Mehmanparast said these sources "were dreaming of creating differences among the officials and authorities in Iran" but advised them to stop this "immoral behaviour".
UPDATE 2015 GMT: More criticism from Mottaki, this time of Ahmadinejad's special envoy for Asia, Hamid Baghaei, who is also the head of the Iran Cultural Heritage, Handcrafts and Tourism Organization.
The Foreign Minister said that it was not clear, based on authority and position, how Baghaei came to make "these inappropriate remarks", presumably a reference to the controversial intervention over Turkey's "genocide" of Armenians.
Mottaki asked the Iranian officials, especially in Government, not to increase the price that Iran has to pay internationally through inappropriate and naïve remarks and speeches.
EA can report, from reliable sources, that Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki tried to resign last month over President Ahmadinejad's appointment of four special envoys, including his Chief of Staff Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai, for international affairs.
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Mottaki offered his resignation in a private letter, but the Supreme Leader intervened by sending a member of his office to talk with the Foreign Minister. Mottaki set out his complaint with the question, "What is my role?", given the apparent takeover of Iran's diplomacy by the Presidency.
The Foreign Minister also noted that the initiative had already caused one embarrassment for Tehran, when Hamid Baghaei, the special envoy for Asia, spoke about the "genocide" of Armenians by Turkey. Mottaki, who had to apologise to his Turkish counterpart Ahmet Davutoglu, said, "We have to answer for these mistakes, and we have to repair them."
Through his office, Ayatollah Khamenei assured Mottaki that he would take action. Days later, he slapped down the President, privately telling him that his action was counter-productive because it was not an organised plan and publicly --- after a meeting with Ahmadinejad and the Cabinet --- criticising "parallel action" in Government.
With Khamenei intervening, Mottaki not only withdrew his resignation but publicly maintained support for Ahmadinejad and the special envoys, fending off questions in Parliament.
(It should be noted, however, that despite the Supreme Leader's apparent rebuke, the President has not pulled back the appointment of the special envoys. This raised questions as to whether Ahmadinejad has indeed been curbed or has merely accepted a temporary public criticism while maintaining his line.)
Today there are further developments pointing to the rift between President and Foreign Minister. Mottaki has said that foreign policy is not a place for crude remarks and that this rule applies to prominent members of the Government. The Foreign Minister also referred to Khamenei's criticism of "parallel action".
The official's words were in reference to yesterday's bitter exchange between Tehran and the Palestinian Authority, following President Ahmadinejad's denunciation of the Israel-Palestine talks in his Qods Day speech. The implication was that Mottaki did not agree with the public criticism of Palestinian Authority head Mahmoud Abbas.
Writing in CounterPunch, Fatemeh Keshavarz re-examines what may have happened in the 2009 Presidential election, bringing in analysis of a recently-leaked audio in which a Revolutionary Guard commander describes interference by the Iranian military before, during, and after the vote.
Keshavarz applies her analysis to the tension in Iran today, 15 months after the election: "The leak of the tape, whether by the IRGC [Islamic Revolution Guards Corps] intelligence [bureau] or unhappy elements among them, makes another point clear. The battle of Ahmadinejad’s government for establishing its legitimacy is not over --- not even among the members of the Guard. The intelligence chiefs therefore deem it necessary to convince their own members that they are in control of the situation --- better still, they themselves have masterminded the current situation in the first place.
More than a year has passed since millions of Iranians marched on the streets calling the 2009 election a military coup carried out by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards (IRG), their militia the Basij, and their armed plainclothes hired hands "lebaseshakhsis". The goals of the coup: keeping Ahmadinejad in power and completing the military and economic control of the IRG in the country. After beating up, arresting, and sometimes killing the protesters, the government put a record number of Iranian journalists behind bars (most now serving long sentences) and banned the foreign press from entering the country except to report on officially-orchestrated occasions.
Subsequently, Mir Housein Mousavi, the main opponent of Ahmadinejad and many members of the reformist opposition --- known as the Green Movement --- were put effectively under house arrest curbing their ability to reach the public in Iran. Moving the scenes of its brutality from the streets to jails and interrogation rooms, the regime dropped out of headlines thereby reducing the pressure on the Iranian authorities to answer for their brutal treatment of the opposition.
In the meantime, using its full control over the media, the Iranian government began to promote an alternative account of the 2009 election, an account which has not been without impact on the western left. It goes like this: the Iranian upper and upper middle classes, fooled by the western supporters of the reformists, had assumed that they had the majority while, in fact, in small towns and villages widespread support for Ahmadinejad gave him his 63% victory in the elections. Frustrated with their own miscalculations, the defeated reformists resorted to street violence, and therefore the government had no choice but to use harsher measures to calm things down.
This scenario has many big holes including the fact that, even if Ahmadinejad had the support of the rural areas, the Iranian population is about 65% urban and in fact the large cities are more than able to give any candidate a victory. Furthermore, hundreds of video clips document the peacefulness of the early protest marches in large cities as well as small towns. They also document the unprovoked violence of the security forces against the marchers.
All of this has become relevant again. Less than a month ago, an audio file of a speech by a chief intelligence officer and interrogator from the top ranks of the Revolutionary Guards came to light describing the behind-the-scenes [manoeuvres] of Ahmadinejad’s 2009 victory. The speech was leaked to the opposition websites, and spread fast despite the heavy censorship imposed in Iran. Besides the fascinating details revealed in it, there are other things that make the document important including the fact that no one (not even the government) has disputed its authenticity.
It is, in fact, very likely that the speech was leaked intentionally by the government itself. These facts lead to important questions. Who is the speaker? What does the tape reveal? What is the reformist opposition doing about it? And, why would the Iranian government leak a document that confirms its complicity in a fraudulent election, if indeed the leak has been intentional?
First a quick update on the current conditions in Iran. The country still has the highest number of jailed reporters in the world and only the official news and views are reported on the national media. Expressing political opposition in a blog can lead to five years in jail where the prisoners go on frequent hunger strikes to protest torture, unsanitary living conditions, and insult. Female prisoners will receive reduced sentences if they confess to illicit sexual relations with prominent members of the reform movement. Families of the prisoners who resist making confessions are threatened with more arrests.
And, despite Mr. Ahmadinejad’s claim quoted in The New Yorker’s recent piece “After the Crackdown”, his critics are not free to speak their minds. A standard charge for jailed journalists is “insulting (read criticizing) the president.” To get a sense of the problem, imagine you are an Iranian blogger citing Mr. Ahmadinejad’s claim in his New Yorker interview in your blog and asking, “If it is ok to criticize our president, why are some journalists in jail for 'insulting' him?” You will likely receive a brief phone call from a security agent within days. He will tell you to introduce yourself to one of the intelligence headquarters (or even directly to the main office of Evin Prison). If you are smart, you will do so immediately and quietly.
Side by side with these “security” measures, the National Iranian Radio and Television works to uphold its conspiratorial master narrative: the discovery of a “foreign” plot to end the supremacy of Islam in Iran. Those who would criticize the government are agents of this foreign “enemy.” One does not even need a blog to be considered a foreign agent. It is enough to mention an anti-government protest to a friend in an e-mail, or, worse still, attach a picture of the protest to the e-mail. Last week, in anticipation of the official Quds Day celebration, the day the Iranian government reiterates its support for the Palestinians, the e-mail use was reduced to three hours a day.
The universities (particularly the schools of humanities and social sciences) are perceived as infested with sympathy for the foreign enemy. In the past ten months, Ali Khamenei the Supreme Leader, major cleric Mesbah Yazdi, and Sadeq Larijani, the head of the Iranian judiciary, have all spoken about the unsuitability of the humanities for Iranian universities. Mr. Larijani targeted sociology, psychology, and the branch of philosophy that addresses human existential issues as the most unsuitable ones.
Against this sustained discourse of a foreign threat --- versus the dutiful, legitimate, and honest efforts of the government to offset the treat –-- there is now the newly leaked audio-file of a speech in which, a major Revolutionary Guard intelligence officer and interrogator brags about saving the Supreme Leader’s glory via keeping Mr. Ahmadinejad in the presidential office. This has, according to him, been done single-handedly by members of the Revolutionary Guard through sensible planning and timely action: that is identifying the enemy (the reformists), and using all means (obstruction, violence, spying, threats, and arrests) to stop them from winning the election.
On Tuesday, the Supreme Leader told industrialists and manufacturers, "The Iranian authorities and nation will undoubtedly circumvent sanctions (against the country) and render them ineffective just as they did over the past three decades and will move ahead with progress and development."
Beyond that straightforward assertion --- would you expect Ayatollah Khamenei to say Tehran is wobbling before the international pressure? --- a more intriguing and possibly more significant story was developing.
On Monday and Tuesday, a series of politicians and officials lined up to challenge President Ahmadinejad's appointment of four envoys, including his Chief of Staff Esfandiar Rahim Mashai, for international affairs. Almost half of the members of Parliament issued a written warning. Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki, who tried to resign over the incident but was dissuaded by the Supreme Leader's office, made it clear that "parallel actions" could not be tolerated, a line echoed by Ahmadinejad's primary critics on domestic issues. Even the Foreign Ministry spokesman took a swipe at the President.
So far, however, Ahmadinejad has refused to retract the appointments of the envoys. Indeed, his public display was to dash to Qatar, with his political supporters acclaiming his abilities as a statesman.
Officially, the Iranian line will be --- it has been since 1979 --- that foreign policy is unified under the undeniable authority of the Supreme Leader. But the repeated calls yesterday, almost a week after Khamenei publicly criticised the envoys' appointments, for the President to heed the words of the Supreme Leader indicate that some leading politicians and officials do not believe Ahmadinejad is accepting that official position.
And that in turn, amidst discussion of renewed talks on the uranium enrichment issue and the high-profile regional manoeuvres from Israel/Palestine to Iraq to Afghanistan, raises the question --- both for international community and for Iranians:
2140 GMT: Is It Really OK to Criticise the President Now? We noted last evening that the chairman of the Supreme Audit Court, Abdolreza Rahmani Fazli, had "taken apart the Ahmadinejad Government over its development plans, privatisation, imports, and subsidy reform".
Iran's Press TV either A) forgot to read EA or B) thought long and hard about whether it would be wise and appropriate to publicise Fazli's criticism. Finally, this afternoon it decided it was OK to let Ahmadinejad have it: "The Iranian government's plans to scrap state subsidies should not lead to 'political disputes' in the country, says the head of Iran's Supreme Audit Court."
Press also noted Fazli's comments on the suspect nature of the Government's privatisation but left out the chairman's scathing remarks on cheap imports pushing out Iranian goods and costing Iranian jobs.
At his press briefing today, Ramin Mehmanparast was asked if foreign policy had been hindered by the President's appointment of special representatives for international affairs.
Mehmanparast replied, "We believe the Foreign Ministry should not be undermined....The Foreign Ministry is the only body that makes final decision and implement foreign policy."
1540 GMT: School Days. "Free teachers", with between four and eight years of experience, from 5 provinces have protested in front of Parliament over discrimination in professional examinations and lack of jobs.
1535 GMT: Economy Watch. Khabar Online reports that about 800,000 jobs have been lost in agriculture since 2005.
1525 GMT: A New Political Contender? The supporters of the new "Front for Justice and Welfare", linked to Ahmadinejad's Chief of Staff Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai, met yesterday. They defended the and his Government and sharply attacked the hardline newspaper Keyhan, which has been critical of Rahim-Mashai.
1510 GMT: Parliament v. President. Challenges to Ahmadinejad on a number of fronts....
122 of the 290 MPs in the Majlis have issued a warning to the President about "parallel actions" in foreign policy, reminding him to follow the command of the Supreme Leader.
On Wednesday the Parliament will officially present letters of impeachment of Minister of Energy Majid Namjoo and Minister of Agriculture minister Sadegh Khalilian.
1500 GMT: The Battle Within. Mohammad Nabi-Habibi, the Secretary-General of the Motalefeh party, has issued a stinging criticism of the President in Khabar Online.
Nabi Habibi rebuked Ahmadnejad for his "parallel actions" in foreign policy and said he should stop them immediately to please the Supreme Leader. While noting the "good performance" of the Ahmadinejad Governments, he added that they should also accept criticism, end quarrels, and create a better life for the people by establishing justice. He urged concentration on the creation of jobs and economic growth.
Nabi Habibi called for a Government commission with Parliament and the Expediency Council to resolve problems.
1315 GMT: MediaWatch. A quick answer to our enquiry earlier today (see 0650 GMT) about whether Thomas Erdbrink of The Washington Post, one of the few front-line "Western" correspondents in Tehran, would be returning to Iran after a break in The Netherlands.
Turns out Erdbrink's story on the Iranian opposition in Delft, published today, was developed last month, and he is already back in post in the Iranian capital.
1250 GMT: Sanctions Watch. On Monday, the Central Bank of the United Arab Emirates froze four Iranian bank accounts, in accordance with the recent sanctions on 41 firms and individuals adopted by the United Nations Security Council.
A source at the CBE said the other 37 accounts on the UN list were outside the country and the amounts frozen in the UAE were "very limited".
1245 GMT: Power Squeeze. Peyke Iran reports that electricity bills for some people in Tehran have risen five times. Khabar Online is also carrying the story.
"Unfortunately, (they are) defending a person who is being tried for murder and adultery, which are two major crimes of this lady and should not become a human rights issue," Foreign Ministry spokesman Ramin Mehmanparast. "If releasing all those who have committed murder is to be perceived as a human rights issue, then all European countries should release all the murderers in their countries."
Not sure that the latest Iranian protest will check the pressure, however: the Parliament of the European Union will pass a resolution on Wednesday in support of Ashtiani. On Monday, the introduction of the resolution brought more than 30 minutes of denunciation of Tehran:
1020 GMT: The Foreign Policy Battle. Key MP Ahmad Tavakoli has issued a harsh warning to President Ahmadinejad over his naming and retention of special envoys for foreign policy, amidst the growing dispute with the Foreign Ministry. Tavakoli said that ignoring the commands of Ayatollah Khamenei to cease "parallel actions" would have "grave consequences".
1015 GMT: Stopping the Lawyers. Reporters Without Borders has condemned the detention of defense attorney Nasrin Sotoudeh, whose office was raided on 28 August and who was summoned to the prosecutor's office inside Evin Prison on Sunday over charges of anti-government propaganda and conspiring against the regime
Reporters Without Borders said. “Detained journalists and other political prisoners are denied their most basic rights. Lawyers cannot visit their detained clients or see their case files. Now the repression is being stepped up a notch. By arresting lawyers, the regime is trying to gag the last dissenting voices. Lawyers’ organisations throughout the world must demand this courageous lawyer’s immediate release.”
0755 GMT: Nothing to See Here, Move Along (Nuclear Edition). And now the other side of the headline hype (see 0525 GMT). Press TV quotes Iran's ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency, Ali Asghar Soltanieh, on the IAEA's latest statement: "After seven years of constant inspections, the report once again confirms the non-diversion of Iran's nuclear activities towards military and banned objectives
Ali Abkar Salehi, the head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, chimes in, "Like the previous reports, the new report reiterates the non-diversion of declared nuclear material ….Therefore, we believe that the other issues mentioned in the report are minor."
It is useful to note Salehi's response to the most challenging remarks in the IAEA reports, criticising Iran's denial of inspections of its heavy water plant: "The IAEA should tell us that by which clause of the mutual agreement can it inspect the heavy water facilities. We have not found such a clause…if they prove it, I will immediately allow inspectors to visit [the plant]."
A dreamy university town in the Netherlands known as the birthplace of 17th-century painter Johannes Vermeer has become a major center for Iranian activists abroad.
Over 1,000 Iranian students, the majority fresh arrivals from Iran's best universities, are studying courses such as applied physics and aerospace engineering at the Delft University of Technology, and meeting during evenings in cafes that line the city's canals.
The university hosts one of the largest communities of visiting Iranian scholars in Europe, and many are involved with the Iranian opposition movement.
Now a question: Erdbrink, one of the few front-line "Western" correspondents who remained in Iran during the post-election conflict, by-lines the story from Delft. Is the Dutch national now outside Iran and, if so, will he be able to get back in? 0535 GMT: We're going to leave the nuclear chatter to others, unless there is a significant development. We've got more important matters to consider....
Our exclusive on the tension between the President and the Foreign Ministry, including Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki's attempted resignation, was posted last night. This morning, we'll be putting up an equally important story involving former President Hashemi Rafsanjani, and tomorrow or Thursday we should have an analysis --- based on new information from inside Iran --- of the battle within the regime.
0525 GMT: As we noted at the end of last night, there will be a lot of "Western"media brushfires to put out today, with the coverage of the International Atomic Energy Agency's latest report on the Iranian nuclear programme. Even though there is almost nothing new of substance in the IAEA summary, most newspapers will be looking for --- actually, they have already seized upon --- a morsel of information to turn into a dramatic statement of conflict and threat.
So far, however, the Obama Administration has put out a relatively muted statement of "disappointment" in Iran over its failure to co-operate fully with the IAEA inspectors. That indicates the US Government is putting more emphasis on the possible resumption of talks with Tehran via the 5+1 Powers rather on a public conflict with Iran.
Sources inside Iran have provided new information about the recent political manoeuvres of former President Hashemi Rafsanjani, dramatically altering our assessment of his relationship with the Supreme Leader and others in the Iranian system.
Our reading over the last month has been that Rafsanjani has aligned himself with Ayatollah Khamenei, giving himself both some leverage against the President and protection against attacks from his foes within the establishment.
Publicly this has been displayed by Rafsanjani's support for the Supreme Leader's message of "unity": the former President joined the Qods Day march last Friday to chants of loyalty to Khamenei and praise for Hashemi. Rafsanjani has also devoted his recent statements, for example as head of the Expediency Council, to strident denunciation of the US and the "West" rather than comments on the internal situation.
Specifically, we thought that a key element of the alignment with Khamenei came through action on the post-election abuses. Last month Rafsanjani personally brought the case files of prisoners who had been mistreated to the Supreme Leader, and he insisted on hand-delivering a letter about the systematic abuse of Hamzeh Karami --- his long-time secretary, managing editor of the Jomhouriat website, and senior official at Islamic Azad University --- to Khamenei.
Days later, Iran's judiciary suspended three officials from their posts for connections with the post-election abuses and killings at Kahrizak Prison. One of those officials was Saeed Mortazavi, Tehran Prosecutor General in 2009 and now an aide to the President. Mortazavi had been a primary target for conservatives who were unhappy with Ahmadinejad's handling of the post-election crisis, so we took the move as a sign that the Supreme Leader was listening to their complaints
Our sources, however, bring us a far different narrative, one that points to serious disputes all the way to the top of the Iranian system.
When Rafsanjani brought the Karami letter to Khamenei, he told the Supreme Leader, "I come here by myself because I am sure your office does not care" about the detainees. Khamenei did not take the bait, however. He refused to look at the letter in front of Hashemi, saying he would read it later.
That in itself would seem a minor rebuff, given the broader public signals that followed. It is what happened next that raises eyebrows.
Rafsanjani took his disappointment to a private gathering of officials of his Kargozaran (Executives of Construction) party. His declaration was clear, "I will not bear this situation. I will begin my opposition against everybody."
It is possible, of course, that Rafsanjani was still caught up in the heat of anger, but given his lengthy political experience and his pragmatic approach, it is very unlikely that he spoke from impulse. (Sources support this.)
What may be more important is the question of whether the former President can do anything. One of our top EA correspondents has evaluated, going back to last Qods Day, that Rafsanjani's power within the system is diminished and that he can do little to confront Ahmadinejad.
Another EA correspondent, however, thinks Rafsanjani still has key bases for action. He is head of both the Assembly of Experts and the Expediency Council. For now, he has fended off the President's effort to wrest away control of the Islamic Azad University, Iran's largest, which is still a Rafsanjani stronghold. And this correspondent thinks that Rafsanjani still has an appeal for the Iranian people, who are looking for a way out of the political quagmire and economic stagnation.
We shall see if Rafsanjani makes a move and how much he and his allies can do. Meanwhile, the episode may say just as much about Ayatollah Khamenei.
Rafsanjani's wider message when he took the Karami letter to the Supreme Leader was clear: read it and put Ahmadinejad behind you. Khamenei would not go that far.
And that is indicative of the Supreme Leader's recent manoeuvres (and indeed those going back to the dispute over the Ahmadinejad Cabinet and control of ministries last summer) with his troublesome President. Khamenei will issue public rebukes, as he just did over Ahmadinejad's appointment of special envoys for foreign policy.
However, those rebukes do not necessarily keep the President in check. Last summer Ahmadinejad, forced by the Supreme Leader to withdraw the appointment of his close ally Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai as 1st Vice President, soon brought Rahim-Mashai back into his office as Chief of Staff. And the special envoys have not disappeared yet, despite the anger of the Foreign Ministry.
More on this --- much more --- later this week....
Wednesday, September 8, 2010 at 12:21 
UPDATE 1410 GMT: President Ahmadinejad has said, "Mr. Mottaki will continue his work…and he attended the cabinet meeting today."
