ali Larijani and Mehdi Karroubi, offering important detail on the discussion. Equally significant is her reading of the power politics behind the encounter:

"The combination of these contradictory tactics may indicate that Khamanei is carefully crafting a strategy for resolving the post-election conflict that applies these different forms of pressure where appropriate. At the same time, however, Khamanei's approach could indicate that the Supreme Leader has a thin, unguided non-strategy and is simply throwing all his resources at the Opposition, in a desperate attempt to end the political standoff -- on this analysis, Khamanei's alternative use of aggression and diplomacy is less an affirmative, calculated decision and more a reaction to the failure of one or the other approach."

Maryam's reading is a vital contrast to our analysis, developed this morning, that it is President Ahmadinejad and his allies that are in the lead with the Supreme Leader scrambling to regain his own position. At the same time, her pondering of "careful strategy" v. "non-strategy" could be applied not only to Ayatollah Khamenei but to the Government's measures in the run-up to Qods Day.

More Details on Karroubi's Meeting Monday with Parliament Speaker Ali Larijani

The website Rouydad adds additional detail to the earlier piece we posted from Karroubi's news outlet, Eteemade Melli. According to this newest report, during yesterday's meeting Karroubi informed Larijani of his concerns with the work of the three-man committee investing the prisoner rape and assault claims, as well as the actions of the state news agecy "Voice & Visage." At the end of the meeting Karroubi reportedly told Larijani of his hope that "unlike his brother [Sadegh Larijani], [Ali Larijani] will not sell his religion to the world." The report goes on to claim that Larijani asked Karroubi to "keep quiet" until the domestic situation improves, promising that his allegations would be properly investigated once calm had been restored. Karroubi replied, "I would prefer death to remaining quite in the face of these violations."

Interestingly, Rouydad's account of the meeting begins with a quotation from a source inside Parliament, stating that: "On the orders of the Supreme Leader, Larijani met with Karroubi. Mr. Larijani is the bearer of the Leader's message." With this in mind, Larijani's request for restraint from Karroubi and Karroubi's purported refusal to do so take on added signficance. As we observed in our earlier post on this meeting, it appears that the Refomists' hand is not as weak as some have suggested and that attempts at conciliation have not been wholly put aside by the Supreme Leader. If anything, this development, taken together with the events of the last week, may indicate that Khamanei is taking multiple approaches to the post-election conflict. On the one hand, he appears to be using some elements of his arsenal, such as the Revolutionary Guard, to strike a confrontational approach with the Reformists, while at the same time using other allies, such as the hardline pragmatic Ali Larijani, to pursue negotiations with Opposition leaders.

The combination of these contradictory tactics may indicate that Khamanei is carefully crafting a strategy for resolving the post-election conflict that applies these different forms of pressure where appropriate. At the same time, however, Khamanei's approach could indicate that the Supreme Leader has a thin, unguided non-strategy and is simply throwing all his resources at the Opposition, in a desperate attempt to end the political standoff -- on this analysis, Khamanei's alternative use of aggression and diplomacy is less an affirmative, calculated decision and more a reaction to the failure of one or the other approach. This reading is borne out by a pattern which appears to have developed post June 12, with periods of intense confrontation followed by spurts of appeasement and vice-versa (witness the fourth Tehran trials and accusations against Reformist leaders of collusion with foreign governments, followed by Khamanei's public statements denying the possibility of any such conspiracy) .

In all likelihood, it is the second analysis that may best capture Khamanei's mindset -- Khamanei is, after all, known to be less than an astute politician, with a tendency to favor uncompromising, agressive political strategies to diplomacy. He is, as such, disinclined to pursue appeasement unless his preferred confrontational approach has failed. In this vein, the recent events surrounding Karroubi are telling. After the raid on his offices, the closure of his newspaper, and the threats of arrest against him have all failed to silence Karroubi, Khamanei may have decided that conciliation should, at least in the short term, be explored. If Karroubi remains defiant, however, we should expect to see Khamanei return to his tried and true aggressive posture.

Other than providing potential insight into Khamanei's political strategy, Karroubi's meeting with Larijani should serve as a small reminder of the in-roads made by the Reformists over the last two months and of the Government's heretofore inability to decisively snuff out the Movement's leaders. There is little doubt that the current situation inside the country, as well as the Government's response, is unique in the history of the Islamic Republic. This is hardly the Iran of 1988, when thousands of political activists were summarily executed, expelled, and otherwise removed from the Iranian political scene. Of course, the circumstances were differen then: those killed and exiled during that period were hardly Establishment darlings, but rather were, by and large, members of dissident groups ideologically opposed to the Islamic Republic; moreover, their elimination was religiously sanctioned by a fatwa issued by Ayatollah Khomeini. Perhaps more tellingly, however, the recent events in Iran also bear little ressemblance to the atmosphere that reigned during the Presidency of Mohammad Khatami, when the Reformists remained cowed and unable to unite against the conservative forces that were working to disrupt Khatami's efforts at change.

Outside of the brutal crackdown against demonstrators, the Government has not yet resorted to large scale violence, such as mass executions or targeted assassinations of Movement leaders, to resolve the crisis. At the same time, the Reformists have managed to maintain some semblance of unity (with Khatami, Karroubi, and Mousavi almost appearing to alternate in the role of "Movement Leader"). Moreover, the Opposition has adapted its tactics in order to maintain pressure on the Government, focusing its message less directly on the election issue and more on the events and incidents that occurred in the aftermath of the dispute, such as the show trials and allegations of prisoner rape and abuse. While these may seem like modest accomplishments, the country's history of political repression and opposition to reform over the last 30 years make them the signposts of a society in transition.

As always, trying to predict where this conflict is headed is futile. What we can conclude, however, is that the Establishment has yet to achieve a decisive victory and that this failure, in and of itself, may tell us more about the future of Iran than any one arrest, office closure, or high-ranking political meeting ever will.