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Saturday
Sep122009

Iran: Is the Supreme Leader Killing Off the Opposition?

The Latest from Iran (12 September): Reassessing
Iran: The Complete Translation of the Supreme Leader’s Friday Prayer Address
Iran: Josh Shahryar’s Snap Analysis of the Supreme Leader’s Speech
The Latest from Iran (11 September): Prayers and Politics


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KHAMENEIKARROUBI2Last night's report, first appearing on the Iranian website Rah-e-Sabz and then extended in The New York Times, carried a double blow. First, the Supreme Leader had issued an order (reportedly two weeks ago) for the arrest of Mehdi Karroubi. Second, Hashemi Rafsanjani, after a conversation with Ayatollah Khamenei, had told aides that he was retreating from front-line politics because of the current dominance of the military

The news was so dramatic that it still has not been fully taken in. The reaction of many, inevitably, was whether that this was the defining setback for the Green movement and Rafsanjani. Will Karroubi be cowed into submission and seclusion? Is Rafsanjani saying that he will not appear at next Friday's Qods Day ceremonies? Is there no prospect of a mass response around those ceremonies?

To be honest, while those questions are vital, they're the easy ones to handle this morning. For we simply don't know. Even before the breaking news, we were watching for the reactions of the Green opposition and Rafsanjani to the Supreme Leader's address, and we're still on that watch.

If the report is true, the more immediate profitable analysis is on the relations within the Establishment. Take the assertion that the order for Karroubi's arrest was issued two weeks ago. That would put it at the end of August, before Khamenei's statement denying that the post-election conflict was a foreign-led "velvet revolution) which distanced him from the position of the Revolutionary Guard and the President and his limited but still clear criticisms of the post-election detentions.

So, if Supreme Leader issued the order for Karroubi's arrest as part of his political approach, then the questions emerge over his relationship with Ahmadinejad and the IRGC: 1) was Khamenei attempting to take the lead by showing his tough side? 2) was he now just following the hard line set by others? 3) was he doing a balancing act, setting out threats while also displaying the possibility of limited concessions as Ahmadinejad's Cabinet was being presented to Parliament?

All of this in turn presumes that the order was carefully considered before it was issued. There is always the possibility that Khamenei, who like his opponents has been under pressure and strain throughout this crisis, had a "Thomas a Becket" moment, declaring, "Will no one rid me of this turbulent priest?" The best observers yesterday (those who listened or saw Khamenei's speech, rather than those who lifted their accounts from the Reuters summary) indicated that the Supreme Leaders seemed nervous and even a bit fraught, crying at one point in the first part of the sermon.

For now, therefore, considering the report in connection with the Supreme Leader's Friday Prayers address, two thoughts:

1. It appears, in line with our recent analyses, that Khamenei is scrambling for position, not against the opposition but against his President and his military. Add to that the significant factor that the Supreme Leader is taking fire from senior clerics in Qom, which Josh Shahryar noted yesterday. So, while trying to secure his "leadership", he also has to be aware that if he is too ham- and heavy-fisted with the opposition, his religious position will be under further tension.

2. If one has to pick out a symbolic figure for the opposition, it is now Mehdi Karroubi. Rafsanjani's reported withdrawal from an immediate public battle (a development I take more seriously than the claim of the arrest order, as it came --- as fact or public-relations spin --- from a Rafsanjani aide) puts him to the side for the moment. Mir Hossein Mousavi is trying to mark with statements but appears to be able to do little beyond that.

Karroubi is the one opposition leader with a significant communications network --- significant enough that the Government tried to knock it out with their raids this week, significant enough to survive that attack. He is the leader carrying the documents about the most symbolic and "real" political issue within the Establishment, the alleged abuse of detainees. He is still working within the system, with his negotiations with the judiciary, as well as appealing to those outside it.

So the arrest order, if it was issued, was a sword of Damocles suspended over Karroubi's head. Misbehave and we take you out. And even if that order doesn't exist, then the Supreme Leader's closing statement in yesterday's speech does: don't make a fuss at Qods Day.

Yes, yesterday was dramatic. Yes, it was tense. But, no, it is not a resolution.

On to next Friday.
Saturday
Sep122009

Transcript/Snap Analysis: Washington's Welcome to Iran

Iran’s Nukes: Full Text of Iran’s Proposal to “5+1″ Powers

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Iran-US-flagsHere's a surprise. Despite the hostility shown in the Western media towards Iran's latest proposal on its nuclear programme, notably over Tehran's negative response to the international demand to halt its nuclear enrichment programme, the State Department said Friday that the United States and the other members of the "5+1" group (Germany, China, Russia, Britain, and France) had accepted Iran's proposal to hold direct talks. Moreover, Tehran's signals of cooperation on issues such as the stability of Afghanistan and Iraq and the struggle against terrorism are appreciated by Washington.



Here is Friday's daily press briefing on Iran given by State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley:
Political directors of P-5+1 continue to study Iran document

Statement issued by Javier Solana on P-5+1 countries to arrange a face-to-face meeting

Iran paper does not reply to international community's concerns; it does not cover nuclear issue / need an early meeting to see if Iran is willing to engage seriously on these issues

We feel that they are out of compliance with their obligations under the NPT [Non-Proliferation Treaty], IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency], Security Council resolutions/wish to have direct dialogue with Iran to see what Iran is prepared to do/5+1 countries want to have face-to-face with Iran to address all the issues that we have concerns about, including the nuclear issue.

We have great concern about Iran's support of terrorism and its role in the region/recognize that we have potentially common interests in terms of a stable Afghanistan; and a stable Iraq; willing to engage Iran on the full range of issues

Iranian election is a matter between the Iranian government and its people

Hence, despite pressure on Washington to allow an Israeli strike on Tehran and claims that the US will press for harsher sanctions, it appears that the Obama Administration is maneuvering towards an expansion of engagement. If this is the case, the next Security Council meeting on September 24 can produce an unexpected consensus with a green light for direct dialogue with Iran. Indeed, when the full transcript is read carefully, it emerges that Washington's signal for negotiations is based on wider political concerns rather than as a specific answer to Iran's nuclear proposals. As Crowley states, the only condition  is that Iran expresses its willingness to talk:

Transcript

QUESTION: On Iran? A question on Iran?

MR. CROWLEY: Sure.

QUESTION: Regarding the proposal the Iranians made this week, you said yesterday – and your comments yesterday seemed to be focused on the fact that they didn’t address the central – the issue of central interest to the U.S., which is the nuclear program, enrichment activity. I’m wondering if, nonetheless, the P-5+1 countries have decided that they will tell the Iranians that they accept the offer to have talks.

MR. CROWLEY: Well, I would kind of bother to turn that around, first and foremost, and recall that it was the nations of the P-5+1 who made a specific offer to Iran to engage directly to address the concerns that the United States has, the international community has, the United Nations Security Council has. So it is Iran providing a paper that responds in a way to the invitation. There was a conference call this morning of the political directors of the P-5+1, and I think we continue to study the Iran document. At the same time, I believe brief – a short time ago, there was a statement made by the EU, by Javier Solana, indicating that he will be in touch with the Iranians on behalf of the P-5+1 countries to arrange a face-to-face meeting as soon as possible.

QUESTION: Just on the one-on-one –

MR. CROWLEY: Sure.

QUESTION: The face-to-face meeting – him and – or all the P-5 --

MR. CROWLEY: I mean, the P-5+1 was put in place to provide a mechanism to address the concerns that the international community has about Iran’s nuclear program. And, clearly, the Iranian paper does not reply to these concerns. It does not cover the nuclear issue. That’s precisely why we think we need an early meeting. We’re not interested in talking for talking’s sake. We’re looking to see – and through an early meeting, should Iran be willing, we’ll be looking to see if they are willing to engage seriously on these issues, but within the context of the P-5+1, the full range of issues that we have among these countries and Iran.

QUESTION: So you’re talking about talks about talks? Because I mean --

MR. CROWLEY: We’re not interested in talks about talks.

QUESTION: Well, okay, but that’s --

MR. CROWLEY: We’re interested in finding out if – I mean, if you go to the Iran document, it says the Iranian nation is prepared to enter into dialogue and negotiation, and so on and so forth. We are going to – as Javier Solana has indicated, we will seek an early meeting and we will seek to test Iran’s willingness to engage. Clearly, from the standpoint of the international community, the central issue that we have is the nuclear issue. If we have talks, we will plan to bring up the nuclear issue. We will hope, as we said earlier this week in the IAEA, that Iran will choose to engage the international community to address the concerns that we have about the nuclear program. So we are seeking a meeting because, ultimately, the only way that we feel we’re going to be able to resolve these issues is to have a meeting. But it’s not just a meeting for meeting’s sake. It is a meeting to be able to see if Iran is willing to engage seriously on these issues.

QUESTION: But they just sent you this response to your offer. You offered them talks on the nuclear issue and other issues. They came back to you and said we’re willing to talk, but not about our nuclear program. So what’s the point of talking to them if you got your response – I mean, then how can you say these are not talks about talks? I mean, they’ve shown you through their official paper their willingness to engage on the nuclear issue, which is not to engage on the nuclear issue. So why would you want to have talks with them if it didn’t? And are you saying that you would sit down with Iran to talk about whether they’re willing to engage on the nuclear issue, or are you not going to sit across the table from Iran unless the nuclear issue is on the table?

MR. CROWLEY: We would expect, if we have a meeting with Iran, that it will be a – we would hope that it would be a substantive exchange. We will go into such a meeting, should Iran agree to prepare to talk about the substance of the issues and concerns that we have on Iran’s nuclear program, as was outlined this week at the IAEA. We feel that they are out of compliance with their obligations under the NPT, IAEA, Security Council resolutions. We wish to have a direct dialogue with Iran. We believe, and the President has said repeatedly, that we feel this is the way in which we will be able to, and hopefully can, resolve these issues. Our objective is clear: to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. I don’t think that we can resolve this issue any other way but through the kind of direct dialogue --

QUESTION: But what in that --

MR. CROWLEY: -- that leads to negotiation that we hope will lead to an understanding --

QUESTION: But what in that letter – you said we expect that there’ll be substantive talks. What gives you that expectation?

MR. CROWLEY: Well --

QUESTION: What in that letter gives you any reason to believe that you would have substantive talks with Iran about its nuclear issue?

MR. CROWLEY: Well, and that’s why we will seek a meeting to see what is – Iran is prepared to do. We’ve been waiting for some months --

QUESTION: So you’re ignoring their letter?

MR. CROWLEY: We have been waiting for some months for Iran to respond to the – to Javier Solana’s invitation earlier this year. We are seeking a meeting now based on the Iranian paper to see what Iran is prepared to do. And then, as the President has said, if Iran responds to our interest in a meeting, we’ll see when that can occur. We hope that will occur as soon as possible, and that as we head towards United Nations General Assembly, I expect there will be further meetings within the P-5+1. As the President has said, we will use this month to assess where we are in terms of our offer of engagement, and then that would lead to a conclusion by the end of the year as to what that approach has yielded.

So I don’t – we’ve gone through this situation where there have been various public statements over the past few weeks. But ultimately, the only way we’re going to resolve the serious and – concerns that we have is to have direct dialogue, see if Iran is willing to engage on these issues. If they’re not, then, obviously, that will – we’ll draw conclusions from that.

QUESTION: Just to clarify, it seems that you think the door is still open to talks on the enrichment because they didn’t explicitly refuse in the letter to talk about that subject.

MR. CROWLEY: Well --

QUESTION: Is that correct?

MR. CROWLEY: -- all I can say is our position has not changed. The United States, the other members of the P5+1 – we seek engagement with Iran, we seek to have better answers, better information, better cooperation from Iran to seriously address the issues that we have. And now it is up to Iran to determine what they are prepared to do. They have given – they’ve provided a paper. It says that they are open to dialogue. The paper itself does not address our nuclear concerns. But we will seek a meeting, as Javier Solana indicated today. And then based on that approach, we’ll see if Iran is willing to have a meeting. At that meeting, we will hope that there will be serious engagement. From that engagement, we hope there will be a willingness to address these issues. And then – but through this process, we’ll be able to determine what Iran is prepared to do, what it’s not prepared to do, and that will lead us to make judgments and there will be consequences going forward.

QUESTION: Let me put it another way. I mean, the paper, the proposals – are they better than their public statements where they refuse strictly to discuss engagement – enrichment?

MR. CROWLEY: The paper itself, I don’t think, broke any new ground. It’s, in a way, a warmed-over version of a previous paper they provided some time ago.

QUESTION: So, P.J., why wouldn’t you just see that as stalling then? I mean, the Iranians for the last several years have done this. You get right up to the deadline and then they put these papers out, then you say, okay, we’re going to go talk to them again, and it just keeps going and going down the road.

MR. CROWLEY: Well – and we will draw conclusions based on how Iran responds to the invitation by Javier Solana and the EU.

QUESTION: And their past behavior hasn’t given you any indication?

MR. CROWLEY: And we will draw conclusions if their past behavior – or their future behavior reflects their past behavior.

QUESTION: I’m sorry, but I still don’t understand – and I think probably most of us don’t – that you say that you’re going to ask Iran for talks based on their response --

MR. CROWLEY: No.

QUESTION: – based on this letter that they sent you.

MR. CROWLEY: No, no, no, no, no. We are – once again, we are making the offer of – for direct dialogue to Iran. It is a consistent approach that --

QUESTION: You made that offer, and they said we’re willing to talk to you about everything that we want to talk to you about and nothing that you want to talk to – about. So why are you – are you, like, ignoring this letter or ignoring the contents, or saying the fact that they sent us anything is a good sign and we’ll see if we could build something on that? Because if you’re saying that we’re asking them for talks based on this piece of paper that they sent you, I don’t see where there’s anything to talk about.

MR. CROWLEY: Well – and we seek direct negotiations. We want to see Iran sit down face to face with the P-5+1 countries and address all of the issues that we have concern about, including the nuclear issue. If we have a meeting, we’re going to bring up the nuclear issue, and we’ll see how Iran responds to that. And this is – this is --

QUESTION: But what – but what about this – I’m sorry, but what about this letter makes you think that they’re willing to talk to you about that? They said no thank you.

MR. CROWLEY: And we’ll find out. We’ll find out. But I – again, I go back --

QUESTION: Why aren’t you taking no for an answer, though?

MR. CROWLEY: Libby, I – Elise, I go back to the – there’s language in the letter that simply says the Government of Iran is willing to enter in a dialogue. We are going to test that proposition. Okay? And if Iran is willing to enter into serious negotiations, then they will find a willing participant in the United States and the other P-5+1 countries. If the – Iran dissembles in the future, as it has in the past, then we will draw conclusions from that.

Recall, we have a two-track strategy here. We are willing to engage, but we are also going to continue to look for ways to pressure Iran to change the path that it’s on. And we are willing to do both of those simultaneously. But ultimately, because these are serious issues, because we have a strategy that will prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear power, we feel the only way you’re ultimately going to resolve these issues is through direct dialogue. We recognize that Iran may or may not be willing to do so.

And as the President said, we’re going to assess where we are during the course of this month, including meetings that we’ll have at the UN General Assembly. And then at the end of the year, we’ll be able to draw some conclusions as to how successful our engagement offer has been.

QUESTION: P.J., can I follow up on that?

MR. CROWLEY: Sure.

QUESTION: Isn’t your second track in trouble, though? I mean, you’ve got the Russian foreign minister out there saying yesterday that new sanctions shouldn’t be considered, especially anything on petroleum. That’s the same thing the Russians have been saying since this process got underway back in 2003. It just seems – how are you going to implement the second track?

MR. CROWLEY: These are not mutually exclusive. I’ll let the Russian foreign minister characterize his own words. There is unanimity within the P-5+1 in support of our two-track approach that involves engagement and pressure. Now – and we are willing to meet with Iran. We hope to meet with Iran. We want to see serious engagement on the nuclear issue, in particular. Within the context of the P-5+1, we are willing to address any other issues that they want to bring to the table. But clearly, if Iran refuses to negotiate seriously, we the United States and the international community and the Security Council can draw conclusions from that. And then based on that, we’ll make some judgments in the future.

QUESTION: P.J. --

QUESTION: I’m sorry, a quick procedural question since the announcement happened while we were in here. What level would the talks be on? Is that – the Solana announcement, what level of talks would take place with Iran? Is it political directors?

MR. CROWLEY: I would say likely at the political director level. But again, that will be part of what will be negotiated, depending on what Iran’s response is.

QUESTION: The U.S. will be at the table for that, or would it be only Solana? I’m trying to understand.

MR. CROWLEY: Oh, no. I would expect – I mean, we would seek a meeting –

QUESTION: At the initial meeting here --

MR. CROWLEY: Yes.

QUESTION: – that Solana is requesting, would it be with all six parties plus him?

MR. CROWLEY: Well, again, as he indicated in his statement, Javier Solana will be in touch with Iranian authorities, look for a meeting at an early date. And then we’ll work those details based on the Iranian response.

QUESTION: So you’re not closed to being at an initial meeting, as opposed to the follow-up meeting?

MR. CROWLEY: But I would – I think we would hope that there’d be a full P-5+1 meeting at a senior level. We’ll be looking, for example, to see from the Iranian standpoint, should this happen, what level of interlocutor will they send, what kind of authority will that person have. But we’re looking for a serious engagement by Iran, address these issues that we have. If it’s there, that will be a positive development. If it’s not there, we’ll draw conclusions from that.

QUESTION: Does that –

MR. CROWLEY: Go ahead. Go ahead.

QUESTION: So, basically, this is probably a last chance for Iran to engage on its nuclear issue, which is sort of a precondition for the talks?

MR. CROWLEY: Well, I wouldn’t say – it is a – it is certainly a best opportunity for Iran. As we said at the IAEA earlier this week, we have made an offer to Iran; it’s out of mutual interest and mutual respect. But clearly, we expect to see Iran be willing to address the concerns that we have. As we said earlier this week, Iran says it has rights, but with those rights come responsibilities. So we’ll see what happens. But obviously, should Iran decide to engage, we will be at the table. Should Iran decide not to engage, that will have consequences and we’ll make judgments based on what Iran does or does not do.

QUESTION: Does that include Iran’s views on Israel and also support of terrorism?

MR. CROWLEY: We have great concern about Iran’s support of terrorism and its role in the region. At the same time, we recognize that we have potentially common interests in terms of a stable Afghanistan, in terms of a stable Iraq. As we have said frequently, we are willing to engage Iran on a full range of issues, but obviously, first on our list, first on the international community’s list, is Iran’s nuclear program.

QUESTION: And their views on Israel – wipe out Israel off the world map?

MR. CROWLEY: Obviously, that is a repugnant statement from the United States[1]. And we – but we are willing to – we have great concerns about Iran’s role in the region. It has been – hardly been a constructive player, and we will be clearly prepared to talk about that.

QUESTION: Can you take another one on Iran from another angle? Every year at the end of the month of Ramadan, the Iranian regime has begun this demonstration in support of the Palestinians. It’s coming up. It’s next week, actually. And today, Khamenei threatened the opposition that if they use that demonstration to voice their own displeasure with the results of the presidential elections that they would be faced with a harsh response and full force and everything.

Could that play – this recent comment play – have any room to play in your decision on the talks in general?

MR. CROWLEY: Well, I mean, as we have said many, many times, the situation in the aftermath of the election is really a matter between the Iranian Government and its people. Clearly, there are many within the political structure, within the clerical structure, that want to see a broader political process, a genuine political process, the formation of a genuine political opposition. And clearly, the regime is determined, and has taken direct actions, to inhibit that from happening both in terms of the arrest of those who have expressed their views publicly of intention and inhibitions given to journalists, and so on and so forth. And obviously, this continues to roil within Iran.

I think it’s not for us to give the Iranian regime advice, other than they should continue to take actions, or should start to take actions, to meet the genuine aspirations of their people.

QUESTION: Well, in that proposal they mentioned that they respect the right of people for free – to have free elections, and they talk about justice and rule of law and --

MR. CROWLEY: I think we would say that actions speak more loudly than words. And clearly, their activities of the past few weeks hardly show a government that is interested in having a free and fair and open political process.
Saturday
Sep122009

Middle East Inside Line: How Will Israel Receive Mitchell?

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MITCHELL NETANYAHUUS Envoy Mitchell Back to Israel: Haaretz reports that the U.S. Mideast special envoy George Mitchell will soon arrive in Israel for another round of talks on Monday on specific topics.

The first issue will be gestures from some Arab states. Mitchell has already stated, without giving any names, that there is a progress with regards to expected normalization gestures from some Arab countries. However, the Israeli side is expected to offer a "wait and see" approach, offering only a six-month freeze on settlements in exchange of for positive steps from the Arabs.

Secondly, the scope of the settlement freeze is expected to be discussed. Israel will offer to suspend the construction of private housing units but will insist on the continuation of public buildings such as classrooms, health clinics and synagogues, neutralising public opposition to a freeze.
Friday
Sep112009

The Latest from Iran (11 September): Prayers and Politics

Iran: The Complete Translation of the Supreme Leader’s Friday Prayer Address
Iran: Josh Shahryar's Snap Analysis of the Supreme Leader's Speech
Iran: Questions on Prayer Day

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KHAMENEI2200 GMT: We have received further information on both the Rah-e-Sabz and New York Times stories on the Khamenei order for the arrest of Mehdi Karroubi and on the Rafsanjani "retreat" because of military pressure.

The information indicates that one of Hashemi Rafsanjani's colleagues has confirmed the Karroubi arrest story to one of the best reporters covering Iran. We are therefore taking the story very seriously.

More to come in a special analysis on Saturday.

2120 GMT: An EA correspondent picks up the following from the Rah-e-Sabz story on Rafsanjani's apparent retreat: "He went as far as to say that Karroubi's arrest warrant should not have been issued by Khamenei himself and that the presence of the IRGC [Revolutionary Guard] in the political sphere will make matters 'complicated'. Khamenei apparently reacted with a long silence to this remark."

2100 GMT: Rumour of the Day. Rah-e-Sabz reports that an "informed source" claims that the Supreme Leader has issued an order for the arrest of Mehdi Karroubi. Almost as significant is the claim, from the same report, that Hashemi Rafsanjani has told members of the Center for Strategic Research of the Expediency Council, about a meeting between himself and Ayatollah Khamenei: “I will back away from everything, they are not granting me permission to speak at the Friday prayers anymore.”

The New York Times, which picked up the story, has added from "a person close to Mr. Rafsanjani" that "the order was issued at least two weeks ago".

1945 GMT: Journalist Mohammad Hasan Fallahizadeh, who had been on hunger strike in Evin Prison, was released on Wednesday on medical grounds.

1520 GMT: The Karroubi Response. A "source close to Mehdi Karoubi" has told Rooz Online's English-language website:
Mr. Karoubi was taken back over the closure of the committee because he believed that the two meetings that he had with judiciary officials on the subject were very constructive.If the committee continues its work with Mr. Karoubi, then many issues will come to light. New issues are surfacing with every passing day. They wish to cut Mr. Karoubi from the people.

That is a straightforward reaction, but the emerging question for us is whether Karroubi comes to the forefront to lead the protests on Qods Day next Friday. The source's comments were focused on the narrower question of the abuse investigation: "Mr. Karoubi shall continue his pursue of the cases of the victims of the post election atrocities....The issue is very clear: Crimes have taken place and the Islamic system is responsible to investigate them."

1515 GMT: More of the Hard Line. The Supreme Leader's address was not the only tough talk on Friday. The leader of prayers in Qom has wondered why Mir Hossein Mousavi has not been arrested and called for the "voice" of the Green movement to be "strangled" on Qods Day.

1500 GMT: Back after an afternoon break. Radio Farda has posted a summary of the Karroubi letter to head of judiciary Sadegh Larijani (English text in separate entry), emphasising Karroubi's declaration that the Revolutionary Guard has hidden documentation of rapes of detainees.

1120 GMT: Agence France Presse's take on the speech: Confrontation. They use this extract, "Those who draw swords against the regime will be confronted. Differences of views should not lead to conflicts....The policy of the regime is to work with the majority. But if opposition groups have ideas that are against the nation's security and the principles of the regime, they will be confronted."

1115 GMT: Irony of the Day (so far). I'm just checking in after a trip to Manchester --- thanks to Mike Dunn and Chris Emery for covering the Supreme Leader's speech.

Reading the updates, 0855 GMT stands out: "Supreme Leader recalls the memory of a modern Shia icon: Ayatollah Taleghani, a contemporary of Ayatollah Khomenei who died shortly after the Revolution."

Hmm, would that be the same Ayatollah Taleghani whose memorial service was initially blocked, for the first time in 30 years, by the regime earlier this week?

0935 GMT: And it's over. The Supreme Leader ends a hardline, but to some observers nervous, performance with a final warning against any Quds Day demonstrations. A full analysis will follow once we have collected our thoughts..

0930 GMT: Great Britain singled out for more than 200 years of experience of evil in Iran.

0925 GMT: Khamenei recalls another momentous in Iran's modern history. He is now recalling Iran's victory over the US in the 1998 soccer World Cup!  "Iran's goal is a goal for us"!

0920 GMT: State TV showing crowds outside Friday Prayers singing 'Death to England'.

0910 GMT: VIPs present - Larijani Ali and Sadegh Larijani, Rahim Safavi, Hassan Rowhani, Int. Minister Heydar Moslehi. President Ahmadinejad seated next to Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi, former judiciary chief.

0906 GMT: Khamenei justifies the crack down..."All States, even European ones, react with force to violent threats. We accept criticism, but not threats."

0900 GMT: A nod to tolerance clearly setting up an attack on dissent. "Differences in opinion are valid and accepted within the framework of the system. The system will not react against anyone in this case; people who do not want to wreck the peace of the regime, and of society will not be dealt with."

0857 GMT: "There have been divisions throughout the revolution", some costly,. others not for the revolution, Khomeini dealt with them at all levels, people who were revolutionaries but that we could no longer work with." The Supreme Leader appears to be trying to reassert his leadership of the Revolution's legacy and the current political system.

0855 GMT: Supreme Leader starts the second sermon by recalling the memory of a modern Shia icon: Ayatollah Taleghani, a contemporary of Ayatollah Khomenei who died shortly after the Revolution.

0850 GMT: Khamenei has the whole crowd weeping:  Suspicions that Ali Larijani's tears are less than convincing. Crowd is big, although they are yet to show the sorrounding streets.

0845 GMT: The SL is winding up the first sermon, the Quranic one, but building up to a possibly confronational second sermon: "Imam Ali said "after tollerance, Ali drew the sword"

0840 GMT: 'What would the Imam Ali do?' The Supreme Leader is drawing heavily on themese of 'spirituality' with particular emphasis on Imam's Ali's example.

0830 GMT: The Speech begins and the Supreme Leader warns of the "dangers" of the seperation of religion from politics. Politics becomes "immoral" in that case, just like in the "secular western".

0430 GMT: We've prepared for today's big events, the Supreme Leader's address at Friday prayers in Tehran, with a quick preview of the issues at play both for the opposition and for the regime. And no doubt we'll be occupied today with covering and then deciphering the speech.

This should not, however, ignore another development. The Green movement has not folded in the face of the toughest strikes on its leadership since the days after the 12 June election. Mir Hossein Mousavi has responded, with his criticism of the Government and his upholding of the "Green Path of Hopse"; the impact of this, given the restrictions on Mousavi's communications, remains to be seen.

Perhaps even more important, however, the Mehdi Karroubi network has bounced back. The Etemade Melli party website (including Saham News) has revived, against the expectations of many. Today Karroubi publishes his letter to the head of judiciary, Sadegh Larijani, on the investigation of the abuse of detainees. Karroubi's line is clear: the Ahmadinejad Government's raids and arrests this week were meant to stop this process, but this must not happen.

Which, of course, raises a vital question: after his recent reference to those "outside the law", does Larijani agree?
Friday
Sep112009

Iran's Nukes: Full Text of Iran's Proposal to "5+1" Powers

The Latest from Iran (11 September): Prayers and Politics

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IRAN NUKESThe New York-based ProPublica has published the full text of Iran's proposal submitted on Wednesday to the "5+1" powers (US, UK, France, Russia, China, and Germany).

After the 5+1 meeting, Washington and Moscow are at odds regarding Tehran's proposal. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said on Thursday that the proposals contained "something to work with".In contrast, U.S. State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley told reporters on the same day that the Iranian proposal is "not really responsive to our greatest concern, which is obviously Iran's nuclear program."

Full Text of Iranian Proposal:

In the Name of the Almighty

Cooperation for Peace, Justice, and Progress

Package of proposals by the Islamic Republic of Iran for Comprehensive and Constructive Negotiations

There is no doubt that our world is at the threshold of entering a new era. The difficult era characterized by domination of empires, predominance of military powers, dominance of organized and interrelated media networks and competitions on the basis of offensive capability and the power from conventional and non-conventional weapons is coming to an end. A new era characterized by cultural approach and rational thinking, and respect for the true godly essence of humankind is flourishing and blossoming. Many of the predicaments facing our world today, such as the unprecedented economic crisis, cultural and identity crisis, political and security dilemmas, and the mushrooming of terrorism, organized crimes and illicit drugs are the products of the fading era of domination of ungodly ways of thinking prevailing in global relations and the ominous legacy for present and future generations of humanity.

Resolution of these problems and creating a world filled with spirituality, friendship, prosperity, wellness, and security requires reorganization and creating an opportunity for broad and collective participation in the management of the world. The existing mechanisms are not capable to meet the present needs of humankind and their ineffectiveness has bean clearly proven in the realms of economics, politics, culture and security. These mechanisms and structures are the direct product of relations based on brute power and domination, while our world today needs mechanisms that come from divine and godly thinking and an approach based on human values and compassion. Thee new mechanisms should pave the way for the advancement, full blossoming of the talents and potentials of all nations, and establishment of lasting world peace end security.

The Iranian nation is prepared to enter into dialogue and negotiation in order to !ay the ground for lasting peace and regionally-inspired and generated stability for the region and beyond, and for the continued progress and prosperity of the nations of the region and the world. Our desire to enter into this dialogue and cooperative relationships proceeds from our inherent national, regional and international capacity and strength, our principled and historical commitment in applying this capacity to foster peace, tranquility, progress and wellbeing for nations in our region and beyond. We stand ready to enter into this dialogue on the basis of godly and human principles and values, including the recognition of the rights of nations, respect for sovereignty and principles of democracy and the right of people to have free elections, as well as refraining from imposing pressure or threats and moving forward on the solid foundation of justice and law.

The Islamic Republic of Iran believes that within the framework of principles of justice, democracy and multilateralism, a wide range of security, political, economic and cultural issues at regional and global levels could be included in these negotiations with a view of fostering constructive cooperation for advancement of nations and promotion of peace and stability in the region and the world.

As it was clearly stated last year in our proposed package, the Islamic Republic or Iran believes that drawing lessons from the past mistakes and not insisting on futile and pointless paths that have proven to be of no avail is the prerequisite for the success in the upcoming negotiations. Accordingly, the commitment of all parties involved to, firstly, composition of new structure of international interactions that is free from past errors, and secondly expression of good intent by all parties both in words and deeds in demonstrating commitment to justice and law can lead to a new phase in negotiations for a long-term cooperation with a view' to consolidating lasting peace and security in the region and the world.

Political, security, economic and international issues are the primary subjects that have raised shared concerns in the region and the world for governments and notions. The Islamic Republic of Iron firmly believes that proceeding from principles and fundamentals stated above and in light of the present state of affairs in our world we all need to show compassion and concern for the destiny of humanity and to turn these shared concerns into collective commitments for the purpose of paving the way for effective regional and international cooperation.

The Islamic Republic of Iran voices its readiness to embark on comprehensive, all-encompassing and constructive negotiations, aiming at acquiring a clear framework for cooperative relationships by ensuring the adherence of all parties to collective commitments, a future free from injustice that promises welfare and progress free from double standards for all nations of the region and the world.

Proceeding from regional and international priorities, the axes of the negotiations for peace and prosperity can be included in three main areas: political-security issues, international issues and economic issues.

1. Political-Security Issues

1.1 Protecting human dignity, respect for their culture and their rights.

1.2 Consolidating stability and fostering just peace, promotion of democracy and enhancement of prosperity of nations in regions that suffer from instability, militarism, violence and terrorism on the basis of:

First: Respect for the rights of nations and national interests of sovereign states.

Second: Consolidating the national sovereignty of countries in the framework of democratic practices.

Third: Refraining from violence and militarism.

Fourth: Tackling the root causes of terrorism.

Some parts of the world, especially in the Middle East, the Balkans, parts of Africa, South America and East Asia need to be accorded priority. Joint efforts and interactions to help the people of Palestine to draw a comprehensive, democratic and equitable plan in order to help the people of Palestine to achieve all-embracing peace, lasting security and to secure their fundamental rights could be good examples of those cooperative relations.

1.3 Combating common security threats by dealing effectively and firmly with the main causes of security threats including terrorism, illicit drugs, illegal migrations, organized crimes and piracy.

2. International Issues

2.1 Reform of the United Nations and the Security Council and raising their effectiveness on the basis of principles of democracy and justice

2.2 Elevating the weight and position of environmental issues in the international relations and fostering collective participation in the management of environmental issues.

2.3 Equitable definition and codification of the rights to space and sharing of all possessors of space technologies in the management and fair use of space.

2.4 Definition and codification of the rights relating to new and advanced technologies.

2.5 Promoting a rule-based and equitable oversight function of the IAEA and creating the required mechanisms for use of clean nuclear energy in agriculture, industry, and medicine and power generation.

2.6 Promoting the universality of NPT mobilizing global resolve and putting into action real and fundamental programmes toward complete disarmament and preventing development and proliferation or nuclear, chemical and microbial weapons.

2.7 Enhancement of ethical and human considerations and their full observance in international mechanisms, ties and practices.

3. Economic Issues

3.1 Energy and its security in production, supply, transport and consumption.

3.2 Trade and investment.

3.3 Capacity-building for promotion of public welfare, global poverty alleviations reducing social gaps and bridging the gap between the South and the North.

3.4 Finding the roof causes of global economic and financial crisis and preventing the occurrence of other manifestations of crisis in the world economy and designing new and just mechanisms.

3.5 Combating underground economy, economic corruption, financial frauds and organized crime activities that are detrimental to economic security.